Source: The Phenomenology of Mind, trans. J. B. Baillie, 2 vols. (London: Swan Sonnenschein; New York: Macmillan, 1910), via the Internet Archive (Cornell University Library scans cu31924097557171, vol. I, and cu31924091023832, vol. II). Source URL: https://archive.org/details/cu31924097557171 and https://archive.org/details/cu31924091023832 Translator: J. B. Baillie (1910 first edition). The 1931 revised Allen & Unwin edition is not used and is not in the U.S. public domain in 2026. Public domain basis: Public-domain translation published 1910. OCR text; series catalogue, contents tables, and printer's imprint omitted. TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION THE work here translated and offered to the English philosophical reader has long been recognised as an unique product of Teutonic genius, and as, on the whole, perhaps the most remarkable treatise in the history of modern philosophy. Alike in its style of thinking, its manner of expression, the comprehensiveness of its survey, and the wealth of its material, it can hardly be said to have a parallel. Tracts of experience, which have each formed from time to time the subject of separate discussion, and have engaged the undivided interest of different thinkers, are here treated as but fragments of a single system. Movements of human history which have marked epochs in the development of the human race are looked upon as but typical or prominent embodiments of principles at work in the spirit of man, and are discussed in shadowy, schematic form, through which the historical reality referred to is only dimly visible. Acknowledged truths of science are stripped of their apparent seif-containedness and independence, and are reduced to phases of the necessary movement of human intelligence. The supreme importance assigned by mankind to religion is not allowed to obscure the fact that reUgion is but one act in the drama of spiritual existence. Even to the work of philosophy there is assigned but a relative, though necessary, place. Man in his lifetime must needs play many parts, and one of vi Translator's Introduction these is to be a philosopher ; and all philosophies are here regarded as but phases of a single mood. The imposing array of philosophical positions, constituting the History of Philosophy, are abbreviated into central principles, which together evolve a single comprehensive truth controlling the minds of the individual philosophers, though all unknown to themselves. So exhaustive an analysis of the life-history of the human spirit, so sustained an effort to reduce its complex and involved harmonies to their simple, elemental, leading motives, and to express these controlhng ideas in an orderly, connected system, has certainly never been compressed within the compass of a single treatise. The courage which made such an effort possible was, no doubt, in large measure due to the state of the intellectual atmosphere at the time when the book was written, an atmosphere surcharged with grand and grandiose ideas, which were capable of stimulating and sustaining philosophical enthusiasm, or of exciting and intoxicating speculative ambition. Inspired by the promise and potency of the Kantian philosophy, Kant's immediate successors made bold to set sail on speculative seas unknown, with a fraction of their master's scientific knowledge and none of his philosophical prudence. Influenced as Hegel undoubtedly was by the confident daring of these earlier intellectual adventurers, it was not long before a mind so concrete as his, and with so reverent a regard for scientific truth and practical fact, saw the necessity for chaining speculative imagination to the solid ground of tried and verifiable experience. It might be possible to dispense with " things in themselves," but it was not possible to dispense with "things," if the new philosophy was to make any claim to be a con- Translator's Introduction vii nected system of ideas, appealing to and satisfying the common reason of mankind. The wealth of familiar and accessible truth in science, history, and ordinary experience, must be at our disposal before philosophy can take with assurance the high road of comprehensive, systematic knowledge. The constant, if cryptic, reference throughout the whole of the following treatise to facts of nature, human nature, and human history, amply testifies at any rate to the seriousness with which Hegel endeavloured to meet this demand of all true philosophy. In this sense, the work before us is in large measure a reaction against the soaring insubstantiality, the ingenious manipulation of principles in abstracto, and the wearisome, unmethodical constructions of the works which intervened between the Kantian analysis of experience and the appearance of the Phenomenology in 1807. It is, therefore, small surprise that, though the appearance of the book was hailed with great expectation, the work was received with coldness and dissatisfaction by those who had, up to this point, been HegeFs teachers and friends. But while an enormous wealth of representative material lies behind the treatise, partly illuminating the argument, partly determining the course of its development, it need not be supposed that the author could possibly lay claim to omniscience. From first to last it is apparent that the author was limited by the information available at his time, by the scientific views prevalent during his day, and by his own selective interest in the material presented before him. Only in one department was his knowledge sufficiently adequate to reduce this limitation to a neghgible characteristic. This was the department of History, and more especially the History viii Translator's Introduction of Philosophy.* But here, it may well be said, the material was regarded as primarily representative, and typical of movements of the human spirit, so that errors of fact or of delail are, for the purpose of this treatise!, insignificant. Even so, his selection of such materia' is governed both by his interest in the problem oi the Phenomenology, and also by the intellectual attitudt;; and bias of his time. A selection under such conditions imposes restrictions on the character of the argument of the treatise. Such limitations as those indicated ard doubtless inevitable, and they help us to explain many ot the more singular peculiarities, or even obvious defects, of the work. Subjects are treated in the book with a fullness, and even diffuseness of analysis, which must now seem utterly out of proportion to the value of what is discussed. For example, Hegel devotes much labour to demonstrating the hollow pretentiousness of the pseudo-sciences of " Phrenology " and " Physiognomy,"! and endeavours to bring to light the truth which they had misconstrued, f The explanation is that in his day these twin scientific impostures had great success, and won much favour from learned and unlearned alike. The scientific function of " Observation/' again, is dealt with at an inordinate length, doubtless because of the success which attended the scientific investigation of nature towards the end of the eighteenth century. I So, too, the constantly recurring reference to states of spiritual fife which were familiar features of the Romantic movement, is only to be ex- * In 1805 he lectured at Jena on the History of Philosopliy ; and the lectures then delivered are substantially the same as those which were afterwards published in his collected works. t 'ITiis truth finds ample recognition not merely in ordinary experience but in the recent work of scientific investigators such as Lomhroso. J Vide -p. 221. Translator's Introditction ix plained by the outstanding historical importance of this movement at the time the book was written. But the omissions from the treatise are as remarkable as the exaggerated attention devoted to some aspects of experience relatively to others. In a work ostensibly dealing with the whole range of human experience, it seems surprising to find no specific discussion of our knowledge of space or of number, or of the sphere of lact dealt with by chemistry ; or again, to take another domain of experience remote from these, there is no mention at all of important fine arts, like music or painting. Such omissions are all the more striking when we bear in mind Hegel's keen appreciation of the value of both pure science and fine art, and when we remember that, in his later works, a full and elaborate treatment is given to the subjects just mentioned. It is not enough to plead in excuse that he is deahng in this work with the main types of experience, and that what is not expHcitly discussed is imphed in the analyses of the types selected ; for it seems obvious that the kinds of knowledge and of art above referred to play a unique part in experience, and are not simply specific forms of more general types of experience. Looking at the plan of the treatise as a whole and the method of treatment assigned to the forms of experience brought under review, an impartial critic is bound to admit that the scheme of the work is unbalanced and out of proportion. The discussion of some parts is foreshortened ; in other cases, subjects are treated with an elaborateness of detail in which the main idea is overborne by the sheer mass of the material used to elucidate it. At times, indeed, the writer seems to have become so absorbed with the particular subject X Translator's Introduction in hand, that for the time being he seems to have lost, sight of the ^^lan and purpose of the argmnent of the whole treatise. In such cases, the author's description of his work as his " voyage of discovery " has a literalness of application which is more accurate than complimentary to the author. For the business of a writer is to determine the chart of his argument before he sets out on his literary expedition, and not to draw it afterwards in order to discover what coasts of truth he has visited. Hegel himself felt that in many parts, the argument had been overweighted,* and expressed the hope, in a letter to his friend Niethammer, that he might be able, in a second edition, to ' unload some of the ballast, and get the ship to float more easily.'! The last part of the work is especially unsatisfactory. To the discussion of " Religion " and " Absolute Knowledge," one would naturally have expected the author to have devoted the greatest care and the best of his energies. For it was one of the main objects of his task to explain and justify the place of Philosophical Knowledge in the plan of human experience. Yet the analysis of "Religion" is condensed, fragmentary, and inadequate to the theme ; while the statement of " Absolute Knowledge " is brief and eUiptical to' the verge of obscurity. This is disappointing, more particularly after the long and carefully-wrought argument dealing with the sphere of moral and social experience which immediately precedes the section on Rehgion. The defect certainly demands some explanation, and this is to be found in the circum- * Briefe, I, p. 80. See also the letter to Schelling, Briefe, \, p. 102. + It was a quarter of a century before the wish had the prospect' of being fulfilled, and then, unfortunately, the author died before he had ' revised many pages. Translator's Introduction xi stances under which this last part of the treatise was written. In a letter to Schelling, in which Hegel promises to send him a copy of the book,* Hegel asks indulgence for the unsatisfactory character of the last parts of the work, and says, as if by way of explanation, that the " composition of the book was concluded at midnight before the battle of Jena." This sounds a Uttle hollow and melodramatic. For one naturally asks what the roar of Napoleon's cannon had to do with the philosophical delineation of the Absolute. The Absolute, as well as his expositor, could surely afford to wait till the smoke of such temporalities had cleared. In any case, " on the night before the battle " there could have been no serious cannonade to disturb Hegel's meditations. In point of fact, the Prussian General himself did not expect Napoleon to attack on the 14th of October (the day of the battle) ; and it is extremely unlikely that Hegel could have been so certain of Napoleon's plans as to feel constrained to hurry on the completion of his book in case of eventuahties. No doubt, after the battle, kfiffairs in Jena were uncomfortable, and sufficiently funcertain to induce Hegel to carry about in his pocket the MS. finished on the night of the 13th, and to defer till the 20th, when things had quieted down, the despatch of his MS. to Bamberg. The real explanation was much more commonplace. Hegel had made an unfortunate arrangement with his publisher. Instead of waiting till the MS. of the work was actually finished before sending it to the publisher, Hegel arranged to let the publisher have it in instalments. The publisher was to pay so much a sheet, the * Briefe, I, p. 102. xii Translator's Introduction first payment to be made when half the entire MS. was: in his hands. Printing began in February, 1806. Any pubhsher could easily make sure of getting the best of. such a bargain ; in this case the publisher was printer, publisher, and bookseller all in one — a singularly dangerous person for an impecunious man of letters to deal with. When Hegel had sent what he took to be half the MS. of the book, and demanded payment accordingly, the publisher declared himself unable to feel satisfied that this really was half the MS. Payment was therefore refused, and further, the edition of one thousand copies, originally agreed upon, was altered now to one of seven hundred and fifty, with a corresponding diminution of payment to the author. Hegel, being much in need of the money, appealed in despair to his friend Niethammer, then living in Bamberg (the place of publication), and asked his good offices to urge the publisher to forward the money. The publisher was; obdurate. Finally, Niethammer made a new contract with the pubhsher, whereby Niethammer agreed to pay the pubhsher so much should Hegel fail to senc the last of the MS. by the 18th October, 1806. This new^ contract was made on 29th September. By great effort,! ■ Hegel managed to send off large instalments on the 8th' and on 10th of October, promising faithfully to send the last remaining instalment by the 13th. Meantime, Napoleon appeared on the scene, and hostilities with Prussia were definitely declared from Bamberg on the 7th October. The proximity of this " Weltseele " on horseback added to Hegel's anxieties and difficulties ;• for there could be no certainty that postal arrangementsi would be efficiently carried out and the MS. safely^ reach its destination, either in due time or at all. Hegel | Translator's Introduction xiii was in agony, for the loss of time would be serious to his friend, and the loss of the MS. irreparable to himself. It was in these circumstances that the last part of the Phenomenology was composed. With his mental energies strained to keep pace with the flight of time, his personal honour at stake, with the roll of war in his ears, and a pitiless publisher master of his financial resources — even Hegel could hardly be expected to be in the appropriate frame of mind necessary to compose the dialectic hymn of Absolute Knowledge. There is thus some excuse, and at any rate sufficient explanation, for the curtailed analysis, the hurried argument, the condensed utterance, which characterise these last stages of the work. But the result, as it now appears, must be taken as it stands. Valuable as it is, it is not a fully elaborated development of one of the richest and most important parts of the whole range of experience : it is not an ample and measured survey of the domain of the Absolute ; it is speculative steeplechasing. But these defects, avoidable and unavoidable, to which reference has been made, do not seriously impair the monumental greatness of the work. No man can escape from the limitations of his own individuality, any more than he can avoid the restrictions imposed upon him by the circumstances of his time. The very attempt to rise above them requires their assistance to support the effort. We cannot, therefore, expect that the work before us, which, as we shall see, is so closely concerned with history, should be unaffected by the conditions imder which historical phenomena exist. The translator has endeavoured throughout the book to indicate the train of thought connecting the successive xiv Translator's Introduction stages in the analysis. It will suffice here to indicate the general character and purpose of the work, and to draw out the main thread.* In general terms, the Phenomenology of Mind is a comprehensive and systematic survey of the ways in which experience appears. This explains the meaning of the term " phenomenology " — a term employed by Lambert in his work, The New Organon (1764), and later by Kant, who uses the word to cover the metaphysical interpretation of the idea of motion, which forms the concluding section of his Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (1786). The survey seeks to accom- ' plish a threefold result : (1) to shew that the various ■ forms of experience constitute a continuous and con- J nected series of stages of mind, that the life of mind as ■ a whole is thus a single continuous movement : (2) to ; vindicate for each typical form of experience a necessary i place in the plan of the whole : (3) to prove that : the self-comprehension of Spirit, " Absolute Knowled<^e," is the necessary demand, the inevitable outcome, and the final consummation of the entire process of experience. These three aspects of the argument essentially involve one another. Without some single principle present throughout the series of forms, they could not be connected together ; Spirit is this principle : without some single end dominating the movement from first to last the movement could not be continuous ; " Absolute Knowledge " is this end. Unless each stage had a definite positive value of its own, no connection could be established between them ; the moments of * Tlie history of Hegel's development up to the time of the appearance of the Phciiomenologij (1 807) need not be repeated here. Information on this point will he found in a volume bv the translator on the Origin of llegd's Logic {VMl). Translator's Introduction xv experience would be illusory, and experience as a whole rtieaningless ; a series of negations would not even be a series, and certainly could not give us a system of truth. The source of this positive significance of each step is again " Absolute Knowledge." And, finally unless " Absolute Knowledge " were the outcome of the whole process, either there would be no Absolute at all, and the process would be endless, and so uninteUigible, or else the Absolute would simply appear as " shot out of a pistol," and hence would be itself unintelligible ; the process of experience is as necessary to the meaning Cj)f the Absolute, as the Absolute is necessary to give ijneaning to the process. ! There seems no reason to doubt that all three aspects of the result were present in the author's mind before he proceeded to work out the argument of the treatise. This seems obvious in itself, and a perusal of his " Introduction " conclusively shows this to have been the case. The ways in which he varies the description of the character of the treatise, arise from laying emphasis on one or other of the features of the argument. The t(3rm " phenomenology of mind " has in view the fact that we are here deahng with the procession of the modes of mind, and the forms in which its experience appears. The term " Science of the Experience of Consciousness," by which he described it on the title page of the first edition (a designation omitted, apparently, by Hegel and his editors in the subsequent edition), lays stress on the second aspect above noted — the constructive interpretation of the positive value of each phase of experience. " The development of Science," or again, the " development of the natural consciousness up to the level of science," by which he designates xvi Translator's Introduction \ the work, refers to the relation of the movement of experience to its final outcome and end — a relation iix virtue of which he also speaks of the work as a " firs'o part " of a " System of Science," and as an " introl duction " to Speculative Science in general. I To interpret experience in the manner above indicated, it is necessary to find at the outset a conception of experience which will apply both to experience as a whole and to every form in which experience appears. The term " experience " is indefinite, and hence has been used by different thinkers for different puxposes'i. Accepting the result of Kant's analysis, Hegel regard^? experience as constituted by an interrelation of subjecfc and object. The interrelation takes the form of conscious awareness of an object. The moments are distinct, and the unity of these factors is simply the mental process of holding them together in a single mental situation and distinguishing them from each other within that state. The moments are inseparable, and have neither existence nor significance except in conscious relation to each other. Till the distinction arises there is no experience, after it disappears there is equally no experience. Kant held that the relation disappeared if a particular kind of object (a sense-object) disappeared or could not be produced. From this followed his view of things per se, " apart from experience," and of " ideas of reason " beyond the bounds of experience. Both notions are connected together. Accepting, contemporary criticism of Kant, Hegel rejected both notions, and hence rejected Kant's restriction of 'experience' to sense-phenomena. The subject-object relation was still maintained as the essential nature of experience, but whereas, in virtue of the above restric- Translator's Introduction xvii tion, Kant admitted a subject-object relation to hold where there was no experience (e.g. in the sphere of 'I reason "), Hegel extended the term ' experience ' to each and every consciouf relation of subject and object. In this way Hegel was in closer touch with fact and common usage, and carried to its legitimate conclusion the fuuitful principle established by Kant. This extension of Kant's principle both removed its limitations and deepened its meaning. What Kant meant by insisting that sense-objects were necessary for experience, was that in all experience there must be a given or immediate element. But Kant identified the given, or immediate, with sense-objects. Here, no doubt, givermess seems very prominent and very obvious. This givenness, which is so obvious a feature of sense-facts, is, however,largely due to the striking mental contrast between ' thought ' and ' sense.' In truth, the immediate is found in many other forms besides that of sensibility ; and, on Kant's own showing, even the givenness of sense involves an operation of the subject before emtering ' experience.' Kant confounded the ' immediacy ' which is essential to the relation of subject and object with a particular kind of immediacy found in a particular kind of relation of subject to object, viz. sense-experience, or consciousness of sense-objects. In other words, he identified a formal character of all experience with the peculiar content of one kind of experience. Hegel saw that the very nature of the conscious relation of subject and object implied that subject and object were in all cases immediately related to one another. But this is only the first step in the relationship, the formal condition of there being any relationship at xviii Translator's Introduction all. The relation is not static ; it is a process or conscious movement, in the constitution of which the two terms are distinct and distinguishable factors, the movcf ment being simply the process of uniting the two in a single and complete mental situation. This process, as contrasted with immediacy, is described as the condition of ' mediation.' It is as essential to the total state a« immediacy, and in the nature of the case is absolutely inseparable from immediacy. Kant had been at pains to estabhsh the necessity of such a mediating process in the constitution of experience ; but had again interpreted this in a one-sided way. For Kant, the mediation was introduced in the form of an intellectual operation, manipulating the ' material of sense,' which somehow the mind appropriated externally.. Just as there was one kind of immediacy — that of "sense," — so there was only one kind of mediation — that of " understanding.'" The error in the interpretation of the former has it^; counterpart in the interpretation of the latter. The; correction of the error takes the same line in both cases.; Sense-immediacy is only one way in which immediacy appears in the general relation of subject and object ; intellectual mediation through ' understanding ' is but one of the many ways in which the mediation of subject through object and object through subject takes place.. There are, in short, as many forms of mediation as there: are forms of immediacy, for both are required and found; in every possible relation of subject and object. But the transformation of Kant's result is not yet| complete; another step is required, equally necessary^ and equally important. Immediacy and mediation are formal conditions of every possible relation of subject and object ; but the form is inseparable from, and in Translator's Introduction XIX every case relative to, content. This principle, the full significance of which Hegel seems to have found through the study of Aristotle, was indirectly confirmed by the very confusions and ambiguities which characterised Kant's attempt to keep them apart in his three Critiques. The concrete embodiment of the principle was typically represented first of all in the fact of a living organism, and more clearly still in the actual process of the moral life of man. The reality of the principle in those spheres indicated to Hegel, as to Aristotle, how the principle was to be interpreted in other spheres. Kant's doctrine of the " primacy of the practical reason " now received a new and supremely important meaning. The moral life provided the clue to the solution of the relation of matter and form in experience as a whole, and in experience of every kind. For there the essential union of man's rational activity with nature was the very condition of the experience ; and yet the form and the matter of the experience were, as Kant had held, distinct. If, as Kant maintained, the reason at work in moral experience was one and the same with the reason which operated in Knowledge, then the reason, which was practically, i.e. actually, established as an operative principle of unity of subject and object in morality, must be equally the operative principle of unity of subject and object in Knowledge. If, as Hegel interpreted the position, self-conscious reason (or Spirit) actually controlled and permeated the entire range of its material (Nature) in the moral hfe, where the separation of subject and object was greatest, and the union of the two the very purpose of their relation, then in this experience we have at once a supreme manifestation of the principle of the unity of form and XX Translator's Introduction content, and a key to interpret all other ways in which that unity may appear in experience.* Thus, then, we get the fundamental features of experience with which the Phenomenology starts. Experience, wherever found, is constituted by (1) subject and object, (2) in immediate conscious relation, (3) mediating that relation in a process of reciprocal involution, the one with the other, (4) within the limits, and under the control, of an underlying unity or universal, which (5) is implicitly or explicitly determined bj self-conscious reason or Spirit. We next ask, how are the forms of experience to be found ? Whose experience is under consideration ? What determines the selection of the types to be considered ? The answer lies in the nature of system which the treatise seeks to furnish. The system of experience has a logical and an historical aspect. On the one hand it seeks to be a coherently ordered body of truth : as such, it must work with universals, for the coherence which every scientific system requires can only be obtataed by connecting universals. On the other hand, its facts are the manifestations in time of the content and processes of conscious individual experience : as such, they are historical phenomena, for history is precisely the co-existence and succession in time of the appearances of a living individuality. But it is transparent that the ' system of experience ' does not appear qua system,, for historical experience is a discontinuous disarray of events and occurrences. It is equally clear that every individual does not as a fact take on, either successively or otherwise, each and all * In this connexion the reader should examine the analysis of Spirit ill pp. 430 ff. (Vol. II.) This passage is in a sense the key to the whole work. Translator's Introduction xxi of the forms which the human spirit historically assumes. For the purposes of a system of experience we must therefore combine those two aspects in a single working conception. The science requires generality, the experience requires individuality ; the generahty of science must be individuahsed, the individuahty of experience must be generalised. The generality of science is satisfied if it is allowed to abstract a form of experience from a given historical or individual situation, and treat this form as a typical moment of experience ; the individuality of experience is satisfied if at any time, or in any individual situation, the typical form can be, has been, or is, actually realised ; both are satisfied at once if the experience considered by this system is treated as the experience of a generahsed individual. The series of forms of experience, analysed and connected in the Phenomenology, constitute the experience of such a typified individual. This working conception enables us to treat experience as a whole, and at the same time to embrace the various modes of experience as these appear discretely in history. Without it, we should either have mere history, which is inexhaustible and so cannot be a whole, or mere connection of abstract ideas, which cannot as such be experience. This typified individual is no doubt another expression for the Kantian conception of " consciousness in general " ; and in any case the idea of such an individual is directly analogous to what we find in any science which seeks to deal with hving individuahty. No physiologist supposes that what he says of the functional operations of the individual organism will be found precisely to hold of any chance individual whom he may examine at a moment's notice ; for the xxii Translator's Introduction chance individual may happen at the time to be below the level of ' normal health/ or may have had his organic functions affected by an endless variety of circumstances, prejudicial or otherwise. Yet the physiologist does not consider that these variations make a science of the functions of the organism impossible. He deals with ' averages ; ' the ' average individual ' is the basis of his science. In a similar way the generalised individual is the working basis for the construction of the ' system of experience.' Such a conception determines the principle on which the forms of experience are selected, and the manner in which historical phenomena are treated in the argument. Those selected are, in the main, the constant or recurrent forms of experience. We do not find every possible form of experience discussed, but only such forms as serve the main idea of the discussion. Idiosyncrasy and eccentricity are no doubt of interest in human experience, but they have a significance for purposes of biography or autobiography ; they are off the main track of common experience, and do not play a necessary part in the development of the essential substance of the human spirit. Nor do we find all the forms of experience that might have been expected to have a place in the general plan of experience. This restriction in the selection of the forms of experience is largely accounted for by the hmitations under which the author worked.* Again, historical phenomena are throughout the argument invariably treated as individual instances of a type of experience, not as mere historical fact. This accounts for one of the most perplexing difficulties in following the discussion at certain points. Concrete * V. ante, p. vii. fF. Translator's Introduction xxiii historical facts are before the mind of the author, inspiring and suggesting the course of his analysis ; but hardly a single hint is given of the particular facts in question. It would seem as if history were treated as a mere illustrative footnote to a typical movement of experience, instead of being, as it is, the substance of the movement analysed. The particular time at which the historical facts appeared is a matter of indifference to the type of experience ; still more so the thousand and one details which fitted them into one historical epoch as distinct from another. Hence, at some stages of the argument, currents of history similar or identical in general character, but far removed in point of time, may operate simultaneously in determining the nature of the discussion, and elements may be drawn, now from one, and now from another, regardless of historicity. The reason, and the justification, for such procedure is that while history may not repeat itself, types of experience do, as we see, e.g., from the simple facts of language, custom, and tradition. And, indeed, it may be said that only when a form of experience has been repeatedly insc]?ibed upon time's pahmpsest so as to produce a composite impression, are we in a position to regard it as a type, and thus an essential factor in the unfolding of the complete meaning of human experience. That type and historical fact should thus be indissolubly blended in the argument of the Phenomenology is a necessary characteristic and condition of such a system of experience. Whether the author has successfully interW(5ven the two in his analysis may well be questioned. It may be said that sometimes he mistakes a side-track for the high road, sometimes takes an incident for a t^^pe, sometimes takes aspects of a type for the whole xxiv Translator's Introduction type, sometimes repeats types at different stages of the development of the whole. But at any rate there need be no doubt regarding his intention and aim. The last general question of importance concerns the nature of the method of constructing such a system. This is determined by what has been already said. The method, in a word, is that of development. There was nothing novel in such a method. It had been used with success by Aristotle, and in modern, philosophy by Leibniz. The application of it for the construction of a system of experience had been suggested, and even attempted, by Schelling in his Transcendentl^il Idealism (1800), where he sought to exhibit all ' parts of philosophy in a continuous succession of stages ' ,,or ' epochs ' in the ' history of self-consciousness.'* Wh.at was new in Hegel's use of the method was due to the clearness of his conception of what he meant by development, and the rigorous, inflexible persistence with which he sought to work it out. In his view, the principle of the method is involved in the very nature of every type of experience, as well as in the whole of experience. For the method is neither more nor less than the operation of the form of experience itself ; and the form 'of experience, as we have seen, is inseparable from the content. Indeed, it may be said, the presence of the method is a test of whether or not any apparent case of experience is or is not typical and worthy of consideration. The general character of the method is that of the unification of opposites by a process which reveals their inherent necessity to one another in virtue of their participation in a common principle, and conversely. The specific procedure of the method is that of (1 ) starting * V. Preface and conclusion to Trunscendentaler Idealismus. Translator's Introduction xxv from the prima facie or " immediate " relation of the terms opposed as subject and object, (2) showing how they mutually involve and determine or " mediate " one another, and thereby (3) evolving the inner unity of principle which both estabhshes and contains their im|mediate relation, and makes possible and necessary thifeir mediation. This procedure is one and the same in I its operation in every type of experience and in ! experience as a whole ; for one and the same prijiciple controls and pervades all experience (viz. sel'f-conscious reason or Spirit), and the various types of exiperience are to the whole of experience as the factors in' a given experience (subject and object) are to the type in question. The same method thus spontaneously determines the various chief divisions of the whole argument, and the particular stages in the evolution of the meaning of a given type of experience. The author fully explains in his '' Preface " and '' Introduction" the significance of the various phases of the method, and his statements need not be repeated here. Enough has been said to indicate the general nature of the method as apphed throughout. But while the system is constructed dehberately by thi« method, it need not be supposed that the successful use of the method was an unique and mysterious secret of the author of the treatise, who carried out his scheme in the private laboratory of his own mind, without suggestion or assistance from any other source whatsoever. As a matter of fact, the author's claim is that his own particular inspiration is quite unnecessary, and is even irrelevant : and so far from dispensing with assistance in the construction of the argument, he maintains that this method really operates, though xxvi Translator's Introduction unconsciously, in all muids and in all experience. And there can be no doubt that in the working out of the method the author was guided to a very large extelnt by results achieved by others, and by facts and sifggestions drawn from familiar sources. For one thiijig, it is clear that before commencing his argument he must have had as definite an idea of where his argument was to terminate as of the stage of experience fr(;)m which to begin. And it is not difficult to trace the profound influence of Greek thought in determin;[ng the analysis of both the beginning and the conclusijon of his system of experience. The discussion of " senbecertainty " in the first stage of the Plienomenology seems little more than a fresh restatement of the analysis and criticism of the nature of aladtjo-i?, foiind in Greek philosophy, especially in Plato and Aristotle.* The conception of "Absolute Knowledge" with wliich the Phenomenology concludes is a reproduction of Aristotle's interpretation of pure thought. " Pure thought thinks that which is the most divine and most precious, and it does not change. . . . Since it is the most excellent thing, it thinli;s itself, and its thinking is the thinking on thitiking. ... In productive activity, apart fi'om the matter, the substance or formal essence is the object, and in theoretical activity the object is the concept or function of thinking. Therefore thought and the object of thought, not being different in the cases where there is no matter, will be the same, and thinking will be one with the object of thought. ... As human thought holds in a certain period of time ... so the divine * This has been well brought out by Purpus in his pamphlet. Die Dialekiik der Sinnlichen Gewissheit bei Hegel, NQrnberg, 1905. Translator's Introduction, xxvii tliought, the thought which thinks itself, holds throughout all eternity." * Again, the order in which the various forms of experience are placed between the upper and lower Limits of experience was also suggested, to a large extent, by the mental development of the individual, and the historical development of mankind. This was inevitable, for the very nature of experience, as we have seen, involves process in time, and this occurs in a definite oi'der. If that order coincides with the necessary order re.quired by a logically constructed system, the coincidence may be a chance, but it facilitates and gives vividness to the analysis. Moreover, it is of the essence of the argument to look upon historical process, whether in the individual unit, or in the larger area of spiritual life found in society, as the condition by which the particular and universal elements of experience become concretely identified and harmonised. Thus, e.g., the " psychological " process of mental development provides the suggestion for the ' dialectical ' process of m'nd from sense-knowledge to perception, or again, from consciousness to self-consciousness ; the historical evolution of Greek and Roman society suggests the " dialectical " transition from the custom-constituted to the law-constituted order of society; the historical connexion between the individualism of the eighteenth century and the ethical philosophy of Kant and Fichte suggests the " dialectical " connexion between the atomistic freedom of a revolutionary epoch and the inner freedom of conscience. Such, then, is the principle and method of this Philosophy of Experience. When systematically developed, * Metaphysics, 1074i, 15-1 075a, 10. xxviii Translator's Introduction every essential mode of experience must find its due position and validity guaranteed ; for the guarantee of the value of every form is the ultimate transparent unity of subject and object in Absolute Knowledge, and every essential form is required as a stage in the realisation of this spiritual idea. The only truth about the whole of esperience is thus the comprehensive system of all the forms in which truth is attained throughout experience. Every essential form makes it own peculiar contribution; and none can be absolutely false, for an absolutely false relation of subject and object is either meaningless or a contradiction in terms. i We may describe this system as a " critique of experience," but only in the sense that such a criticism is the self-criticism of experience ; for beyond experience we cannot possibly find anything, still less a standard to criticise experience. We cannot arbitrarily break up experience into separate parts, and elaborate independently a "critique of knowledge," a "critique of morahty," and a "critique of beauty"; for all these are but forms of one experience : experience is tjhe common denominator of all, and must be construed as a whole. In short, a true critique of experience can only be a connected system of the whole of experience. It is manifest that such a system is no more than an orderly arrangement of the ways in which experience appears. It does not expound all the truth that the various modes of experience themselves contain. Each mode forms a nucleus of a sphere of truth all its own, the elaboration of which is a separate undertaking by itself. The substance of the truth which each contains is only relevant to the argument, and is only introduced, \ Translator's Introduction xxix so far as is necessary to bring out the peculiar nature of the kind of experience each mode embodies. Again, the Phenomenology is distinct from empirical psychology on the one hand, and the concrete Ufe of individual experience on the other. The growth in mental life of the distinction between subject and object is presupposed before experience can be said to exist, a;ad the growth of that distinction in time it is part of the work of psychology to trace. On the other hand, relatively to the living agent in concrete experience, the phenomenological observer is like the historian or the dramatist who perceives and understands the play of the forces controlling the living agent, and traces the connexion of the moving principles that operate unseen, and certainly unforeseen, in the production of the result. It is equally clear from what has been said that the Phenomenology is not a complete system of philosophy. It is at most a part, and, as the author insisted, the introductory part to a comprehensive philosophical system. The exhaustive elaboration of " Absolute Knowledge " would alone be a complete system of philosophy. All that is done in the Phenomenology towards such a system is to show that " Absolute Knowledge " as a mode of spiritual life has its roots in experience, and is the consummation and final cause of the whole process of experience. The author endeavoured in his other works to construct the entire system of " Absolute Knowledge," but the success or incompleteness of this achievement does not affect the value of the argument of the Phenomenology, which justifies the standpoint of " Absolute Knowledge." * * On the relation of the Phenomevology to Hegel's other works, the reiader may consult the Origin of Hegel's Logic, above mentioned, p. xiv. note XXX Translator's Introduction But, though the Phenomenology is not a complete system of philosophical knowledge, it is itself a philosophical systematisation of the modes of experience. For only a philosophical argument could justify the validity of the philosophical point of view ; and th..s Hegel does by showing that every mode of experience in the long run derives its vahdity as an avenue to truth from the fact that it implies the essential principle of philosophical knowledge. The argument of the Phenomenology is undertaken to prove that the interes fcs of all forms of knowledge are bound up with the validity of philosophical knowledge. The Phenotnenology enables us to determine the position of Absolute Truth, and the parallax of the Absolute can only be found if we take f.s our base-line the diameter of the orbit of human experience. It is not necessary here, even if it were in place, to defend the argument of the Phenomenology from possible lines of attack and criticism. Least of all need it be asserted that we have in this work the last word of philosophy regarding the nature and meaning of experience. The discussions of philosophy are not to be reduced to the level of a brawl in the market-place, and no serious philosopher ever made a merit of having the ' last word.'' But so much may be said : — if, ''n principle aim and result, the argument of this work is untenable, idealism, whether as a creed or a systeri, may be once for all abandoned — and indeed any attempt to put a spiritual interpretation upon the facts of human life. In a sense, the present work contains little that is ne\ir beyond the method by which the forms of experience are wrought into a connected system. In a manner, it Translator's introduction xxxi is but an elaborate exposition of the doctrine expressed in the well-known lines : — How exquisitely the individual Mind (And the progressive powers perhaps no less Of the whole species) to the external World Is fitted : — and how exquisitely too The external World is fitted to the Mind.* That experience must in the long run obtain its explanation and justification from itself, may be regarded as a truism. And again, that the Absolute embodies itself in all modes of experience, that it requires every form of truth to constitute the whole truth, that only in the entire extent of our human experience can we read the full meaning of the Absolute Spirit in which we live and move and have our being — these are propositions acceptable in every age, and recurring as regularly as the days of the human calendar. We might even say, in the words of the unsbphisticated child of nature, Ungefahr sagt das der Pfarrer auch, Nur mit ein bischen anderen Worten.f But the familiarity of much of the substance under discussion will not lessen the value of the argument in the eyes of those to whom a comprehensive conspectus of experience is an intellectual need. That they will find both Hght and leading in this remarkable book there can be no doubt. To these the book may be safely commended, and those whose need is greatest will find the most. 'The best edition of the text is that of Georg Lasson, Pastor of St. Bartolemaus Church in Berlin. This * \Vordswortli, Preface to the Excursion. t Faust. XXXll Translatm-'s Introduction appeared in 1907, and is a most carefully collated recension of the work. The translator was fortunate in being able to make use of this edition in the final revision of the translation, which was begun long bef^)re Lasson's edition appeared. Another competent studcint of Hegel, Professor Bolland of Leyden, also produced an edition of the work in 1907 ; but this is merely a reproduction of the second edition of 1843, beautifully printed on beautiful paper. All the footnotes accompanying the text of the translation have been appended by the translator. For sojTie of these he is indebted to the editions of Lasson and Bolland. The editions of 1807 and of 1843 (Hegel's Werke II) contain no notes. In addition to the fo(3tnotes the translator has also written short introductory paragraphs for most of the sections and sub-sections into which the work is divided. These paragraphs will be found in small type within brackets, at the beginning of the respective sections. They are intended partly to be explanatory, partly to be a guide to the argument, and partly to indicate the background of historical fact to which the analysis refers. In default of a fuller commentary,* which, it is to be hoped, vdaj some day appear, these paragraphs may be found useful to the student of the book. In translating the work there has been no attempt to do more than give a rendering of the original which * Beyond the work of Purpus, Die Dialcktik der sinnlicken GewLtsheit hei Heyel (1905), and Ziir Diakktik des Bewusstseins nach Hegel (1908), no attempt has been made to furnish a commentary on the work. Thure are some suggestive hints in the introductions of Lasson and Bolland^to their respective editions ; and the same is true of Brunstad's introduction to the Reclam edition of Hegel's Philosophic der Geschichte. Rosenkrant's Hegel (lis Deutsche.!- National Philosoph contains a valuable and interestifag chapter ; Galiler's Kritik des Beimissiscins \vill be found very useful : and Haym's Hegel und seine Zcit is still of much interest. Translator's Introduction xxxiii would be as faithful to the meaning and as close to the style of the text as was consistent with clearness and intelligibihty. There seems no doubt that the work was written with less regard than usual to literary effect, and with more regard to the logical coherence of the result than is common in works of philosophy. The appalling struggle of the author to carry out his self-imposed task of arranging the crass material of experience into an organically connected plan of necessary thought, and of satisfying his demands for philosophical system, overwhelm all other considerations whatsoever. It is impossible, as it is unfair, to expect any one who is staggering under the weight of absolute truth to move to the graceful measures of a literary minuet. He is content to get his meaning expressed in the way that comes readiest to his hand and offers the least impediment to the movement of his thought. The consequence is that the style throughout the work is severely formal, and only relieved at times by the crudest and homehest metaphors. It is no part of a translator's task to improve his author ; and when the thought of the original is clad in wincey, it is not the translator's business to drape it in satin. The translator has therefore refrained in the present case from attempting to make the reproduction more attractive from the Uterary point of view than the original. He can only hope it will not be found to be less so. In the task of revising and correcting the proofs, the translator has been placed under deep obhgations to those who have kindly assisted him with suggestions and criticisms. The whole of the proof has been read by the general editor for this series. Professor Muirhead, and by Mr. R. M. Maclver, Lecturer in Philosophy, Translator's Introduction xxxiii would be as faithful to the meaning and as close to the style of the text as was consistent with clearness and intelHgibility. There seems no doubt that the work was written with less regard than usual to literary effect, and with more regard to the logical coherence of the result than is common in works of philosophy. The appalling struggle of the author to carry out his self-imposed task of arranging the crass material of experience into an organically connected plan of necessary thought, and of satisfying his demands for philosophical system, overwhelm all other considerations whatsoever. It is impossible, as it is unfair, to expect any one who is staggering imder the weight of absolute truth to move to the graceful measures of a literary minuet. He is content to get his meaning expressed in the way that comes readiest to his hand and ofiers the least impediment to the movement of his thought. The consequence is that the style throughout the work is severely formal, and only relieved at times by the crudest and homeliest metaphors. It is no part of a translator's task to improve his author ; and when the thought of the original is clad in wincey, it is not the translator's business to drape it in satin. The translator has therefore refrained in the present case from attempting to make the reproduction more attractive from the literary point of view than the original. He can only hope it will not be found to be less so. In the task of revising and correcting the proofs, the translator has been placed under deep obhgations to those who have kindly assisted him with suggestions and criticisms. The whole of the proof has been read by the general editor for this series. Professor Muirhead, and by Mr. R. M. Maclver, Lecturer in Philosophy, Translator's Introduction xxxiii would be as faithful to the meaning and as close to the style of the text as was consistent with clearness and intelligibility. There seems no doubt that the work was written with less regard than usual to literary effect, and with more regard to the logical coherence of the result than is common in works of philosophy. The appalling struggle of the author to carry out his self-imposed task of arranging the crass material of experience into an organically connected plan of necessary thought, and of satisfying his demands for philosophical system, overwhelm all other considerations whatsoever. It is impossible, as it is unfair, to expect any one who is staggering under the weight of absolute truth to move to the graceful measures of a literary minuet. He is content to get his meaning expressed in the way that comes readiest to his hand and offers the least impediment to the movement of his thought. The consequence is that the style throughout the work is severely formal, and only reUeved at times by the crudest and homeliest metaphors. It is no part of a translator's task to improve his author ; and when the thought of the original is clad in wincey, it is not the translator's business to drape it in satin. The translator has therefore refrained in the present case from attempting to make the reproduction more attractive from the literary point of view than the original. He can only hope it will not be found to be less so. In the task of revising and correcting the proofs, the translator has been placed under deep obligations to those who have kindly assisted him with suggestions and criticisms. The whole of the proof has been read by the general editor for this series. Professor Muirhead, and by Mr. R. M. Maclver, Lecturer in Philosophy, xxxiv Translator's Introduction Aberdeen University. Georg Lasson, pastor in Berlin, has also given invaluable help with all the translation. The early part of the translation has been greatly improved by the suggestions of Professor Pringle-Pattison of Edinburgh. Whatever merit the translation of the middle portion of the work may possess is in large measure due to the careful criticism of Mr. H. H. Joachim, of Merton College, Oxford. The Eight Honble. R. B. Haldane, M.P., has read in proof a considerable part of the work, and the translator is also indebted to Miss Haldane for criticisms on one of the most difficult sections of the argument. King's College, Aberdeen, March, 1910. CONTENTS [In the following table of contents the matter within square brackets is inserted by the translator.] Volume I PAGE Translator's Introduction .... v-xxxiv PEEFACE On Scientific Knowledge in General . . 1-72 The element in which truth is found is the notion ; its true embodiment is a scientifically constructed system. The position and point of view of spiritual culture at the present time. A principle of Knowledge is not the completion of Knowledge : objections to formalism. The Absolute is Subject : the meaning of this statement. The sphere and element of systematic Knowledge : the course by which consciousness rises to this stage constitutes the Phenomenology of Mind. The transformation of figurative presentations and familiar ideas ii>to thoughts ; and these again into notions. To what extent is the Phenomenology of Miiid negative, or how far does it contain falsity? Historical and Mathematical truth. Nature of philosophical truth, and its Method : objections to schematising fornialisiti. XXXVl Contents Eequisite for the study of philosophy. The negative procedure of ratiocination : its positive procedure : its subject. Philosophising by the light of the nature : healthy common-sense : the inspiration of genius. Conclusion : the relation of the author to his public. INTEODUCTION [Intention and Method of the argument of the Phenomenology] A. CONSCIOUSNESS . I. Sense-certainty, or the this and " meaning " [1. The object of sense-certainty. 2. The subject of sense-certainty. 3. The concrete experience of sense-certainty]. II. Perception : or things and the deceptive- NESS OF PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCE [1. The notion of a " thing." 2. The contradictoruiess of the perception of "things." 3. The transition to unconditioned universality and the sphere of Understanding]. III. Force and Understanding ; Appearance and THE supersensible WORLD [1. Force and the play of forces. 2. The inner realm. (a) The supersensible world. (1) The inner ; appearance ; understanding. (2) The supersensible as an app'-arance. (3) Law as the true nature of appearance. (6) Law as distinction and sameni;ss. (1) Specific laws and genera'J law. (2) Law and force. 73-89 90-162 90-103 104-123 124-162 Contents xxxvii PAOE (3) Explanation, (c) The law of pure distinction : the inverted world. ^ 3. Infinitude]. B. SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS 163-219 IV. The true nature of self-cektainty . 163- L74 [1. Consciousness in itself. 2. Life. 3. The Ego and Desire.] A. Independence and Dependence of Self -con- sciousness : Lordship and Bondage . 175-188 [1. Duplicated self -consciousness. 2. The conflict of self-consciousness in self- opposition. 3. Lord and bondsman. (a) Lordship. (i) Fear. (c) The formative process of self-'^afranchisement]. B. Freedom of Self -consciousness : Stoicism, Scepticism, and the Unhappy Consciousness .... 189-219 [Preliminary : the stage of consciousness reached at this point : Thinking. 1. Stoicism. 2. Scepticism. 3. The unhappy consciousness : sulijective piety, (a) The changeable consciousness. (6) The form of the Unchangeable, (c) The union of the actual and self-consciousness. (1) The pure consciousness : the life of emotion : devotion. xxxvm Contents (2) The individual and actuality. The deeds of the pious consciousness. (.>) Self - coneciousness passing into Keason. Self-mortification]. C. [CONCRETE MIND] (AA). EEASON V. Certainty and Tedth of Eeason [1. Idealism. 2. Categories. 3. Empty or subjective Idealism : its Know- ledge]. A. Observation as a mode of Eeason . a. Observation of Nature [1. Observation of things of Nature] . [(«.)] Description in general, [(i)] Descriptive marks, [(c)] Lavi's. [(1) Notion and experience of law. (2) Experiment. (3) Material elements]. [2] Observation of organic existence (a) Relation of the organic to inorganic elements. (6) Organic teleology, (c) Iinier and outer. li. The inner : the general moments of the inner aspect of organic life, Sensibihty, Irritahility, and Reproduction : the laws of these moments: the relation of the inner aspect to its outer expression. /J. The inner and the outer as constituting an organic individual form. y. The outei- as at ouce inner and outer. 220-823 220-427 222-232 no o on f-7 ZOD—ZO i 236-285 236-246 247-274 Contents xxxix [3. Observation of nature, as an organic whole] . 274-285 [(a)] The idea of organisation applied to the inorganic : [specific weight, cohesion, number]. [(6)] The organisation of organic nature : genus, species, and individuality. [(c) Life as reason in contingent form] h. Observation of self-consciousness purely as self-cousciousness, and as standing in relation to external reality. Logical and Psychological laws . . . 28/ -295 [1. Laws of thought. 2. Psychological laws. 3. The law of individuality]. c. Observation of the relation of self-consciousness to its immediate actuality. Physiognomy and Phrenology . . . 298-337 [1. The physiognomic significance of organs. 2. This significance is manifold and diverse. 3. Phrenology. (a) The cranium interpreted as an external actualisation of mind. (6) Relation of cranial formation to individuality. (c) Mental disposition and actuality. Conclusion. The identity of thinghood and reason.] B. Eealisafcion of rational self-consciousness through itself .... 339-380 [1. The immediate direction of the movement of self-oonsciousness : the sphere of the Ethical Order. xl Contents 2. The converse process involved in this movement : the essential nature of Morahty] . 339-348 a. Pleasure and Necessity . . . 350-355 h. The law of the heart, and the frenzy of selfconceit .... 357-367 c. Virtue and the course of the world . 3G9-380 C. Individuality, which takes itself to be real in and for itself .... 382-427 a. Society as a herd of individuals : deception : actual fact . . . 387-409 [1. The notion of individuality as real. 2. Actual fact and individuality. 3. Mutual deception and sj)iritual substance]. h. Reason as lawgiver . . . 411—417 c. Reason as test of laws . . . 418—427 Volume II (BE). SPIRIT . 429-682 VI. Spirit ...... 430-435 A. Objective Spirit : the ethical order . 436-485 a. The ethical world : law divine and human : man and woman . . 440-458 [1. Nation and family, (a) Human la\y. (i) Divine law. (c) The claims of the individual. 2. The process involved in these two laws. (a) Government as positive power, war a3 negative. (6) The ethical relation of man and woman as brother and sister. (c) The interfusion of the two laws. Contents xli 3. The ethical world as infinitude or selfcomplete totality.] l>. Ethical action : knowledge human and Divine : guilt and Destiny . . 460-477 [1. Contradiction of individuality with its essence. 2. Opposite characteristics of ethical action. 3. Dissolution of the ethical being.] c. Legal status .... 479-485 [1. Personality. 2. Contingencj' of the person. 3. The lord of the world ; the absolute person.] B. Spirit in self-estrangement : the discipline of cultitre and civilisation . . 486-605 I. The world of spirit in self-estrangement . 493-545 a. Culture and its sphere of reality . 494-533 [(1) Culture as the estrangement of natural existence, (a) Goodness and badness : state-power and wealth. (fc) The cleavage of self-consciousness : nobility and baseness. (c) Service and advice. (2) Language as the actuality of culture. {a) Flattery. (6) The language of distraction. (c) The vanity of culture.] b. Belief and pure insight . . 534-545 [(1) The idea of belief. (2) The object of belief. (3) The rationality of pure insight,] xlii Contents II. Enlightenment . a. The struggle of enlightenment with superstition [(1) The negative attitude of insight towards belief. (2) The doctrine of enlightenment. (3) The rights of enlightenment,] J). The truth of enlightenment [(1) Pure thought and pure matter. (2) The sphere of utility. (3) Self-certainty]. III. Absolute freedom and terror [The awakening of free sul)jectivity.] C. Spirit certain of itself : Morality . a. The moral view of the world [(1) The postulated harmony of duty and reality. (2) The divine lawgiver and the imperfect moral consciousness. (3) The moral world as a presented idea.] b. Dissemblance [(1) The contradictions in the moral view of the world. (2) The resolution of morality into its opposite. (3) The truth of moral self-consciousness. c. Conscience : the " beautiful soul " : EvU and the forgiveness of it . [(1) Conscience as the freedom of the self within itself. The reality of duty : conviction. (2) The universality of conscience. (3) Evil and forgiveness.] PAHE 546-591 549-581 582-591 592-605 606-682 610-623 625-639 642-682 Contents xliii PA-OE (CC). RELIGION . . 683-799 VII. Eeligion in General . . 685-696 A. Natural Eeligion . .698-711 a. God as Light. b. Plants and animals as religious objects. c. The artificer. B. Eeligion in the form of Art . 712-758 a. The abstract work of art. [(1) The representation of the gods. (2) The hymn. (3) The cult.] b. The living work of art : the human form as embodiment of l^eaut}'. c. The spiritual work of art : art expressive of social life. [(1) Epic. (2) Tragedy. (3) Comedy.] C. Eevealed Eeligion .... 759-799 [1. The presuppositions requisite for the notion of revealed religion 2. The ultimate content of revealed religion : the reality of the incarnation of God (a) in an individual, (6) in a religious communion. 3. Development of the notion of revealed religion. The Absolute as a trinity : the Absolute as externalised in the world : the Absolute as, fulfilled in a spiritual kingdom.! xliv Contents I' AGE (DD). ABSOLUTE KNOWLEDGE . 800-823 VIIL Absolute Knowledge . . . 800-823 [L The ultimate content of the Self which knows itself as all existence. ^ 2. Systematic Science as the self-comprehension of Spirit. 3. The return of Spirit so comprehended to immediate existence.] PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND PREFACE IN the case of a philosophical work it seems not onlysuperfluous, but, in view of the nature of the subject, even inappropriate and inexpedient to begin, as writers usually do, with a preface explaining the end the author had in mind, the circumstances which gave rise to the work, and the relation in which the writer takes it to stand to other treatises on the same subject, written by his predecessors or his contemporaries. For whatever it might be smtable to state about philosophy in a preface — say, an historical sketch of the main drift and point of view, the general content and results, a string of desultory assertions and assurances about truth — this cannot be accepted as the form and manner in which to expound philosophical truth. Moreover, because philosophy has its being essentially in the element of universality, which encloses the particular within it, the end or final result seems, in the case of philosophy more than in that of other sciences, to have absolutely expressed the complete fact itself in its very nature, for which the mere process of bringing it to light would seem, properly speaking, to have no essential significance. On the other hand, in the general idea of e.g. anatomy — the knowledge of the VOL. I. — B I 2 Phenomenology of Mind parts of the body regarded as lifeless — we are quite sure we do not possess the objective concrete fact, the actual content of the science, but must, over and above, be concerned with particulars. Further, in the case of such a collection of items of knowledge, which has no real right to the name of science, any talk about purpose and such-like generalities is not commonly very different in manner from the descriptive and superficial way in which the contents of the science — these nerves and muscles, etc. — are themselves spoken of. In philosophy, on the other hand, it would at once be felt incongruous were such a method made use of and yet shown by philosophy itself to be incapable of grasping the truth. In the same way too by determining the relation which a philosophical work professes to have to other treatises on the same subject, an extraneous interest is introduced, and obscurity is thrown over the point at issue in the knowledge of the truth. The more the ordinary mind takes the opposition between true and false to be fixed, the more is it accustomed to expect either agreement or contradiction with a given philosophical system, and only to see the one or the other in any explanation about such a system. It does not conceive the diversity of philosophical systems as the progressive evolution of truth ; rather, it sees only contradiction in that variety. The bud disappears when the blossom breaks through, and we might say that the former is refuted by the latter ; in the same way when the fruit comes, the blossom may be explained to be a false form of the plant's existence, for the fruit appears as its true nature in place of the blossom. These stages are not merely differentiated ; they supplant one another as being incompatible with one another. But the ceaseless activity of their own inherent nature makes them at the same time moments of an organic unity, where they not merely do not contradict one another, but where one is as necessary as the other ; and this equal necessity of all moments constitutes from the outset the Hfe of the whole. But contradiction in the case of a philosophical system is not usually conceived in this way ; and again, the mind perceiving the contradiction does not commonly know how to reheve it or keep it free of onesidedness, or to recognise in what seems conflicting and inherently antagonistic the presence of mutually necessary moments. The demand for such explanations, as also the attempts to satisfy this demand, very easily pass for the essential business philosophy has to undertake. Where could the inmost truth of a philosophical work be found better expressed than in its purposes and results ? and in what way could these be more definitely known than through their distinction from what is produced during the same period by others working in the same field ? If, however, such procedure is to pass for more than the beginning of knowledge, if it is to pass for actually knowing what a philosophical system is, then we must, in point of fact, look on it as a device for avoiding the real business at issue, an attempt to combine the appearance of being in earnest and taking trouble about the subject with an actual neglect of the subject altogether. For the real subject-matter is not exhausted in its purpose, but in working the matter out ; nor is the mere result attained the concrete whole itself, but the result along with the process 4 Phenomenology of Mind of arriving at it. The purpose by itself is a lifeless universal, just as the general drift is a bare activity in a certain direction, which is still without its concrete realisation ; and the naked result is the corpse of the system which has left its guiding tendency behind it. Similarly, the distinctive difference of anything is rather the boundary, the limit, of the subject ; it is found at that point where the matter stops, or it is what the matter is not. To trouble oneself in this fashion with the purpose and results, or again with the differences, the positions taken up and judgments passed by one thinker and another, is therefore an easier task than perhaps it seems. For instead of laying hold of the matter itself, a procedure of that kind is all the while away from the subject altogether. Instead of dwelling within it and becoming absorbed by it, knowledge of that sort is always grasping at something else ; such knowledge, instead of keeping to the subject-matter and giving itself up to it, never gets away from itself. The easiest thing of all is to pass judgments on what has a sohd substantial content ; it is more difficult to grasp it, and most of all difficult to do both together and produce the systematic exposition of it. The beginning of culture and of the struggle to get out of the imbroken immediacy of naive psychical Hfe has always to be made by acquiring knowledge of universal principles and points of view, by striving, 'J'in the first instance, to work up simply to the thought of the subject-matter in general, not forgetting at the same time to give reasons for supporting it or refuting it, to apprehend the concrete riches and fullness contained in its various determinate qualities, and to know how to furnish a coherent, orderly account of it and , a responsible judgment upon it. This beginning of mental cultivation will, however, very soon make way for the earnestness of actual life in all its fullness, which leads to a living experience of the subject-matter itself ; and when, in addition, conceptual thought strenuously penetrates to the very depths of its meaning, such knowledge and style of judgment will be relegated to their due place in everyday thought and conversation. The systematic development of truth in scientific form can alone be the true shape in which truth exists. To help to bring philosophy nearer to the form of science — that goal where it can lay aside the name of love of knowledge and be actual knowledge — that is what I have set before me. The inner necessity that knowledge should be science Lies in its very nature ; and the adequate and sufficient reason for this is simply and solely the systematic exposition of philosophy itself. The external necessity, however, so far as this is apprehended in a universal way, and apart from the accident of the personal element and the particular occasioning influences affecting the individual, is the same as the internal : it lies in the form and shape in which the process of time presents the existence of its moments. To show that the time has come to raise philosophy to the level of scientific system would, therefore, be the only true justification of the attempts which aim at proving that philosophy must assume this character ; because the temporal process would thus bring out and lay bare the necessity of it, nay, more, would at the same time be carrying out that very aim itself. 6 Phenomenology of MmA When we state the true form of truth to be its scientific character — or, what is the same thing, when it is maintained that truth finds the medium of its existence in notions or conceptions alone — I know that this seems to contradict an idea with all its consequences which makes great pretensions and has gained widespread acceptance and conviction at the present time. A word of explanation concerning this contradiction seems, therefore, not out of place, even though at this stage it can amount to no more than a dogmatic assurance exactly like the view we are opposing. If, that is to say, truth exists merely in what, or rather exists merely as what, is called at one time intuition, at another immediate knowledge of the Absolute, religion, Being — not being in the centre of divine love, but the very Being of this centre, of the Absolute itself — from that point of view it is rather the opposite of the notional or conceptual form which would be required for systematic philosophical exposition. The Absolute would not be grasped in conceptual form, but felt, intuited ; it is not its conception, but the feeling of it and intuition of it that are to have the say and find expression. If we consider the appearance of a claim hke this in its more general setting, and look at it from the level which the self-conscious mind at present occupies, we shall find that self-consciousness has got beyond the substantial fullness of life, which it used to carry on in the element of thought — beyond this naive immediacy of belief, beyond the satisfaction and security arising from the sense of certainty which conscious life possessed regarding its reconciliation with ultimate reality wherever present, whether inner or outer. Self-cPn- scious mind has not merely passed beyond that to the opposite extreme of insubstantial reflection of self into self, but beyond this too. It has not merely lost its essential and concrete hfe, it is also conscious of this loss and of the transitory finitude characteristic of its content. Turning away from the husks it has to feed on, and confessing that it lies in wickedness and sin, it reviles itself for so doing, and now desires from philosophy not so much to bring it to a knowledge of what it is, as to obtain once again through philosophy the restoration of that comfortably solid and substantial mode of existence it has lost. Philosophy is thus expected not so much to meet this want by opening up the compact solidity of substantial existence, and bringing this to the hght and level of self-consciousness — is not so much to get chaotic conscious life brought back to the orderly ways of thought, and the simple unity of the concept, as to run together what thought has divided asunder, suppress the notion with its distinctions, and restore the feeling of existence. What it wants from philosophy is not so much insight as edification. The beautiful, the holy, the eternal, religion, love — these are the bait required to awaken the desire to bite : not the notion, but ecstasy, not the march of cold necessity in the subject-matter, but ferment and enthusiasm— these are to be the ways by which the wealth of the concrete substance is to be stored and spread out to view. With this demand there goes the strenuous effort, altnost perfervidly zealous in its activity, to rescue mankind from being sunken in what is sensuous, vulgar, and of fleeting importance, and to raise men's eyes to the stars ; as if men had quite forgotten the 8 Phenomenology of Mind divine, and were on the verge of finding satisfaction, like worms, in mud and water. Time was when man had a heaven, decked and fitted out with endless wealth of thoughts and pictures. The significance of all that is, lay in the thread of light by which it was attached to heaven ; instead of dwelhng in the present as it is here and now, the eye ghded away over the present to the Divine, away, so to say, to a present that lies beyond. The mind's gaze had to be directed under compulsion to what is earthly, and kept fixed there ; and it has needed a long time to introduce that clearness, which only celestial reahties had, into the crassness and confusion shrouding the sense of things earthly, and to make attention to the immediate present as such, which was called Experience, of interest and of value. Now we have apparently the need for the opposite of all this ; man's mind and interest are so deeply rooted in the earthly that we require a like poAver to get them raised above that level. His spirit shows such poverty of nature that it seems to long for the mere pitiful feeling of the divine in the abstract, and to get refreshment from that, like a wanderer in the desert craving for the merest mouthful of water. By the little vsrhich can thus satisfy the needs of the human spirit we can measure the extent of its loss. This easy contentment in receiving, or stinginess in giving, does not suit the character of science. The man who only seeks edification, who wants to envelop in mist the manifold diversity of his earthly existence and thought, and craves after the vague enjoyment of this vague and indeterminate Divinity — he may look where he likes to find this : he will easily find for himself the means to get something he can rave over Preface. i) and puff himself up with. But philosophy must beware of the wish to be edifying. ' Still less must this kind of contentment, which holds sfcience in contempt, take upon itself to claim that raving obscurantism of this sort is something higher than science. These apocalyptic utterances pretend to occupy the very centre and the deepest depths ; they look askance at all definiteness and preciseness {opo<;) of meaning ; and they deliberately hold back from conceptual thinking and the constraining necessities of thought, as being the sort of reflection which, they say, can only feel at home in the sphere of finitude. But just as there is a breadth which is emptiness, there is a depth which is empty too : as we may have an extension of substance which overflows into finite multiplicity without the power of keeping the manifold together, in the same way we may have an insubstantial intensity which, keeping itself in as mere force without actual expression, is no better than superficiality. The force of mind is only as great as its expression ; its depth only as deep as its power to expand and lose itself when spending and giving out its substance. Moreover, when this unreflective emotional knowledge makes a pretext of having immersed its own very self in the depths of the absolute Being, and of philosophising in all hohness and truth, it hides from itself the fact that instead of devotion to God, it rather, by this contempt for aU measurable precision and definiteness, simply confirms in its own case the fortuitous character of its content, and on the other endows God with its own caprice. When such minds commit themselves to the unrestrained ferment of sheer emotion, they think that, by putting ■oil over self-consciousness, and surrendering all 10 Pkenowcnology of Mind understanding, they are thus God's beloved ones to whom He gives His wisdom in sleep. This is the reason, too, that in point of fact what they do conceive and bring forth in sleep is dreams. For the rest it is not difficult to see that our epoch is a birth-time, and a period of transition. The spirit of the age has broken with the world as it has hitherto existed, and with the old ways of thinking, and is in the mind to let them all sink into the depths of the past and to set about its own transformation. It is indeed never at rest, but carried along the stream of progress ever onward. But it is here as in the case of the birth of a child ; after a long period of nutrition in silence, the continuity of the gradual growth in size, of quantitative change, is suddenly cut short by the first breath drawn — there is a break in the process, a quahtative change — and the child is born. In like manner the spirit of the time, growing slowly and quietly ripe for the new form it is to assume, loosens one fragment after another of the structure of its previous world. That it is tottering to its fall is indicated only by symptoms here and there. Frivohty and again ennui, which are spreading in the established order of things, the undefined foreboding of something unknown — all these are hints foretelling that there is sometliing else approaching. This gradual crumbling to pieces, v/hicli did not alter the general look and aspect of the whole, is interrupted by the sunrise, which, in a flash and at a single stroke, brings to view the form and structure of the new world. But this new world is perfectly realised just as little as the new-born child ; and it is essential to bear this in mind. It comes on the stage to begin with in its immediacy, in its bare generality. A building is not finished when its foundation is laid ; and just as little is the attainment of a general notion of a whole the whole itself. When we want to see an oak with all its vigour of trunk, its spreading branches, and mass of foliage, we are not satisfied to be shown an acorn instead. In the same way science, the crowning glory of a spiritual world, is not found complete in its initial stages. The beginning of the new spirit is the outcome of an extensive transformation of manifold forms of spiritual culture ; it is the reward which comes after a chequered and devious course of development, and after much struggle and effort. It is a whole which, after running its course and laying bare all its content," returns again to itself ; it is the resultant abstract notion of the whole. But the actual reahsation of this abstract whole is only found when those previous shapes and forms, which are now reduced to ideal moments of the whole, are developed anew again, but developed and shaped within this new medium, and with the meaning they have thereby acquired. While the new world makes its first appearance merely in general outline, merely as a whole lying concealed and hidden within a bare abstraction, the wealth of the bygone life, on the other hand, is still consciously present in recollection. Consciousness misses in the new form the detailed expanse of content ; but still more the developed expression of form by which distinctions are definitely determined and arranged in their precise relations. Without this last feature science has no general intelligibihty, and has the appearance of being an esoteric possession of a few individuals — an esoteric possession, because in the 12 Phenomenology of Mind first instance it is only the essential principle or notion of science, only its inner nature that is to be found ; and a possession of few individuals, because, at its first appearance, its content is not elaborated and expanded in detail, and thus its existence is turned into something particular. Only what is perfectly determinate in form is at the same time exoteric, comprehensible, and capable of being learned and possessed by everybody. Intelhgibility is the form in which science is offered to everyone, and is the open road to it made plain for all. To reach rational knowledge by our intelhgence is the just demand of the mind which comes to science. For intelligence, understanding (Ver stand), is thinking, pure activity of the self in general ; and what is intelligible ( Verstdndige) is something from the first familiar and common to the scientific and unscientific mind alike, enabling the unscientific mind to enter the domain of science. Science, at its commencement, when as yet it has neither got as far as detailed completeness nor perfection of form, is exposed to blame on that account. But to suppose this blame to attach to its essential nature would be as unjust, as it is inadmissible not to be ready to recognise the demand for that further development in fuller detail. In the contrast and opposition between these two aspects (the initial and the developed stages of science) seems to He the critical knot which scientific cultiixe at present struggles to loosen, and about which it is so far not very clear. One side parades the wealth of its material and the intelligibiUty of its ideas ; the other pours contempt at any rate on the latter, and makes a parade of the immediate intuitive rationality and divine quality of its content. Although the first is reduced to silence, perhaps by the inner force of truth alone, perhaps, too, by the noisy bluster of the other side, and though having regard to the reason and nature of the case it did feel overborne, yet it does not therefore feel satisfied as regards those demands for greater development ; for those demands are just, but still unfulfilled. Its silence is due only in part to the victory of the other side ; it is half due to that weariness and indifference which are usually the consequence when expectations are being constantly awakened by promises which are not followed up by performance. The other side * no doubt at times makes an easy enough matter of getting a vast expanse of content. They haul in a lot of material — already famihar and arranged in order ; and since they are concerned more especially about what is exceptional, strange, and curious, they seem all the more to be in possession of the rest, which knowledge in its own way was finished and done with, as well as to have control over what was unregulated and disorderly. Hence everything appears brought within the compass of the Absolute Idea, which seems thus to be recognised in everything, and to have succeeded in becoming a system in extenso of scientific knowledge. But if we look more closely at this expanded system we find that it has not been reached by one and the same principle taking shape in diverse ways ; it is the shapeless repetition of one and the same idea, which is apphed in an external fashion to different material, the wearisome reiteration of it keeping up the semblance of diversity. The Idea, which by itself is no doubt the truth, really never gets * Schelling and his school. 14 PJienomenology of Mind any farther than just where it began, as long as the development of it consists in nothing else than such a repetition of the same formula. If the knowing subject carries round everywhere the one inert abstract form, taking up in external fashion whatever material comes his way, and dipping it into this element, then this comes about as near to fulfilhng what is wanted — viz. a selforigination of the wealth of detail, and a self- determining distinction of shapes and forms — as any chance fancies about the content in question. It is rather a monotonous formalism, which only comes by distinction in the matter it has to deal with, because this is already prepared and well known. This monotonousness and abstract universality are maintained to be the Absolute. This formalism insists that to be dissatisfied therewith argues an incapacity to grasp the standpoint of the Absolute, and keep a firm hold on it. If it was once the case that the bare possibihty of thinking of something in some other fashion was sufficient to refute a given idea, and the naked possibihty, the bare general thought, possessed and passed for the entire substantive value of actual knowledge ; we find here similarly all the value ascribed to the general idea in this bare form without concrete reahsation ; and we see here, too, the style and method of speculative contemplation identified with dissipating and resolving what is determinate and distinct, or rather with hurling it down, without more ado and without any justification, into the abyss of vacuity. To consider any specific fact as it is in the Absolute, consists here in nothing else than saying about it that, while it is now doubtless spoken of as something specific, yet in the Absolute, in the abstract identity A==A, there is no such thing at all, for everything is there all one. To pit this single assertion, that " in the Absolute all is one," against the organised whole of determinate and complete knowledge, or of knowledge which at least aims at and demands complete development — to give out its Absolute as the night in which, as we say, all cows are black — that is the very naivete of vacuous knowledge. The formahsm which has been deprecated and despised by recent philosophy, and which has arisen once more in philosophy itself, will not disappear from science, even though its inadequacy is known and felt, till the knowledge of absolute reality has become quite clear as to what its own true nature consists in. Having in mind that the general idea of what is to be done, if it precedes the attempt to carry it out, faciUtates the comprehension of this process, it is worth while to indicate here some rough idea of it, with the hope at the same time that this will give us the opportunity to set aside certain forms whose habitual presence is a hindrance in the way of speculative knowledge. In my view — a view which the developed exposition of the system itself can alone justify — everything depends on grasping and expressing the ultimate truth not as Substance but as Subject as well. At the same time we must note that concrete substantiahty implicates and involves the universal or the immediacy of knowledge itself, as well as the immediacy which is being, or immediacy qua object for knowledge. If the generation which heard God spoken of as the One Substance* was shocked and revolted by such a characterisation of his nature, the reason lay partly in the * Spinoza. 16 Phenomenology of Mind instinctive feeling that in such a conception selfconsciousness was simply submerged, and not preserved. But partly, again, the opposite position, which maintains thinking to be merely subjective thinking, abstract universality as such, is exactly the same bare uniformity, is undifferentiated, unmoved substantiality.* And even if, in the third place, thought combines with itself the being of substance, and conceives immediacy or intuition (AnscJiauung) as thinking, it is still a question whether this intellectual intuition does not fall back into that inert, abstract simphcity, and exhibit and expound reality itself in an unreal manner.f The Hving substance, further, is that being which is truly subject, or, what is the same thing, is truly reahsed and actual [wirhlicli) solely in the process of positing itself, or in mediating with its own self its transitions from one state or position to the opposite. As subject it is pure and simple negativity, and just on that account a process of spUtting up what is simple and undifferentiated, a process of duplicating and setting factors in opposition, which [process] in turn is the negation of this indifferent diversity and of the opposition of factors it entails. True reahty is merely this process of reinstating self-identity, of reflecting into its own self in and from its other, and is not an original and primal unity as such, not an immediate unity as such. It is the process of its own becoming, the circle which presupposes its end or its purpose, and has its end for its beginning ; it becomes concrete and actual only by being carried out, and by the end it involves. The Ufe of God and divine intelhgence, then, can, * Kant and Fichte. t Schelling. if we like, be spoken of as love disporting witli itself ; but this idea falls into edification, and even sinks into insipidity, if it lacks the seriousness, the suffering, the patience, and the labour of the negative. Per se the divine hfe is no doubt undisturbed identity and oneness with itself, which feels no anxiety over otherness and estrangement, and none over the surmounting of this estrangement. But this " per se " is abstract generality, where we abstract from its real nature, which consists in its being objective to itself, conscious of itself on its own account {fiir sich zu sein) ; and where consequently we neglect altogether the self-movement which is the formal character of its activity. If the form is declared to correspond to the essence, it is just for that reason a misunderstanding to suppose that knowledge can be content with the " per se," the essence, but can do without the form, that the absolute principle, or absolute intuition, makes the carrying out of the former, or the development of the latter, needless. Precisely because the form is as necessary to the essence as the essence to it, absolute reality must not be conceived of and expressed as essence alone, i.e. as immediate substance, or as pure self-intuition of the Divine, but as form also, and with the entire wealth of the developed form. Only then is it grasped and expressed as really actual. The truth is the whole. The whole, however, is merely the essential nature reaching its completeness through the process of its own development. Of the Absolute it must be said that it is essentially a result, th?.t only at the end is it what it is in very truth ; and just in that consists its nature, which is to be actual, aubject, or self -becoming, self-development. Should VOL. I.— C 18 Phenomenology oj Mind it appear contradictory to say that the Absolute has to be conceived essentially as a result, a little consideration wiU set this appearance of contradiction in its true hght. The. beginning, the principle, or the Absolute, as at first or immediately expressed, is merely the universal. If we say " all animals," that does not pass for zoology ; for the same reason we see at once that the words absolute, divine, eternal, and so on do not express what is imphed in them ; and only mere words hke these, in point of fact, express intuition as the immediate. Whatever is more than a word hke that, even the mere transition to a proposition, is a form of mediation, contains a process towards another state from which we must return once more. It is this process of mediation, however, that is rejected with horror, as if absolute knowledge were being surrendered when more is made of mediation than merely the assertion that it is nothing absolute, and does not exist in the Absolute. This horrified rejection of mediation, however, arises as a fact from want of acquaintance with its nature, and with the nature of absolute knowledge itself. For mediating is nothing but self-identity working itself out through an active self-directed process ; or, in other words, it is reflection into self, the aspect in which the ego is for itself, objective to itself. It is pure negativity, or, reduced to its utmost abstraction, the process of bare and simple becoming. The ego, or becoming in general, this process of mediating is, because of its being simple, just immediacy coming to be, and is immediacy itself. We misconceive therefore the nature of reason if we exclude reflection or meditation from ultimate truth, and do not take it to be a positive moment of tlie Absolute. It is reflection svhich constitutes truth the final result, and yet at bhe same time does away with the contrast between result and the process of arriving at it. For this process is hkewise simple, and therefore not distinct from the form of truth, which consists in appearing as simple in the result ; it is indeed just this restoration and return to simplicity. While the embryo is certainly, in itself, implicitly a human being, it is not so exphcitly, it does not take itself to be a human being [fUr sich) ; it is only the latter in the form of developed and cultivated reason, which has made itself to be what it is implicitly. Its actual reality is first fomid here. But this result arrived at is itself simple immediacy ; for it is self-conscious freedom, which is at one with itself, and has not set aside the opposition it involves and left it there, but has made its account with it and become reconciled to it. What has been said may also be expressed by saying that reason is purposive activity. Extolling so-called nature at the expense of thought misunderstood, and more especially the rejection of external purposiveness, have brought the idea of purpose in general into disrepute. AU the same, in the sense in which Aristotle, too, characterises nature as purposive activity, purpose is the inunediate, the midisturbed, the unmoved which is self-moving ; as such it is subject. Its power of moving, taken abstractly, is its existence for itself, or pure negativity. The result is the same as the beginning solely because the beginning is purpose. Stated otherwise, what is actual and concrete is the same as its inner principle or notion simply because the immediate qua purpose contains within it the self , or 20 Phenomenology of Mind pure actuality. The realised purpose, or concrete actuality, is movement and process of development. But this very unrest is the self ; and it is one and the same with that immediacy and simphcity characteristic of the beginning just for the reason thai it is the result, and has returned upon itself — while this latter again is just the self, and the self is self-referring and self-relating identity and simphcity. When thinking of the Absolute as subject, men have made use of statements Uke ' God is the eternal,' the ' moral order of the world,' or ' love,' etc. In such propositions ultimate truth is just barely stated to be Subject, but not set forth as the process of reflectively mediating itself within itself. In a proposition of that kind we begin with the word God. By itself this is a meaningless sound, a mere name ; the predicate says afterwards wliat it is, gives it content and meaning : the empty beginning becomes real knowledge only when we thus get to the end of the statement. So far as that goes, why not speak alone of the eternal, of the moral order of the world, etc., or, Hke the ancients, of pure conceptions such as being, the one, etc., i.e. of what gives the meaning without adding the meaningless sound at all ? But this word just indicates that it is not a being or essence or universal in general that is put forward, but something reflected into self, a subject. Yet at the same time this acceptance of the Absolute as Subject is merely anticipated, not really affirmed. The subject is taken to be a fixed point, and to it as their support the predicates are attached, by a process falhng within the individual knowing about it, but not looked upon as belonging to the point of atta,chment itself ; only by such a process, however, could the content be presented as subject. Constituted as it is, tbis process cannot belong to tbe subject ; but when that point of support is fixed to start wdth, this process cannot be otherwise constituted, it can only be external. The anticipation that the Absolute is subject is therefore not merely not the realisation of this conception ; it even makes reahsation impossible. For it makes out the notion to be a static point, while its actual reahty is self-movement, self-activity. «^ Among the many consequences that follow from what has been said, it is of importance to emphasise this, that knowledge is only real and can only be set forth fully in the form of science, in the form of system ; and further, that a so-called fundamental proposition or first principle of philosophy, even if it is true, is yet none the less false just because and in so far as it is merely a fundamental proposition, merely a first principle. It is for that reason easily refuted. The refutation consists in bringing out its defective character ; and it is defective because it is merely the universal^ merely a principle, the beginning. If the refutation is complete and thorough, it is derived and developed from the nature of the principle itself, and not accomplished by bringing in from elsewhere other coimter assurances and chance fancies. It would be strictly the development of the principle, and thus the completion of its deficiency, were it not that it misunderstands its own purport by taking account solely of the negative aspect of what it seeks to do, and is not conscious of the positive character of its process and result. The really positive working out of the beginning is at the same time just as much the very reverse, it is a negative attitude towards the principle we start from, negative, that is to 22 PJienomenology of Mind say, of its one-sided form, which consists in being primarily immediate, a mere purpose. It may therefore be regarded as a refutation of what constitutes the basis of the system ; but more correctly it should be looked at as a demonstration that the basis or principle of the system is in point of fact merely its beginning. " ^ That the truth is only realised in the form of system, that substance is essentially subject, is expressed in the idea which represents the Absolute as Spirit (Geist) — the grandest conception of all, and one which is due to modern times and its religion. Spirit is the only Reality. It is the inner being of the world, that which essentially is, and is per se ; it assumes objective, determinate form, and enters into relations with itself — it is externahty (otherness), and exists for self ; yet, in this determination, and in its otherness, it is still one with itself — it is self-contained and self-complete, in itself and for itself at once. This self-containedness, however, is first something known by us, it is imphcit in its nature {an sicli) ; it is Substance spiritual. It has to become self-contained for itself, on its own account ; it must get knowledge of spirit, and must be consciousness of itself as spirit. This means, it must be presented to itself as an object, but at the same time straightway annul and transcend this objective form ; it must be its own object in which it finds itself reflected. So far as its spiritual content is produced by its own activity, it is only we [the thinkers] who know spirit to be for itself, to be objective to itself ; but in so far as spirit laiows itself to be for itself, then this selfproduction, the pure notion, is the sphere and element in which its objectification takes effect, and where it b gets its existential form. In tliis way it is in its existence aware of itself as an object in which, its own self is reflected. Mind, which, when thus developed, knows itself to be mind, is science. Science is its realisation, and the kingdom it sets up for itself in its own native element. - A self having knowledge purely of itself in the absplute antithesis of itself, this pure ether as such, is the very soil where science flourishes, is knowledge in universal form. The beginning of philosophy presupposes or demands from consciousness that it should feel at home in this element. But this element only attains its perfect meaning and acquires transparency through the process of gradually developing it. It is pure spirituality as the universal which assumes the shape of simple immediacy ; and this simple element, existing as such, is the soil of science, is thinking, and can be only in mind. Because this medium, this immediacy of mind, is the mind's substantial nature in general, it is the transfigured essence, reflection which itself is simple, which is aware of itself as immediacy ; it is being, which is reflection into itself. Science on its side requires the individual self-consciousness to have risen into this high ether, in order to be able to Hve with science, and in science, and really to feel ahve there. Conversely the individual has the right to demand that science shall hold the ladder to help him to get at least as far as this position, shall show him that he has in himself this ground to stand on. His right rests on his absolute independence, which he knows he possesses in every type and phase of knowledge ; for in every phase, whether recognised by science or not, and whatever be the content, his right as an 24 Phenomenology of Mind individual is the absolute and final form, i.e. lie is the immediate certainty of self, and thereby is unconditioned being, were this expression preferred. If the position taken up by consciousness, that of knowing about objective things as opposed to itself, and about itself as opposed to them, is held by science to be the very opposite of this position : if, when in knowing it keeps within itself and never gets beyond itself, science holds this state to be rather the loss of mind altogether — on the other hand the element in which science consists is looked at by consciousness as a remote and distant region, in which consciousness is no longer in possession of itself. Each of these two sides takes the other to be the perversion of the truth. For the naive consciousness to give itself up completely and straight away to science is to make an attempt, induced by some unkno-wm influence, all at once to walk on its head. The compulsion to take up this attitude and move about in this position, is a constraining force it is urged to fall in with, without ever being prepared for it and with no apparent necessity for doing so. Let science be fcr se what it likes, in its relation to naive immediate self-conscious life it presents the appearance of being a reversal of the latter ; or, again, because naive self-consciousness finds the principle of its reahty in the certainty of itself, science bears the character of unreality, since consciousness ' for itself ' is a state quite outside of science. Science has for that reason to combine that other element of self-certainty with its own, or rather to show that the other element belongs to itself, and how it does so. When devoid of that sort of reality, science is merely the content of mind qua something imphcit or potential {an sich) ; purpose whicli at the start is no more than something internal ; not spirit, but at first merely spiritual substance. This impHcit moment (AnsicJi) has to find external expression, and become objective on its own account. This means nothing else than that this moment has to establish self-consciousness as one with itself. It is this process by which science in general comes about, this gradual development of knowing, that is set forth here in the Phenomenology of Mind.* Knowing, as it is found at the start, mind in its immediate and primitive stage, is without the essential nature of mind, is^ sense-consciousness. To get the length of genuine knowledge, or produce the element where science is found — the pure conception of science itself — a long and laborious journey must be undertaken. This process towards science, as regards the content it will bring to light and the forms it will assume in the course of its progress, will not be what is primarily imagined by leading the unscientific consciousness up to the level of science : it will be something different, too, from establishing and laying the foundations of science ; and anyway something else than the sort of ecstatic enthusiasm which starts straight of! with absolute knowledge, as if shot out of a pistol, and makes short work of other points of view simply by explaining that it is to take no notice of them. The task of conducting the individual mind from its unscientific standpoint to that of science had to be taken in its general sense ; we had to contemplate the formative development (Bildung) of the universal * " Being the first part of the System of Science " (first edition ; omitted in later edition). 26 Phenomenology of Mind [or general] individual, of self-conscious spirit. As to the relation between these two [the particular and general individual], every moment, as it gains concrete form and its own proper shape and appearance, finds a place in the life of the universal individual. The particular individual is incomplete mind, a concrete shape in whose existence, taken as a whole, one determinate characteristic predominates, while the others are found only in blurred outline. In that mind which stands higher than another the lower concrete form of existence has sunk into an obscure moment ; what was once substantial objective fact {die Sache selhst) is now only a single trace : its definite shape has been veiled, and become simply a piece of shading. The individual, whose substance is mind at the higher level, passes through these past forms, much in the way that one who takes up a higher science goes through those preparatory forms of Imowledge, which he has long made his own, in order to call up their content before him ; he brings back the recollection of them without stopping to fix his interest upon them. The particular individual, so far as content is concerned, has also to go through the stages through which the general mind has passed, but as shapes once assumed by mind and now laid aside, as stages of a road which has been worked over and levelled out. Hence it is that, in the case of various kinds of knowledge, we find that what in former days occupied the energies of men of mature mental ability sinks to the level of information, exercises, and even pastimes for children ; and in this educational progress we can see the history of the world's culture deUneated in faint outhne. This bygone mode of existence has already become an acquired possession of the general mind, wliicli constitutes the substance of the individual, and, by thus appearing externally to him, furnishes his inorganic nature. In this respect culture or development of mind (Bildung), regarded from the side of the individual, consists in his acquiring what hes at his hand ready for him, in making its inorganic nature organic to himself, and taking possession of it for himself. Looked at, how-ever, from the side of universal mind qua general spiritual substance, culture means nothing else than that this substance gives itself its own self -consciousness, brings about its own taherent process and its own reflection into self. Science lays before us the morphogenetic process of this cultural development in all its detailed fullness and necessity, and at the same time shows it to be something that has already sunk into the mind as a moment of its being and become a possession of mind. The goal to be reached is the mind's insight into what knowing is. Impatience asks for the impossible, wants to reach the goal without the means of getting there. The length of the journey has to be borne with, for every moment is necessary ; and again we must halt at every stage, for each is itself a complete individual form, and is fully and finally considered only so far as its determinate character is taken and dealt with as a rounded and concrete whole, or only so far as the whole is looked at in the light of the special and pecuhar character which this determination gives it. Because the substance of individual mind, nay, more, because the universal mind at work in the world (Weltgeist), has had the patience to go through these forms in the long stretch of time's extent, and to take upon itself the 28 Phenomenology of Mind prodigious labour of the world's history, where it bodied forth in each form the entire content of itself, which each is capable of grasping ; and because by nothing less could that all-pervading mind ever manage to become conscious of what itself is — for that reason, the individual mind, in the nature of the case, cannot expect by less toil to grasp what its own substance contains. All the same, its task has meanwhile been made much hghter, because this has historically been imphcitly {an sicli) accomphshed, the content is one where reality has already given place to spiritual possibihties, where immediacy has been overcome and brought under the control of reflection, the various forms and shapes have been already reduced to their intellectual abbreviations, to determinations of thought (GedanJcenbestinimung) pure and simple. Being now a thought, the content is the possession of the substance of mind ; existence has no more to be changed into the form of what is inherent and impKcit (Ansichseins), but only the imphcit — no longer merely something primitive, nor lying hidden within existence, but already present as a recollection — into the form of what is exphcit, of what is objective to self [Filrsichseins). We have to state more exactly the way this is done. At the point at which we here take up this movement, we are spared, in connection with the whole, the process of cancelhng and transcending the stage of mere existence. This process has already taken place. "What is still to be done and needs a higher kind of transfor::iation, is to transcend the forms as ideally presented and made familiar to our minds. By that previous negative process, : existence, having been withdrawn into the mind's sub-~ stance, is, in the first instance, transferred to the life- of self only in an immediate way. The possession tlie self has thereby acquired, has still the same character of imcomprehended immediacy, of passive indifference, which existence itself had ; existence has in this way merely passed into the form of an ideal presentation. At the same time, by so doing, it is something famihar to us, something " well-known," something which the existent mind has finished and done with, and hence takes no more to do with and no further interest in. While the activity that is done with the existent is itself merely the process of the particular mind, of mind which is not comprehending itself, on the other hand, hnowledge is directed against this ideal presentation which has hereby arisen, against this " being-familiar " and " well-known " ; it is an action of universal mind, the concern of tliouglit. What we are " famihar with " is not intelhgently known, just for the reason that it is " familiar." When engaged in the process of knowing, it is the commonest form of self-deception, and a deception of other people as well, to assume something to be famihar, and give assent to it on that very account. Knowledge of that sort, with all its talk, never gets from the spot, but has no idea that this is the case. Subject and object, and so on, God, nature, imderstanding, sensibility, etc., are uncritically presupposed as familiar and something significant, and become fixed points from which to start and to which to return. The process of knowing flits between these secure points, and in consequence goes on merely along the surface. Apprehending and demonstrating consist similarly in seeing whether every one finds what is said corresponding to his idea too, whether it is familiar and seems to him so and so or not, 30 Phenomenology of Mind Analysis of an idea, as it used to be carried out, did anyhow consist in notMng else ttan doing away with its character of familiarity. To break up an idea into its ultimate elements means returning upon its moments, which at least do not have the form of the idea as picked up, but are the imjnediate property of the self. Doubtless this analysis only arrives at thoughts which are themselves known elements, fixed inert determinations. But what is thus broken up into parts, this imreal entity, is itself an essential moment ; for just because the concrete fact is self-divided, and turns into unxeahty, it is something self-moving, self-active. The action of separating the elements is the exercise of the force of Understanding, the most astonishing and greatest of all powers, or rather the absolute power. The circle, which is self-enclosed and at rest, and, being a substance, holds its own moments, is an immediate condition, the immediate, continuous relation of elements with their unity, and hence arouses no sense of wonderment. But that an accident as such, when cut loose from its containing circmnference, — that what is bound and held by something else and actual only by being connected with it, — should get an existence all its own, gain freedom and independence on its own account — this is the portentous power of the negative ; it is the energy of thought, of pure ego. Death, as we may call that unreality, is the most terrible thing, and to keep and hold fast what is dead demands the greatest force of all. Beauty, powerless and helpless, hates understanding, because the latter exacts from it what it cannot perform.* But the Ufe of mind is not one that shuns death, and keeps clear of destruction; * This is directed against Novalis and the cult of beauty. it endures its death and in death maintaitis its being. It only wins to its truth when it finds itself in utter desolation. It is this mighty power, not by being a positive which turns away from the negative, as when we say of anything it is nothing or it is false, and, being then done with it, pass off to something else ; on the contrary, mind is this power only by looking the negative in the face, and dwelhng with it. This dwelling beside it is the magic power that converts the negative into being. That power is just what we spoke of above as subject, which by giving determinateness a place in its substance, cancels abstract immediacy, i.e. immediacy which merely is, and, by so doing, becomes the true substance, becomes being or immediacy that does not have mediation outside it, but is this mediation itself. This process of making what is objectively presented a possession of pm:e self-consciousness, of raising it to the level of universahty in general, is merely one aspect of mental development ; spiritual evolution is not yet completed. The manner of study in ancient times is distinct from that of the modern world, in that the former consisted in the cultivation and perfecting of the natural mind. Testing hfe carefully at all points, philosophising about everything it came across, the former created an experience permeated through and through by universals. In modern times, however, an individual finds the abstract form ready made. In straining to grasp it and make it his own, he rather strives to bring forward the inner meaning alone, without any process of mediation ; the production of the universal is abridged, instead of the universal arising out of the manifold detail of concrete existence. 32 Phenomenology of Mind 'Hence nowadays the task before us consists not so mucli in getting the individual clear of the level of sensuous immediacy, and making him a substance that thinks and is grasped in terms of thought, but rather the very opposite : it consists in actuahsing the universal, and giving it spiritual vitality, by the process of breaking down and superseding fixed and determinate thoughts. But it is much more difficult to make fixed and definite thoughts fuse with one another and form a continuous whole than to bring sensuous existence into this state. The reason hes in what was said before. Thought determinations get their substance and the element of their existence from the ego, the power of the negative, or piire reality ; while determinations of sense find this in impotent abstract immediacy, in mere being as such. Thoughts become fluent and interfuse, when thinking pure and simple, this inner immediacy, knows itself as a moment, when pure certainty of self abstracts from itself. It does not " abstract " in the sense of getting away from itself and setting itself on one side, but of surrendering the fixed quaUty of its self-affirmation, and giving up both the fixity of the purely concrete — vifhich is the ego as contrasted with the variety of its content — and the fixity of all those distinctions [the various thought-functions, principles, etc.] which are present in the element of pure thought and share that absoluteness of the ego. In virtue of this process pure thoughts become notions and conceptions, and are then what they are in truth, selfmoving functions, circles, are what their substance consists in, are spiritual entities. This movement of the spiritual entities constitutes the nature of scientific procedure in general. Looked at as the concatenation of their content, this movement is the necessitated development and expansion of that content into an organic systematic whole. By this movement, too, the road, which leads to the notion of knowledge, becomes itself hkewise a necessary and complete evolving process (Werden). This preparatory stage thus ceases to consist of casual philosophical reflections, referring to objects here and there, to processes and thoughts of the undeveloped mind as chance may direct ; and it does not try to estabhsh the truth by miscellaneous ratiocinations, inferences, and consequences drawn from circimiscribed thoughts. The road to science, by the very movement of the notion itself, will compass the entire objective world of conscious hfe in its rational necessity. Further, a systematic exposition like this constitutes the first part of science,* because the positive existence of mind, qua primary and ultimate, is nothing but the immediate aspect of mind, the beginning ; the beginning, but not yet its return to itself. The characteristic feature distinguishing this part of science [Phenomenology] from the others is the element of positive immediate existence. The mention of this distinction leads us to discuss certain established ideas that usually come to notice in this connection. The mind's immediate existence, conscious life, has two aspects — cognition and objectivity which is opposed to or negative of the subjective function of knowing. Since it is in the medium of consciousness that mind is developed and brings out its various moments, this opposition between the factors of conscious hfe is found at each stage in the evolution of mind, * V. note p. 25. VOL. I.— D 34 Phenomenology of Mind and all the various moments appear as modes or forms {Gestalten) of consciousness. The scientific statement of the course of this development is a science of the experience through which consciousness passes ; the substance and its process are considered as the object of consciousness. Consciousness knows and comprehends nothing but what falls within its experience ; for what is found in experience is merely spiritual substance, and, moreover, object of its self. Mind, however, becomes object, for it consists in the process of becoming an other to itself, i.e. an object for its ov.rn self, and in transcending this otherness. And experience is called this very process by which the element that is immediate, unexperienced, i.e. abstract — whether it be in the form of sense or of a bare thought — externalises itself, and then comes back to itself from this state of estrangement, and by so doing is at length set forth in its concrete nature and real truth, and becomes too a possession of consciousness. The dissimilarity which obtains in consciousness between the ego and the substance constituting its object, is their inner distinction, the factor of negativity in general. We may regard it as the defect of both opposites, but it is their very soul, their moving spirit. It was on this accoimt that certain thinkers long ago took the void to be the principle of movement, when they conceived the moving principle to be the negative element, though they had not as yet thought of it as self. While this negative factor appears in the first instance as a dissimilarity, as an inequality, between ego and object, it is just as much the inequality of the substance with itself. What seems to take place outside it, to be an activity directed against it, is its own doing, its own activity ; and substance shows that it is in reahty subject. When it has brought out this completely, mind has made its existence adequate to and one with its essential nature. Mind is object to itself just as it is, and the abstract element of immediacy, of the separation between l-mowing and the truth, is overcome. Being is entirely mediated ; it is a substantial content, that is hkewise directly in the possession of the ego, has the character of self, is notion. With the attainment of this the Phenomenology of Mind concludes. What mind prepares for itself by the argument of the Phenomenology is the element of true knowledge. In this element the moments of mind are now set out in the form of thought pure and simple, which knows its object to be itself. They no longer involve the opposition between being and knowing ; they remain within the imdivided simplicity of the knowing function ; they are the truth in the form of truth, and their diversity is merely diversity of the content of truth. The process by which they are developed into an organically connected whole is Logic and Speculative Philosophy. Now, because the systematic statement of the mind's experience embraces merely its ways of appearing, it may well seem that the advance from that to the science of ultimate truth in the form of truth is merely negative ; and we might readily be content to dispense with the negative process as something altogether false, and might ask to be taken straight to the truth at once : why meddle with what is false at all ? The point formerly raised, that we should have begun with science at once, may be answered here by considering the character of negativity in general regarded as 36 Phenomenology of Mind something false. The usual ideas on this subject particularly obstruct the approach to the truth. The consideration of this point will give us an opportunity to speak about mathematical knowledge, which the unphilosophical mind looks upon as the ideal Avhicli philosophy ought to try to attain, but has so far striven in vain to reach. Truth and falsehood as commonly understood belong to those sharply defined ideas which claim a completely fixed nature of their own, one standing in sohd isolation on this side, the other on that, without any community between them. Against that view it must be pointed out, that truth is not like stamped coin* that is issued ready from the mint and so can be taken up and used. Nor, again, is there something false, any more than there is something evil. Evil and falsehood are indeed not so bad as the devil, for in the form of the devil they get the length of being particular subjects ; qua false and evil they are merely universals, though they have a nature of their own with reference to one another. Falsity (that is what we are dealing with here) would be otlierness, the negative aspect of the substance, which [substance], qua content of knowledge, is truth. But the substance is itself essentially the negative element, partly as involving distinction and determination of content, partly as being a process of distinguishing pure and simple, i.e. as being self and knowledge in general. Doubtless we can know in a way that is false. To know something falsely means that knowledge is not adequate to, is not on equal terms with, its substance. Yet this very dissimilarity is the process of distinction in general, the essential moment in know- * C'p. Lessing, Nathan der Weise, IV. 6. ing. It is, in fact, out of this active distinction that its harmonious unity arises, and this identity, when arrived at, is truth. But it is not truth in a sense which would involve the rejection of the discordance, the diversity, hke dross from pure metal ; nor, again, does truth remain detached from diversity, hke a finished article from the instrument that shapes it. Difference itself continues to be an immediate element within truth as such, in the form of the principle of negation, in the form of the activity of Self. All the same, we cannot for that reason say that falsehood is a moment or forms even a constituent part of truth. That " in every case of falsity there is something true " is an expression in which they are taken to be like oil and water, which do not mix and are merely united externally. Just in the interest of their real meaning, precisely because we want to designate the aspect or moment of complete otherness, the terms true and false must no longer be used where their otherness has been cancelled and superseded. Just as the expressions " unity of subject and object," of " finite and infinite," of " being and thought," etc., are absurd if subject and object, etc., are taken to mean what they are outside their unity, and are thus in that miity not meant to be what its very expression conveys. In the same way falsehood is not, qua false, any longer a moment of truth. Dogmatism as a way of thinking, whether in ordinary knowledge or in the study of philosophy, is nothing else but the view that truth consists in a proposition, which is a fixed and final result, or again which is directly known. To questirms hke, " When was Ceesar born ? ", " How many feet made a furlong ? ", etc., 38 Phenomenology of Mind a straight answer ought to be given ; just as it is absolutely true that the square of the hypotenuse is equal to the sum of the squares of the other two sides of a right-angled triangle. But the nature of a socalled truth of that sort is different from the nature of philosophical truth. As regards truth in matters of historical fact — to deal briefly with this subject — so far as we consider the purely historical element, it will be readily granted that they have to do with the sphere of particular existence, with a content in its contingent and arbitrary aspects, features that have no necessity. But even bare truths of the kind, say, like those mentioned, are impossible without the activity of self-consciousness. To get to know any one of them, there has to be a good deal of comparison, books must be consulted, or in some way or other inquiry has to be made. Even in a case of direct perception, only when we know it along with the reasons behind it, is it held to be something of real value ; although it is merely the naked fact itself that we are, properly speaking, supposed to be concerned about. — ' As to mathematical truths, we should be still less inclined to consider anyone a geometer who had got Euchd's theorems by heart (auswendig) without knowing the proofs, without, if we may say so by way of contrast, getting them into his head {inwendig). Similarly, if anyone came to know by measuring many right-angled triangles that their sides are related in the way everybody knows, v/e should regard knowledge so obtained as unsatisfactory. All the same, while proof is essential in the case of mathematical knowledge, it still does not have the .significance and nature of being a moment in the result itself ; the proof is over when we get the result, and has disappeared. Qua result the theorem is, no doubt, one that is seen to be true. But this eventuality has nothing to do with its content, but only with its relation to the knowing subject. The process of mathematical proof does not belong to the object ; it is a function that takes place outside the matter in hand. Thus, the nature of a right-angled triangle does not break itself up into factors in the manner set forth in the mathematical construction which is required to prove the proposition expressing the relation of its parts. The entire process of producing the result is an affair of knowledge which takes its own way of going about it. In philosophical knowledge, too, the way existence, qua existence, comes about (Werden) is different from that whereby the essence or inner nature of the fact comes into being. But philosophical knowledge, for one thing, contains both, while mathematical knowledge sets forth merely the way an existence comes about, i.e. the way the nature of the fact gets to be in the sphere of knowledge as such. For another thing, too, philosophical knowledge unites both these particular movements. The inward rising into being, the process of substance, is an unbroken transition into outwardness, into existence or being for another ; and conversely, the coming of existence into being is withdrawal into the inner essence. The movement is the twofold process in which the whole comes to be, and is such that each at the same time posits the other, and each on that account has in it both as its two aspects. Together they make the whole, through their resolving each other, and making themselves into moments of the whole. 40 Phenomenology of Mind In mathematical knowledge the insight required is an external function so far as the subject-matter dealt with is concerned. It follows that the actual fact is thereby altered. The means taken, construction and proof, contain, no doubt, true propositions ; but all the same we are bound to say that the content is false. The triangle in the above example is taken to pieces, and its parts made into other figures to which the construction gives rise in the triangle. It is only at the end that we find again reinstated the triangle we are really concerned with ; it was lost sight of in the course of the construction, and was present merely in fragments, that belonged to other wholes. Thus we find negativity of content coming in here too, a negativity which would have to be called falsity, just as much as in the case of the movement of the notion where thoughts that are taken to be fixed pass away and disappear. The real defect of this kind of knowledge, however, affects its process of knowing as much as its material. As to that process, in the first place we do not see any necessity in the construction. The necessity does not arise from the nature of the theorem : it is imposed ; and the injunction to draw just these lines, an infinite number of others being equally possible, is blindly acquiesced in, without our knowing anything further, except that, as we fondly believe, this will serve our purpose in getting at the proof. Later on this purposive device then comes out, and is therefore merely external in character, just because it is only after the proof is found that it comes to be known. In the same way, again, the proof takes a direction that begins anywhere we like, without our knowing as yet what relation 'Preface 4l iliis beginning has to the result to be brought out. In its Jourse, it takes up certain specific elements and relations md lets others alone, without its being directly obvious f?hat necessity there is in the matter. An external purpose controls this process. The evidence peculiar to this defective way of knowing — an evidence on the strength of which mathematics plumes itself and proudly struts before philosophy — rests solely on the poverty of its purpose and the defectiveness of its material, and is on that account of a kind that philosophy must scorn to have anything to do with. Its purpose or principle is quantity. This is precisely the relationship that is non-essential, alien to the character of the notion. The process of knowledge goes on, therefore, on the surface, does not affect the concrete fact itself, does not touch its inner nature or notion, and is hence not a conceptual way of comprehendmg. The material which is to enable mathematics to proffer these welcome treasures of truth consists of space and nmnerical units {das Eins). Space is that kind of existence on which the concrete notion inscribes the diversity it contains — an empty, lifeless element in which its differences likewise subsist in passive, hfeless form. What is concretely actual is not something spatial, such as is treated of in mathematics. With unieahties like the things mathematics takes account of, neither concrete sensuous perception nor philosophy has anything to do. In an unreal element of that sort we find, then, only unreal truth, fixed lifeless propositions. We can call a halt at any of them ; the next begins of itself de novo, without the first having led up to the one that follows, and without any necessary connexion having in this way 42 Phenomenology of Mind arisen from the nature of the subject-matter itself. So, too — and herein consists the formal character of mathematical evidence — because of that principle and the element where it appHes, knowledge advances along the hues of bare equality, of abstract identity. For what is hfeless, not being self-moved, does not bring about distinction within its essential nature ; does not come at essential opposition or unlikeness ; and hence involves no transition of one opposite element into its other, no qualitative, immanent movement, no seZ/-movement. It is quantity, a form of difference that does not touch the essential nature, which alone mathematics deals with. It abstracts from the fact that it is the notion which separates space into its dimensions, and determines the connections between them and in them. It does not consider, for example, the relation of line to surface, and when it compares the diameter of a circle with its circumference, it runs up against their incommensurability, i.e. a relation in terms of the notion, an infinite element, that escapes mathematical determination. Inamanent or so-called pure mathematics, again, does not oppose, time qua time to space, as a second subjectmatter for consideration. Applied mathematics, no doubt, treats of time, as also of motion, and other concrete things as well ; but it picks up/ from experience synthetic propositions — i.e. propositions expressing relations, relations determined by their essential nature — and merely applies its formulae to those propositions assumed to start with. That the so-called proofs of propositions like that stating the equilibrium of the lever, the relation of space and time in gravitation, etc., which applied mathematics fre- quently gives, should be taken and given as proofs, is itself merely a proof of how great the need is for knowledge to have a process of proof, seeing that, even where proof is not to be had, knowledge yet puts a value on the mere semblance of it, and gets thereby a certain sense of satisfaction. A criticism of these proofs would be as instructive as it would be significant, if the criticism could strip mathematics of this artificial finery, and bring out its hmitations, and thence show the necessity for another type of knowledge. As to time, which we are asked to think of as the coimterpart to space, and as constituting the objectmatter of the other division of pure mathematics, it is the notion itself in the form of existence. The principle of quantity, of difference which is not determined by the notion, and the principle of equality, of abstract, lifeless unity, are incapable of deahng with that sheer restlessness of hfe and its absolute and inherent process of differentiation. It is therefore only in an arrested, paralysed form, only in the form of the quantitative unit, that this essentially negative activity becomes the second object-matter of this way of knowing, which, itself an external operation, degrades what is selfmoving to the level of mere matter, in order thus to get an indifferent, external, lifeless content. Philosophy, on the contrary, does not deal with a determination that is non-essential, but with a determination so far as it is an essential factor. The abstract or unreal is not its element and content, but the real, what is self-establishing, has life within itself, existence in its very notion. It is the process that creates its own moments in its course, and goes through them all ; and the whole of this movement constitutes its positive 44 ' Phenomenology of Mind content and its truth. This movement includes, therefore, within it the negative factor as well, the element which would be named falsity if it could be considered one from which we had to abstract. The element that disappears has rather to be looked at as itself essential, not in the sense of being something fixed, that has to be cut off from truth and allowed to lie outside it, heaven knows where ; just as similarly the truth is not to be held to stand on the other side as an immovable lifeless positive element. Appearance is the process of arising into being and passing away again, a process that itself does not arise and does not pass away, but is fer se, and constitutes reality and the life-movement of truth. In this way truth is the bacchanalian revel, where not a soul is sober ; and because every member no sooner gets detached than it 60 ipso collapses straightway, the revel is just as much a state of transparent imbroken calm. Judged by that movement, the particular shapes which mind assumes do not indeed subsist any more than do determinate thoughts or ideas ; but they are, all the same, as much positive and necessary moments, as negative and transitory. In the entirety of the movement, taken as an unbroken quiescent whole, that which gets distinctness in the course of its process and secures specific existence, is preserved in the form of a self-recollection, in which existence is self-knowledge, and self-knowledge, again, is immediate existence. It might well seem necessary to state at the outset the chief points in connexion with the method of this process, the way in which science operates. Its nature, however, is to be found in what has already been said, while the proper systematic exposition of it is the special business of Logic, or rather is Logic itself. For the method is nothing else than the structure of the whole in its pure and essential form. In regard, however, to what has been hitherto currently held on this point, we must be sensible that the system of ideas bearing on the question of philosophical method, belongs also to a stage of mental culture that has now passed away. This may perhaps seem somewhat roughhanded or revolutionary ; and I am far from adopting an attitude of that sort; but it is significant that the scientific regime bequeathed by mathematics — a regime of explanations, divisions, axioms, an array of theorems, with proofs, principles, and the consequences and conclusions drawn from them — all this has already come to be generally considered as at any rate out of date. Even though there is no clear idea why it is unsuitable, yet little or no use is made of it any longer ; and even though it is not condemned outright, it is all the same not in favour. And we must have the prejudice and conviction that what is excellent can turn itself to practical account, and make itself acceptable. But it is not difficult to see that the method of propounding a proposition, producing reasons for it and then refuting its opposite by reasons too, is not the form in which truth can appear. Truth moves itself by its very nature ; but the method just mentioned is a form of Imowledge external to its material. Hence it is pecuhar to mathematics and must be left to mathematics, which, as already indicated, takes for its principle the relation of quantity, a relation alien to the notion, and gets its material from lifeless space, and the equally lifeless numerical unit. Or, again, such a method, adopting a freer style, one involving more 46 Phenomenology of Mind of arbitrariness and chance, may have a place in ordinary Ufe, in a conversation, or in supplying matter-offact instruction for the satisfaction of curiosity rather than knowledge, very much like what a preface does. In every-day life the mind finds its content in different kinds of knowledge, experiences of various sorts, concrete facts of sense, thoughts, too, and principles, and, in general, in whatever Ues ready to hand, or passes for a sohd stable entity, or real being. The mind follows wherever this leads, sometimes interrupting the connection by an unrestrained caprice in deahng with the content, and takes up the attitude of determining and handhng it in quite an external fashion. It runs the content back to some touchstone of certainty or other, even though it be but the feeling of the moment ; and conviction is satisfied if it reaches some familiar resting-place. But when the necessity of the notion banishes from its realm the loose procedure of the " raisonnements " of conversation, as well as the pedantic style of scientific pomposity, its place, as we have already mentioned, must not be taken by the disconnected utterance of presageful surmise and inspiration, and the arbitrary caprice of prophetic utterance ; for this does not merely despise that particular form of scientific procedure, but contemns scientific procedure altogether. Now that the triplicity, adopted in the system of Kant — a method rediscovered, to begin with, by instinctive insight, but left Kfeless and uncomprehended —has been raised to its significance as an absolute method, true form is thereby set up in its true content, and the conception of science has come to light. But the use this form has been put to in the Kantian system has no right to the name of science. For we see it there reduced to a hfeless schema, to nothing better than a mere shadow, and scientific organisation to a synoptic table. This formahsm — about which we spoke before in general terms, and whose procedure we wish here to state more fully — thinks it has comprehended and expressed the nature and life of a given form when it proclaims a determination of the schema to be its predicate. The predicate may be subjectivity or objectivity, or again magnetism, electricity, and so on, contraction or expansion, East or West, and such hke — ■ a form of predication that can be multiplied indefinitely, because according to this way of working each determination, each mode, can be applied as a form or schematic element in the case of every other, and each will thankfully perform the same service for any other. With a circle of reciprocities of this sort it is impossible to make out what the real fact in question is, or what the one or the other is. We find there sometimes constituents of sense picked up from ordinary intuition, determinate elements that certainly should mean something else than they express ; at other times what is inherently significant, viz. pure determinations of thought — like subject, object, substance, cause, universality, etc. — these are apphed just as uncritically and unreflectingly as in every-day life, are used much as people employ the terms strong and weak, expansion and contraction. As a result that type of metaphysics is as unscientific as those ideas of sense. Instead of the inner activity and self-movement of its own actual hfe, such a simple determination of direct intuition {Anschauung) — which means here 48 Phenomenology of Mind sense-knowledge — is expressed in terms of a superficial analogy, and this external and empty application of the formula is called " construction." The same thing happens here, however, as in the case of every kind of formalism. A man's head must be indeed dull if he could not in a quarter of an hour get up the theory that there are enervating, innervating, and indirectly enervating diseases and as many cures, and who could not — smce not so long ago instruction of that sort sufficed for the purpose — in as short a time be turned from being a man who works by rule of thumb into a theoretical physician. Formahsm in the case of speculative Philosophy of Nature {Naturphilosophie) takes the shape of teaching that understanding is electricity, animals are nitrogen, or equivalent to south or north and so on. When it does this whether as baldly as it is here expressed or concocted with even more terminology, such forceful procedure brings and holds together elements to all appearance far removed from one another ; the violence done to stable inert sense-elements by connecting them in this way, confers on them merely the semblance of a conceptual unity, and spares itself the trouble of doing what is after all the important thing — expressing the notion itself, the meaning that underlies sense-ideas. All this sort of thing may strike any one who has no experience with admiration and wonder. He may be awed by the profound genius he thinks it displays, and be dehghted at the happy ingenuity of such characterisations, since they fill the place of the abstract notion with something tangible and sensuous, and so make it more pleasing ; and he may congratulate himself on feeling an instinctive mental affinity for that glorious way of proceeding. The trick of wisdom of that sort is as quickly acquired as it is easy to practise. Its repetition, when once it is famihar, becomes as boring as the repetition of any bit of sleight-of-hand once we see through it. The instrument for producing this monotonous formahsm is no more difficult to handle than the palette of a painter, on which he only two colours, say red and green, the former for colouring the surface when we want a historical piece, the latter when we want a bit of landscape. It would be difficult to settlewhich is greater in all this, the agreeable ease with which everything in heaven and earth and under the earth is plastered with that botch of colour, or the conceit that prides itself on the excellence of its means for every conceivable purpose ; the one lends support to the other. What results from the use of this method of sticking on to everything in heaven and earth, to every kind of shape and form, natural and spiritual, the pair of determinations from the general schema, and filing everything in this manner, is no less than an " account as clear as noonday " * of the organised whole of the imiverse. It is, that is to say, a synoptic index, hke a skeleton with tickets stuck all over it, or hke rows of pots standing sealed and labelled in a grocer's stall ; and is as intelhgible as either the one or the other. It has lost hold of the hving nature of concrete fact ; just as in the former case we have merely dry bones with flesh and blood all gone, and in the latter, what is hidden away in those pots has equally nothmg to do with hving things. We have already remarked that the final outcome of this style of thinking is, * Expression adopted from Fichte's " Sonnenklarer Bericht an das Publikum uber das eigentliclie Wesen der neuesten Philosopliie," VOL. I.— E 50 Phenomenology of Mind at the same time, to paint entirely in one kind of colour ; for it turns with contempt from the distinctions in the schematic table, looks on them as belonging to the activity of mere reflection, and lets them drop out of sight in the blankness of the Absolute, and there reinstates pure identity, pure formless whiteness. Such uniformity of colouring in the schema with its hfeless determinations, this absolute identity, and the transition from one to the other — these are one and all alike the expression of inert Hfeless understanding, and an external process of knowledge into the bargain. Not only can what is excellent not escape the fate of becoming thus devitalised and despirituahsed, and seeing its skin flayed and paraded about in this way by hfeless knowledge, and the conceit such knowledge engenders ; but, further, such a fate lets us see the power the " excellent " exercises over the heart (GemutJi), if not over the mind (Geist). Moreover, we recognise here, too, that process towards universahty and determinateness of form which marks the complete attainment of excellence, and which alone makes it possible that this universahty can be turned to superficial uses. Science can become an organic system only by the inherent hfe of the notion. In science the determinateness, which was taken from the schema and stuck on to existing facts in external fashion, is the self-directing inner soul of the concrete content. The movement of what is partly consists in becoming another to itself, and thus developing exphcitly into its own immanent content ; partly, again, it takes this evolved content, this existence it assumes, back into itself, i.e. makes itself into a mom^ent, and reduces itself to gjmple determinateness. In the first stage of the pro- cess negativity lies in the function of distinguishing and estabhshing existence ; in this latter return into self, negativity consists in the bringing about of determinate simplicity. It is in this way that the content shows its specific characteristic not to be received from something else, and stuck on externally ; the content gives itself this determinate characteristic, appoints itself of its own initiative to the rank of a moment and to a place in the whole. The pigeon-holing process of understanding retains for itself the necessity and the notion controUing the content, that which constitutes the concrete element, the actuahty and hving process of the subject-matter which it labels : or rather, understanding does not retain this for itself, on the contrary, understanding fails to know it. For if it had as much insight as that, it would surely show that it had. It is not even aware of the need for such insight ; if it were, it would drop its schematising process, or at least would no longer be satisfied to know by way of a mere table of contents. A table of contents is all that understanding gives, the content itself it does not furnish at all. If the specific determination (say even one like magnetism) is one that in itself is concrete or actual, it all the same gets degraded into something hfeless and inert, since it is merely predicated of another existing entity, and not known as an immanent living principle of this existence ; nor is there any comprehension of how in this entity its intrinsic and pecuHar way of expressing and producing itself takes effect. This, the very kernel of the matter, formal understanding leaves to others to add later on. Instead of making its way into the inherent content of the matter in 52 Phenomenology of Mind hand, understanding always takes a survey of the whole, assumes a position away from the particular existence about which it is speaking, i.e. it does not see it at all. True scientific knowledge, on the contrary, demands abandonment to the very hfe of the object, or, which means the same thing, claims to have before it the inner necessity controlling the object, and to express this only. Steeping itself in its object, it forgets to take that general survey, which is merely a turning of knowledge away from the content back into itself. But being sunk into the material in hand, and following the course that such material takes, true knowledge retm-ns back into itself, yet not before the content in its fullness is taken into itself, is reduced to the simplicity of being a determinate characteristic, drops to the level of being one aspect of an existing entity, and passes over into its higher truth. By this process the whole as such, taking itself in its entire sweep, emerges out of the wealth where bare reflection seemed to get lost. In general, in virtue of the principle that, as we expressed it before, substance is implicitly and in itself subject, all content makes its reflection into itself in its own special way. The subsistence or substance of anything that exists is its self-identity ; for its want of identity, or oneness with itself, would be its dissolution. But self-identity is pure abstraction ; and this is just thinking. When I say Quality, I state simple determinateness ; by means of its quality one existence is distinguished from another or is an " existence " ; it is for itself, something on its own account, or subsists with itself because of this simple characteristic. But by doing so it is essentially Thought. Here we find contained the principle that Being is Thought : here is exercised that insight which is generally at a discount in the case of the ordinary non-conceptual way of speaking of the identity of thought and being. In virtue, further, of the fact that subsistence on the part of what exists is self-identity or pure abstraction, it is the abstraction of itself from itself, in other words, is itself its own want of identity with itself and dissolution — its own proper inwardness and retraction into self — its process of coming to be. Owing to the nature which being thus has, and so far as what is has this nature from the point of view of knowledge, this thinking is not an activity which treats the content as something alien and external ; it is not reflection into self away from the content. Science is not that kind of Idealism which stepped into the place of the Dogmatism of mere assertion and took the shape of a Dogmatism of mere assurance, the Dogmatism of mere self - certainty. Rather, since knowledge sees the content go back into its own proper inner nature, the activity of knowledge is absorbed in that content — for it (the activity) is the immanent self of the content — and is also at the same time returned into itself, for this activity is pure self-identity in otherness. In this way the knowing activity is the artful device which, pretending to refrain from activity, looks on and watches how specific determinateness, with its concrete fife, just where it pretends to be working out its own self-preservation and its own private interest, is, in point of fact, doing the very opposite, is doing what brings about its own dissolution and makes itself a moment in the whole. While, in the foregoing, the significance of Under- 54 Phenomenology of Mind standing was stated from the point of view of the selfconsciousness of substance ; by what has been here stated we can see clearly its significance from the point of view of substance qua being. Existence is Quality, self-identical determinateness, or determinate simpHcity, determinate thought : this is existence as regards Understanding. On this account it is fow, as Anaxagoras first took reahty to be. Those who succeeded him grasped the nature of existence in a more determinate way as elSoi or ISea, i.e. as determinate or specific universahty, kind or genus. The term genus or kind seems indeed too ordinary and inadequate to express ideas like beauty, holiness, eternal, which are now the vogue. As a matter of fact, however, idea {l&ia) means neither more nor less than kind, genus. But we often find in these days that a term which exactly designates a conception is despised and rejected, and another preferred to it which hides and obscures the conception, and thus sounds more edifying, even though this is merely due to its being expressed in a foreign language. Precisely for the reason that existence is designated a genus or kind, it is a naked simple thought ; vovi;, simple abstraction, is substance. It is on account of its simphcity, its self-identity, that it appears steady, fixed, and permanent. But this self-identity is Ukewise negativity ; hence that fixed and stable existence carries the process of its own dissolution within itself. The determinateness appears at first to be so solely through its relation to something else ; and its process seems imposed and forced upon it externally. But its having its own otherness within itself, and the fact of its being a self-initiated process — these are implied in the very simplicity of thought itself. For this is self-moving thought, thought that distinguishes, is inherent inwardness, the pure notion. Thus, then, it is the very nature of understanding to be a process, and being a process it is Rationahty. In the nature of existence as thus described — to be its own notion and being in one — consists logical necessity in general. This alone is what is rational, the rhythm of the organic whole : it is as much knowledge of content as that content is notion and essential nature. In other words, this alone is the sphere and element of speculative thought. The concrete shape of the content is resolved by its own inherent process into a simple determinate quahty. Thereby it is raised to logical form, and its being and essence coincide ; its concrete existence is merely this process that takes place, and is eo ipso logical existence. It is therefore needless to apply a formal scheme to the concrete content in an external fashion ; the content is in its very nature a transition into a formal shape, which, however, ceases to be formahsm of an external kind, because the form is the indwelling process of the concrete content itself. This nature of scientific method, which consists partly in being inseparable from the content, and partly in determining the rhythm of its movement by its own agency, finds, as we mentioned before, its peculiar systematic expression in speculative philosophy. What is here stated describes in effect the essential principle ; but cannot stand for more at this stage than an assertion or assurance by way of anticipation. The truth it contains is not to be found in this exposition, which is in part historical in character. And just for that reason, too, it is not in the least 66 Phenomenology of Mind refuted if anyone assures us on the contrary that this is not so, that the process instead is here so and so, if ideas we are all used to, being truths accepted or settled and famihar to everyone, are brought to mind and recoimted, or, again, if something new is served up and guaranteed as coming from the inner sanctuaries of inspired intuition. Such a view is bomid to meet with opposition. The first instinctive reaction on the part of knowing, when offered somethmg that was unfamihar, is usually to resist it. It seeks by that means to save freedom and native insight, to secure its own inherent authority against ahen avithority — for that is the way anything apprehended for the first time appears. This attitude is adopted, too, in order to do away with the semblance of a kind of disgrace which would he in the fact that something has had to be learnt. In like manner, again, when the unfamihar or unknown is received with applause, the reaction is in the same way an exaltation of freedom and native authority. It consists in something analogous to ultra-revolutionary declamation and action. Hence the important thing for the student of science is to make himself undergo the strenuous toil of conceptual I'eflection, of thinking in the form of the notion. This demands concentrated attention on the notion as such, on simple and ultimate determinations like being-initself, being-for-itself, self-identity, and so on ; for these are elemental, pure, self-determined functions of a kind we might call souls, were it not that their conceptual nature denotes something higher than that term contains. The interruption by conceptual thought of the habit of always thinking in figurative ideas {Vorstellungen) is as annoying and troublesome to this way of thinking as to that process of formal intelligence which in its reasoning rambles about with no real thoughts to reason with. The former, the habit, may be called materialised thinking, a fortuitous mental state, one that is absorbed in what is material, and hence finds it very distasteful at once to hft its self clear of this matter and be confined to itself alone. The latter, the process of raisonnement, is, on the other hand, detachment from all content, and conceited superiority to it. What is wanted here is the effort and struggle to give up this kind of freedom, and instead of being a merely arbitrary principle directing the content anyhow, this freedom should sink into and pervade the content, should get it directed and controlled by its own proper nature, i.e. by the self as its own self, and should see this process taking place. We must abstain from interrupting the immanent rhythm of the movement of conceptual thought ; we must refrain from arbitrarily interfering with it, and introducing ideas and reflections that have been obtained elsewhere. Restraint of this sort is itself an essential condition of attending to and getting at the real nature of the notion. There are the two aspects in the case of that ratiocinative procedure which mark its contrast from conceptual thinking and call for further notice. Raisonnement, in the first place, adopts a negative attitude towards the content apprehended ; knows how to refute it and reduce it to nothingness. To see what the content is not is merely a negative process ; it is a dead halt, which does not of itself go beyond itself, and proceed to a new content ; it has to get hold of 58 Phenomenology of Mind something else from somewhere or other in order to have once more a content. It is reflection upon and into the empty ego, the vanity of its own knowledge. Conceit of this kind brings out not only that this content is vain and empty, but also that to see this is itself fatuity too : for it is negation with no perception of the positive element within it. In that this reflection does not even have its own negativity as its content, it is not inside actual fact at all, but for ever away outside it. On that account it imagines that by asserting mere emptiness it is going much farther than insight that embraces and reveals a wealth of content. On the other hand, in the case of conceptual thinking, as was above indicated, the negative aspect falls within the content itself, and is the positive substance of that content, as well by being its inherent character and moving principle as by being the entirety of what these are. Looked at as a result, it is determinate specific negation, the negative which is the outcome of this process, and consequently is a positive content as well. In view of the fact that ratiocinative thinking has a content, whether of images or thoughts or a mixture of both, there is another side to its process which makes conceptual comprehension difficult for it. The pecuHar nature of this aspect is closely connected with the essential meaning of the idea (ISea) above described, in fact, expresses the idea in the way this appears as the process of thinking apprehension. For just as ratiocinative thinking in its negative reference, which we have been describing, is nothing but the self into which the content returns ; in the same way, on the other hand, in its positive cognitive process the self is an ideally presented subject to wliicli the content is related as an accident and predicate. This subject constitutes the basis to which the content is attached and on which the process moves to and fro. Conceptual thinking goes on in quite a different way. Since the concept or notion is the very self of the object, manifesting itself as the development of the object, it is not a quiescent subject, passively supporting accidents : it is a self-determining active concept which takes up its determinations and makes them its own. In the course of this process that inert passive subject really disappears ; it enters into the different constituents and pervades the content ; instead of remaining in inert antithesis to determinateness of content, it constitutes, in fact, that very specificity, i.e. the content as differentiated along with the process of bringing this about. Thus the sohd basis, which ratiocination found in an inert subject, is shaken to its foundations, and the only object is this very movement of the subject. The subject supplying the concrete filling to its own content ceases to be something transcending this content, and cannot have further predicates or accidents. Conversely, again, the scattered diversity of the content is brought under the control of the self, and so bound together ; the content is not a universal that can be detached from the subject, and adapted to several indifferently. Consequently the content is in truth no longer predicate of the subject ; it is the very substance, is the inmost reality, and the very principle of what is being considered. Ideational thinking {vmstellen), since its nature consists in dealing with accidents or predicates, and in exercising the right to transcend them because they are nothing more 60 Phenomenology of Mind than predicates and accidents — this way of thinking is checked in its course, since that which has in the proposition the form of a predicate is itself the substance of the statement. It is met by a counter-thrust, as we may say. Starting from the subject, as if this were a permanent base on which to proceed, it discovers, by the predicate being in reahty the substance, that the subject has passed into the predicate, and has thereby ceased to be subject : and since in this way what seems to be predicate has become the entire mass of the content, whole and complete, thinking cannot wander and ramble about at will, but is restrained and controlled by this weight of content. Usually the subject is first set down as the fixed and objective self ; from this fixed position the necessary process passes on to the multiphcity of determinations or predicates. Here the knowing ego takes the place of that subject and is the function of knitting or combining the predicates one with another, and is the subject holding them fast. But since the former subject enters into the determinate constituents themselves, and is their very life, the subject in the second case — viz. the knowing subject — finds that the former, — which it is supposed to be done with and which it wants to transcend, in order to return into itself, — is still there in the predicate : and instead of being able to be the determining agency in the process of resolving the predicate — reflectively deciding whether this or that predicate should be attached to the former subject — it has really to deal with the self of the content, is not allowed to be something on its own account {fur sich), but has to exist along with this content. What has been said can be expressed in a formal manner by saying that the nature of judgment or the proposition in general, which involves the distinction of subject and predicate, is subverted and destroyed by the speculative judgment ; and the identical proposition, which the former becomes [by uniting subject and predicate], imphes the rejection and repudiation of the above relation between subject and predicate. This conflict between the form of a proposition in general and the unity of the notion which destroys that form, is similar to what we find between metre and accent in the case of rhythm. Rhythm is the result of what hovers between and unites both. So in the case of the speculative or philosophical judgment ; the identity of subject and predicate is not intended to destroy their distinction, as expressed in propositional form ; their unity is to appear as a harmony of the elements. The form of the judgment is the way the specific sense appears, or is made manifest, it is the accent which differentiates the content of its meaning : that the predicate expresses the substance, and the subject itself falls within the universal, is the unity wherein that accent dies aAvay. To explain what has been said by examples let us take the proposition God is Being. The predicate is " being " : it has siibstantive significance, and thus absorbs the meaning of the subject within it. Being is meant to be here not predicate but the essential nature. Thereby, God seems to cease to be what he was when the proposition was put forward, viz. a fixed subject. Thinking [i.e. ordinary reflection], instead of getting any farther with the transition from subject to predicate, in reality finds its activity checked through the loss of the subject, and it is thrown back 62 Phenomenology of Mine on the thought of the subject because it misses this subject. Or again, since the predicate has itself been pronounced to be a subject, to be the being, to be the essential reality, which exhausts the nature of the subject, thinking finds the subject directly present in the predicate too : and now, instead of having, in the predicate, gone into itself, and preserved the freedom characteristic of ratiocination, it is absorbed in the content all the while, or, at any rate, is required to be so. Similarly, when it is said : " the real is the universal," the real, qua subject, passes away in its predicate. The universal is not only meant to have the significance of a predicate, as if the proposition stated that the real is universal : the universal is meant to express the essential nature of the real. Thinking therefore loses that fixed objective basis which it had in the subject, just as much as in the predicate it is thrown back on the subject, and therein returns not into itself but into the subject underlying the content. This unaccustomed restraint imposed upon thought is for the most part the cause of the complaints made regarding the unintelhgibihty of philosophical writings, when otherwise the individual has in him the requisite mental cultivation for understanding them. In w^hat has been said we see the reason for the definite objection often made against them, that a good deal has to be read repeatedly before it can be understood — an accusation which is meant to imply something objectionable in the extreme, and one which if granted to be sound admits of no further reply. It is obvious from the above what is the state of the case here. The philosophical proposition, being a proposition, calls up the accepted view of the usual relation of subject and predicate, and suggests the idea of the customary procedure which takes place in knowledge. Its philosophical content destroys this way of proceeding and the ordinary view taken of this process. The common view discovers that the statement is intended in another sense than it is thinking of, and this correction of its opinion compels knowledge to recur to the proposition and take it now in some other sense. There is a difficulty which might well be avoided. It consists in mixing up the methods of procedure followed by speculation and ratiocination, when what is said of the subject has at one time the significance of its conceptual principle, and at another time the meaning of its predicate or accidental quality. The one mode of thinking invalidates the other ; and only that philosophical exposition can manage to become plastic in character which resolutely sets aside and has nothing to do with the ordinary way of relating the parts of a proposition. As a matter of fact, non-speculative thinking has its rights too, which are justifiable, but are disregarded in the speculative way of stating a proposition. Abolishing the form of the proposition must not take place merely in an immediate manner, merely through the bare content of the proposition. On the contrary, we must give explicit expression to this cancelling process ; it must be not only that internal restraining and confining of thought within its own substance ; this turning of the conception back into itself has to be expressly brought out and stated. This process, which constitutes what formerly had to be accomphshed by proof, is the internal dialectical movement of the 64 Phenomenology of Mind proposition itself. This alone is the concrete speculative element, and only the exphcit expression of this is a speculative systematic exposition. Qua proposition, the speculative aspect is merely the internal restriction of, thought within its own substance where the return of the essential principle into itself is not yet brought out. Hence we often find philosophical expositions referring us to the inner intuition, and thus dispensing with the systematic statement of the dialectical movement of the proposition, which is what we wanted all the while. The proposition ought to express ivhat the truth is : in its essential nature the truth is subject : being so, it is merely the dialectical movement, this self-producing course of activity, maintaining its advance by returning back into itself. In the case of knowledge in other spheres this aspect of the articulated internal nature of the content is constituted by proof. When dialectic, however, has been separated from proof, the idea of philosophical demonstration as a matter of fact vanishes altogether. On this point it may be mentioned that the dialectical process Ukewise consists of parts or elements which are propositions. The difficulty indicated seems therefore to recur continually, and seems to be a difficulty inherent in the nature of the case. This is like what happens in the ordinary process of proving anything ; the grounds it makes iise of themselves need to be based on other grounds again, and so on ad infinitum. This manner of furnishing grounds and conditions, however, concerns that type of proof from which the dialectical movement is distinct and hence belongs to the process of external knowledge. As to what this movement is, its element is the bare concept ; this furnishes a content which is through and through subject impUciter and per se. There is to be found, therefore, no sort of content standing in a relation, as it were, to an underlying subject, and getting its significance by being attached to this as a predicate. The proposition as it appears is a mere empty form. Apart from the sensuously apprehended or ideally presented {vorgestellten) self, it is in the main the mere name qua name which denotes the subject pure and simple, the empty unit without any conceptual character. For this reason it would e.g. be expedient to avoid the name " God." because this word is not in its primary use a conception as well, but the special name of an underlying subject, its fixed resting-place ; while, on the other hand, being or the one, singleness, subject, etc., themselves directly indicate conceptions. Furthermore, if speculative truths are stated about that subject [God], even then their content is devoid of the immanent notion, because that content is merely present in the form of a passive subject, and owing to this the speculative truths easily take on the character of mere edification. From this side, too, the obstacle, arising from the habit of putting the speculative predicate in the form of a proposition, instead of taking it as an inherent essential conception, is capable of being made greater or less by the mere way philosophical truths are put forward. Philosophical exposition, faithfully following its insight into the nature of speculative truth, must retain the dialectical form, and exclude everything which is not grasped conceptually and is a conception. As in the case of the procedure of ratiocination, the study of philosophy finds obstruction, too, in the un- VOL. I.— F 66 Phenomenology of Mind reasoning conceit that builds itself on well-established truths, which the possessor considers he has no need to return upon and reconsider, but rather takes to be fundamental, and thinks he can propound as well as decide and pass sentence by means thereof. In this regard, it is especially needful to make once again a serious business of philosophy. In all spheres of science, art, skill, and handicraft it is never doubted that, in order to master them, a considerable amount of trouble must be spent in learning and in being trained. A.S regards philosophy, on the contrary, there seems still an assumption prevalent that, though every one with eyes and fingers is not on that account in a position to make shoes if he only gets leather and a last, yet everybody understands how to philosophise straight away, and pass judgment on philosophy, simply because he possesses the criterion for doing so in his natural reason — as if he did not in the same way possess the standard for shoemaking too in his own foot. It seems as if the possession of philosophy lay just in the want of knowledge and study, as if philosophy left off where the latter began. It is commonly held to be a formal kind of knowledge devoid of all substantial content. There is a general failure to perceive that, in the case of any knowledge and any science, what is taken for truth, even as regards content, can only deserve the name of " truth " when philosophy has had a hand in its production. Let the other sciences try as much as they hke to get along by ratiocination or raisonnement without philosophy, they are unable to keep alive without it, or to have any spiritual significance and truth in them. As regards philosophy in its proper and genuine sense, we find put forward without any hesitation, as an entirely sufficient equivalent for the long course of mental discipHne — for that profound and fruitful process through which the human spirit attains to knowledge — the direct revelation of the divine and the healthy common sense of mankind, imtroubled and undisciplined by any other knowledge or by proper philosophical reflection. These are held to be a good substitute for real philosophy, much in the way as chicory is lauded as a substitute for coffee. It is not a very pleasing spectacle to observe uncultivated ignorance and barbarity of mind, with neither grace nor taste, without the capacity to concentrate its thoughts on an abstract proposition, still less on a connected statement of such propositions, confidently proclaiming itself to be intellectual freedom and toleration, and even the inspiration of genius. This last used once upon a time, as every one knows, to be all the rage in the case of poetry, as it is now in philosophy. Instead of poetry, however, the efforts of this form of inspiration, when it had any sense at all, resulted in the production of jejune prose, or, if it got beyond that, it produced raving nonsense. In the same way here in the case of philosophy ; philosophising by the hght of nature, which thinks itself too good for conceptual thinking, and, because of the want of it, takes itself to have direct intuitive ideas and poetical thoughts, — such philosophising trades in arbitrary combinations of an imagination merely disorganised through thinking — fictitious creations that are neither fish nor flesh, neither poetry nor philosophy. On the other hand again, when instinctive philosophy follows the more secure course prescribed by healthy 68 Phenomenology of Mind common sense, it supplies, at tlie very best, a rhetorical melange of commonplace truths. When it is charged with the triviahty of what it offers, it assures us, in reply, that the fullness and richness of its meaning lie deep down in its own heart, and that others must feel this too, since with such phrases as the " heart's natural innocence," " purity of conscience," and so on, it supposes it has expressed things that are ultimate and final, to which no one can take exception, and about which nothing further can be required. But the very problem in hand was just that the best must not be left behind hidden away in secret, but be brought out of the depths and set forth in the light of day. It could quite well from the start have spared itself this trouble of bringing forward ultimate and final truths of that sort ; they were long since to be found, say, in the Catechism, in popular proverbs, etc. It is an easy matter to take such truths in their indefinite and crooked inaccurate form, and in many cases to point out that the mind convinced of them is conscious of the very opposite truths. When it struggles to get itself out of the mental embarrassment thereby produced, it will tumble into further confusion, and possibly burst out with the assertion that in short and in fine the matter is settled, the truth is so and so, and anything else is mere " sophistry " — a password used by plain common sense against cultivated critical reason, hke the phrase " visionary dreaming," by which those ignorant of philosophy sum up its character once for all. Since the man of common sense appeals to his feehng, to an oracle within his breast, he is ready to meet any one who does not agree. He has simply to explain that he has no more to say to any one who does not find and feel the same as himself. In other words, he tramples the roots of humanity under foot. For the nature of hiunanity is to impel men to agree with one another, and its very existence hes simply in the exphcit reahsation of a community of conscious life. What is anti-human, the condition of mere animals, consists in keeping within the sphere of feeling pure and simple, and in being able to communicate only by way of feehng-states. When a man asks for a royal road to science, no more convenient and comfortable way can be mentioned to him than to put his trust in " healthy common sense " ; and in order, besides, to keep abreast of the times and advance with philosophy, let him read reviews of philosophical works, and even go the length of reading the prefaces and first paragraphs of the works themselves ; for the latter give the general principles on which everything turns, while the reviews, besides the historical references, provide over and above the critical judgment and appreciation, which, being a judgment passed on the work, goes farther than the work that is judged. This common way a man can take in his dressing-gown. But spiritual elation in the eternal, the sacred, the infinite, moves along the highway of truth in the robes of the high priest — a road, that, from the first, is itself immediate being in its innermost, the inspiration of profound and original ideas and flashes of elevated thought. All the same, those depths do not yet reveal the well-spring of inner reality ; nor, again, do these sky-rockets illumine the empyrean. True thoughts and scientific insight can only be won by the labour of the notion. Conceptions alone can produce universahty in the knowing process. This vmiversality is critically 70 Phenomenology of Mind developed and completely finished knowledge, and not the common indefiniteness and inadequacy of ordinary intelligence ; nor, again, is it that extraordinary kind of universahty where the powers and potencies of reason are spoiled and ruined by the indolence and vanity of genius ; it is truth successfully arrived at its own inherent native form, and capable of being the property of every self-conscious reason. Since I have taken the self-development of conceptions or notions to be the medium wherein science really exists, and since in those respects to which I have drawn attention as well as in others, current ideas about the nature of truth and the shape it assumes deviate from my view, and indeed are quite opposed to my position, it is not hkely that the consideration of all this will promise well for a favourable reception of an attempt to expound the system of science in this sense. In the meantime, I may call to mind that while e.g. the supreme merit of Plato's philosophy has sometimes been held to consist in his myths which are scientifically valueless, there have also been times, spoken of even as times of mere sentimentahty and emotion, when the AristoteHan philosophy has been respected on account of its speculative depth of insight, and when the Parmenides of Plato — perhaps the greatest hterary product of ancient dialectic — has been taken to be the positive expression of the divine life, the unveiling and disclosing of its inmost truth. I may reflect, too, that notwithstanding much cloudy obscurity which was the product of ecstasy, this misunderstood ecstasy was in point of fact meant to be nothing else than the activity of the pure notion ; furthermore, that what is best in the philosophy of our time takes its value to lie in its scientific character ; and even though others take a difierent view, it is only in virtue of its scientific character that recent philosophy really gets its worth acknowledged and accepted. Thus, then, I too may hope that this attempt to vindicate and claim science for conceptual thought, and systematically to develop and present science in this its own pecuhar medium, will manage to make a way for itself by the inherent truth of the result accomphshed. We may rest assured that it is the nature of truth to force its way to recognition when its time comes, and that it only appears when its time has come, and hence never appears too soon, and never finds a public that is not ripe to receive it ; and, further, we may be sure that the individual thinker requires this result to take place, in order to give him confidence in regard to what is no more as yet than a matter for himself singly and alone, and in order to find his assurance, which in the first instance merely belongs to a particular individual, accepted as something universal. In this connection, however, it is very often necessary to distinguish the public from those who take upon themselves to be its representatives and spokesmen. The pubhc takes up an attitude in many respects quite difierent from the latter, indeed, even opposed to them. Whereas the pubhc good-naturedly and generously will rather take the blame upon itself when a philosophical work is not quite acceptable or intelhgible to it, these " representatives," on the contrary, convinced of their own competence, put all the blame on the authors. The influence of the work on the pubhc is more silent than the action of those " representatives," who are like the dead burying their dead. While the general 72 Phenomenology of Mind level of insight at the present time is in the main more highly cultivated, its curiosity more quickened and alert, and its judgment more swiftly made up and pronomiced, so that the feet of those who will carry you out are already at the door : at the same time we have often to distinguish from all this the slower and more gradual effect which rectifies the direction of attention caught and compelled by imposing assurances, corrects, too, contemptuous censure, and after a httle provides a contemporary audience for one class, while another after a temporary vogue finds no audience with posterity any longer. For the rest, at a time when the universal nature of spiritual life has become so very much emphasised and strengthened, and the mere individual aspect has become, as it should be, correspondingly a matter of indiilerence, when, too, that universal aspect holds, by the entire range of its substance, the full measure of the wealth it has built up, and lays claim to it all, the share in the total work of mind that falls to the activity of any particular individual can only be very small. Because this is so, the individual must all the more forget himself, as in fact the very nature of science implies and requires that he should ; and he must, moreover, become and do what he can. But all the less must be demanded of him, just as he must expect the less from himself, and ask the less for himself. INTRODUCTION IT is natural to suppose that, before philosopliy enters upon its subject proper — namely, the actual knowledge of what truly is — it is necessary to come first to an understanding concerning knowledge, which is looked upon as the instrument by which to take possession of the Absolute, or as the means through which to get a sight of it. The precaution seems legitimate, partly because there are various kinds of knowledge, among which one might be better adapted than another for the attainment of our purpose, — and thus a wrong choice is possible : partly, again, because knowing is a faculty of a definite kind and with a determinate range, without the more precise determination of its nature and limits we might take hold on clouds of error instead of the heaven of truth. This apprehensiveness is sure to pass even into the conviction that the whole enterprise which sets out to secure for consciousness by means of knowledge what exists fer se, is in its very nature absurd ; and that between knowledge and the Absolute there lies a boundary which completely cuts o£E the one from the other. For if knowledge is the instrument by which to get possession of absolute Reahty, the suggestion immediately occurs that the application of an instrument to anything does not leave it as it is for itself, but rather entails in the process and has in 74 Phenomenology of Mind view a moulding and alteration of it. Or, again, if knowledge is not an instrument wliich we actively employ, but a kind of passive medium through wliich the light of the truth reaches us, then here, too, we do not receive it as it is in itself, but as it is through and in this medium. In either case we employ a means which immediately brings about the very opposite of its own end ; or, rather, the absurdity lies in making use of any means at all. It seems indeed open to us to find in the knowledge of the way in which the instrument operates, a remedy for this parlous state ; for thereby it becomes possible to remove from the result the part which, in our idea of the Absolute received through that instrument, belongs to the instrument, and thus to get the truth in its purity. But this improvement would, as a matter of fact, only bring us back to the point where we were before. If we take away again from a definitely formed thing that which the instrument has done in the shaping of it, then the thing (in this case the Absolute) stands before us once more just as it was previous to all this trouble, which, as we now see, was superfluous. If the Absolute were only to be brought on the whole nearer to us by this agency, without any change being wrought in it, hke a bird caught by a limestick, it would certainly scorn a trick of that sort, if it were not in its very nature, and did it not wish to be, beside us from the start. For a trick is what knowledge in such a case would be, since by all its busy toil and trouble it gives itself the air of doing something quite different from bringing about a relation that is merely immediate, and so a waste of time to estabhsh. Or, again, if the examination of knowledge, which we represent as a medium, makes us acquainted with tke law of its refraction, it is likewise useless to eliminate tkis examination from tke result. For knowledge is not tke divergence of tke ray, but tke ray itself by wkick tke trutk comes in contact witk us ; and if tkis be removed, tke bare direction or tke empty place would alone be indicated. Meanwkile, if tke fear of falkng into error introduces an element of distrust into science, wkick witkout any scruples of tkat sort goes to work and actually does know, it is not easy to understand wky, conversely, a distrust skould not be placed in tkis very distrust, and wky we skould not take care lest tke fear of error is not just tke initial error. As a matter of fact, tkis fear presupposes sometking, indeed a great deal, as trutk, and supports its scruples and consequences on wkat skould itself be examined beforekand to see wketker it is trutk. It starts witk ideas of Imowledge as an instrument, and as a medium ; and presupposes a distinction of ourselves from tkis knowledge. More especially it takes for granted tkat tke Absolute stands on one side, and tkat knowledge on tke otker side, by itself and cut off from tke Absolute, is still sometking real ; in otker words, tkat knowledge, wkick, by being outside tke Absolute, is certainly also outside trutk, is nevertkeless true — a position wkick, wkile calkng itself fear of error, makes itself known ratker as fear of tke trutk. Tkis conclusion comes from tke fact tkat tke Absolute alone is true or tkat tke True is alone absolute. It may be set aside by making tke distinction tkat a knowledge wkick does not indeed know tke Absolute as science wants to do, is none tke less true too; and tkat knowledge in general, tkougk it may 76 Phenomenology of Mind possibly be incapable of grasping the Absolute, can still be capable of truth of another kind. But we shall see as we proceed that random talk like this leads in the long run to a confused distinction between an absolute truth and a truth of some other sort, and that " absolute," " knowledge," and so on, are words which presuppose a meaning that has first to be got at. With suchlike useless ideas and expressions about knowledge, as an instrument to take hold of the Absolute, or as a medium through which we have a ghmpse of truth, and so on (external relations to which all these ideas of a knowledge which is divided from the Absolute and an Absolute divided from knowledge m the last resort lead), we need not concern ourselves. Nor need we trouble about the evasive pretexts which create the incapacity of science out of the presupposition of such relations, in order at once to be rid of the toil of science, and to assume the air of serious and zealous effort about it. Instead of being troubled with giving answers to all these, they may be straightway rejected as adventitious and arbitrary ideas; and the use which is here made of words like " absolute," "knowledge," as also "objective" and "subjective," and innumerable others, whose meaning is assumed to be famihar to everyone, might well be regarded as so much deception. For to give out that their significance is universally familiar, and that every one indeed possesses their notion, rather looks like an attempt to dispense with the only important matter, which is just to give this notion. With better right, on the contrary, we might spare ourselves the trouble of taking any notice at all of such ideas and ways of talking which would have the effect of warding off science altogether ; for they make a mere empty show of knowledge which at once vanishes when science comes on the scene. But science, in the very fact that it comes on the scene, is itself a phenomenon ; its " coming on the scene " is not yet itself carried out in all the length and breadth of its truth. In this regard, it is a matter of indifference whether we consider that it (science) is the phenomenon because it makes its appearance alongside another kind of knowledge, or call that other untrue knowledge its process of appearing. Science, however, must Kberate itself from this phenomenality, and it can only do so by turning against it. For, science cannot simply reject a form of knowledge which is not true, and treat this as a common view of things, and then assure us that itself is an entirely different kind of knowledge, and holds the other to be of no accoimt at all ; nor can it appeal to the fact that in this other there are presages of a better. By giviag that assurance it would declare its force and value to he in its bare existence ; but the untrue knowledge appeals hkewise to the fact that it is, and assures us that to it science is nothing. One barren assurance, however, is of just as much value as another. Still less can science appeal to the presages of a better, which are to be found present in untrue knowledge and are there pointing the way towards science ; for it would, on the one hand, be appealing again in the same way to a merely existent fact ; and, on the other, it would be appealing to itself, to the way in which it exists in untrue knowledge, i.e. to a bad form of its own existence, to its appearance, rather than to its real and true nature {an und fur sich). For this 78 Phenomenology of Mind reason we shall here undertake the exposition of knowledge as a phenomenon. Now because this exposition has for its object only phenomenal knowledge, the exposition itself seems not to be science, free, self-moving in the shape proper to itself, but may, from this point of view, be taken as the pathway of the natural consciousness which is pressing forward to true knowledge. Or it can be regarded as the path of the soul, which is traversing the series of its own forms of embodiment, hke stages appointed for it by its own nature, that it may possess the clearness of spiritual hfe when, through the complete experience of its own self, it arrives at the knowledge of what it is in itself. Natural consciousness will prove itself to be only knowledge in principle or not real knowledge. Since, however, it immediately takes itself to be the real and genuine knowledge, this pathway has a negative significance for it; what is a reahsation of the notion of knowledge means for it rather the ruin and overthrow of itself ; for on this road it loses its own truth. Because of that, the road can be looked on as the path of doubt, or more properly a highway of despair. For what happens there is not what is usually imderstood by doubting, a jostling against this or that supposed truth, the outcome of which is again a disappearance in due course of the doubt and a return to the former truth, so that at the end the matter is taken as it was before. On the contrary, that pathway is the conscious insight into the untruth of the phenomenal knowledge, for which that is the most real which is after all only the unreaUsed notion. On that account, too, this thoroughgoing scepticism is not what doubt- less earnest zeal for truth and science fancies it tas equipped itself with in order to be ready to deal with them, — viz. : the resolve, in science, not to dehver itself over to the thoughts of others on their mere authority, but to examine everything for itself, and only follow its own conviction, or, still better, to produce everything itself and hold only its own act for true. The series of shapes, which consciousness traverses on this road, is rather the detailed history of the process of training and educating consciousness itself up to the level of science. That resolve presents this mental development, (Bildung) in the simple form of an intended purpose, as immediately finished and complete, as having taken place ; this pathway, on the other hand, is, as opposed to this abstract intention, or untruth, the actual carrying out of that process of development. To follow one's own conviction is certainly more than to hand oneself over to authority ; but by the conversion of opinion held on authority into opinion held out of personal conviction, the content of what is held is not necessarily altered, and truth has not thereby taken the place of error. If we stick to a system of opinion and prejudice resting on the authority of others, or upon personal conviction, the one differs from the other merely in the conceit which animates the latter. Scepticism, directed to the whole compass of phenomenal consciousness, on the contrary, makes mind for the first time quahfied to test what truth is ; since it brings about a despair regarding what are called natural views, thoughts, and opinions, which it is matter of indifference to call personal or belonging to others, and with which the consciousness, that proceeds straight 80 Phencnnenology of Mind away to criticise and test, is still filled and hampered, thus being, as a matter of fact, incapable of what it wants to undertake. The completeness of the forms of unreal consciousness will be brought about precisely through the necessity of the advance and the necessity of their connection with one another. To make this comprehensible we may remark, by way of preliminary, that the exposition of untrue consciousness in its untruth is not a merely negative process. Such a one-sided view of it is what the natural consciousness generally adopts ; and a knowledge, which makes this one-sidedness its essence, is one of those shapes assumed by incomplete consciousness which falls into the coujse of the inquiry itself and will come before us there. For this view is scepticism, which always sees in the result only pure nothingness, and abstracts from the fact that this nothing is determinate, is the nothing of that out of wliicJi it comes as a resiilt. Nothing, however, is only, in fact, the true result, when taken as the nothing of what it comes from ; it is thus itself a determinate nothing, and has a content. The scepticism which ends with the abstraction " nothing " or " emptiness " can advance from this not a step farther, but must wait and see whether there is possibly anything new offered, and what that is, — in order to cast it into the same abysmal void. When once, on the other hand, the result is apprehended, as it truly is, as determinate negation, a new form has thereby immediately arisen ; and in the negation the transition is made by which the progress through the complete succession of forms comes about of itself. The goal, however, is fixed for Imowledge just as Introduction S^ necessarily as the succession in the process. The terminus is at that point where knowledge is no longer compelled to go beyond itself, where it finds its own self, and the notion corresponds to the object and the object to the notion. The progress towards this goal consequently is without a halt and at no earUer stage is satisfaction to be found. That which is confined to a life of nature is unable of itself to go beyond its immediate existence; but by something other than itself it is forced beyond that ; and to be thus wrenched out of its setting is its death. Consciousness, however, is to itself its own notion ; thereby it immediately transcends what is limited, and, since this latter belongs to it, consciousness transcends its own self. Along with the particular there is at the same time set up the " beyond," were this only beside what is limited, as in the case of spatial intuition. Consciousness, therefore, suffers this violence at its own hands ; it destroys its own limited satisfaction. At the feeling of this violence, anxiety for the truth may well withdraw, and struggle to preserve for itself that which is in danger of being lost. But it can find no rest. Should that anxious fearfulness wish to remain always in unthinking indolence, thought will agitate the thoughtlessness, its restlessness will disturb that indolence. Or let it take its stand as a form of sentiimentahty which assures us it finds everything good in its kind, and this assurance likewise will suffer violence at the hands of reason, which finds something not good just because and in so far as it is a kind. Or, again, fear of the truth may conceal itself from itself and others behind the pretext that precisely burning zeal for the very truth makes it so difficult, VOL. I.— G 8? Phenomenology of Mind nay impossible, to find any other truth, except that of which alone vanity is capable — that of being ever so much cleverer than any ideas, which one gets from oneself or others, could make possible. This sort of conceit which imderstands how to behttle every truth and turn away from it back into itself, and gloats over this its own private understanding, which always knows how to dissipate every possible thought, and to find, instead of all the content, merely the barren Ego — this is a satisfaction which must be left to itself ; for it flees the imiversal and seeks only an isolated existence on its own account {Fiirsicliseyn). As the foregoing has been stated, provisionally and in general, concerning the manner and the necessity of the process of the inquiry, it may also be of further service to make some observations regarding the method of carrying this out. This exposition, viewed as a process of relating science to phenomenal knowledge, and as an inquiry and critical examination into the reality of knowing, does not seem able to be effected without some presupposition which is laid down as •in ultimate criterion. For an examination consists in applying an accepted standard, and, on the final agreement or disagreement therewith of what is tested, deciding whether the latter is right or wrong ; and bhe standard in general, and science as well, were this the criterion, is thereby accepted as the essence or inherently real (Ansich). But, here, where science first appears on the scene, neither science nor any sort of standard has justified itself as the essence or ultimate reality ; and without this no examination seems able to be instituted. This contradiction and the removal of it will become more definite it, to begin witti, we call to mind tlie abstract determinations of knowledge and of truth, as they are found in consciousness. Consciousness, we find, distinguishes from itself something, to which at the same time it relates itself ; or, to use the current expression, there is something for consciousness ; and the determinate form of this process of relating, or of there being something for a consciousness, is knowledge. But from this being for another we distinguish being in itself or fer se ; what is related to knowledge is likewise distinguished from it, and posited as also existing outside this relation ; the aspect of being per se or in itself is called Truth. What really lies in these determinations does not further concern us here ; for since the object of our inquiry is phenomenal knowledge, its determinations are also taken up, in the first instance, as they are immediately offered to us. And they are offered to us very much in the way we have just stated. If now oitr inquiry deals with the truth of knowledge, it appears feljat we are inquiring what knowledge is in itself. But "In this inquiry knowledge is our object, it is for us ; and the essential nature (Ansich) of knowledge, were this to come to hght, would be rather its being for us : what we should assert to be its essence would rather be, not the truth of knowledge, but only om* knowledge of it. The essence or the criterion would he in us, and what was to be compared with this standard, and decided upon as a result of this comparison, would not necessarily have to recognise that criterion. But the nature of the object which we are examining surmounts this separation, or semblance of separation, 84 Phenomenology of Mind and presupposition. Consciousness furnislies its own criterion in itself, and the inquiry will thereby be a comparison of itself with its own self ; for the distinction, just made, falls inside itself. In consciousness there is one element for an other, or, in general, consciousness impHcates the specific character of the moment of knowledge. At the same time this " other " is to consciousness not merely for it, but also outside this relation, or has a being in itself, i.e. there is the moment of truth. Thus in what consciousness inside itself declares to be the essence or truth we have the standard which itself sets up, and by which we are to measure its l^TL0wledge. Suppose we call knowledge the notion, and the essence or truth "being" or the object, then the examination consists in seeing whether the notion corresponds with the object. But if we call the inner nature of the object, or what it is in itself, the notion, and, on the other side, understand by object the notion qua object, i.e. the way the notion is for an other, then the examination consists in our seeing whether the object corresponds to its own notion. It is clear, of course, that both of these processes are the same. The essential fact, however, to be borne in mind throughout the whole inquiry is that both these moments, notion and object, " being for another " and " being in itself," themselves fall within that knowledge which we are examining. Consequently we do not require to bring standards with us, nor to apply our fancies and thoughts in the inquiry; and just by our leaving these aside we are enabled to treat and discuss the subject as it actually is in itself and for itself, as it is in its complete reahty. But not only in this respect, that notion and object, the criterion and what is to be tested, are ready to hand in consciousness itself, is any addition of ours superfluous, but we are also spared the trouble of compariag these two and of making an examination in the strict sense of the term; so that in this respect, too, since consciousness tests and examines itself, all we are left to do is simply and solely to look on. For consciousness is, on the one hand, consciousness of the object, on the other, consciousness of itself ; consciousness of what to it is true, and consciousness of its knowledge of that truth. Since both are for the same consciousness, it is itself their comparison; it is the same consciousness that decides and knows whether its knowledge of the object corresponds with this object or not. The object, it is true, appears only to be in such wise for consciousness as consciousness knows it. Consciousness does not seem able to get, so to say, behind it as it is, not for consciousness, but in itself, and consequently seems also unable to test knowledge by it. But just because consciousness has, in general, knowledge of an object, there is already present the distinction that the inherent nature, what the object is in itself, is one thing to consciousness, while knowledge, or the being of the object for consciousness, is another moment. Upon this distinction, which is present as a fact, the examination turns. Should both, when thus compared, not correspond, consciousness seems bound to alter its knowledge, in order to make it fit the object. But in the alteration of the knowledge, the object itself also, in point of fact, is altered ; for the knowledge which existed was essentially a knowledge of the object ; with change in the knowledge, the object also becomes 86 Phenomenology of Mind different, since it belonged essentially to this knowledge. Hence consciousness comes to find that what formerly to it was the essence is not what is fer se, or what was fer se was only fer se for consciousness. Since, then, in the case of its object consciousness finds its knowledge not corresponding with this object, the object hkewise fails to hold out ; or the standard for examining is altered when that, whose criterion this standard was to be, does not hold its ground in the course of the examination ; and the examination is not only an examination of knowledge, but also of the criterion used in the process. This dialectic process which consciousness executes on itself — on its knowledge as well as on its object — in the sense that out of it the new and true object arises, is precisely what is termed Experience. In this connection, there is a moment in the process just mentioned which should be brought into more decided prominence, and by which a new hght is cast on the scientific aspect of the following exposition. Consciousness knows something ; this something is the essence or what is fer se. This object, however, is also the fer se, the inherent reality, for consciousness. Hence comes the ambiguity of this truth. Consciousness, as we see, has now two objects ; one is the first fer se, the second is the existence for consciousness of this fer se. The last object appears at first sight to be merely the reflection of consciousness into itself, i.e. an idea not of an object, but solely of its knowledge of that first object. But, as was already indicated, by that very process the first object is altered ; it ceases to be what 'is fer se, and becomes consciously something which is fer se only for consciousness. Consequently, then, Introduction §7' wtat this real fer se is for consciousness is truth : which, however, means that this is the essential reahty, or the object which consciousness has. This new object contains the nothingness of the first ; the new object is the experience concerning that first object. In this treatment of the course of experience, there is an element in virtue of which, it does not seem to be in agreement with what is ordinarily understood by experience. The transition from the first object and the knowledge of it to the other object, in regard to which we say we have had experience, was so stated tbat the knowledge of the first object, the existence for consciousness of the first ens per se, is itself to be the second object. But it usually seems that we learn by experience the untruth of our first notion by appealing to some other object which we may happen to find casually and externally; so that, in general, what we have is merely the bare and simple apprehension of what is in and for itself. On the view above given, however, the new object is seen to have come about by a transformation or conversion of consciousness itself. This way of looking at the matter is our doing, what we contribute ; by its means the series of experiences through which consciousness passes, is lifted into a scientifically constituted sequence, but this does not exist for the consciousness we contemplate and consider. We have here, however, the same sort of circumstance, again, of which we spoke a short time ago when dealing with the relation of this exposition to scepticism, viz. that the result which at any time comes about in the case of an untrue mode of knowledge cannot possibly collapse into an empty nothing, but must necessarily be taken as the negation of that of which it is a result 8S Phenomenology of Mind — a result which contains what truth the preceding mode of knowledge has in it. What we have here is presented to us in this form : — since what at first appeared as object is reduced, when it passes into consciousness, to what knowledge takes it to be, and the ultimate entity, the real in itself, becomes what this entity per se is for consciousness; this latter is the new object, whereupon there appears also a new mode or embodiment of consciousness, of which the essence is something other than that of the preceding mode. It is this circumstance which carries forward the whole succession of the modes or attitudes of consciousness in their own necessity. It is only this necessity, this origination of the new object — which offers itself to consciousness without consciousness knowing how it comes by it— that to us, who watch the process, is to be seen going on, so to say, behind its back. Thereby there enters into its process a moment of being per se or of beiag for us, which is not expressly presented to that consciousness which is in the grip of experience itself. The content, however, of what we see arising, exists for it, and we lay hold of and comprehend merely its formal character, i.e. its hare origination ; for it, what has thus arisen has merely the character of object, while, for us, it appears at the same time as a process and coming into being. In virtue of that necessity this pathway to science is itself eo if so science, and is, moreover, as regards its content. Science of the Experience of Consciousness. The experience which consciousness has concerning itself can, by its essential principle, embrace nothing less than the entire system of consciousness, the whole realm of the truth of mind, and in such wise that the aaoments of truth are set forth in the specific and pecuhar character they here possess — i.e. not as abstract pure moments, but as they are for consciousness, or as consciousness itself appears in its relation to them, and in virtue of which they are moments of the whole, are Bmbodiments or modes of consciousness. In pressing forward to its true form of existence, consciousness will come to a point at which it lays aside its semblance of being hampered with what is foreign to it, with what is only for it and exists as an other ; it will reach a position where its appearance becomes identified with its essence, where, in consequence, its exposition coincides with just this very point, this very stage of the science proper of mind. And, finally, when it grasps this its own essence, it will indicate the nature of absolute knowledge itself. A. CONSCIOUSNESS CEETAINTY OE KNOWLEDGE AT THE LEVEL OF SENSE —THE "THIS," AND "MEANING." THE knowledge, which is at the start or iromediately our object, can be nothing else than just that which is immediate knowledge, knowledge of the immediate, of what is. We have, in dealing with it, to proceed, too, in an immediate way, to accept what is given, not altering anything in it as it is presented before us, and keeping mere apprehension (Auffassen) free from conceptual comprehension (Begreifen) The concrete content, which sensuous certainty furnishes, makes this prima facie appear to be the richest kind of knowledge, to be even a knowledge of endless wealth — a wealth to which we can as little find any limit when we traverse its extent in space and time, where that content is presented before us, as when we take a fragment out of the abundance it offers us and by dividing and dividing seek to penetrate its intent. Besides that, it seems to be the truest, the most authentic knowledge : for it has not as yet dropped anything from the object ; it has the object before itself in its entirety and completeness. This bare fact of certainty, however, is really and admittedly the abstractest and the poorest kind of truth. It merely says regarding what it knows : it is ; and its truth contains solely tke heing of tlie fact it knows. Consciousness, on its part, in the case of this form of certainty, takes the shape merely of pure Ego. In other words, I, in such a case, am merely qua pure This, and the object likewise is merely qua pure This. I, this particular conscious I, am certain of this fact before me, not because I qua consciousness have developed myself in connection with it and in manifold ways set thought to work about it : and not, again, because the fact, the thing, of which I am certain, in virtue of its having a multitude of distinct quahties, was replete with possible modes of relation and a variety of connections with other things. Neither has anything to do with the truth sensuous certainty contains : neither the I nor the thing has here the meaning of a manifold relation with a variety of other things, of mediation in a variety of ways. The I does not contain or imply a manifold of ideas, the I here does not think: nor does the thing mean what has a multiphcity of qualities. Rather, the thing, the fact, is ; and it is merely because it is. It is — that is the essential point for senseknowledge, and that bare fact of heing, that simple immediacy, constitutes its truth. In the same way the certainty qua relation, the certainty " of " something, is an immediate pure relation ; consciousness is I — nothing more, a pure this ; the individual consciousnes knows a pure this, or knows what is individual. But, when we look closely, there is a good deal more implied in that bare pure being, which constitutes the kernel of this form of certainty, and is given out by it as its truth. A concrete actual certainty of sense is not merely this pure immediacy, but an example, an instance, of that immediacy. Amongst the innumerable 92 Phenomenology of Mind distinctions that here come to hght, we find in all cases the fundamental difference — viz. that in sense-experience pure being at once breaks up into the two " thises," as we have called them, one this as I, and one as object. When we reflect on this distinction, it is seen that neither the one nor the other is merely immediate, merely is in sense-certainty, but is at the same time mediated : I have the certainty through the other, viz. through the actual fact ; and this, again, exists in that certainty through an other, viz. through the I. It is not only we who make this distinction of essential truth and particular example, of essence and instance, immediacy and mediation ; we find it in sense-certainty itself, and it has to be taken up in the form in which it exists there, not as we have just determined it. One of them is put forward in it as existing in simple immediacy, as the essential reality, the object. The other, however, is put forward as the non-essential, as mediated, something which is not per se in the certainty, but there through something else, ego, a state of knowledge which only knows the object because the object is, and which can as well be as not be. The object, however, is the real truth, is the essential reahty ; it is, quite indifferent to whether it is known or not ; it remains and stands even though it is not known, while the knowledge does not exist if the object is not there. We have thiis to consider as to the object, whether in point of fact it does exist in sense-certainty itself as such an essential reality as that certainty gives it out to be ; whether its meaning and notion, which is to be essential reahty, corresponds to the way it is present in that certainty. We have for that purpose not to reflect about it and ponder what it might be in truth, but to deal with it merely as sense-certainty contains it. Sense-certainty itself has thus to be asked: What is the This ? If we take it in the two-fold form of its existence, as the Now and as the Here, the dialectic it has in it will take a form as intelhgible as the This itself. To the question. What is the Now ? we reply, for example, the Now is night-time. To test the truth of this certainty of sense, a simple experiment is all we need : write that truth down. A truth cannot lose anything by being written down, and just as httle by our preserving and keeping it. If we look again at the truth we have written down, look at it noiv, at this noon-time, we shall have to say it has turned stale and become out of date. The Now that is night is kept fixed, i.e. it is treated as what it is given out to be, as something which is ; but it proves to be rather a something which is not. The Now itself no doubt maintains itself, but as what is not night ; similarly in its relation to the day which the Now is at present, it maintains itself as something that is also not day, or as altogether something negative. This self-maintaining Now is therefore not something immediate but something mediated ; for, qua something that remains and preserves itself, it is determined through and hy means of the fact that something else, namely day and night, is not. Thereby it is just as much as ever it was before, Now, and in being this simple fact, it is indifferent to what is still associated with it ; just as little as night or day is its being, it is just as truly also day and night ; it is not in the least affected by this otherness through which it is what it 94 Phenomenology of Mind is. A simple entity of this sort, whicii is by and through negation, which is neither this nor that, which / is a not-this, and with equal indiiTerence this as well as that — a thing of this kind we call a Universal. The Universal is therefore ia point of fact the truth of sensecertainty, the true content of sense-experience. It is as a universal, too, that we give utterance to sensuous fact. What we say is : " This," i.e. the universal this ; or we say : " it is," i.e. being in general. Of course we do not present before our mind in saying so the universal this, or being in general, but we utter what is universal ; in other words, we do not actually and absolutely say what in this sense-certainty we really mean. Language, however, as we see, is the more truthful ; in it we ourselves refute directly and at once our own " meaning " ; and since universahty is the real truth of sense-certainty, and language merely expresses this truth, it is not possible at all for us even to express in words any sensuous existence which we " mean." The same will be the case when we take the Here, the other form of the This. The Here is e.g. the tree. I turn about and this truth has disappeared and has changed round into its opposite : the Here is not a tree, but a house. The Here itself does not disappear ; it is and remains in the disappearance of the house, tree, and so on, and is indifferently house, tree. The This is shown thus again to be mediated simflicity, in other words, to be universality. Pure being, then, remains as the essential element for this sense-certainty, since sense-certainty in its very nature proves the universal to be the truth of its object. But that pure being is not in the form of something immediate, but of something in which the process of negation and mediation is essential. Consequently it is not what we intend or " mean " by being, but being with the characteristic that it is an abstraction, the purely universal ; and our intended " meaning," which takes the truth of sense-certainty to be not something universal, is alone left standing in contrast to this empty, indifferent Now and Here. If we compare the relation in which knowledge and the object first stood with the relation they have come to assume in this result, it is found to be just the reverse of what first appeared. The object, which professed to be the essential reahty, is now the nonessential element of sense-certainty ; for the universal, which the object has come to be, is no longer such as the object essentially was to be for sense-certainty. The certainty is now found to lie in the opposite element, namely in knowledge, which formerly was the non-essential factor. Its truth lies in the object as my (meinem) object, or lies in the " meaning " (meinen), in what I " mean " ; it is, because I know it. Sense- certainty is thus indeed banished from the object, but it is not yet thereby done away with ; it is merely forced back into the I. We have still to see what experience reveals regarding its reality in this sense. The force of its truth thus Hes now in the I, in the, immediate fact of my being conscious of seeing, hearing, ( and so on ; the disappearance of the particular Now ' and Here that we " mean " is prevented by the fact that / keep hold on them. The Now is daytime, because I see it; the Here is a tree for a similar reason. Sensecertainty, however, goes through, in this connection, 96 Phenomenology of Mind the same dialectic process as in the former case. I, tins I, see the tree, and assert the tree to be the Here ; another I, however, sees the house and maintains the Here is not a tree but a house. Both truths have the same authenticity — the immediacy of seeing and the certainty and assurance both have as to their specific way of knowing ; but the one certainty disappears in the other. In all this, what does not disappear is the I qua universal, whose seeing is neither the seeing of this tree nor of this house, but just seeing simpliciter, which is mediated through the negation of this house, etc., and, in being so, is all the same simple and indifferent to what is associated with it, the house, the tree, and so on. I is merely universal, like Now, Here, or This in general. No doubt I " mean " an individual I, but just as little as I am able to say what I " mean " by Now, Here, so it is impossible in the case of the I too. By saying " this Here," " this Now," " an individual thing," I say all Thises, Heres, Nows, or Individuals. In the same way when I say " I," " this individual I," I say quite generally " all I's," every one is what I say, every one is " I," this individual I. When philosophy is requested, by way of putting it to a crucial test — a test which it could not pqssibly sustain — to " deduce," to " construe," " to find a priori," or however it is put, a so-called this thing, or this particular man,'* it is quite fair to ask that this demand should say what " this thing," or what " this I " it means : but to say this is quite impossible. Sense-certainty discovers by_ej;perimce, therefore, that its essential nature lies neither in the object nor * Cf. Encvclo. § 250. in the I ; and that the immediacy pecuhar to it is neither an immediacy of the one nor of the other. For, in the case of both, what I "mean" is rather something non-essential ; and the object and the I are universals, in which that Now and Here and I, which I "mean," do not hold out, do not exist. We arrive in this way at the result, that we have to put the whole of sense-certainty as its essential reahty, and no longer merely one of its moments, as happened in both cases, where first the object as against the I, and then the I, was to be its true reality. Thus it is only the whole sense- certainty itself which persists therein as immediacy, and in consequence excludes from itself all the opposition which in the foregoing had a place there. This pure immediacy, then, has nothing more to do with the fact of otherness, with Here in the form of a tree passing into a Here that is not a tree, with Now in the sense of day-time changing into a Now that is night-time, or with there being an other I to which something else is object. Its truth stands fast as a self-identical relation making no distinction of essential and non-essential, between I and object, and into which, therefore, in general, no distinction can find its way. I, this I, assert, then, the Here as tree, and do not turn round so that for me Here might become not a tree, and I take no notice of the fact that another I finds the Here as not-tree, or that I myself at some other time take the Here as not-tree, the Now as not-day. I am directly conscious, I intuit and nothing more, 1 1 am pure intuition ; I am — seeing, looking. For myself I stand by the fact, the Now is day-time, or, again, by the fact the Here is tree, and, again, do not compare Here and Now themselves with one another ; I take VOL. I.— H 98 Phenomenology of Mind my stand on one immediate relation : the Now day. Since, then, this certainty will cease to exist if m^ direct its attention to a Now that is night or an I to whoi it is night, let us go to it and try to point to the No that is asserted. We must let ourselves foint it oh for the truth of this immediate relation is the trul of this ego which restricts itself to a Now or a Here. Were we to examine this truth afterwards, or stand at a distance from it, it would have no meaning at all ; for that would do away with the immediacy, which is of its essence. We have therefore to enter the same point of time or of space, indicate them, show them to ourselves, i.e. turn ourselves into the very same I, the very same This, which is the subject knowing with certainty. Let us, then, see how that immediate is constituted, which is shown to us. The Now is pointed out ; this Now. " Now " ; it has already ceased to be when it is pointed out. The Now that is, is other than the one indicated, and we see that the Now is just this — to be no longer the very time when it is. The Now as it is shown to us is one that has been, and that is its truth ; it does not have the truth of being, of something that is. No doubt this is true, that it has been ; but what has been is in point of fact not genuinely real, it is not, and the point in question concerned what is, concerned being. In thus pointing out the Now we see then merely a process which takes the following course : First I point out the Now, and it is asserted to be the truth. I point it out, however, as something that has been, or as something cancelled and done away with. I thus annul and pass beyond that first truth and in the second place I now assert as the second truth that it has been, that it is superseded. But, thirdly, what has been is not ; I then supersede, cancel, its having been, the fact of its being annulled, the second truth, negate thereby the negation of the Now and return in so doing to the first position : that Now is. The Now and pointing out the Now are thus so constituted that neither the one nor the other is an immediate simple fact, but a process with diverse moments in it. A This is set up ; it is, however, rather an other tliat is set up ; the This is superseded : and this otherness, this cancelhng of the former, is itself again annulled, and so turned back to the first. But this first, reflected thus into itself, is not exactly the same as it was to begin with, namely something immediate : rather it is a something reflectedinto-self, a simple entity which remains in its otherness, what it is : a Now which is any number of Nows. And that is the genuinely true Now ; the Now is simple daytime which has many Nows within it — hours. A Now of that sort, again — an hour — is similarly many minutes ; and this Now — a minute — in the same way many Nows and so on. Showing, indicating, pointing out [the Now] is thus itself the very process which expresses what the Now in truth really is : namely a result, or a plurality of Nows all taken together. And the pointing out is the way of getting to know, of experiencing, that Now is a universal. The Here poiuted out, which I keep hold of, is hkewise a this Here which, in fact, is not this Here, but a Before and Behind, an Above and Below, a Eight and Left. The Above is itself likewise this manifold otherness — above, below, etc. The Here, which 100 Phenomenology of Mind was to be pointed out, disappears in other Heres, and these disappear similarly. What is pointed out, held fast, and is permanent, is a negative This, which only is so when the Heres are taken as they should be, but therein cancel one another ; it is a simple complex of many Heres. The Here that is " meant " would be the point. But it is not : rather, when it is pointed out as being, as having existence, that very act of pointing out proves it to be not immediate knowledge, but a process, a movement from the Here " meant " through a plurality of Heres to the universal Here, which is a simple plurality of Heres, just as day is a simple plurality of Nows. It is clear from all this that the dialectic process involved in sense-certainty is nothing else than the mere history of its process — of its experience ; and sensecertainty itself is nothing else than simply this history. The naive consciousness, too, for that reason, is of itself always coming to this result, which is the real truth in this case, and is always having experience of it : but is always forgetting it again and beginning the process all over. It is therefore astonishing when, in defiance of this experience, it is announced as " universal experience " — nay, even as a philosophical doctrine, the outcome, in fact, of scepticism — that the reality or being of external things in the sense of " Thises," particular sense objects, has absolute validity and truth for consciousness. One who makes such an assertion really does not know what he is saying, does not know that he is stating the opposite of what he wants to say. The truth for consciousness of a " This " of sense is said to be universal experience ; but the very opposite is universal experience. Every consciousness of itself cancels again, as soon as made, such a truth as e.g. the Here is a tree, or the Now is noon, and expresses the very opposite : the Here is not a tree but a house. And similarly it straightway cancels again the assertion which here annuls the first, and which is also just such an assertion of a sensuous This. And in all sense-certainty what we find by experience is in truth merely, as we have seen, that " This " is a universal, the very opposite of what that assertion maintained to be universal experience. We may be permitted here, in this appeal to universal experience, to anticipate * with a reference to the practical sphere. In this connection we may answer those who thus insist on the truth and certainty of the reality of objects of sense, by saying that they had better be sent back to the most elementary school of wisdom, the ancient Eleusinian mysteries of Ceres and Bacchus ; they have not yet learnt the inner secret of the eating of bread and the drinking of wine. For those who are initiated into these mysteries not only come to doubt the being of things of sense, but get into a state of despair about them altogether ; and they themselves partly bring about the nothingness of those things, partly they see those things accomplish their own nothingness. Even animals are not shut off from this wisdom ; but show they are deeply initiated into it. For they do not stand stock still before things of sense as if these were things fer se, with being in themselves : they despair of this reality altogether, and in complete assurance of the nothingness of things they fall-to without more ado and eat them up. And all nature proclaims, as animals do, these open secrets, these * Cf. Analysis of Desire, p. IGG fF. 102 Phenomenology of Mind mysteries revealed to all, which teach what the truth of things of sense is. Those who put forward such assertions really themselves say, if we bear in mind what we remarked before, the direct opposite of what they mean : — a fact which is perhaps best able to bring them to reflect on the nature of the certainty of sense-experience. They speak of the " existence " of external objects, which can be more precisely characterised as actual, absohitely particular, wholly personal, individual things, each of them not like anything or anyone else ; this is the existence which they say has absolute certainty and truth. They " mean " this bit of paper I am writing on, or rather have written on : but they do not say what they " mean." If they really wanted to say this bit of paper which they "mean," and they wanted to say so, that is impossible, because the This of sense, which is " meant," cannot be reached by language, which belongs to consciousness, i.e. to what is inherently universal. In the very attempt to say it, it would, therefore, cruinble in their hands ; those who have begun to describe it would not be able to finish doing so : they would have to hand it over to others, who would themselves in the last resort have to confess to speaking about a thing that has no being. They " mean," then, doubtless this bit of paper here, which is quite different from that bit over there ; but they speak of actual things, external or sensible objects, absolutely individual, real, and so on; that is, they say about them what is simply universal. Consequently what is called mispeakable is nothing else than what is untrue, irrational, something barely and simply " meant." If nothing is said of a thing except that it is an actual tiling, an external object, this only makes it the most imiversal of all possible things, and thereby we express its likeness, its identity, with everything, rather than its difference from everything else. When I say "an individual thing," I at once state it to be really quite a universal, for everything is an individual thing : and in the same way " this thing " is everything and anything we like. More precisely, as this bit of paper, each and every paper is a " this bit of paper," and I have thus said all the while what is universal. If I want, however, to help out speech — which has the divine nature of directly turning the mere " meaning " right round about, making it into something else, and so not letting it ever come the length of words at all — by pointing out this bit of paper, then I get the experience of what is, in point of fact, the real truth of sense-certainty. I point it out as a Here, which is a Here amongst other Heres, or is in itself simply many Heres together, i.e. is a universal. I take it up then, as in truth it is ; and instead of knowing something immediate, I " take " something " truly," I fer-ceive {wahrnehne, per-cipio). II PERCEPTION: OR THINGS AND THEIR DECEPTIVENESS* [In this as in the preceding section apprehension is effected under conditions of sense. But whereas in the preceding type of consciousness the universality which knowledge implies and requires no sooner appeared than it melted away, here in Perception we start from a certain stahility in the manner of apprehension, and a certain constancy in the content apprehended. The universality in this case satisfies more completely the demands of knowledge. The problem for further analysis is to find the form which the universal here assumes and to determine the way in which the unity of the object (the "thing") holds together its essential differences. The result shows that the unity of the thing qua unity is only admissible as an unqualified or non-sensuous unity. It is an universal, but as such, not conditioned by sense; it is a pure or "unconditioned" universal — a thought proper. Being undetermined by^sense, it transcends sense-apprehension, and so transcends perception proper, and compels the mind to adopt another cognitive attitude in order to apprehend it. This new attitude is Understanding. The following section is thus indirectly an analysis of the principle and a criticism of the position of pure sensationalism. It shows that the doctrine "esse est percipi " must give way to the principle "esse est iutelligi.''] IMMEDIATE certainty does not make the truth its own, for its truth is something universal, whereas certainty wants to deal with the This. Perception, on the other hand, takes what exists for it to be a universal. Universality being its principle in general, its moments immediately distinguished within it are also universal ; 7 is a imiversal, and the object is a universal. That * Cp. Wissenschaft der Logik, Buch 2, Absch. 2, Kap 1. Das Ding und seine Eigenschaften, etc. principle has arisen and come into being for us who are tracing the course of experience ; and our process of apprehending what perception is, therefore, is no longer a contingent series of acts of apprehension, as is the case with the apprehension of sense-certainty ; it is a logicalty necessitated process. With the origination of the principle, both the moments, which as phenomena merely fell at our feet as bare facts, have come into being : the one, the process of pointing out and indicating, the other the same process, but as a simple fact — the former the process of perceiving, the latter the object perceived. The object is in its essential nature the same as the process ; the latter is the unfolding and distinguishing of the elements involved ; the object is these same elements taken and held together as a single totality. For us (tracing the process) or in itself,* the universal, qua principle, is the essence of perception ; and, as against this abstraction, both the moments distinguished— that which perceives and that which is perceived — are what is non-essential. But in point of * This expression refers to the distinction already made in tlie Introduction, between the point of view of the Fhenoincnology and that of the actual consciousness whose procedure is being analysed in the Phenomenology. That is "for us" which we (i.e. the philosophical "we") are aware of by way of anticipation, but which has not yet been evolved objectively and explicitly ; it is intellig-ible, but not yet intellectually realised. That is "in itself" (an sich), which is implicit, inherent or potential, and hence not yet explicitly developed. The terms "for us" and "in itself" are thus strictly alternative : the former looks at the matter from the point of view of the philosojjhical subject, the latter from the point of view of the object discussed by tlie philosopher. Tlie implicit nature of the object can only be "for us" who are tliinking about the object : and what m have in mind can only be implidtly true of the object. The alternative disappears when the explicit nature of the object is what "we" explicitly take the object to be. 106 Phenomenology of Mini fact, because both are themselves the universal, ol' the essence, they are both essential : but since they are related as opposites, only one can in the relation (constituting perception) be the essential moment ; and the distinction of essential and non-essential has to be shared between them. The one characterised as the simple fact, the object, is the essence, quite indifferent as to whether it is perceived or not : perceiving, on the other hand, being the process, is the insubstantial, the inconstant factor, which can be as ■well as not be, is the non-essential moment. This object we have now to determine more precisely, and to develop this determinate character from the result arrived at : the more detailed development does not fall in place here. Since its principle, the universal, is in its simphcity a mediated principle, the object must express this explicitly as its own inherent natiu-e. The object shows itself by so doing to be the thing with many properties. The wealth of senseknowledge belongs to perception, not to immediate certainty, where all that wealth was merely something alongside and by the way ; for it is only perception that has negation, distinction, multiphcity in its very nature. The This, then, is estabhshed as not This, or as superseded, and yet not nothing {simfliciter) , but a determinate nothing, a nothing with a certain content, viz. the This. The sense-element is in this way itself still present, but not in the form of some particular that is "meant" — as had to be the case in immediate certainty— but as a universal, as that which will have the character of a property. Cancelhng, superseding, brings out and lays bare its true twofold meaning which we found contained in the negative : to supersede {aufheben) is at once to negate and to preserve. The nothing being a negation of the This, preserves immediacy and is itself sensuous, but a universal immediacy. Being, however, is a miiversal by its having in it mediation or negation. When it brings this exphcitly out as a factor in its immediacy, it is a specifically distinct determinate property. As a result, there are many such properties set up at once, one the negation of the other. Since they are expressed in the simple form of the universal, these determinate characters — which, strictly speaking, become properties only by a further additional characteristic— are self-related, are indifferent to each other, each is by itself, free from the rest. The simple selfidentical universahty, however, is itself again distinct and detached from these determinate characteristics it has. It is pure self-relation, the " medium " wherein all these characteristics exist : in it, as in a bare, simple unity, they interpenetrate without affecting one another; for just by participating in this universahty they are indifferent to each other, each by itself. This abstract universal medium, which we can call " Thinghood " in general or pure essential reality, is nothing else than the Here and Now as this on analysis turned out to be, viz. a simple togetherness of many Heres and Nows. But the many (in the present case) are in their determinateness themselves simply universals. This salt is a simple Here and at the same time manifold : it is white, and also pungent, also cubical in shape, also of a specific weight, and so on. All these many properties exist in a simple Here, where they inter- penetrate each other. None of these has a different Here from the others ; each is every- 108 Phenomenology of Mind where in the same Here where the others are. And at the same thne, without being divided by different Heres, they do not affect each other in their interpenetration ; its being white does not affect or alter the cubical shape it has, and neither affects its sharp outhne, and so on : on the contrary, since each is simple relation to self, it leaves the others alone and is related to these merely by being also along with them, a relation of mere indifference. This " Also " is thus the pm:e universal itself, the " medium," the " Thinghood " keeping them together. In this relation, which has emerged, it is merely the character of positive universality that is first noticed and developed. But there is still a side presented to view which must also be taken into account. It is this. If the many determinate properties were utterly indifferent to each other, and were entirely related to themselves alone, they would not be determinate ; for they are so, merely in so far as they are distinguished and related to others as their opposites. In view of this opposition, however, they cannot exist together in the bare and simple imity of their " medium," which unity is just as essential to them as negation. The process of distinguishing them, so far as it does not leave them indifferent, but effectually excludes, negates one fj'om another, thus falls outside this simple " medium." And this, consequently, is not merely an " also," an unity indifferent to what is in it, but a " one " as well, an excluding repelling imity. The " One " is the moment of negation, as, in a direct and simple manner, relating itself to itself, and excluding an other : and is that by Vvfliich " Thinghood " qua Thing is determined. In the case of the property, negation becomes specified, assumes a determinate character, which is directly one with the inxmediacy of being, an immediacy which, by this unity with negation, is universahty. Qua the " one," however, negation takes a form in which it is freed from this unity with the object, and exists j^er se on its own account. These moments taken together exhaust the nature of the Thing, the truth of perception, so far as it is necessary to develop it here. It is (1) a universahty, passive and indifferent, the " also " which forms the sole bond of connection between the quahties, or rather constituent elements, " matters," existing together ; (2) negation, hkewise in a simple form, or the " one," which consists in excluding properties of an opposite character ; and (3) the many properties themselves, the relation of the two first moments — the negation, as it is related to that indifferent element, and in being so expands into a manifold of differences, the focal point of particularity radiating forth into plurality within the " medium " of subsistence. Taking the aspect that these differences belong to a "medium" indifferent to what is within it, they are themselves imiversal, they are related merely to themselves and do not affect each other. Taking, however, the other aspect, that they belong to the negative unity, they at the same time mutually exclude one another ; but do so necessarily in the shape of properties that have a separate existence apart from the " also " connecting them. The sensuous universahty, the immediate unity of positive being and negative exclusion, is only then a property, when oneness and pure universahty are evolved from it and distinguished from one another, and when that sensuous universality combines these with one another. Only 110 Phenomenology .of Mind after this relation of tlie unity to those pure essential moments is eiiccted, is the " Thing " complete. This, then, is the way the " Thing " in perception is constituted, and consciousness is perceptual in character so far as this " Thing '"' is its object : it has merely to " take " the object [ccvpio — ^QT-eeption'] and assume the attitude of pure apprehension, and what comes its way in so doing is truth {das Wahre). If it did something when taking the given, it would by such supplementation or elimination alter the truth. Since the object is the true and universal, the self-same, while consciousness is the variable and non-essential, it may happen that consciousness apprehends the object wrongly and deceives itself. The percipient is aware of the possibihty of deception ; for, in the universaHty forming the principle here, the percipient is directly aware of otherness, but aware of it as null and naught, as what is superseded. His criterion of truth is therefore scl/'-sameness, and his procedure is that of apprehending what comes before him as self-same. Since, at the same time, diversity is a fact for him, his procedure is a way of relating the diverse moments of his apprehension to one another. If, however, in this comparison a want of sameness comes out, this is not an untruth on the part of the object (for the object is the self-same), but on the part of perception. Let us now see what sort of experience consciousness forms in the course of its actual perception. We, who are analysing the process, find this experience already contained in the development (just given) of the object and of the attitude of consciousness towards it. The experience will be merely the development of the contradictions that appear there. The object which I apprehend, presents itself as purely " one " and single : also, I am aware of the " property " (Eigenschaft) in it, a property which is universal, thereby transcending the particularity of the object. The first form of being, in which the objective reahty has the sense of a " one," was thus not its true being ; and since the object is the true fact here, the untruth falls on my side, and the apprehension was not correct. On account of the universality of the property {Eigenschaft) I must rather take the objective entity as a commu7iity {Gemeinschaft) in general. I further perceive now the property to be determinate, opposed to another and excluding this other. Thus, in point of fact, I did not apprehend the object rightly when I defined it as a " commonness " or commimity with others, or as continuity; and must rather, taking account of the determinateness of the proj^erty, divide the continuity and set down the object as a " one " that excludes. In the divided " one " I find many such properties, which are not attached to one another, but indifferent to one another. Thus I did not apprehend the object correctly when I took it for something that excludes. The object, instead, just as formerly it was merely continuity in general, is now a universal common medium where many properties in the form of sense universals subsist, each for itself and on its own account, and, qua determinate, excluding the others. The simple and true fact, which I perceive, is, however, in virtue of this result, not a universal medium either, but the particular property by itself, which, again, in this form, is neither a property nor a determinate being, for it is now neither attached to a distinct "one" nor in relation to others. But the particular quahty is a property only when 112 Phenomenology of Mind attached to a " one,'' and determinate only by relation to others. By being this bare relation of self to self, it remains merely sensuous existence in general, smce it no longer contains the character of negativity ; and the mode of consciousness, which is now aware of a bemg of sense, is merely a way of " meaning " (Meinen) or " intending," i.e. it has left the attitude of perception entirely and gone back into itself. But sense existence and " meaning " themselves pass over into perception : I am thrown back on the beginning, and once more dragged into the same circuit, that supersedes itself in every moment and as a whole. Consciousness, then, has to go over this cycle again, but not in the same way as on the first occasion. For it has found out, regarding perception, that the truth and outcome of perception is its dissolution, is reflection out of and away from the truth into itself. In this way consciousness becomes definitely aware of how its perceptual process is essentially constituted, viz. that this is not a simple bare apprehension, but in its apprehension is at the same time reflected out of the true content back into itself. This return of consciousness into itself, which is immediately involved and implicated in that pure apprehension — for this return to self has proved to be essential to perception — alters the true content. Consciousness is aware that this aspect is at the same time its own, and takes it upon itself ; and by so doing consciousness will thus get the true object bare and naked. In this way we have, now, in the case of perception, as happened in the case of sensuous certainty, the aspect of consciousness being forced back upon itself ; but, in the first instance, not in the sense in which Perception .113 this took place in the former case — i.e. not as if the truth of perception fell within it. Rather consciousness is aware that the untruth, that comes out there, falls within it. By knowing this, however, consciousness is able to cancel and supersede this untruth. It distinguishes its apprehension of the truth from the untruth of its perception, corrects this untruth, and, so far as itself takes in hand to make this correction, the truth, qua truth of perception, certainly falls within its own consciousness. The procedure of consciousness, which we have now to consider, is thus so constituted that it no longer merely perceives, but is also conscious. of its reflection into self, and keeps this apart from the simple apprehension proper. To begin with, then, I am aware of the " thing " as a " one," and have to keep it fixed in this true character as " one." If in the course of perceiving something crops up contradicting that, then I must take it to be due to my reflection. Now, in perception various different properties also turn up, which seem to be properties of the thing. But the thing is a " one " ; and we are aware in ourselves that this diversity, by which the thing ceases to be a unity, falls in us. This thing, then, is, in point of fact, merely white to our eyes, also sharp to our tongue, and also cubical to our feehng, and so on. The entire diversity of these aspects comes not from the thing, but from us ; and we find them falling apart thus from one another, because the organs they affect are quite distinct inter se, the eye is entirely distinct from the tongue, and so on. We are, consequently, the imiversal medium where such elements get dissociated, and exist each by itself. By the fact, then, that we regard the characteristic of being a universal VOL, I,— I 114 Phenomenology of Mind medium as our reflection, we preserve and maintain the self-sameness and truth of the thing, its being a " one." These diverse aspects, which consciousness puts to its side of the account, are, however, each by itself just as it appears in the universal medium, specifically determined. White is only in opposition to black, and so on, and the thing is a " one " just by the fact that it is opposed to other things. It does not, however, exclude others from itself, so far as it is " one " ; for to be " one " is to be in a universal relation of self to self, and hence by the fact of its being " one " it is rather like all. It is through the determinate characteristic that the thing excludes other things. Things themselves are thus determinate in and for themselves ; they have properties by which they distinguish themselves from one another. Since the property is the special and peculiar property [the proper property] of, the thing, or a specific characteristic in the thing itself, the thing has several properties. For, in the first place, the thing is true being, is a being inherently in itself ; and what is in it is so as its own essential nature, and not on account of other things. Hence, in the second place, the determmate properties are not on account of other things and for other things, but inherent in that thing itself. They are, however, determinate properties in it only by the fact that they are several, and maintain their distinction from one another. And, in the third place, since they are thus within " thinghood," they are self-contained, each in and for itself, and are indifferent to one another. It is, then, in truth the thing itself which is white, and also cubical, and also sharp, and so on ; in other words, the thing is the " also," the general medium, wherein the many properties subsist externally to one another, without touching or aSecting one another, and without cancelhng one another ; and, so taken, the " also " is accepted as the true being of the thing. Now, on this mode of perception arising, consciousness is at the same time aware that it reflects itself also into itself, and that, in perceiving, the opposite moment to the " also " crops up. This moment, however, is the unity of the thing with itself, an unity which excludes distinction from itself. It is consequently this unity which consciousness has to take upon itself ; for the thing as such is the subsistence of many different and independent properties. Thus we say of the thing, " it is white, and also cubical, and also sharp," and so on. But so far as it is white it is 7wt cubical, and so far as it is cubical and also white, it is not sharp, and so on. Putting these properties into a " one " belongs solely to consciousness, which, therefore, has to avoid letting them coincide and be one (i.e. one and the same property) in the thing. In the long run it introduces the idea of " in-so-far " to meet the difficulty ; and by this means it keeps the quahties apart, and preserves the thing in the sense of the " also." Quite properly consciousness at first makes itself responsible for the " oneness " in such a way that what was called a property is represented as being " free matter " {materia libera).* In this way the thing is raised to the level of a true " also," since it thus becomes a collection of component elements (materials or matters), and instead of being a " one " becomes a mere enclosure, a circumscribing surface. * All expression dreiwu from the physics of Hegel's day. 116 Phenomenology of Mind If we look back on what consciousness formerly took upon itself, and now takes upon itself, what it previously ascribed to the thing, and now ascribes to it, we see that consciousness alternately makes itself, as well as the thing, into both a pure atomic many-less " one," and an " also " resolved into independent constituent elements (materials or matters). Consciousness thus finds through this comparison that not only its way of taking the truth contains the diverse moments of apprehension and return upon itself, but that the truth itself, the thing, manifests itself in this twofold manner. Here we find, as a result of experience, that the thing exhibits itself, in a determinate and specific manner, to the consciousness apprehending it, but at the same time is reflected back into itself out of that manner of presenting itself to consciousness ; in other words, the thing contains within it opposite aspects of truth, a truth whose elements are in antithesis to one another. Consciousness, then, gets away also from this second form of perceptual procedure, that, namely, which takes the thing as the true selfsame, and itself as the reverse, as the factor that leaves sameness behind and goes back into self. Its object is now the entire process which was previously shared between the object and consciousness. The thing is a "one," reflected into self ; it is for itself ; but it is also for an other ; and, further, it is an other for itself as it is for another. The thing is, hence, for itself and also for another, a being that has difference of a twofold kind. But it is also "one." Its being "one," however, contradicts the diversity it has. Consciousness would, consequently, have again to make itself answerable for putting the diversity into the "one," and would have to keep this apart from the thing. It would thus be compelled to say that the thing " in-so-far as " it is for itself is not for another. But the oneness belongs to the thing itself, too, as consciousness has found out ; the thing is essentially reflected into self. The " also," the distinction of elements indifferent to one another, falls doubtless within the thing, too, qua oneness, but since both are different, they do not fall within the same thing, but in different things. The contradiction which is found in the case of the objective content as a whole is assigned to and shared by two objects. The thing is, thus, doubtless as it stands {an und fur sich) selfsame, but this unity with itself is disturbed by other things. In this way the unity of the thing is preserved, and, at the same time, the otherness that is external to the thing, and also outside consciousness. Now, although the contradiction in the object is in this way allotted to difierent things, yet the isolated individual thing will still be affected with distinction. The different things have a subsistence on their own account {fur sich) ; and the conflict between them takes place on both sides in such a way that each is not different from itself, but only from the other. Each, however, is thereby characterised as a something distinctive, and contains in it essential distinction from the others ; but at the same time not in such a way that this is an opposition within its being ; on the contrary, it is by itself a simple determinate characteristic which constitutes its essential character, distinguishing it from others. As a matter of fact, since the diversity lies in it, this diversity does indeed necessarily assume 118 Phenomenology of Mind the form of a real distinction of manifold quaUties within it. But because the determinate characteristic gives the essence of the thing, by which it is distinguished from others, and has a being all its own, this further manifold constitution is something indifferent. The thing thus no doubt contains in its unity the quaHfying " in-so-far " in two ways, which have, however, unequal significance; and by that quahfication this oppositeness becomes not a real opposition on the part of the thing itself, but — so far as the thing comes into a condition of opposition through its absolute distinction — this opposition belongs to the thing with reference to an other thing lying outside it. The further manifoldness is doubtless necessarily in the thing too, and cannot be left out ; but it is unessential to the thing. This determinate characteristic, which constitutes the essential character of the thing and distinguishes it from all others, is now so defined that thereby the thing stands in opposition to others, but must therein preserve itself for itself {filr sicli). It is, however, a thing, a self-existent "one," only so far as it does not stand in relation to others. For in this relation, the connection with another is rather the point emphasised, and connection with another means giving up selfexistence, means ceasing to have a being on its own account. It is precisely through the absolute character and its opposition that the thing relates itself to others, and is essentially this process of relation, and only this. The relation, however, is the negation of its independence, and the thing collapses through its own essential property. The necessity of the experience which consciousness has to go through in finding that the thing is destroyed just by the very characteristic which constitutes its essential nature and its distinctive existence on its own account, may, as regards the bare principle it imphes, be shortly stated thus. The thing is set up as having a being of its own, as existing for itself, or as an absolute negation of all otherness ; hence it is absolute negation merely relating itself to itself. But this kind of negation is the cancelling and superseding of itself, or means that it has its essential reality in an other. In point of fact the determination of the object^ as it (the object) has turned out, contains nothing else. It aims at having an essential property, constituting its bare existence for itself, but with this bare self-existence it means also to embrace and contain diversity, which is to be necessary, but is at the same time not to constitute its essential characteristic. But this is a distinction that only exists in words ; the TCOM-essential, which has all the same to be necessary, cancels its own meaning, or is what we have just called the negation of itself. With this the last qualifying " in-so-far," which separated self-existence and existence for another, drops away altogether. The object is really in one and the same respect the opposite of itself — for itself " so far as " it is for another, and for another " so far as " it is for itself. It is for itself, reflected into self, one ; but all this is asserted along with its opposite, with its being for another, and for that reason is asserted merely to be superseded. In other words, this existence for itself is as much unessential as that which alone was meant to be unessential, viz. the relation to another. By this process the object in its pure characteristics, in those features which were to constitute its essential 120 Phenomenology of Mind nature, is superseded, just as the object in its sensible mode of existence became transcended. From being sensible it passed into being a universal ; but this universal, because derived from sense, is essentially conditioned by it, and hence is, in general, not a genuine self-identical universaHty, but one affected with an opposition. For that reason this universality breaks up into the extremes of singleness and universality, of the " one " of the properties and the " also " of the free constituents or "matters." These pure determinations appear to express the essential nature itself ; but they are merely a self-existence which is fettered at the same time with existence for an other. Since, however, both essentially exist in a single unity, we have before us now unconditioned absolute universality ; and it is here that consciousness first truly passes into the sphere of Understanding, of Intelligence. Sensible singleness thus disappears in the dialectic process of immediate certainty, and becomes universality, but merely sensuous universality. The stage of " meaning " has vanished, and perceiving takes the object as it inherently is in itself, or, put generally, as a universal. Singleness, therefore, makes its appearance there as true singleness, as the inherent nature of the " one," or as reflectedness into self. This is still, however, a conditioned self-existence alongside which appears another self-existence, the universality opposed to singleness and conditioned by it. But these two contradictory extremes are not merely alongside one another, but within one unity ; or, what is the same thing, the common element of both, selfexistence, is entirely fettered to its opposite, i.e. is, at the same time, not an existence-for-self. The Sophistry of perception seeks to save these moments from their contradiction, tries to keep them fixed by distinguishing between " aspects," by using terms hke " also " and " so far as," and seeks in hke manner to lay hold on the truth by distinguishing the unessential element from an essential nature opposed thereto. But these expedients, instead of keeping away deception from the process of apprehension, prove rather to be of no avail at all ; and the real truth, which should be got at through the logic of the perceptual process, proves to be in one and the same "aspect" the opposite (of what those expedients imply), and consequently to have as its essential content undifferentiated and indeterminate universality. These empty abstractions of " singleness " and its antithetic " universahty," as also of " essence," that is attended with a " non-essential " element, an element which is all the same " necessary," are powers the interplay of which constitutes perceptual understanding, often called " sound common sense " {Menschenver stand). This "healthy common sense," which takes itself for the sohd substantial type of conscious life, is, in the sphere of perception, merely the interplay of these abstractions ; it is always poorest where it pretends to be richest. In that it is tossed about by these unreal entities, bandied from one to the other, and by its sophistry endeavours to affirm and hold fast alternately now one, then the exact opposite, it sets itself against the truth, and imagines philosophy has merely to do with " things of the intellect," (GedanJcendinge) merely manipulates " ideas." As a matter of fact, philosophy does have to do with them, too, and knows them to be the pure essential entities, the absolute powers and 122 Phenomenology of Mind ultimate elements. But, in doing so, pliilosophy knows them at the same time in their determinate and specific constitution, and is, therefore, master over them ; while that perceptual understanding takes them for the real truth, and is led by them from one mistake to another. It does not get the length of being aware that there are such simple essentiahties operating within it and dominating its activity ; it thinks it has always to do with quite sohd material and content, just as sense-certainty is unaware that its essence is the empty abstraction of pure being. But in point of fact it is these essential elements in virtue of which perceptual understanding makes its way hither and thither through every kind of material and content ; they are its principle of coherence and control over its varied material ; they alone are what constitutes for consciousness the essence of sensuous things, what determines their relation to consciousness, and they are that in the medium of which the process of perceiving, with the truth it contains, runs its course. The course of this process, a perpetual alternate determining of the truth and superseding of this determination, constitutes, properly speaking, the constant everyday life and activity of perceptual intelligence, of the consciousness that thinks it hves and moves in the truth. In that process it advances, without halt or stay, till the final result is reached, when these essential ultimate elements or determinations are all alike superseded ; but in each particular moment it is merely conscious of one given characteristic as the truth, and then, again, of the opposite. It no doubt suspects their unessentiality ; and, to save them from the impending danger, it takes to the sophistry of now asserting to be true what it had just affirmed to be not true. What the nature of these untrue entities wants really to force this understanding to do — viz. to bring together and thereby cancel and transcend the ideas about that " universahty " and " singleness," about " also " and " one " — about that " essentiahty " which is " necessarily " connected with an " unessentiahty," and an " unessential " that is yet " necessary " — understanding strives to resist by leaning for support on the quahfying terms " in-sofar," " a diiierence of aspect," or by making itself answerable for one idea in order to keep the other separate and preserve it as the true one. But the very nature of these abstractions brings them together as they stand and of their own accord. Sound common sense robs these abstractions of their real nature. They compel understanding to go round in their whirhng circle. When understanding tries to give them truth by at one time taking their untruth upon itself, at another by calling deception a mere appearance due to the uncertainty and unrehabihty of things, and, again, by separating the essential from what is necessary, and yet is to be unessential, holding the former to be their truth as against the latter : — when understanding takes this hne, it does not secure them their truth, but convicts itself of untruth. Ill FORCE AND UNDERSTANDING— THE WORLD OF APPEARANCE AND THE SUPERSENSIBLE WORLD * [The term "force" holds primarily with reference to the realm of Nature, whether physical or vital : but it is also used, more or less analogically, in reference to other spheres, e.g. morality. It is the objective counterpart of the activity of "understanding " ; it is objectively the same kind of relation of unity to differences which is subjectively realised when the mind "understands." "Force" is a self-conditioned principle of unity; the differences are the "expressions of force,'' the unity evolves the diiferences out of itself. Understanding similarly is a self-conditioned process; it consists in "reducing" differences to some ultimate unity, which is capable of " deriving " or " e.-tplaining " those differences from itself. The ''' unconditioned universal '' to which we are led by tlie analysis of perception takes shape, therefore, as " force." The question is. How are the elements of this "unconditioned universal" related, and how do they hold together? The answer is found in the highest achievement of the operation of understanding — the establishment of a " kingdom of laws," which in its entirety is the meaning of the world so far as understanding goes. But laws pej- se are looked on as an inner realm, which merely "appears" in the detailed particulars which those laws control, and in which those laws are made manifest. Tlie differences, in fact, are "' phenomena," the laws per se are behind the scenes : — the world as a whole thus becomes distinguished into a realm of phenomena and a realm of noumena. These two realms set a new problem to the mind, and must again be brought together in a completer way than understanding can do. This new state of consciousness is " self-consciousness." In this section we have at once an analysis of empiricism and a critici.sm of the Kantian solution of the problem of empiricism. It is shown that if phenomena are appearances of noumena, then the noumena do appear, and are, in fact, nothing except so far as they appear : — otherwise the noumena, so far being "hidden,"' are worse than appearances, they are illusion. The phenomena arc not merely appearances "to the mind," but appearances of something that does make itself manifest. If phenomena * Cp. Wisseiu-chaft dcr Logik, Buch 2, Absch. 2, Kap 3. are thus not external to and still less independent of noumena, noumena are just as truly immanent in plienomena. Treated in any other way, noumena can at best be only another kind of phenomena ; and this raises anew precisely the problem which the opposition of phenomena or noumena was intended to solve. Phenomena are related to noumena as the trees to the wood, not as a compound to its atoms. The solution of the difficulty is thus only to be found in the type of consciousness which contains both — and this, Hegel says, is self-consciousness.] CONSCIOUSNESS lias found "seeing" and "hearing," etc., pass away in the dialectic process of senseexperience, and has, at the stage of perception, arrived at thoughts which, however, it brings together in the first instance in the unconditioned universal. This unconditioned element, again, if it were taken as inert essence bare and simple, would itself be nothing else than the one-sided extreme of self-existence (Fiirsichseyn) ; for the non-essential would then stand over against it. But if thus related to the latter, it would be itself unessential, and consciousness would not have got disentangled from the deceptions of perception ; whereas this universal has proved to be one which has passed out of such conditioned separate existence and returned into itself. This unconditioned universal, which henceforward is the true object of consciousness, is still object of consciousness ; consciousness has not yet grasped its principle, or notion, qua notion. There is an essential distinction between the two which must be drawn. On the one hand, consciousness is aware that the object has passed from its relation to an other back into itself, and thereby become inherentlj^ and implicitly {an sich) notion ; but, on the other hand, consciousness is not yet the notion explicitly or for itself, and consequently it does not know itself in that reflected object. We 126 Phenomenology of Mind (who are analysing experience) found this object arise through the process of consciousness in such a way that consciousness is imphcated and involved in the development of the object, and the reflection is the same on both sides, i.e. there is only one reflection. But because in this movement consciousness had as its content merely the objective entity, and not consciousness as such, the result has to be given an objective significance for consciousness ; consciousness, however, still withdrawing from what has arisen, so that the latter in objective form is the essential reahty to consciousness. Understanding has, indeed, eo if so, done away with its own untruth and the untruth in its object. What has thereby come to view is the notion of the truth as imphcit inherent truth, which is not yet notion, or lacks a consciously explicit existence for itself (Fiirsichseyn) , and is something which understanding allows to have its way without knowing itself in it. It works out its own reality for itself, so that consciousness has no share in its process of free reahsation, but merely looks on and apprehends that reahsation as a naked fact. It is, consequently, our business in the first instance to step into its place and be the notion, which works up into shape what is contained in the result. With this complete formation of the object, which is presented to consciousness as a bare existent fact {ein Seyendes), mere conscious awareness becomes for the first time conceptual consciousness, conscious comprehension. The result arrived at was an unconditioned universal, in the first instance in the negative and abstract sense that consciousness negated its one-sided notions and abstracted them: it surrendered them. This result, however, has inherently a positive significance ; it has established the unity of existence-for-self, and existence-for-another ; in other words, absolute opposites are immediately posited as one and the same reality. At first this seems to affect merely the formal relation of the moments to one another. But to be for-self and to be for-another constitutes the content itself as well, because the opposition, looked at truly, can have no other nature than what has come about in the result — viz. that the content, taken in perception for truth, belongs, in point of fact, solely to the form, and is dissipated into its unity. This content is at the same time universal ; there can be no other content which by its peculiar constitution would refuse to return into this unconditioned universahty. Such a content would be some specific way or other of being for-itself and taking up a relation to something else. But to be in general for-self and to stand in relation to something else constitutes the very nature and meaning of that whose truth lies in being unconditionally universal ; and the result is through and through universal. Since, however, this unconditioned universal is an object for consciousness, the distinction of form and content makes its appearance within it ; and, in the shape of content, the moments have the aspect in which they were first presented — that of being on one side a universal medium of many substantial elements, and, on the other, a unit reflected into self, where their substantial independence is overthrown and done away with. The former dissolves the independence of the thing, is the condition of passivity 128 Phenomenology of Mind which consists in being something for something else ; the latter is its individual subsistence, its being something on its own account {fiir sicli). We have to see what shape these moments take in the unconditioned universal which is their essential nature. It is obvious at the outset that, by existing only in this universal, they do not in general he any longer apart from one another, but rather are in themselves essentially selfcancelhng aspects, and what is estabhshed is only their transition into one another. One moment, then, appears as imiversal medium, or as the subsistence of independent constituents, as the reahty that has stepped aside. The independence of these constituent elements, however, is nothing else than this medium ; i.e. this universal is simply and entirely the plurality of such diverse universals. That the miiversal is fcr se in -undivided unity with this plurality means, however, that these elements are each where the other is ; they m.utually permeate one another — without touching one another, because, conversely, the manifold diversity is equally independent. Along with that, too, goes the fact that they are absolutely pervious and porous, or are cancelled and superseded. To be thus superseded, again, or the reduction of this diversity to bare and simple self-existence, is nothing else than the medium itself, and this is the independence of the different elements. In otlier words, the elements set up as independent pass directly over into their unity, and their unity directly into its exphcit diversity, and the latter back once again into the reduction to unity. This process is what is called Force. One of its moments, where Force takes the form of a dispersion of the independent elements each with a being of its own, is the Expression of Force ; when, however, force takes the form of that wherein they disappear and vanish, it is Force proper, force withdrawn from expressing itself and driven back into itself. But in the first place force driven back into itself must express itself ; and, secondly, in that expression it is still force existing within itself, as much as in thus being within itself it is expression. " When we thus keep both moments in this immediate unity, it is Understanding, to which the conception of force belongs, that is, properly speaking, the principle which carries the difierent moments qua different. For per se they should not be different ; the distinction consequently exists only in thought. Stated otherwise, only the mere conception of force has been put forward in the above, not its reahsation. In point of fact, however, force is the rmconditioned universal, which is in itself just what it is for something else, or which holds its difference within itself — for it is nothing else than existence-for-an-other. Hence for force to be what it truly is, it has to be completely set free from thought, and put forward as the substantial reality of these differences, that is, first the substance qua the entire force remaining essentially self-contained (an und fiir sich), and then its differences as substantial entities, or as moments subsisting each on its own account. Force as such, force as driven back within itself, is in this way by itself an excluding unit, for which the unfolding of the elements or differences is another thing subsisting separately ; and thus there are set up two sides, distinct and independent. But force is also the whole, or it remains what, in its very conception, it is ; that is to say, these differences remain VOL. I. — K 130 Phenomenology of Mind mere forms, superficial vanishing " moments. ^ Ine differences between force proper, withdrawn into itself, and force unfolded and expressed in independent constituent elements, would at the same time have no being at all if they had no subsistence ; i.e. force would have no being if it did not really exist in these opposite ways. But to exist in this way as opposite aspects means nothing else than that both moments are themselves at the same time independent. It is this process we have now to deal with — the process by which both moments get themselves fixed as independent and then cancel their independence again. Looked at broadly, it is manifest that this process is nothing else than the process of perceiving, where the aspects, both percipient and content perceived, are at once inseparably miited as regards the process of grasping the truth, and yet, by that very fact, each aspect is at the same time reflected into itself, is something on its own account. In the present case these two aspects are elements or moments of force ; they subsist within one unity, just as much as this unity, which appears as the middle term for the distinct and independent extremes, always gets broken up into these very extremes, which only become such through this taking place. Thus the process, which formerly took the shape of the self-negation of contradictory conceptions, here assumes objective form, and is a movement of force, the result of which is to bring out the " unconditioned imiversal " as something which is not objective — which is the inner (unperceived) being of things. .^^ Force, as thus determined, since it is taken as force, or as reflected into itself, is the one side of its notion and meaning : but a substantiated extreme, and, moreover, the extreme established with the characteristic of oneness. In virtue of this, the subsistence of the elements which have arisen falls outside it, and is something other than it. Since of necessity it has to he this subsistence, i.e. to express, externaUse itself, its expression takes the form that the other approaches it and incites it. But, in point of fact, since it must necessarily express itself, it has within itself this other, which to begin with took up a position as something outside it. The latter (this other) must be retracted, in order that force should be estabhshed as a single " one," and its essential nature — which consists in self-expression — put forward as an other, approaching it externally. Force itself is rather this universal medium for the subsistence of the moments as constituent elements ; or, in other words, it has expressed or externalised itself, and what was to be something outside it attracting or inciting it is really force itself. It exists now as the medium of the constituent elements which have been evolved. But at the same time it is in its very nature one and single, and has essentially the form of being that in which these various elements are superseded. This oneness is in consequence now something other than, external to, force, since force takes its place as the medium for the elements to exist in ; and force therefore has this its essential being outside itself. Since, however, it must of necessity be this essential nature, which as yet it is not affirmed to be, this other comes forward soliciting or inciting it to reflect into self, to turn this pseudo-external factor into an aspect of itself ; in other words, this other cancels its external expression. In point of fact, however, it is force itself that is thus reflected into self, 132 Plienmnenology of Mind that is the sublation of the external expression. The oneness vanishes as it appeared, viz. as something external ; force is that very other, is force thrust back into itself. What took the character of an external other, and incited force at once to expression and to return into self, turns out directly to be itself force : for the other shows itself to be luiiversal medium as well as one and single, and shows this in such a way that each of the forms assumed appears at the same time to be merely a vanishing moment. Consequently force, in that there is an other for it, and it is for an other, has as a whole not yet developed its complete meaning. There are two forces present at the same time ; the notion of both is no doubt the same notion, but it has passed out of its unity into duality. Instead of the opposition continuing to be entirely and essentially a mere moment, it appears to have escaped from the control of the unity and to have become, owing to this diremption, two quite independent forces. We have now to see more precisely what sort of situation this independence introduces. To begin with, the second force stands towards the force incited in the character of inciting force, and, moreover, with respect to its content, plays the part of universal medium. But since that second force consists essentially in an alternation of these two moments and is itself force, it is likewise, in point of fact, their imiversal medium only then when it is incited or solicited to being so ; and in the same way, too, it is negative unity, or incites and leads to the retraction of force, only by being incited thereto. As a result, this distinction, which took place between one force re- garded as inciting and tlie other as incited, turns also into one and the same reciprocal interchange of characteristics. The interplay of the two forces in this way arises from and consists in the two being thus determined with opposite characteristics, in their being for one another in virtue of this determination and in the complete and direct exchange of their characteristics— a transition from one to the other, whereby alone these determinations, in which the forces seem to appear independently, have being. For example, the inciting force is set up as universal medium, and, on the other hand, the force incited as a force repressed. But the former is universal medium just by the very fact of the latter being repressed : that is to say, this latter is really what incites the former, and makes it the medium it claims to be. The former gets the character it has only through the other, and is an inciting force only so far as it is incited by the latter to be so. And it loses just as readily this character given to it, for this character passes, or rather has already passed, into the character of the other. The former, acting in an external way, takes the part of universal medium, but only by its having been incited by the other force to do so. This means, however, that the latter gives it that position, and is really itselj essentially universal medium : it gives the inciting agency this character just because this other character is essentially its own, i.e. because it is really its own self. To complete our insight into the principle of this process, we may notice, further, that the distinctions themselves reveal distinction in a twofold manner. They are, on the one hand, distinctions of 134 Phenomenology of Mind content, since one extreme is force reflected into itself, while the other is a medium for the constituent elements involved : on the other hand, they appear as distinctions of form, since one incites and the other is incited, the former being active, the latter passive. As regards the distinction of content, they are in a general way distinct, or distinct for us [who are analysing the process] ; as regards form, however, they are independent, in their relation they break away from one another of themselves, and stand opposed. In the perception of the movement of force, consciousness becomes aware that the extremes, in both these aspects, are nothing fer se, that rather these sides, in which their distinction of nature was meant to consist, are merely vanishing moments, an immediate transition of each into its opposite. For us, however [who are analysing the process], it was also true, as stated above, that per se the distinctions, qiia distinctions of content and form, vanished : and on the side of form, the active, inciting, or independent factor was in its very nature the same as what, from the side of content, was presented as repressed force, force driven back into itself ; the passive, incited, or related factor was, from the side of form, the same as what, from the side of content, took shape as universal medium for the many constituent elements. ^ From this we see that the notion of Force becomes actual when resolved into two forces, and we see too how it comes to be so. These two forces exist as independent entities : but their existence lies in a movement each towards each, of such a kind that in order to be, each has in reality to get its position purely through the other ; that is to say, their being has purely the significance of disappearance. They are not hke extremes, that keep to themselves something positively fixed, and merely transmit an external property to one another through their common medium and by external contact : they are what they are solely in this mediimi and in their contact with each other. We have there immediately both force as it is independently, force repressed within itself, and also its expression, force inciting and force being incited. These moments are thus not divided and set up as two extremes, offering each other only an opposite pole : rather their true nature is simply and solely to be each through the other, and to be in the first instance no more than just what each is thus through the other, since it is just that. They have thus, in point of fact, no substances of their own which could support and maintain them. The notion of force rather maintains itself as the essence in its very actuality : force when actual exists wholly and only in its expression ; and this, at the same time, is nothing else than a process of cancelling itself. This actual force, when represented as detached from its expression and existing by itself, is force driven back into itseK ; but this feature is itself, in point of fact, as appears from the foregoing, merely a moment in the expression of force. The true nature of force thus remains merely the thought or idea of force ; the moments in its realisation, its substantial independence and its process, rush, without let or hindrance, together into one single undivided unity, a unity which is not force withdrawn into itself (for this is merely one of those moments), but is its notion qua notion. The realisation of force is, then, at the same time dissipation or loss of reality; 136 Phenomenology of Mind it has thereby become something quite different, viz. this universahty, which understanding knows from the start or immediately to be its essential nature, and which shows itself, too, to be the essence of it in what is supposed to be its reaHty, in the actual substances. So far as we look on the first universal as the notion of understanding, where force does not yet exist for itself, the second is now its essential reahty, as it is revealed in and for itself. Or, conversely, if we look on the first universal as the immediate, which should be an actual object for consciousness, then this second has the characteristic of being the negative of sensuously objective force : it is force, in the form in which, in its true being, force exists merely as object for understanding. The first Vt^ould be force withdrawn into itself, i.e. force as substance ; the second, however, is the inner being of things qua imier, which is one and the same with the notion qua notion. This true being of things has here the characteristic that it does not exist immediately for consciousness ; rather, consciousness takes up a mediated relation to the inner ; in the form of understanding it looks through the intervening play of forces into the real and true backgromid of things. The middle term combining the two extremes, understanding and the inner of things, is the explicitly evolved being of force, which is now and henceforth a vanishing process for understanding itself. Hence it is called Appearance (Erscheinung) ; for being which is per se straightway non-being we call a show, a semblance (Schein). It is, however, not merely a show, but appearance, a totality of seeming {Schein). This totahty as totahty or universal is what makes up the inner world, the play of forces in the sense of its rejlection into itself. There consciousness has before itself in objective form the things of perception as they truly are, i.e. as moments turning, without halt or separate subsistence, directly into their opposite, the "one" changing immediately into the universal, the essential becoming at once something unessential, and vice versa. This play of forces is consequently the development of the negative ; but its true nature is the positive element, viz. the universal, the implicit object, the object existing 'per se. The being of this object for consciousness is mediated through the movement of appearance, by which the content of perception and the sensuous objective world as a whole, get merely negative significance. There consciousness is turned back upon itself as the truth ; but, being consciousness, it again makes this truth into an inner being of the object, and distinguishes this reflection of things from its own reflection into self : just as the mediating process likewise is for it still an objective process. This inner natm:e is therefore for it an extreme placed over against it. But it is on that accotmt the truth for it, because therein, as in something essentially real, it possesses at the same time the certainty of its own self, the moment of its own self-existence. But it is not yet conscious of this basis [its self-existence], for the independence, its being on its own account, v/hich should have the inner world within it, would be nothing else than the negative process. This negative process, however, is for consciousness still objective vanishing appearance, and not yet its own proper self-existence (Filrsichseyn). Hence the inner is no doubt taken to be 138 Phenomenology of Mind notion, but consciousness does not yet know the nature of the notion. Within this inner truth, this absolute universal which has got rid of the opposition between imiversal and particular, and become the object of understanding, is a supersensible world which henceforth opens up as the true world, lying beyond the sensuous world which is the world of appearance. Away remote from the changing vanishing present (Diesseits) hes the permanent beyond (Jenseits) : an immanent inherent reahty {ein Ansich), which is the first and therefore imperfect manifestation of Reason, i.e. it is merely the pure element where the truth finds its abode and its essential being. Our object henceforward has thus the form of a syllogistic inference (Schluss), whose extremes are the inner being of things and understanding, and its middle term the sphere of appearance. The course of this inferential process, however, furnishes the further characterisation of what imderstanding detects in the inner world by the aid of the middle term ; and gives rise to the experience understanding goes through regarding this relation of the combined and mutually inferrible terms. The inner world is so far for consciousness a bare and simple beyond, because consciousness does not as yet find itself in it. It is empty, for it is merely the nothingness of appearance, and positively the naked universal. This type of inwardness suits those who say that the inner being of things cannot be known ;* but the reason for the position would have to be taken in some other sense. Certainly there is no laiowledge to be had of this * Cp. Goethe, " /m innern der Natur," etc. inner world, as we have it here ; not, however, owing to reason being too short-sighted, or limited, or whatever you care to call it (on this point there is as yet nothing known at this stage ; we have not gone deep enough for that yet), but on account simply of the nature of the case, because in the void there is nothing known, or, putting it from the point of view of the other side, because its very characteristic lies in being beyond consciousness. The result is, of course, the same if you place a bhnd man amid the wealth of the supersensible world (if it has a wealth, whether this be a content peculiarly its own, or whether consciousness itself be this content), and if you place one with sight in absolute darkness, or, if you like, in pure light, supposing the supersensible world to be this. The seeing man sees in that pure light as little as in absolute darkness, and just as much as the blind man in the ample fulness which lay before him. If there were really nothing further ado with the inner sphere and with our being bound up along with it by means of the world of appearance, then there would be nothing left but to stop at the phenomenal world, i.e. take something for truth about which we know that it is not true. Or in order that there may be something in this empty void — which, while it originally came about as a state devoid of objective things, has, however, since it is emptiness pure and simple, to be taken to be also devoid of all mental relations and distinctions of consciousness qua consciousness — in order that in this complete vacuity, which is even called the holy of hohes, the inner sanctuary, there may yet be something, we should be driven to fill it up with dreamings, appearances, produced by consciousness itself. It 140 Phenomenology of Mind would have to be content with being treated so badly, for it would not deserve anything better, since even dreams are something better than its own barren emptiness. The inner world, or the supersensible beyond, has, however, arisen : it comes to us out of the sphere of appearance, and the latter is its mediating agency : in other words, appearance is its essential nature and, in point of fact, its filhng. The supersensible is the estabhshed truth of the sensible and perceptual. The truth of the sensible and the perceptual lies, however, in being appearance. The supersensible is then appearance qua appearance. We distort the proper meanmg of this, if we take it to mean that the supersensible is therefore the sensible world, or the world as it is for immediate sense-certainty and perception. For, on the contrary, appearance is just not the world of sense-knowledge and perception as positively being, but this world as superseded or established in truth as an inner world. It is often said that the supersensible is not appearance ; but by appearance is thereby meant not appearance, but rather the sensible world taken as itself real actuality. Understanding, which is our object here, finds itself in this position, that, for it, the inner world has come about, to begin with, only as the imphcit inherent being, universal and still without a filling. The play of forces has simply and solely this negative significance of not being something j^er se; and its only positive significance is that of being the mediating agency, but outside understanding. The relation of understanding to the inner world through mediation is, however, its own process, by which the inner world will be found to receive fullness of content. The play of forces is what understanding has directly to do with ; but the real truth for it is the inner world bare and simple. The movement of force is consequently the truth only by being in like manner something simple. Regarding this play of forces, however, we saw that its pecuharity lay in this, that the force which is awakened into activity by another force is just on that account the inciting agency for this other force, which thereby itself only then becomes an inciting force. We have here in this way merely direct and immediate interchange or complete exchange of the characteristic which constitutes the sole content of what comes before us, viz. the fact of being either universal medium or negative unity. It ceases immediately on its entrance in determinate form to be what it was on entering: it awakens or incites, by its appearance in determinate shape, the other side, which thereby gives itself expression, i.e. the latter is now directly what the first was to be. Each of these two sides, the relation of inciting and the relation of the opposed determinate content, is on its own account an absolute process of permutation and transposition. But these two relations are again themselves one and the same, and the formal distinction of being incited and of inciting to activity, is the same as the distinction of content, i.e. the distinction between the incited factor as such, viz. the passive medium, on the one side, and the inciting factor, viz. the active medium, the negative unity, or the "one" on the other side. In this way there disappears all distinction of contrasted and opposed particular forces, which were meant to be present in this process ; for they rested solely on the above distinctions. And, along with both those distinctions, the distinction between 142 Phenomenology of Mind the forces collapses likewise into merely one. There is thus neither force nor inciting and being incited to action, nor the characteristic of being a stable medium and a unity reflected into self, there is neither a particular which is something on its own account, nor are there diverse opposites. What is found in this flux of thoroughgoing change is merely difference as universal difference, or difference into which the various opposites have been resolved. This difference as universal, consequently, is what constitutes the ultimate simple element in that play of forces, and is the resultant truth of that process. It is the Law of Force.* The absolute flux of the world of appearance passes into bare and simple difference through its relation to the simplicity of the inner being, the simplicity apprehended by understanding. The inner being is in the first instance merely the implicit universal. This implicit simple universal, however, is essentially absolute universal dift'erence as well ; for it is the outcome of the change itself, or change is its very nature. But change, when planted in the inner reality as it [change] truly is, forthwith is taken up into that reality as equally absolute universal difference at peace with itself, and remaining at one with itself. In other words, negation is an essential moment of the universal ; and negation, or mediation in the universal, is universal difference. This difference is expressed in the law, which is the stable presentment or * Cp. Helmholtz, "It is precisely in the purest form of the expression of force — viz. in mechanical force which acts on a mass-point — that we find most clearly brought out that force is merely the objectified law of action." — Lectures and Addresses, v., Eng. trans.. Vol. I., p. 326. picture of unstable appearance. The supersensible world is in this way a quiescent " kingdom of laws," no doubt beyond the world of perception — for this exhibits the law only through incessant change — but likewise present in it, and its direct immovable copy or image. This kingdom of laws is indeed the truth for understanding ; and that truth finds its content in the distinction which lies in the law. At the same time, however, this kingdom of laws is only the prehminary truth, and does not give all the fullness of the world of appearance. The law is present therein, but is not all the appearance present; under ever- varying circumstances the law has an ever-varying actual existence. Thereby appearance continues to keep one aspect which is not in the inner world; i.e. appearance is not yet in very truth established as appearance, as that whose independent being has been done away with. This defect in the law has to be brought out in the law itself. What seems defective in it is that while it no doubt has difference within it, it contains this in a merely universal indeterminate way. So far, however, as it is not law in general, but a law, it has determinateness within it ; and as a result there are found an indeterminate plurahty of laws. But this pluiahty is rather itself a defect ; it contradicts the principle of understanding, for which, since it is consciousness of the simple inner being, truth is the inherently universal unity. It must, therefore, let the many laws coalesce into a single law, just as, e.g., the law by which a stone falls, and that by which the heavenly bodies move have been conceived as one law. When the laws thus coincide, however, they lose their specific character. 144 Phenomenology of Mind The law becomes more and more abstract and superficial, and in consequence we find as a fact, not the unity of these various determinate laws, but a law which leaves out their specific character; just as the one law, which combines in itself the laws of falhng terrestrial bodies, and of the movements of celestial bodies, does not, in point of fact, express both kinds of laws. The unification of all laws in universal attraction expresses no fiu'ther content than just the bare concept of the law itself, a concept which is therein set doAvn as existing. Universal attraction says merely that everything has a constant distinction for anything else. Understanding pretends by that to have found a universal law which gives expression to universal reality as such ; but, in point of fact, it has merely found the conception of law itself, although in such a way that it at the same time thereby declares all reality to be in its very nature conformed to law. The idea of universal attraction has, therefore, to this extent great importance, that it is directed against that unthinking way of representing reality, to which everything appears in the shape of accident and chance, and for which determinateness, specificity, takes the form of sensuous independence. In contrast, then, with determmate laws stands universal attraction, or the bare conception of law. In so far as this pure conception is looked on as the essentially real, or as the true inner being, the determinateness characterising the specific law itself belongs still to the sphere of appearance, or rather to sensible existence. But the pure conception of law transcends not merely the law, which, being itself a determinate law, stands contrasted with other determinate laws, but also transcends law as such. The determinateness, of which we spoke, is itself strictly a mere vanishing moment, which can no longer come forward here as an essential entity {Wesenheit), for it is only the law which is the truth here : but the conception of law is turned against the law itself. That is to say, in the law distinction itself is immediately apprehended and taken up into the universal, thereby, however, making the moments, whose relation it expresses, subsist as mutually indifferent and inherently real entities. These parts of the distinction found in the law are, however, at the same time themselves determinate aspects. The pure concept of law, as universal attraction, must, to get its true significance, be so apprehended that in it, as the absolutely single and simple, the distinctions which are present in law as such, return again themselves into the inner being, qua bare and simple unity. This unity is the inner " necessity " of the law. The law is thereby present in a twofold form. In one case it is there as law in which the differences are expressed as independent moments ; in the other it is in the form of a simple withdrawal into itself, which agaia can be called Force, but in the sense not of repressed force [spoken of above], but force in general, or the concept of force, an abstraction which absorbs the distinctions involved in what attracts and is attracted. In this sense, e.g., simple electricity is force ; the expression of difference falls, however, within the law ; this difference is positive and negative electricity. In the case of the motion of falhng bodies force is the simple element, gravity, which has the law that the magnitudes of the different factors in the motion, the time spent, and the space traversed, are VOL, I.— L 146 Phenomenology of Mind to one another in the relation of root and square. Electricity itself is not difference fer se, is not in its essential natui'e a twofold entity consisting of positive and negative electricity ; hence it is often said it has the law of being so and so in the way indicated, or again, that it has the property of expressing itself in this fashion. This property is doubtless the essential and pecuhar property of this force, i.e. it belongs to it necessarily. But necessity is here an empty phrase ; force must, just because it must, duphcate itself in this manner. Of course, if positive electricity is given, negative electricity is inherently necessary ; for the positive element only is by being related to a negative ; in other words, the positive element in its very self involves difference from itself, just in the same way as the negative does. But that electricity as such should break itself up into parts in this way — this is not in itself a necessity. Electricity qua simple force is indifferent to its law — to be in the form of positive and negative; and if we call the former its notion and the latter its being, then its notion is indifferent to its being ; it merely has this as a property, which just means that this is not per se necessary to it. This indifference takes another form when it is said that to be positive and negative is involved in the definition of electricity, or that this is neither more nor less than its notion and its essence. Its being in that case would mean its existence in general. But in that definition the necessity of its existence is not contained ; it exists either because we find it, i.e. its existence is not necessary at all, or else it exists through other forces, i.e. the necessity of its existence is an external necessity. But in that the determinateness of being through another is what the necessity consists in, we are back again to the plurahty of determinate laws, which we have just left in order to consider law as law. It is only with the latter that we can compare its notion as notion, or its necessity. This necessity, however, has in all these forms shown itself to be just an empty phrase. • There is still another way than that just indicated in which the indifference of law and force, or of notion and being, is found. In the law of motion, e.g., it is necessary for motion to be broken up into the elements time and space, or again, into distance and velocity. Since motion is merely the relation of these factors, motion, the universal, has in this way certainly distinct parts in its own self. But now these parts, time and space, or distance and velocity, do not express in themselves this origination from a single unity. They are indifferent the one to the other. Space is thought of as able to be without time, time without space, and distance at least without velocity — just as their magnitudes are indifferent the one to the other, since they are not related like positive and negative, and consequently do not refer to one another by their very nature. The necessity of partition into distinct factors, then, we certainly do have here ; but not the necessity of the parts as such for one another. On that account, however, that first necessity too is itself a merely delusory false necessity. For motion is not itself thought of as something simple or as bare essence, but as, from the first, divided into elements ; time and space are in themselves its independent parts or its real elements : in other words, distance and velocity are modes of being, or ways of thinking, each of which 148 Phenomenology of Mind can very well be without the other ; and motion is consequently no more than their superficial relation, not their true nature. If it is represented as simple essence or as force, motion is no doubt gravity ; but this does not, properly spealdng, contain these distinctions. The distinction is, then, in both cases no distinction of an inherent or essential kind. Either the universal, force, is indifferent to the division into parts, which is found in the law, or else the distinctions, the parts of the law, are indifferent to one another. Understanding, however, does have the notion of this distinction per se, just by the fact that law is in part the inner being, the inherent nature, but is in it at the same time distinguished. That this distinction is in this way mner distinction is shown by the fact that law is bare and simple force, or is the notion of that distinction, and thus is a distinction of the notion. But still this inner distinction falls to begin with only within understanding, and is not yet estabhshed in the fact itself. It is thus only its own necessity to which un.derstanding gives expression — the distinction, that is to say, is one which it makes only so as at the same time to express that the distinction is not to be a distinction in the nature of the fact itself. This necessity, which is merely verbal, is thus a rehearsal of the moments which make up the cycle of necessity. They are no doubt distinct, but their distinction is at the same time explicitly stated to be not a distinction of the fact itself, and consequently is itself again straightway cancelled and transcended. This process is called Explanation. A law is expressed ; from this its inherently universal element, or the ground in the sense of force, is distinguished ; but, regarding this distinction, it is asserted that it is no distinction, rather that the ground has entirely the same constitutive nature as the law. For example, the particular occurrence of hghtning is apprehended as universal, and this universal is expressed as the law of electricity ; the explanation thereupon merges the law in force as the essence of the law. This force is, then, so constituted that, when it finds expression, opposite electrical discharges appear, and these again disappear into one another. In other words, force has exactly the same constitutive character as law ; both are thus declared to be in no way distiuct. The distinctions are pure universal expression or law and pure force ; but both have the same content, the same constitutive character ; thus the distinction between them qua distinction of content, i.e. of fact, is also again withdrawn. In this tautological process understandiug, as the above shows, holds fast to the changeless unity of its object, and the process takes effect solely within understanding itself, not in the object. It is an explanation that not only explains nothing, but is so plain that, while it makes as if it would say something different from what is already said, it really says nothing at all, but merely repeats the same thing over again. So far as the fact itself goes, this process gives rise to nothing new ; the process is only of account as a process of understanding. In it, however, we now get acquainted with just what we missed in the case of the law — absolute change itself ; for this process, when looked at more narrowly, is directly the opposite of itself. It sets up, that is, a distinction which is not only for us no distinction, but which it itself cancels 150 . Phenomenology of Mind as distinction. This is the same process of change which was formerly manifested as the play of forces. In the latter we found the distinction of inciting and incited force, or force expressing itself, and force withdrawn into itself ; but these were distinctions which in reality were no distinctions, and therefore were also immediately cancelled again. We have here not merely the naked unity, so that no distinction could be set up at all ; the process we have is rather this, that a distinction is certainly made, but because it is no distinction, it is again superseded. Thus, then, with the process of explaining, we see the ebb and flow of change, which was formerly characteristic of the sphere of appearance, and lay outside the inner world, finding its way into the region of the supersensible itself. Our consciousness, however, has passed from the inner being as an object over to understanding on the other side, and finds the changing process there. The change is in this way not yet a process of the fact itself, but rather presents itself before us as pure change, just by the content of the moments of change remaining the same. Since, however, the notion qua notion of understanding is the same as the inner nature of things, this change becomes for understanding the law of the inner world. Understanding thus learns that it is a law in the sphere of appearance for distinctions to come about which are no distinctions. In other words, it learns that what is selfsame is self-repulsive, and, similarly, that the distinctions are only such as in reality are none and cancel one another, or that what is not selfsame is self-attractive. Here we have a second law, whose content is the opposite of Understanding I5I what formerly was called law, viz. the invariable and unchanging self-identical distinction ; for this new law expresses rather the process of Hke becoming unUke, and unhke becoming hke. The notion demands of the unreflective mind to bring both laws together, and become conscious of their opposition. Of course the second is also a law, an inner self-identical bemg ; but it is rather a selfsameness of the unlike, a constancy of inconstancy. In the play of forces this law turned out to be just this absolute transition and pure change ; the selfsame, force, spht into an opposition, that in the first instance appeared as a substantial independent distinction, which, however, in point of fact proved to be none. For it is the selfsame which repels itself from itself, and this element repelled is in consequence essentially self-attracted, for it is the same ; the distinction made, since it is none, thus cancels itself again. The distinction is hence set forth as a distinction on the part of the fact itself, or as an absolute (objective) distinction ; and this distinction on the part of the fact is thus nothing but the selfsame, that which has repelled itself from itself, and consequently only set up an opposition which is none. By means of this principle, the first supersensible world, the changeless kingdom of laws, the immediate ectype and copy of the world of perception, has turned round into its opposite. The law was in general, hke its differences, self-identical ; now, however, it is established that each side is, on the contrary, the opposite of itself. The self-identical repels itself from itself, and the self-discordant sets up to be selfsame. In truth, with a characteristic of this kind, distinction is only inner distinction, or immanent distinction, 152 Phenomenology of Mind since the like is unlike itself, and the unlike like itself. This second supersensible world is in this way the inverted world {verkehrte Welt), and, moreover, since one aspect is abeady present in the first supersensible world, the inverted form of this first. The inner being is, thereby, in its character of appearance, completed. For the first supersensible world was only the immediate raising of the world of perception into the element of universahty. It had its necessary counterpart in this world of perception, which still retains as its own the principle of change and alteration. The first kingdom of laws dispenses with this principle, but preserves it in the form of an inverted world. By the law of this inverted world, then, the selfsame in the first world is the unhke of itself, and the unhke in the first is equally unlike . to itself, or it becomes like itself. Expressed in determinate moments, this will assume the form that what by the law of the first is sweet, is, in this inner, inverted reality, sour ; what is there black is here white. What, by the law of the first, was north pole in the case of the magnet, is, in its other supersensible inner world (viz. in the earth), south pole ; while what was there south pole is here north pole. Similarly, what by the first law is in the case of electricity the oxygen pole becomes in its other supersensible reahty hydrogen pole ; and conversely, what is there the pole of hydrogen, becomes here the pole of oxygen. To take another sphere of experience : revenge on an enemy is, according to the primitive immediate law, the supreme satisfaction of injured individuality. This law, however — that of standing up against one who does not treat me as a substantial self, letting him see that I am a substantial being, and even doing away with him as a reahty— this law is converted, by the principle of the other world, into the very opposite, viz., into the reinstatement of myself as the true reality through the removal of the alien hostile being in self-destruction.* If now this inversion, which is brought out in the punishment of crime, is made into a law, it also is again only the law of a world which has an inverted supersensuous world standing in antithesis to itself, where that which is despised in the former comes to honour, and that which in the former is honoured meets with contempt. The punishment which, by the law of the former, disgraces a man and annihilates him, turns round in its inverted world into the pardoning grace which preserves his being and brings him to honour. Looked at on the surface, this inverted world is the antithesis of the first in the sense that it has the latter outside itself, and repels that world from itself as an inverted reahty ; that the one is the sphere of appearance, while the other is the inherent being ; that the one is the world as it is for an other, the other again the world as it is for itself. In this way, to use the previous examples, what tastes sweet is properly, or inwardly in the thing, sour ; or what is north pole in the case of the actual magnet belonging to the sphere of appearance, would be, in the inner or essential being, south pole. What is shown to be oxygen pole * The primitive procedure of individual vengeance finds its inner meaning revealed in the ethically justifiable ^jrocedure of punishment. But ethical punishment is really self-punishment (cp. Plato's Gorgias). Punishment, however, Hegel goes on to say, has an inner meaning of its own too. 154 Phenomenology of Mind in electricity as a phenomenon, would be hydrogen pole in the case of electricity not falhng within the sphere of appearance. Or again, an act which m appearance is a crime would m its inner nature be capable of being really good — a bad act may have a good intention ; punishment is only in appearance punishment ; in itself or in another world it might well be, for the criminal, a benefit. But such oppositions of inner and outer, appearance and supersensible, in the sense of two sorts of reahty, are no longer to be found here. The differences repelled are not divided anew and assigned to two substances such as would support them and lend them a separate subsistence, the result of which would be that understandiag would leave the iuner region, and fall back again on its previous position. The one aspect or substance would be once more the world of perception, where the one of those two laws would carry on its existence, and in opposition to it an inner world, just such a sensible world as the first, but in the sphere of ideas ; one that could not be indicated, seen, heard, and tasted as a sensible world, and yet would be thought of as such a sensible world. But in point of fact, if the one element set up is a perceived reahty, and its inherent being, as its inverted form, is at the same time a sensuously represented element, then sour, which would be the inherent nature of the sweet thing, is a real thing just as much as the latter would be a sour thing ; black, which would be the inherent nature of white, is the actual black ; the north pole, which is the true reahty of the south pole, is the north pole present in the same magnet ; the oxygen pole, the inherent nature of the pole of hydrogen, is the given oxygen pole of the same voltaic pile. The actual crime, however, finds its inversion, and its inherent nature qua possibihty, in the intention as such, but not in a good intention ; for the truth of intention is simply the deed itself. The crime, so far as its content goes, recoils upon itself, finds its inversion in actual punishment ; this is the reconcihation of the law with the reality set up against it in crime. Finally, the actual punishment carries its inverted reality with it, in such a way that it is a kind of realisation of the law, whereby the activity, which the law exercises in the form of punishment, is cancelled in the process, a manner of realisation through which the law, from being actively operative, becomes again quiescent and authoritative, and the conflict of individuality with it, and of it with individuality, is extinguished. From the idea, then, of inversion which constitutes the essential nature of one aspect of the supersensible world, we must dissociate the sensuous idea of keeping distinctions substantively fixed in a difierent element that sustains them ; and this absolute notion of distinction must be set forth and apprehended purely as inner distinction, self-repulsion of the selfsame as selfsame, and likeness of the unhke as unlike. We have to think pure flux, opposition within opposition itself, or Contradiction. For in the distinction, which is an internal distinction, the opposite is not only one of two factors — if so, it would not be an opposite, but a bare existent — it is the opposite of an opposite, or the other is itself directly and immediately present within it. No doubt I put the opposite here and the other, of which it is the opposite, there ; that is, I place the opposite on one side, taking it by itself 156 Phenomenology of Mind without the other. Just on that account, howev ?, since I have here the opposite all by itself, it is the opposite of its own self, that is, it has in point of fact the other immediately within itself. Thus the supersensible world, which is the inverted world, has at the same time reached out beyond the other world and has in itself that other ; it is to itself conscious of being inverted {fiir sick verhelirte), i.e. it is the inverted form of itself ; it is that world itself and its opposite in a single unity. Only thus is it distinction as internal distinction, or distinction fer se ; in other words, only thus is it in the form of Infinity. By means of infinity we see law attaining the form of inherent necessity, and so reahsing its complete nature ; and all moments of the sphere of appearance are thereby taken up into the inner realm. That the simple and ultimate nature of law is necessity means, according to the foregoing analysis, (a) that it is a self-identical element, which, however, is inherently distinction ; or that it is selfsameness which repels itself from itself, breaks asunder into two factors. What was called simple force duplicates itself, and through its infinity is law. It means (6) that what is thus sundered, constituting as it does the parts which are thought of as in the law, puts itself forward as subsisting, as stable ; and, if the parts are considered without the conception of internal distinction, then space and time, or distance and velocity, which appear as moments of gravity, are just as much indifferent and without necessary relation to one another as to gravity itself, or again as this bare gravity is indifferent to them, or as simple electricity is indifferent to positive and negative. But (c) by this conception of internal distinction, this unUke Understanding I57 and indifierent factor, space and time, etc., becomes a distinction, which is no distinction, or merely a distinction of what is selfsame, and whose essence lies in tinity. They are reciprocally awakened into activity as positive and negative by each other, and their being lies rather in their setting themselves up as not-being, and cancelhng themselves in the common unity. Both the factors distinguished subsist ; they are per se, and they are fer se as opposites, that is, are the oppositea of themselves ; they have their antithesis withia. them, and are merely one single unity. This bare and simple infinity, or the absolute notion, may be called the ultimate nature of hfe, the soul of the world, the universal hfe-blood, which courses everywhere, and whose flow is neither disturbed nor checked by any obstructing distinction, but is itself every distinction that arises, as well as that into which all distinctions are dissolved ; pulsating within itself, but ever motionless, shaken to its depths, but still at rest. It is self -identical, for the distinctions are tautological ; they are distinctions that are none. This self-identical reahty stands, therefore, in relation solely to itself. To itself ; which means this is an other, to which the relation points ; and relation to itself is, more strictly, breaking asunder ; in other words, that very self-identity is internal distinction. These sundered factors have, hence, each a separate being of their own ; each is an opposite— of an other ; and thus with each the other is therein if so facto expressly given ; or it is not the opposite of an other, but only the pure opposite ; and thus each is, therefore, in itself the opposite of itself. Or, agam, each is not an opposite at all, but exists purely for itself, a pure self-identical reahty, with no distinction 158 Phenomenology of Mind in it. This being so, we do not need to ash, still less to treat anxiety over such a question as philosophy, — or even regard this as a question philosophy cannot answer, — ' how distinction or otherness is to come out of this pure essence, how these are to be really got out of it/ For the process of disruption has already taken place ; distinction has been excluded from the selfidentical entity, and put on one side so far as it is concerned ; what should have been taken as the selfidentical is thus already one of the sundered elements, instead of being the absolute essential reality. That the self-identical breaks asunder means, therefore, juSt as truly that it supersedes itself as already sundered, that it cancels itself qua otherness. The unity which people usually have in mind when they say distinction cannot come out of unity, is, in poiut of fact, itself merely one moment of the process of disruption ; it is the abstraction of simpHcity, which stands in contrast with distinction. But in that it is abstraction, is merely one of the two opposed elements, the statement thus already imphes that the unity is the process of breaking asunder; for if the imity is a negative element, an opposite, then it is put forward precisely as that which contains opposition withiu it. The different aspects of diremption and of becoming self-identical are therefore hkewise merely this process of self- cancelling. For since the self-identical element, which should first divide itself asunder or pass into its opposite, is an abstraction, i.e. is already itself a sundered element, its diremption is eo if so a cancelUng of what it is, and thus the cancelhng of its being srmdered. The process of becoming selfidentical is likewise a process of diremption ; what becomes identical with itself thereby opposes itself to disruption, that is, itself thereby puts itself on one side ; in other words, it becomes really something sundered. Infinitude, this absolute unrest of pure self-movement, such that whatever is determined in any way, e.g., as being, is really the opposite of this determinateness — has from the start been no doubt the very soul of all that has gone before ; but it is in the inner world that it has first come out exphcitly and definitely. The world of appearance, or the play of forces, aheady shows its operation ; but it is in the first instance as Explanation that it comes openly forward. And since it is at length an object for consciousness, and consciousness is aware of it as what it is, consciousness is in this way Self -consciousness. Understanding's function of explaining furnishes in the first instance merely the description of what self-consciousness is. Understanding cancels the distinctions present in Law, distinctions which have aheady become pure distinctions but are still indifferent, and puts them inside a single unity. Force. To bring about this identification, however, is at the same time and immediately a process of diremption ; for understanding removes the distinctions and sets up the oneness of force only by the fact that it creates a new distinction of force and law, which at the same time, however, is no distinction. And in spite of the fact that this distinction is at the same time no distinction, it goes on to deal with it and to cancel this distinction again, since it lets force have just the same constitutive character as law. This process or necessity is, however, in this form, still a necessity and a process of imderstanding, or the process as such is not the 'object of understanding ; instead, 160 Phenmnenology of Miiid understanding has as its objects in that process positive and negative electricity, distance, velocity, force of attraction, and a thousand other things — objects which make up the content of the moments of the process. It is just for that reason that there is so much satisfaction in explanation, because consciousness being there, if we may use such an expression, in direct conununion with itself, enjoys itself only. No doubt it there seems to be occupied with something else, but in point of fact it is busied all the while merely with itself. In the opposite law, as the inversion of the first law, or in internal distinction, infinitude doubtless becomes itself object of understanding. But once more understanding fails to do justice to infinity as such, since understanding assigns again to two worlds, or to two substantial elements, that which is distinction per se, — the self-repulsion of the selfsame, and the self-attraction of unhke factors. To understanding the process, as it is found in experience, is here an event that happens, and the selfsame and the unhke are predicates, whose reality is an underlying substratum. What is for understanding an object in a covering veil of sense, now comes before us in its essential form as a pure notion. This apprehension of distinction as it truly is, the apprehension of infinitude as such, is something for us [observing the course of the process], or is implicit, immanent. The exposition of its notion belongs to science. Consciousness, however, in the way it immediately has this notion, again appears as a peculiar form or new attitude of consciousness, which does not recognise its own essential nature in what has gone before, but looks upon it as something quite different. In that this notion of infinitude is its object, it is thus a consciousness of the distinction as one which at the same time is at once cancelled. Consciousness is for itself and on its own account, it is a distinguishiag of what is undistinguished, it is Self-consciousness. I distinguish myself from myself ; and therein I am immediately aware that this factor distinguished from me is not distinguished. I, the selfsame being, thrust myself away from myself ; but this which is distinguished, which is set up as unlike me, is immediately on its being distinguished no distinction for me. Consciousness of an other, of an object in general, is indeed itself necessarily self-consciousness, reflectedness into self, consciousness of self in its otherness. The necessary advance from the previous attitudes of consciousness, which found their true content to be a thing, something other than themselves, brings to hght this very fact that not merely is consciousness of a thing only possible for a self-consciousness, but that this selfconsciousness alone is the truth of those attitudes. But it is only for us [who trace this process] that this truth is actually present ; it is not yet so for the consciousness immersed in the experience. Self-consciousness has in the first iustance become a specific reahty on its own account {fiir sich), has come into being for itself ; it is not yet in the form of unity with consciousness in general. We see that in the inner being of the sphere of appearance, understanding gets to know in truth nothing else but appearance itself, not, however, appearance in the shape of a play of forces, but that play of forces in its absolutely universal moments and in the process of those moments; in fact, understanding merely experiences itself. Kaised above perception, con- VOL. I.— M 162 Phenomenology of Mind sciousness reveals itself •united and bound up with the supersensible world through the mediating agency of the realm of appearance, through which it gazes into this background that hes behind appearance. The two extremes, the one that of the pure inner region, the other that of the inner being gazing into this pure inner region, are now merged together ; and as they have disappeared qua extremes, the middle term, the mediating agency, qua something other than these extremes, has also vanished. This curtain [of appearance], therefore, hanging before the inner world is withdrawn, and we have here the inner being [the ego] gazing into the inner reahn — the vision of the imdistinguished selfsame reahty, which repels itself from itself, affirms itself as a divided and distinguished inner reahty, but as one for which at the same time the two factors have immediately no distinction ; what we have here is Selfconsciousness. It is manifest that behind the so-called curtain, which is to hide the inner world, there is nothing to be seen unless we ourselves go behind there, as much in order that we may thereby see, as that there may be something behind there which can be seen. But it is clear at the same time that we cannot without more ado go straightway behind there. For this knowledge of what is the truth of the idea of the realm of appearance and of its inner being, is itself only a result arrived at after a long and devious process, in the course of which the modes of consciousness, " meaning," " perception," and " understanding " disappear. And it will be equally evident that to get acquainted with what consciousness knows when it is knowing itself, requires us to fetch a still wider compass. What follows will set this forth at length. B SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS * IV THE TRUTH WHICH CONSCIOUS CERTAINTY OF SELF REALISES [The analysis of experience up to this point has been occupied with the relation of consciousness to an object admittedly different in nature from the mind aware of it. This external opposition, however, breaks down under analysis, and we are left with the result that consciousness does and must find itself in unity with its object, a unity which implies identity of nature between consciousness and its object : consciousness becomes " certain of itself in its object." This is not merely a result, but the truest expression of the initial relation with which experience starts. It is, therefore, the ground of the possibility of any relation between the terms in question : " consciousness of self " is the basis of the consciousness of anything whatsoever. This is Hegel's re-interpretation of the Kantian analysis of experience. But this result is, again, really the starting-point for a further analysis of experience, but of experience at a higher level of realisation. Consciousness of self is to begin with a general attitude, a definite type of experience, which requires elucidation. It has its own conditions and forms of manifestation. Self-consciousness, being supreme, must realise itself in relation to nature, to other selves similar to the self, and to the Ultimate Being of the world. These are different kinds of content with which consciousness is to find its oneness, and they furnish different forms in which the same principle is manifested. The argument seeks to show that these forms are also different degrees of realisation of self-consciousness. The outcome of the argument is that self -consciousness is truly realised only when it is universal self-consciousness, when consciousness is certain of itself throughout all reality, and explicitly finds there only itself. This result takes the form, as we shall see, of what is called Reason. The immediately succeeding section takes up the first stage of the development of self-consciousness — the consciousness of self in relation to * Cp. Propddeutik, p. 84 ff. 164 Phenomenology of Mind nature. This takes the shape of Desire, Instinct, Impulse, etc., and involves the category of Life. This relationship, vi'hile undoubtedly implying the sense of self in the object and consciousness of unity with it, is the least satisfying and the least complete of all the modes of selfconsciousness. It points the way, therefore, to the fuller sense of self obtained when the self is aware of itself in relation to another self.] IN the kinds of certainty hitherto considered, the truth for consciousness is something other than consciousness itself. The conception, however, of this truth vanishes in the course of our experience of it. What the object immediately was in itself — whether mere being in sense-certainty, a concrete thing in perception, or force in the case of understanding — it turns out, in truth, not to be this really ; but instead, this inherent nature (AnsicJi) proves to be a way in which it is for an other. The abstract conception of the object gives way before the actual concrete object, or the first immediate idea is cancelled in the course of experience. Mere certainty vanished in favour of the truth. There has now arisen, however, what was not estabhshed in the case of these previous relationships, viz. a certainty which is on a par with its truth, for the certainty is to itself its own object, and consciousness is to itself the truth. Otherness, no doubt, is also found there ; consciousness, that is, makes a distinction ; but what is distinguished is of such a kind that consciousness, at the same time, holds there is no distinction made. If we call the movement of knowledge conception, and knowledge, qua simple unity or Ego, the object, we see that»not only for us [tracing the process], but Hkewise for knowledge itself, the object corresponds to the conception ; or, if we put it in the other form and call conception what the object is in itself, while applying the term object to what the object is qua object oi' for an other, it is clear that being " in-itself " and being " for an other " are here the same. For the inherent being [Ansich) is consciousness ; yet it is still just as much that for which an other (viz. what is " in-itself ") is. And it is for consciousness that the inherent nature {Ansich) of the object, and its " being for an other " are one and the same. Ego is the content of the relation, and itself the process of relating. It is Ego itself which is opposed to an other and, at the same time, reaches out beyond this other, which other is all the same taken to be only itself. With self-consciousness, then, we have now passed into the native land of truth, into that kingdom where it is at home. We have to see how the form or attitude of seK-consciousness in the first instance appears. When we consider this new form and type of knowledge, the knowledge of self, in its relation to that which preceded, namely, the knowledge of an other, we find, indeed, that this latter has vanished, but that its moments have, at the same time, been preserved ; and the loss consists in this, that those moments are here present as they are implicitly, as they are in themselves. The being which " meaning " dealt with, particularity and the universahty of perception opposed to it, as also the empty, inner region of understanding — these are no longer present as substantial elements {Wesen), but as moments of seKconsciousness, i.e. as abstractions or differences, which are, at the same time, of no account for consciousness itself, or are not differences at all, and are purely vanishing entities (Wesen). What seems to have been lost, then, is only the principal moment, viz. the simple fact of having 166 Phenomenology of Mind independent subsistence for consciousness. But, in reality, self-consciousness is reflexion out of the bare being that belongs to the world of sense and perception, and is essentially the return out of otherness. As selfconsciousness, it is movement ; but since it is only its self as such which it distinguishes from itself, the difference is straightway taken to be superseded qua otherness. The distiuction is not, and self-consciousness is only the hfeless tautology. Ego is Ego, I am I : since for self-consciousness the distinction does not also have the shape of being, it is not self-consciousness. For self-consciousness, then, otherness is a fact, it does exist as a distinct moment ; but the unity of itself with this difference is also a fact for selfconsciousness, and is a second distinct moment. With that first moment, self-consciousness occupies the position of consciousness, and the whole expanse of the world of sense is conserved as its object, but at the same time only as related to the second moment, the unity of self-consciousness with itself. And, consequently, the sensible world is regarded by self-consciousness as having a subsistence which is, however, only appearance, or forms a distinction from selfconsciousness that per se has no being. This opposition of its appearance and its truth finds its real essence, however, only in the truth — in the unity of selfconsciousness with itself. This unity must become essential to self-consciousness, i.e. self -consciousness is the state of Desire in general. Consciousness has, qua self-consciousness, henceforth a twofold object — the one immediate, the object of sense-certainty and of perception, which, however, is here found to be marked by the character of negation ; the second, viz. itself, which is the true essence, and is found in the first instance only in the opposition of the first object to it. Self -consciousness presents itself here as the process in which this opposition is removed, and oneness or identity with itself estabhshed. For us or impUcitly, the object, which is the negative element for self-consciousness, has on its side returned into itself, just as on the other side consciousness has done. Through this reflexion into self, the object has become Life. What self -consciousness distinguishes as having a being distinct from itself, has in it too, so far as it is affirmed to he, not merely the aspect of sense-certainty and perception ; it is a being reflected into itself, and the object of immediate desire is something hving. For the inherent reahty (Atisich), the general result of the relation of the understanding to the inner nature of things, is the distinguishing of what cannot be distinguished, or is the unity of what is distinguished. This vmity, however, is, as we saw, just as much its recoil from itself; and this conception breaks asunder into the opposition of self-consciousness and fife : the former is the unity for which the absolute unity of differences exists, the latter, however, is only this unity itself, so that the unity is not at the same time for itself. Thus, according to the independence possessed by consciousness, is the independence which its object in itself possesses. Self-consciousness, which is absolutely for itself, and characterises its object directly as negative, or is primarily desire, will really, therefore, find through experience this object's independence. The determination of the principle of Mfe,* as * Cp. Hegel's Logik, T. II, Absch. 3. Kap. i.— "das Leben," 168 Phenomenology of Mind obtained from the conception or general result with which we enter this new sphere, is sufficient to characterise it, without its nature being evolved further out of that notion. Its circuit is conapleted in the following moments. The essential element (Wesen) is infinitude as the supersession of all distinctions, the pure rotation on its own axis, itself at rest while being absolutely restless infinitude, the very self-dependence in which the differences brought out in the process are all dissolved, the simple reahty of time, which in this self-identity has the sohd form and shape of space. The differences aU the same hold as differences in this simple universal medium ; for this universal flux exercises its negative activity merely when it is the sublation of them ; but it could not transcend them unless they had a subsistence of their own. Precisely this flux is itself, as self-identical independence, their subsistence or their substance, in which they accordingly are distinct members, parts which have being in their own right. Being no longer has the significance of mere abstract being, nor has their naked essence the meaning of abstract universality : their being now is just that simple fluent substance of the pure movement within itself. The difference, however, of these members inter se consists, in general, in no other characteristic than that of the moments of infinitude, or of the mere movement itself. The independent members exist for themselves. To be thus for themselves, however, is really as much their reflexion directly into the unity, as this unity is the breaking asunder into independent forms. The imity is sundered because it is absolutely negative or infinite unity!; and because it is subsistence, difference likewise has independence only in it. This independence of form, for the form is a sundered element, appears as a determinate entity, as what is for another, and the sublation of diremption takes effect so far-through another. But this sublation lies just as much in the actual form itself. For just that flux is the substance of the independent forms. This substance, however, is infinite, and hence the form itself in its very subsistence involves diremption, or sublation of its existence for itself. If we distinguish more exactly the moments contained here, we see that we have as first moment the subsistence of the independent forms, or the suppression of what distinction inherently involves, viz. that the forms have no being per se, and no subsistence. The second moment, however, is the subjection of that subsistence to the infinitude of distinction. In the fiist moment there is the subsisting, persisting mode or form ; by its being in its own right, or by its being in its determinate shape an infinite substance, it comes forward in opposition to the universal substance, disowns this fluent continuity with that substance, and insists that it is not dissolved in this universal element, but rather on the contrary preserves itself by and through its separation from this its inorganic nature, and by the fact that it consumes this inorganic nature. Life in the universal fluid medium, quietly, silently shaping and moulding and distributing the forms in all their manifold detail, becomes by that very activity the movement of those forms, or passes into hfe qua Process. The mere universal flux is here the inherent being; the outer being, the *' other," is the distinction of the forms assumed. But 170 ■ Phenomenology of Mind this flux, this fluent condition, becomes itself the other in virtue of this very distinction, because now it exists " for " or in relation to that distinction, which is selfconditioned and self-contained {an und fur sich), and consequently is the endless, infinite movement by which that stable mediimi is consumed^s life as a living process. This inversion of character, however, is on that account again invertedness in itself as such. Wliat is consumed is the essential reahty : the IndividuaUty, which preserves itself at the expense of the universal and gives itself the feeling of its unity with itseH, precisely thereby cancels its contrast with the other, by means of which it exists for itself. The unity with self, which it gives itself, is just the fluent continuity of difierences, or universal dissolution. But, conversely, the cancelling of individual subsistence at the same time produces the subsistence. For since the essence of the individual form — universal Hfe — and the self-existent entity in itself are simple substance, each cancels this its own simplicity or its essence by putting the other within itself, i.e. it sunders that simplicity, and this disruption of fluent undifferentiated continuity is just the setting up, the affirmation, of individuahty. The simple substance of life, therefore, is the diremption of itself into shapes and forms, and at the same time the dissolution of these substantial differences ; and the resolution of this diremption is just as much a process of diremption, a dismemberment. Thus both the sides of the entire movement which were before distinguished, viz., the setting up of individual forms lying apart and imdisturbed in the universal medium of independent existence, and the process of life — collapse into one another. The latter is just as much a formation of independent individual shapes, as it is a way of cancelhng a shape assumed ; and the former, the setting up of individual forms, is as much a cancelling as an articulation of them. The fluent, continuous element is itself only abstraction of the real essence, or is actual only as a definite shape or form ; and that it articulates itself is once more a breaking up of the articulated form, or a dissolution of it. The entire circuit of this activity constitutes Life. It is neither what is expressed to begin with, the immediate continuity and concrete sohdity of its essential nature ; nor the stable, subsisting form, the discrete individual which exists on its own account ; nor the bare process of this form ; nor again is it the simple combination of all these moments. It is none of these ; it is the whole which develops itself, resolves its own development, and in this movement simply preserves itself. Since we started from the first immediate unity, and returned through the moments of form-determination, and of process, to the unity of both these moments, and thus again back to the first simple substance, we see that this reflected unity is other than the first. As opposed to that immediate unity, the unity expressed as a mode of being, this second is the universal unity, which holds all these moments sublated within itself. It is the simple genus, which in the movement of hfe itself does not exist in this simpUcity for itself ; but in this result points hfe towards what is other than itself, namely, towards Consciousness for which hfe exists as this unity or as genus. This other life, however, for which the genus as such 172 Phenomenology of Mini exists and which is geniis for itseK, namely, self-consciousness, exists in the first instance only in the form of this simple, essential reahty, and has for object itself qua pure Ego. In the course of its experience, which we are now to consider, this abstract object will grow in richness, and will be unfolded in the way we have seen in the case of hfe. The simple ego is this genus, or the bare universal, for which the differences are insubstantial, only by its being the negative essence of the moments which have assumed a definite and independent form. And self-consciousness is thus only assured of itself through sublating this other, which is presented to self-consciousness as an independent hfe ; self-consciousness is Desire. Convinced of the nothingness of this other, it definitely affirms this nothingness to be for itself the truth of this other, negates the independent object, and thereby acquires the certainty of its own self, as true certainty, a certainty which it has become aware of in objective form. In this state of satisfaction, however, it has experience of the independence of its object. Desire and the certainty of its self obtained in the gratification of desire, are conditioned by the object ; for the certainty exists through cancelHng this other ; in order that this cancelling may be effected, there must be this other. Self-consciousness is thus unable by its negative relation to the object to abohsh it ; because of that relation it rather produces it again, as well as the desire. The object desired is, in fact, something other than self-consciousness, the essence of desire ; and through this experience this truth has become reaHsed. At the same time, however, self-consciousness is Hkewise absolutely for itself, exists on its own account ; and it is so only by sublation of tlie object ; and it must come to feel its satisfaction, for it is the truth. On account of tbe independence of the object, therefore, it can only attain satisfaction when this object itself efiectually brings about negation within itself. The object must fer se effect this negation of itself, for it is inherently {an sich) something negative, and must be for the other what it is. Since the object is in its very self negation, and in being so is at the same time independent, it is Consciousness. In the case of hfe, which is the object of desire, the negation either lies in an other, namely, in desire, or takes the form of determinateness standing in opposition to an other external individuum indifferent to it, or appears as its inorganic general nature. The above general iudependent nature, however, in the case of which negation takes the form of absolute negation, is the genus as such, or as self-consciousness. Self-consciousness attains its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness. It is in these three moments that the notion of seKconsciousness first gets completed : (a) pure undifferentiated ego is its first inmaediate object. (&) This immediacy is itself, however, thoroughgoing mediation ; it has its being only by cancelling the independent object, in other words it is Desire. The satisfaction of desire is indeed the reflexion of self-consciousness into itself, is the certainty which has passed into objective truth. But (c) the truth of this certainty is reaUy twofold reflexion, the reduphcation of self-consciousness. Consciousness has an object which impUcates its own otherness or affirms distinction as a void distinction, and therein is independent. The individual form dis- 174 Phenomenology of Mind tinguislied, which is only a hving form, certainly cancels its independence also in the process of life itself ; but it ceases along with its distinctive difference to be what it is. The object of self-consciousness, however, is still independent in this negativity of itself ; and thus it is for itself genus, universal flux or continuity in the very distinctiveness of its own separate existence ; it is a living self-consciousness. A self-consciousness has before it a self- consciousness. Only so and only then is it self-consciousness in actual fact ; for here first of all it comes to have the unity of itself in its otherness. Ego, which is the object of its notion, is in point of fact not " object." The object of desire, however, is only independent, for it is the universal, ineradicable substance, the fluent self-identical essential reality. When a self-consciousness is the object, the object is just as much ego as object. With this we already have before us the notion of Mind or Spirit. What consciousness has further to become aware of, is the experience of what mind is, this absolute substance, which is the unity of the different self-related and self-existent self-consciousnesses, in the perfect freedom and independence of their opposition as component elements of that substance : Ego that is " we," a plurality of Egos, and " we " that is a single Ego. Consciousness first finds in self-consciousness — the notion of mind^ts turningpoint, where it leaves the parti-coloured show of the sensuous immediate, passes from the dark void of the transcendent and remote super-sensuous, and : .^eps into the spiritual daylight of the present. A INDEPENDENCE AND DEPENDENCE OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS LORDSHIP AND BONDAGE [The selves conscious of self in another self are, of course, distinct and separate from each other. The difference is, in the first instance, a question of degree of self-assertion and self -maintenance : one is stronger, higher, more independent than another, and capable of asserting this at the expense of the other. Still, even this distinction of primary and secondary rests ultimately on their identity of constitution ; and the course of the analysis here gradually brings out this essential identity as the true fact. The equality of the selves is the truth, or completer realisation, of self in another self ; the affinity is higher and more ultimate than the disparity. Still, the struggle and conflict of selves must be gone through in order to bring out this result. Hence the present section. The background of Hegel's thought is the remarkable human phenomenon of the subordination of one self to another which we have in all forms of servitude — whether slavery, serfdom, or voluntary service. Servitude is not only a phase of human history, it is in principle a condition of the development and maintenance of the consciousness of self as a fact of experience.] Self-consciousness exists in itself and for itself, in that, and by the fact that it exists for another self-consciousness ; that is to say, it is only by being acknowledged or "recognised." The conception of this its unity in its duphcation, of infinitude reahsing itself in self-consciousness, has many sides to it and encloses within it elements of varied significance. Thus its moments must on the one hand be strictly kept apart in detailed distinctiveness, and, on the other, in this distinction must, at the same time, also be taken as not 176 Phenomenology of Mind distinguished, or must always be accepted and understood in their opposite sense. This double meaning of what is distinguished lies in the nature of selfconsciousness : — of its being infinite, or directly the opposite of the determinateness in which it is fixed. The detailed exposition of the notion of this spiritual unity in its duplication will bring before us the process of Recognition. Self-consciousness has before it another self-consciousness ; it has come outside itself. This has a double significance. First it has lost its own self, since it finds itself as an other being ; secondly, it has thereby sublated that other, for it does not regard the other as essentially real, but sees its own self in the other. It must cancel this its other. To do so is the sublation of that first double meaning, and is therefore a second double meaning. First, it must set itself to sublate the other independent being, in order thereby to become certain of itself as true being, secondly, it thereupon proceeds to sublate its own self, for this other is itself. This sublation in a double sense of its otherness in a double sense is at the same time a return in a double sense into its self. For, firstly, through sublation, it gets back itself, because it becomes one with itself again through the cancelhng of its otherness ; but secondly, it likewise gives otherness back again to the other selfconsciousness, for it was aware of being in the other, it cancels this its own being in the other and thus lets the other again go free. This process of self-consciousness in relation to another self-consciousness has in this manner been represented as the action of one alone. But this action on the part of the one has its'ilf the double significance of being at once its own actir-n and the action of that other as well. For the other is likewise independent, shut up within itself, and there is nothing in it which is not there through itself. The first does not have the object before it in the way that object primarily exists for desire, but as an object existing independently for itself, over which therefore it has no power to do anything for its own behoof, if that object does not per se do what the first does to it. The process then is absolutely the double process of both selfconsciousnesses. Each sees the other do the same as itself ; each itself does what it demands on the part of the other, and for that reason does what it does, only so far as the other does the same. Action from one side only would be useless, because what is to happen can only be brought about by means of both. The action has then a double entente not only in the sense that it is an act done to itself as well as to the other, but also inasmuch as it is in its undivided entirety the act of the one as well as of the other. In this movement we see the process repeated which came before us as the play of forces ; in the present case, however, it is found in consciousness. What in the former had effect only for us [contemplating experience], holds here for the terms themselves. The middle term is self-consciousness which breaks itself up into the extremes ; and each extreme is this interchange of its own determinateness, and complete transition into the opposite. While qua consciousness, it no doubt comes outside itself, still, in being outside itself it is at the same time restrained within itself, it exists for itself, and its self-externahsation is for consciousness. VOL. I. — N 178 Phenomenology of Mind Consciousness finds that it immediately is and is not another consciousness, as also that this other is for itself only when it cancels itself as existing for itself, and has self-existence only in the self-existence of the other. Each is the mediating term to the other, through which each mediates and unites itself with itself ; and each is to itself and to the other an immediate selfexisting reahty, which, at the same time, exists thus for itself only through this mediation. They recognise themselves as mutually recognising one another. This pure conception of recognition, of duplication of self- consciousness within its unity, we must now consider in the way its process appears for self-consciousness. It will, in the first place, present the aspect of the disparity of the two, or the break-up of the middle term into the extremes, which, qua extremes, are opposed to one another, and of which one is merely recognised, while the other only recognises. Self-consciousness is primarily simple existence for self, self-identity by exclusion of every other from itself. It takes its essential nature and absolute object to be Ego ; and in this immediacy, in this bare fact of its self- existence, it is individual. That which for it is other stands as unessential object, as object with the impress and character of negation. But the other is also a self - consciousness ; an individual makes its appearance in antithesis to an individual. Appearing thus in their immediacy, they are for each other in the manner of ordinary objects. They are independent individual forms, modes of consciousness that have not risen above the bare level of life (for the existent object here has been determined as life). They are, moreover, forms of consciousness which have not yet accomplished for one another the process of absolute abstraction, of uprooting all immediate existence, and of being merely the bare, negative fact of self-identical consciousness ; or, in other words, have not yet revealed themselves to each, other as existing purely for themselves, i.e. as self-C)Onsciousness. Each is indeed certain of its own self, but not of the other, and hence its own certainty of itself is still without truth. For its truth would be merely that its own individual existence for itself would bts shown to it to be an independent object, or, which is the same thing, that the object would be exhibited as this pure certainty of itself. By the notion of recognition^ however, this is not possible, except in the form that s^s the other is for it, so it is for the other ; each in its self through its own action and again through the action of the other achieves this pure abstraction of existence for; self. The presentjjition of itself, however, as pure abstraction of self-conscio|usness consists in showing itself as a pure negation of itsi objective form, or in showing that it is fettered to no\ determinate existence, that it is not bound at all hj\ the particularity everywhere characteristic of existence as such, and is not tied up with life. The process of bringing all this out involves a twofold action— laction on the part of the other, and action on the par*t of itself. In so far as it is the other's action, each aimsl at the destruction and death of the other. But in thri's there is imphcated also the second kind of action, «(|'lf-activity ; for each imphes that it risks its own hfe.. The relation of both self-consciousnesses is in this way so constituted that they prove themselves and each other through a hfe-and-death struggle. They ixlust enter into this struggle, for they 180 Phenomenology of Mind must bring their certainty of f,hemselves, the certainty of being for themselves, to the level of objective truth, and make this a fact both in the case of the other and in their ovm case as well. And it is solely by risking life, that freedom is obtained ; only thus is it tried and proved that the essential nature of self-consciousness is not bare existence, is not the merely immediate form in which it at first makes its appearance, is not its mere absorption in the expanse of hfe. Rather it is thereby guaranteed that there is nothing present but what might be taken as a vanishiing moment — that self-consciousness is merely pure se^f -existence, being-for-self. The individual, who ha.s not staked his 'ife, may, no doubt, be recognised as 'a Person; but he Jias not attained the truth of this recognition as an independent self-consciousness. In the same way each must aim at the death of the other, as it risks its own life thereby; for that other is to it of no more worth than itself ; the other's reality is presented to the former as an external other, as outside itself; it must cancel that externality. The other is a purely' existent consciousness and entangled in manifold \vays ; it must regard its otherness as pure existence for itself or as absolute negation. This trying and testing, however, by a struggle to the death, cancels both the truth which was to result from it, and therewith the certainty of self altogether. For just as Ufe is the natural " position " of consciousness, independence without absolute negativity, so death is the natural " negation " of consciousness, negation without independence, which thus remains without the requisite significance of actual recognition. Through death, doubtless, there has arisen the certainty that both did stake their hfe, and held it hghtly both in their own case and in the case of the other ; but that is not for those who underwent this struggle. They cancel their consciousness which had its place in this ahen element of natural existence ; in other words, they cancel themselves and are sublated, as terms or extremes seeking to have existence on their own account. But along with this there vanishes from the play of change, the essential moment, viz. that of breaking up into extremes with opposite characteristics ; and the middle term collapses into a hfeless unity which is broken up into hfeless extremes, merely existent and not opposed. And the two do not mutually give and receive one another back from each other through consciousness ; they let one another go quite indifferently, hke things. Their act is abstract negation, not the negation characteristic of consciousness, which cancels in such a way that it preserves and maintains what is sublated, and thereby survives its being sublated. In this experience self-consciousness becomes aware that life is as essential to it as pure self-consciousness. Tn immediate self-consciousness the simple ego is absolute object, which, however, is for us or in itself absolute mediation, and has as its essential moment substantial and sohd independence. The dissolution of that simple unity is the result of the first experience ; through this there is posited a pure self-consciousness, and a consciousness which is not purely for itself, but for another, i.e. as an existent consciousness, consciousness in the form and shape of thinghood. Both moments are essential, since, in the first instance, they are unlike and opposed, and their reflexion into 182 Phenomenology of Mind unity has not yet come to light, they stand as two opposed forms or modes of consciousness. The one is independent whose essential nature is to be for itself, the other is dependent whose essence is hfe or existence for another. The former is the Master, or Lord, the latter the Bondsman. The master is the consciousness that exists for itself ; but no longer merely the general notion of existence for self. Rather, it is consciousness which, while existing on its own account, is mediated with itself through an other consciousness, viz. bound up with an independent being or with thinghood in general. The master brings himself into relation to both these moments, to a thing as such, the object of desire, and to the consciousness whose essential character is thinghood, and since the master, qua notion of self-consciousness, is (o) an immediate relation of self-existence, but is now moreover at the same time (6) mediation, or a being-for-self which is for itself only through an other — he [the master] stands in relation (a) immediately to both (&) mediately to each through the other. The master relates himself to the bondsman mediately through independent existence, for that is precisely what keeps the bondsman in thrall ; it is his chain, from which he could not in the struggle get away, and for that reason he proves himself dependent, shows that his independence consists in being a thing. The master, however, is the power controlling this state of existence, for he has shown in the struggle that he holds existence to be merely something negative. Since he is the power dominating the negative nature of existence, while this existence again is the power controlling the other [the bondsman], the master holds, far consequence, :his other in subordination. In the same way the naster relates himself to the thing mediately through :he bondsman. The bondsman being a self-consciousaess in the broad sense, also takes up a negative attitude to things and cancels them ; but the thing is, at the same time, independent for him, and, in consequence, he cannot, with all his negating, get so far as to annihilate it outright and be done with it ; that is to say, he merely works on it. To the master, on the other hand, by means of this mediatiag process, belongs the immediate relation, in the sense of the pure negation of it, in other words he gets the enjoyment. What mere desire did not attain, he now succeeds in attaining, viz. to have done with the thing, and find satisfaction in enjoyment. Desire alone did not get the length of this, because of the independence of the thing. The master, however, who has interposed the bondsman between it and himself, thereby relates himself merely to the dependence of the thing, and enjoys it without quahfication and without reserve. The aspect of its independence he leaves to the bondsman, who labours upon it. In these two moments, the master gets his recognition through an other consciousness, for in them the latter aiSrms itself as unessential, both by working upon the thing, and, on the other hand, by the fact of being dependent on a determinate existence ; in neither case can this other get the mastery over existence, and succeed in absolutely negating it. We have thus here this moment of recognition, viz. that the other consciousness cancels itself as self-existent, and, ipso facto, itself does what the first does to it. In the same way we have the other moment, that this action on the part of the second is the action proper of the first ; for what 184 Phenomenology of Mind is done by the bondsman is properly an action on tlie part of the master. The latter exists only for himself, that is his essential nature ; he is the negative power without quahfication, a power to which the thing is naught, and his is thus the absolutely essential action in this situation, while the bondsman's is not so, his is an unessential activity. But for recognition proper there is needed the moment that what the master does to the other he should also do to himself, and what the bondsman does to himself, he should do to the other also. On that accomit a form of recognition has arisen that is one-sided and unequal. In all this, the unessential consciousness is, for the master, the object which embodies the truth of his certainty of himself. But it is evident that this object does not correspond to its notion ; for, just where the master has effectively achieved lordship, he really finds that something has come about quite different from an independent consciousness. It is not an independent, but rather a dependent consciousness that he has achieved. He is thus not assured of seK-existence as his truth ; he finds that his truth is rather the unessential consciousness, and the fortuitous unessential action of that consciousness. The truth of the independent consciousness is accordingly the consciousness of the bondsman. This doubtless appears in the first instance outside it, and not as the truth of self-consciousness. But just as lordship showed its essential nature to be the reverse of what it wants to be, so, too, bondage will, when completed, pass into the opposite of what it immediately is : being a consciousness repressed within itself, it will enter into itself, and change round into real and true independence. We have seen what bondage is only in relation to lordship. But it is a self-consciousness, and we have now to consider what it is, in this regard, in and for itself. In the first instance, the master is taken to be the essential reahty for the state of bondage ; hence, for it, the truth is the independent consciousness existing for itself, although this truth is not yet taken as inherent in bondage itself. Still, it does in fact contain within itself this truth of pure negativity and self-existence, because it has experienced this reahty within it. For this self-consciousness was not in peril and fear for this element or that, nor for this or that moment of time, it was afraid for its entire being ; it felt the fear of death, it was in mortal terror of its sovereign master. It has been in that experience melted to its inmost soul, has trembled throughout its every fibre, the stable foundations of its whole being have quaked within it. This complete perturbation of its entire substance, this absolute dissolution of all its stabihty into fluent continuity, is, however, the simple, ultimate nature of self-consciousness, absolute negativity, pure self-referrent existence, which consequently is involved in this type of consciousness. This moment of pure self-existence is moreover a fact for it; for in the master this moment is consciously his object. Further, this bondsman's consciousness is not only this total dissolution in a general way; in serving and toiling, the bondsman actually carries this out. By serving he cancels in every particular moment his dependence on and attachment to natural existence, and by his work removes this existence away. The feeling of absolute power, however, reahsed both in general and in the particular form of service, is 186 Phenomenology of Mind only dissolution implicitly, and albeit the fear of his lord is the beginning of wisdom, consciousness is not therein aware of being self-existent. Through work and labour, however, this consciousness of the bondsman comes to itself. In the moment which corresponds to desire in the case of the master's consciousness, the aspect of the non-essential relation to the thing seemed to fall to the lot of the servant, since the thing there retained its independence. Desire has reserved to itself the pure negating of the object and thereby unalloyed feehng of self. This satisfaction, however, just for that reason is itself only a state of evanescence, for it lacks objectivity or subsistence. Labour, on the other hand, is desire restrained and checked, evanescence delayed and postponed; in other words, labour shapes and fashions the thing. The negative relation to the object passes into the form of the object, into something that is permanent and remains ; because it is just for the labourer that the object has independence. This negative mediating agency, this activity giving shape and form, is at the same time the individual existence, the pure self-existence of that consciousness, which now in the work it does is externahsed and passes into the condition of permanence. The consciousness that toils and serves accordingly comes by this means to view that independent being as its self. But again, shaping or forming the object has not only the positive significance that the bondsman becomes thereby aware of himself as factually and objectively self-existent ; this type of consciousness has also a negative import, in contrast with its first moment, the element of fear. For in shaping the thing it only becomes aware of its own proper negativity, its existence on its own account, as an object, tkrough. the fact that it cancels the actual form confronting it. But this objective negative element is precisely the alien, external reahty, before which it trembled. Now, however, it destroys this extraneous alien negative, affirms and sets itself up as a negative in the element of permanence, and thereby becomes aware of being objectively for itself. In the master, this self-existence is felt to be an other, is only external ; in fear, the self- existence is present implicitly ; in fashioning the thing, self-existence comes to be felt explicitly as its own proper being, and it attains the consciousness that itself exists in its own right and on its own account {an und fur sich). By the fact that the form is objectified, it does not become something other than the consciousness moulding the thing through work ; for just that form is his pure selfexistence, which therein becomes truly reahsed. Thus precisely in labour where there seemed to be merely some outsider's mind and ideas involved, the bondsman becomes aware, through this re-discovery of himself by himself, of having and being a " mind of his own." For this reflexion of self into self the two moments, fear and service in general, as also that of formative activityTare necessary : and at the same time both must "exist in a universal manner. Without the discipline of service and obedience, fear remains formal and does not spread over the whole known reahty of existence. Without the formative activity shaping the thing, fear remains inward and mute, and consciousness does not become objective for itself. Should consciousness shape and form the thing without the initial state of absolute fear, then it has merely a vain and futile 188 Phenomenology of Mind " mind of its own " ; for its form or negativity is not negativity perse, and hence its formative activity cannot furnish the consciousness of itself as essentially real. If it has endured not absolute fear, but merely some slight anxiety, the negative reahty has remained external to it, its substance has not been through and through infected thereby. Since the entire content of its natural consciousness has not tottered and shaken, it is still inherently a determinate mode of being ; having a " mind of its own " {der eigen Sinn) is simply stubbornness (Eigensinn), a type of freedom which does not get beyond the attitude of bondage. The less the pure form can become its essential nature, the less is that form, as overspreading and controlling particulars, a universal formative activity, an absolute notion ; it is rather a piece of cleverness which has mastery within a certain range, but does not wield imiversal power and dominate the entire objective reality. B FREEDOM OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS STOICISM: SCEPTICISM: THE UNHAPPY CONSCIOUSNESS [The previous section has established the self as ultimately a free self. But even this is abstract at first, and hence the attempt to maintain it must pass through different stages. These attempts have taken historical expression in European civilisation, but these are merely instances of an experience that is strictly found in all mankind. Hegel, however, selects the forms assumed in European history, and has these in mind throughout the succeeding analysis. The terms Stoicism and Scepticism refer primarily to the forms which these assumed in Greece and Rome. The last stage of independent and free self-hood he names, faute de mieux, the "unhappy consciousness." The background of historical material for this type of mind is found in the religious life of the Middle Ages and the mental attitude assumed under the dominion of the Roman Catholic Church and the Peudal Hierarchy. The social and political dissolution of the Roman Empire has its counterpart in the mental chaos and dissolution of Scepticism ; the craving of free mind for absolute stability and constancy amid change and uncertainty found expression in an organised attempt on the part of the Church to establish permanent connection between man's mental insecurity and an Immutable Reality. The two poles of the antithesis were far removed from each other, and the method or methods adopted to bring about the union reflect the profound contrast of the opposing elements. It is the inner process of free mind in this realm of abstract subjective piety which Hegel analyses in the part termed the ' unhappy consciousness ' — ' unhappy ' because craving complete consciousness of self and never at this stage attaining it. The end of this movement, and therefore the disappearance of all the onesidedness of abstract individual freedom of self, is found when, through the above struggle, there dawns on the self the consciousness of its complete and explicit unity with reality in every shape and form. This is the beginning of the absolute sovereignty of Mind — the Consciousness of Reason as supreme. The change to this new condition found historical expression in the Reformation and the Renaissance]. 190 Phenomenology of Mind Independent self-consciousness partly finds its essential reality in the bare abstraction of Ego. On the other hand, when this abstract ego develops further and forms distinctions of its own, this differentiation does not become an objective inherently real content for that self-consciousness. Hence this self-consciousness does not become an ego which truly difierentiates itself in its abstract simpHcity, or one which remains identical with itself in this absolute differentiation. The repressed and subordinated type of consciousness, on the other hand, becomes, in the formative activity of work, an object to itself, in the sense that the form, given to the thing when shaped and moulded, is his object ; he sees in the master, at the same time, self-existence as a real mode of consciousness. But the subservient consciousness as such finds these two moments fall apart — the moment of itself as independent object, and the moment of this object as a mode of consciousness, and so its own proper reality. Since, however, the form and the self -existence are for us, or objectively in themselves, one and the same, and since in the notion of independent consciousness the inherent reality is consciousness, the phase of inherent existence {Ansichsein) or thinghood, which received its shape and form through labour, is no other substance than consciousness. In this way, we have a new attitude or mode of consciousness brought about. We have now a consciousness, which takes itself to be infinitude, or one whose essential nature is pure process of consciousness. It is one which thinhs or is free self-consciousness. For thinking does not consist in being an abstract ego, but in being an ego which has, at the same time, the significance of inherently existing in itself ; or which relates itself to objective reality in sucli a way that this signifies the self-existence of that consciousness for which it is an object. The object does not for thinking proceed by way of presentations or figures, but of notions, conceptions, i.e. of a differentiated reality or essence, which, being an immediate content of consciousness, is nothing distinct from it. What is presented, shaped and constructed, and existent as such, has the form of being something other than consciousness. A notion, however, is at the same time an existent, and this distinction, so far as it falls in consciousness itself, is its determinate content. But in that this content is, at the same time, a conceptually constituted, a comprehended {hegriffener) content, consciousness remains immediately aware within itself of its unity with this determinate existent so distinguished ; not as in the case of a presentation, where consciousness from the first has to take special note that this is the idea of the object ; on the contrary, the notion is for me eo ipso and at once my notion. In thinking I am free, because I am not in an other, but remain simply and solely in touch with myself ; and the object which for me is my essential reality, is in undivided unity my self-existence ; and my procedure in dealing with notions is a process within myself. It is essential, however, in this determination of the above attitude of self-consciousness to keep hold of the fact that this attitude is thinking consciousness in general, that its object is immediate unity of the self's imphcit, inherent existence, and of its existence explicitly for self. The self-same consciousness which repels itself from itself, becomes aware of being an element existing in itself. But to itself it is this element to begin with 192 Phenomenology of Mind only as universal reality ia general, and not as this essential reality appears when developed in all the manifold details it contains, when the process of its being brings out all its fullness of content. This freedom of self-consciousness, as is well known, has been called Stoicism, in so far as it has appeared as a phenomenon conscious of itself in the course of the history of man's spirit. Its principle is that consciousness is essentially that which thinks, is a thinking reahty, and that anything is really essential for consciousness, or is true and good, only when consciousness in dealing with it adopts the attitude of a thinking being. The manifold, self-difierentiating expanse of hfe, with all its individuahsation and comphcation, is the object upon which desire and labour operate. This varied activity has now contracted itself into the simple distinction which is found in the pure process of thought. What has still essential reahty is not a distinction in the sense of a determinate thing, or in the shape of a consciousness of a determinate kind of natural existence, in the shape of a feehng, or again in the form of desire and its specific purpose, whether that purpose be set up by the consciousness desiring or by an extraneous consciousness. What has the more essential significance here is solely that distinction, which is a thought-constituted distinction, or which, when made, is not distinguished from me. This consciousness in consequence takes a negative attitude towards the relation of lordship and bondage. Its action, in the case of the master, results in his not simply having his truth in and through the bondsman ; and, in that of the bondsman, in not finding his truth in the will of his master and in service. The essence of this consciousness is to be free, on the throne as well as in fetters, throughout all the dependence that attaches to its individual existence, and to maintain that stohd lifeless unconcern which persistently withdraws from the movement of existence, from effective activity as well as from passive endurance, into the simple essentiahty of thought. Stubbornness is that freedom which makes itself secure in a sohd singleness, and keeps vjithin the sphere of bondage. Stoicism, on the other hand, is the freedom which ever comes directly out of that sphere, and returns back into the pure universahty of thought. It is a freedom which can come on the scene as a general form of the world's spirit only in a time of universal fear and bondage, a time, too, when mental cultivation is universal, and has elevated culture to the level of thought. Now while this self-consciousness finds its essential reahty to be neither something other than itself, nor the pure abstraction of ego, but ego which has within it otherness — otherness in the sense of a thought-constituted distinction — so that this ego in its otherness is turned back directly into itself ; yet this essential nature is, at the same time, only an abstract reahty. The freedom of seK-consciousness is indifferent towards natural existence, and has, therefore, let this latter go and remain free. The reflexion is thus duphcated. Freedom of thought takes only pure thought as its truth, and this lacks the concrete filhng of hfe. It is, therefore, merely the notion of freedom, not living freedom itseK ; for it is, to begin with, only thinking in general that is its essence, the form as such, which has turned away from the independence of things and gone back into itself. Since, however, individuahty when VOL. I.— o 194 Phenomenology of Mind acting should show itself to be ahve, or when thinking should grasp the hving world as a system of thought, there ought to he in thought itself a content to supply the sphere of the ego, in the former case with what is good, and, in the latter, true, in order that there should throughout be no other ingredient in what consciousness has to deal with, except the notion which is the real essence. But here, by the way in which the notion as an abstraction cuts itself off from the multiplicity of things, the notion has no content in itself ; the content is a datum, is given. Consciousness, no doubt, abohshes the content as an external, a foreign existent, by the fact that it thinks it, but the notion is a determinate notion, and this determinateness of the notion is the ahen element the notion contains within it. Stoicism, therefore, got embarrassed, when, as the expression went, it was asked for the criterion of truth in general, i.e. properly speaking, for a content of thought itself. To the question what is good and true, it responded by giving again the abstract, contentless thought ; the true and good are to consist in reasonableness. But this self-identity of thought is simply once more pure form, in which nothing is determinate. The general terms true and good, wisdom and virtue, with which Stoicism has to stop short, are, therefore, in a general way, doubtless elevating ; but seeing that they cannot actually and in fact reach any expanse of content, they soon begin to get wearisome. This thinking consciousness, in the way in which it is thus constituted, as abstract freedom, is therefore only incomplete negation of otherness. Withdrawn from existence solely into itself, it has not there fully vindicated itself as the absolute negation of this existence. It holds Scepticism I95 the content indeed to be only thought, but in doing so also takes thought as a specific determinate thought, and at the same time the general character of the content. Scepticism is the reahsation of that of which Stoicism is merely the notion, and is the actual experience of what freedom of thought is ; it is in itself and essentially the negative, and must so exhibit itself. With the reflexion of self-consciousness into the simple, pure thought of itself, independent existence or permanent determinateness has, in contrast to that reflexion, dropped as a matter of fact out of the infinitude of thought. In Scepticism, the entire unessentiahty and unsubstantiaHty of this " other " becomes a reahty for consciousness. Thought becomes thinking which wholly annihilates the being of the world with its manifold determinateness, and the negativity of free self-consciousness comes to be, in the case of these manifold forms which hfe assumes, real negativity. It is clear from the foregoing that, just as Stoicism answers to the notion of independent consciousness, which appeared as a relation of lordship and bondage. Scepticism, on its side, corresponds to its realisation, to the negative attitude towards otherness, to desire and labour. But if desire and work could not carry out for self-consciousness the process of negation, this polemical attitude towards the manifold substantiahty of things will, on the other hand, be successful, because it turns against them as a free self-consciousness, and one complete within itself beforehand ; or, expressed more definitely, because it has inherent in itself thought or the principle of infinitude, where the independent elements in their distinction from one another are held to 196 Phenomenology of Mind be merely vanisliing quantities. The differences, which, in the pure thinking of self are only the abstraction of differences, become here the whole of the differences ; and every differentiated existent becomes a difference of self-consciousness. With this we get determined the action of Scepticism in general, as also its mode and nature. It shows the dialectic movement, which is sense-certainty, perception, and understanding. It shows, too, the unessentiahty of that which holds good in the relation of master and servant, and which for abstract thought itself passes as determinate. That relation involves, at the same time, a determinate situation, in which there are found even moral laws, as commands of the sovereign lord. The determinations in abstract thought, however, are scientific notions, into which formal contentless thought expands itself, attaching the notion, as a matter of fact in merely an external fashion, to the existence independent of it, and holding as valid only determinate notions, albeit they are still pure abstractions. Dialectic as a negative process, taken immediately as it stands, appears to consciousness, in the first instance, as something at the mercy of which it is, and which does not exist through consciousness itself. In Scepticism, on the other hand, this negative process is a moment of self-consciousness, which does not simply find its truth and its reality vanish, without selfconsciousness knowing how, but rather which, in the certainty of its own freedom, itself lets this other, so claiming to be real, vanish. Self-consciousness here allows not only the objective as such to disappear before the negations of Scepticism, but also its own attitude and relation to the object, where the object is held to be objective and rendered 'valid — i.e. its attitude of perception as also its process of securing wliat is in danger of being lost, viz. sophistry with, its self-constituted and self-estabHsbed truth. By means of this self-conscious negation, self-consciousness procures for itself the certainty of its own freedom, brings about the experience of that freedom, and thereby raises it into the truth. What vanishes is what is determinate, the difference which, no matter what its nature or whence it comes, sets up to be fixed and unchangeable. The difference has nothing permanent in it, and must vanish before thought, because to be differentiated just means not to have being in itself, but to have its essential nature solely in an other. Thinking, however, is the insight into this character of what is differentiated ; it is the negative function in its simple, ultimate form. Sceptical self-consciousness thus discovers, in the flux and alternation of all that would stand secure in its presence, its own freedom, as given by and received from its own self. It is aware of being this arapa^la of self-thinking thought, the unalterable and genuine certainty of its self. This certainty does not arise as a result out of something extraneous and foreign which stowed away inside itself its whole complex development ; a result which would thus leave behind the process by which it came to be. Kather consciousness itself is thoroughgoing dialectical restlessness, this m^lee of presentations derived from sense and thought, whose differences collapse into oneness, and whose identity is similarly again resolved and dissolved — for this identity is itself determinateness as contrasted with non-identity. This consciousness, however, as a matter 198 Phenomenology of Mind of fact, instead of being a self-same consciousness, is here neither more nor less than an absolutely fortuitous embroglio, the giddy whirl of a perpetually self-creating disorder. This is what it takes itself to be ; for itself maintains and produces this self-impelhng confusion. Hence it even confesses the fact ; it owns to being an entirely fortuitous individual consciousness— a consciousness which is empirical, which is directed upon what admittedly has no reahty for it, which obeys what, in its regard, has no essential being, which realises and does what it knows to have no truth. But while it passes in this manner for an individual, isolated, contingent, in fact animal life, and a lost self-consciousness, it also, on the contrary, again turns itself into universal self-sameness ; for it is the negativity of all singleness and all difference. From this self-identity, or rather within its very self, it falls back once more into that contingency and confusion, for this very self-directed process of negation has to do solely with what is single and individual, and is occupied with what is fortuitous. This form of consciousness is, therefore, the aimless fickleness and instabihty of going to and fro, hither and thither, from one extreme of self-same self-consciousness, to the other of contingent, confused and confusing consciousness. It does not itself bring these two thoughts of itself together. It finds its freedom, at one time, in the form of elevation above all the whirling complexity and all the contingency of mere existence, and again, at anot_. time, likewise confesses to falhng back upon what is unessential, and to being taken up with that. It lets the unessential content in its thought vanish ; but in that very act it is the consciousness of some- thing unessential. It announces absolute disappearance but the announcement is, and this consciousness is the evanescence expressly announced. It announces the nulhty of seeing, hearing, and so on, yet itself sees and hears. It proclaims the nothingness of essential ethical principles, and makes those very truths the sinews of its own conduct. Its deeds and its words behe each other continually ; and itself, too, has the doubly contradictory consciousness of immutabihty and sameness, and of utter contingency and non-identity with itself. But it keeps asunder the poles of this contradiction within itself ; and bears itself towards the contradiction as it does in its purely negative process in general. If sameness is shown to it, it points out unlikeness, non-identity ; and when the latter, which it has expressly mentioned the moment before, is held up to it, it passes on to indicate sameness and identity. Its talk, in fact, is hke a squabble among self-willed children, one of whom says a when the other says B, and again B, when the other says a, and who, through being in contradiction with themselves, procure the joy of remaining in contradiction with one another. In Scepticism consciousness gets, in truth, to know itself as a consciousness containing contradiction within itself. From the experience of this proceeds a new attitude which brings the two thoughts together which Scepticism holds apart. The want of intelhgence which Scepticism manifests regarding itself is bound to vanish, because it is in fact one consciousness which possesses these two modes wjthin it. This new att' , :le consequently is one which is aware of being the double consciousness of itself as self-hberating, unalterable, self-identical, and as utterly self-confounding, self- 200 Phenomenology of Mind perverting ; and this new attitude is the consciousness of this contradiction within itself. In Stoicism, self-consciousness is the bare and simple freedom of itself. In Scepticism, it reaUses itself, negates the other side of determinate existence, but, in so doing, really doubles itself, and is itself now a duaUty. In this way the dupUcation, which previously was divided between two individuals, the lord and the bondsman, is concentrated into one. Thus we have here that duahsing of self-consciousness within itself, which lies essentially in the notion of mind ; but the tmity of the two elements is not yet present. Hence the Unhapfy Consciousness * the AUenated Soul which is the consciousness of self as a divided nature, a doubled and merely contradictory being. This unhappy consciousness, divided and at variance within itself, must, because this contradiction of its essential nature is felt to be a single consciousness, always have in the one consciousness the other also ; and thus must be straightway driven out of each in turn, when it thinks it has therein attained to the victory and rest of unity. Its true return into itself, or reconciliation with itself, will, however, exhibit the notion of mind endowed with a hfe and existence of its own, because it implicitly involves the fact that, qua single and undivided, it is a double consciousness. It is itself the gazing of one self-consciousness into another, ar itself is both, and the unity of both is p]&