The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes

Summary

The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes is the first volume of Imre Lakatos's Philosophical Papers, edited after his death by John Worrall and Gregory Currie and published by Cambridge University Press in 1978. It gathers his principal essays in the philosophy of science, written between about 1968 and 1974, around a single idea: the unit of scientific appraisal is not an isolated theory but a research programme, a series of theories that develop over time from a shared core. The volume opens with an Introduction, a talk broadcast by the Open University in 1973, which states the problem of demarcation plainly. Lakatos argues that neither the number of a theory's supporters nor its apparent confirmations can show that it is scientific, and that Karl Popper's test of falsifiability is too simple, because scientists routinely keep theories in the face of contrary evidence. The long first chapter, Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes (first published in 1970 in Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge), develops the alternative. Every programme has a hard core of central assumptions which its followers agree not to abandon; the negative heuristic forbids aiming refutations at it. Around the core lies a protective belt of auxiliary hypotheses, which are adjusted to absorb anomalies, and a positive heuristic, a plan for developing ever more sophisticated models. A programme is progressive when each new version predicts novel facts, some of which are then confirmed; it is degenerating when it only explains facts after the event, patching its belt without new successes. Lakatos illustrates the view with Newton's gravitational theory, William Prout's hypothesis that atomic weights are whole numbers, and Niels Bohr's model of the atom, and he argues that crucial experiments are usually recognized as crucial only long afterward. The second chapter, History of Science and its Rational Reconstructions (1971), proposes that rival methodologies be judged by how much of the actual history of science they can present as rational. The remaining chapters examine Popper's views on demarcation and induction, explain why Copernicus's programme superseded Ptolemy's (with Elie Zahar), and discuss Newton's effect on scientific standards. The book is still in print and under copyright; the library holds no text.

Plot or Argument

• Introduction: the 1973 broadcast talk on demarcation

  In a 1973 broadcast talk Lakatos asks what distinguishes genuine science from mere imitations of it. Strength of conviction and number of confirmations cannot decide it, and the simple demand that a theory be falsifiable fails because scientists rightly hold on to theories facing anomalies. He proposes instead that a programme is scientific when it leads to the discovery of novel facts.

• Chapter 1: from dogmatic to sophisticated falsificationism

  Lakatos distinguishes several positions: dogmatic falsificationism, which supposes that observation can conclusively refute theories; naive methodological falsificationism, which decides by convention which statements to accept as refuting; and a sophisticated falsificationism, under which a theory is set aside only when a better theory, predicting more, is available.

• Chapter 1: hard core, protective belt and heuristics

  A research programme is a series of theories sharing a hard core that the negative heuristic shields from refutation. The positive heuristic guides the construction of a protective belt of auxiliary hypotheses and increasingly realistic models, so that scientists can ignore many anomalies while they develop the programme.

• Chapter 1: progressive and degenerating programmes

  A programme progresses when its successive versions predict new facts, some of which are corroborated, and degenerates when it merely accommodates known facts. Lakatos tests the account on Newton's programme, Prout's hypothesis and Bohr's atom, and argues that there is no instant rationality: experiments are seen as crucial only with hindsight.

• Chapter 2: History of Science and its Rational Reconstructions

  Each methodology implies a rational reconstruction of the history of science. Lakatos compares inductivism, conventionalism, falsificationism and his own view, arguing that the best methodology is the one that explains the most of the history scientists themselves judge to be great science, leaving the rest to external, social explanation.

• Chapters 3–5: Popper, Copernicus and Newton

  Lakatos criticizes Popper's treatment of demarcation and induction, argues with Elie Zahar that Copernicus's programme was superior to Ptolemy's because it predicted facts Ptolemy's could only accommodate, and examines how Newton's success changed what counted as scientific standards.

Characters

• Imre Lakatos, author

  Hungarian-born philosopher of mathematics and science at the London School of Economics.

• Karl Popper, teacher and principal interlocutor

  Lakatos's senior colleague at the LSE, whose falsificationism he sets out to improve.

• Thomas Kuhn, opponent

  Author of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, whose account of paradigm change Lakatos contests as making science irrational.

• Isaac Newton, chief example

  Founder of the gravitational programme Lakatos treats as the model of a progressive research programme.

• William Prout, example

  Chemist whose hypothesis that atomic weights are whole multiples of hydrogen's survived long periods of apparent refutation.

• Niels Bohr, example

  Physicist whose model of the atom Lakatos analyses as a programme built on inconsistent foundations.

Lessons

• Theories are not abandoned one test at a time

  Lakatos observes that real scientists keep promising theories alive despite anomalies, adjusting auxiliary assumptions rather than giving up their central ideas. This is not stubbornness but method, provided the adjustments lead to new discoveries.

  • Why does Lakatos think that a single failed prediction should not usually end a theory?
  • What is the difference between the hard core and the protective belt of a programme?
  • When does defending a theory become unreasonable?

• Progress means predicting the new

  For Lakatos, the mark of a healthy programme is that it predicts facts no one expected, and some of those predictions come true. A programme that only explains what is already known, after the fact, is degenerating, however ingenious its explanations.

  • Why does Lakatos value novel predictions more than explanations of known facts?
  • Can you think of a theory that predicted something surprising that was later confirmed?

• History tests philosophy

  Lakatos insists that a theory of scientific method must be checked against the actual history of science. A methodology that would condemn Newton or Copernicus as irrational has, in his view, refuted itself.

  • What does Lakatos mean by a rational reconstruction of history?
  • Is it fair to judge a philosophy of science by whether it agrees with scientists' own judgments of great work?

Context

In the 1960s the philosophy of science was dominated by debate between Karl Popper's falsificationism, which held that scientific theories must be open to refutation by experience, and Thomas Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962), which described long periods of normal science governed by a paradigm and interrupted by revolutions. Lakatos, Popper's colleague at the London School of Economics, sought a middle course that kept Popper's concern for rational standards while doing justice to the history Kuhn emphasized. His earlier Proofs and Refutations had already treated mathematics as a growing, self-correcting body of knowledge.

Composition

The central essay grew from Lakatos's contribution to the International Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science held in London in 1965 and appeared in Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (1970), which he edited with Alan Musgrave. History of Science and its Rational Reconstructions appeared in 1971. Lakatos planned further revisions but died in 1974. John Worrall and Gregory Currie edited his papers in two volumes for Cambridge University Press in 1978; this first volume collects the essays on scientific method, with editorial notes on unrevised passages.

Reception

The methodology of scientific research programmes became one of the standard positions in twentieth-century philosophy of science and was applied in economics, psychology and international relations. Supporters valued its account of how theories can be rationally retained despite anomalies. Critics, including his friend Paul Feyerabend, argued that because a degenerating programme might later recover, the methodology gives no firm advice on when to abandon one; others questioned how to define a novel fact. Scholars continue to debate whether Lakatos's position is best read as a refinement of Popper or as a distinct third way between Popper and Kuhn.

Comparisons

• popper-the-logic-of-scientific-discovery

  Popper makes falsifiability the mark of science; Lakatos keeps the demand for testability but shifts it from single theories to whole programmes judged by their progress over time.

• kuhn-the-structure-of-scientific-revolutions

  Kuhn's paradigms resemble Lakatos's programmes, but Lakatos argues that several programmes usually compete at once and that the choice between them can be rational rather than a conversion.

• feyerabend-against-method

  Feyerabend's book was conceived as one side of a planned joint volume with Lakatos and argues that no methodology, including Lakatos's, can be binding on scientists.

• duhem-the-aim-and-structure-of-physical-theory

  Duhem showed that experiments test a theory together with auxiliary assumptions, never alone; Lakatos builds this insight into his distinction between hard core and protective belt.

• copernicus-on-the-revolutions

  Lakatos and Zahar's chapter argues that Copernicus's programme was progressive relative to Ptolemy's, offering a test case students can check against Copernicus's own book.

• principia

  Newton's gravitational theory is Lakatos's chief example of a progressive programme whose hard core was shielded while its models of the solar system were refined.

Quotes

For Students

A reading companion for classical Christian high school students. See the student guide.

Reading Guide

Watch for

• The opening question of the 1973 talk: what makes a theory scientific, if not the number of its believers or confirmations?
• The ladder of positions in Chapter 1, from dogmatic falsificationism to sophisticated falsificationism.
• The definitions of hard core, protective belt, negative heuristic and positive heuristic.
• The tale of the misbehaving planet, in which a Newtonian scientist invents one auxiliary hypothesis after another rather than give up Newton.
• The claim in Chapter 2 that a methodology should be tested against the history of science.

Key terms and names

Research programme

A series of related theories sharing a core of assumptions, developed over time according to a plan, and judged as a whole rather than one theory at a time.

Hard core

The central assumptions of a programme, such as Newton's laws of motion and gravitation, which its followers resolve not to give up.

Protective belt

The auxiliary hypotheses and initial conditions surrounding the hard core, which are revised when predictions fail.

Positive heuristic

The programme's guidance for building more refined models, telling scientists which problems to address next and allowing them to set anomalies aside for a time.

Novel fact

A fact predicted by a new version of a programme that was improbable or unknown in the light of earlier knowledge.

Degenerating programme

A programme whose changes merely accommodate known facts after the event without leading to new confirmed predictions.

Rational reconstruction

An account of the history of science showing which episodes a given methodology can explain as rational choices.

Seminar Questions

1. Comprehension What is wrong, according to Lakatos, with judging a theory's scientific status by how many people believe it or how many observations agree with it?
2. Comprehension Explain the difference between the negative heuristic and the positive heuristic of a research programme.
3. Comprehension What makes a programme progressive, and what makes it degenerating?
4. Interpretation Lakatos says there is no instant rationality in science. What does he mean, and why does this make crucial experiments a matter of hindsight?
5. Interpretation How does Lakatos try to keep what is right in both Popper's and Kuhn's accounts of science?
6. Interpretation Feyerabend objected that a degenerating programme might later recover. Does this objection undermine Lakatos's methodology or only show that it is modest?
7. Big Question When is it wise to hold on to a belief in the face of contrary evidence, and when is it a refusal to see?

Faith Connections

• 1 Thessalonians 5:21 (Scripture)

  Prove all things; hold fast that which is good. Lakatos's account joins both halves of Paul's charge: scientists test their auxiliary assumptions constantly while holding fast to a core that has proved fruitful.

• Deuteronomy 18:21-22 (Scripture)

  Israel is told to judge a prophet by whether what he foretells comes to pass. Lakatos likewise prizes successful prediction of the unexpected as the mark of a living programme, though he insists a single failure need not be decisive.

• John Henry Newman, An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent (1870) (Great Conversation)

  Newman argued that real certitude rests on the convergence of many probabilities judged over time by an informed mind, not on a single demonstration; Lakatos's appraisal of programmes over their whole history makes a similar point about scientific judgment.

Logic and Rhetoric

Central argument: Every theory faces anomalies, so if refutation by a single contrary observation decided scientific status, all theories would have to be rejected, including the greatest. Scientists in fact defend central assumptions by adjusting auxiliary ones. Such defence is rational when the adjusted programme goes on to predict novel facts that are confirmed, and irrational when it only explains after the event. Therefore science should be appraised by comparing the progress of rival research programmes over time, not by testing single theories in isolation.

Rhetorical device: hypothetical case (thought experiment). In Chapter 1 Lakatos tells of an imagined Newtonian physicist whose planet strays from its calculated path; instead of abandoning Newton, he postulates an unseen planet, then a dust cloud to hide it, then a magnetic field to disturb the instruments. The story shows vividly how a hard core can be shielded indefinitely and why falsification alone cannot settle the matter.

Debate: Resolved: That a scientific theory should be retained in the face of a failed prediction if it continues to predict new facts successfully.

Writing Prompts

Essay: Using Lakatos's distinction between progressive and degenerating research programmes, analyse one theory from the history of science, identifying its hard core, protective belt and novel predictions, and argue whether Lakatos's methodology gives clear guidance on when scientists should have accepted or abandoned it.

Comparison with The Structure of Scientific Revolutions: Kuhn describes scientific change as a shift between paradigms that resembles a conversion; Lakatos describes rational competition between research programmes. Compare their accounts of how scientists choose between rival theories and argue which better fits one historical example.

Medical Lens

The book contains no medical material. Its framework has, however, been borrowed by historians and philosophers of medicine and psychiatry to ask whether a line of clinical research is progressive, yielding new confirmed predictions, or degenerating, accommodating failures after the fact; such applications belong to later literature, not to Lakatos's text.

Creative Prompts

• Classroom

  Divide the class into teams, each defending a research programme from the history of science (Ptolemaic astronomy, Newtonian gravitation, the phlogiston theory). Have each team identify its hard core, its protective belt and one novel prediction, then let the class judge which programmes were progressive.

• Essay

  Lakatos says that experiments are recognized as crucial only with hindsight. Choose a famous experiment and argue whether it was seen as decisive at the time.

• Dialogue

  Write a seminar exchange among Popper, Kuhn and Lakatos about whether astronomers in 1846 should have abandoned Newton's theory when Uranus strayed from its predicted orbit.

Further Reading

• Proofs and Refutations: The Logic of Mathematical Discovery, Imre Lakatos, ed. John Worrall and Elie Zahar

  Lakatos's dialogue on the growth of mathematical knowledge.

• Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave (eds.)

  The 1970 volume in which the central essay first appeared, with Kuhn, Popper and Feyerabend.

• For and Against Method, Imre Lakatos and Paul Feyerabend, ed. Matteo Motterlini

  Lectures and correspondence of the two friends.

• Method and Appraisal in the Physical Sciences, Colin Howson (ed.)

  Case studies applying the methodology of research programmes.