Work record

Against Method

1975 · Postwar Contemporary · Philosophy · English

Copyrightedlow medical relevanceFive-minute digest

Abstract

Written
Essay version 1970; book 1975; revised editions 1988 and 1993
Setting
The philosophy-of-science debates of the 1960s and 1970s; Written chiefly at the University of California, Berkeley, and in London and Europe
Country
United Kingdom (published in London); author Austrian-born, teaching in the United States
Language
English
Genre
Philosophy of science
Form
Polemical treatise in numbered chapters with an analytical index; revised across editions
Recommended
Grade 12 (Summary and guide only; no text stored.)

Background. After Popper, Kuhn and Lakatos had proposed rival accounts of how science advances, Feyerabend planned to take the opposing side in a joint debate with Lakatos. When his friend died, he published his half alone. The material grew out of his Berkeley lectures and a long journal essay of 1970.

Content. Drawing on historical episodes, the book claims that every methodological rule has been broken to good effect, recommends inventing hypotheses that clash with accepted facts, and studies how Galileo defended the earth's motion against the evidence of falling bodies, partly by reinterpreting observation and partly by persuasion. It goes on to argue that rival world-views may lack a common measure and that democratic societies should not grant science official supremacy.

Availability. Because the book remains in copyright, the library holds no text of it and offers a paraphrase and study guide without quotations.

Significance. Widely attacked and widely read, the book became a standard reference point for debates over relativism, the authority of experts and the history of science. Its reading of the Galileo affair was later cited in Catholic discussion of that episode. Feyerabend answered his reviewers in later books and revised the text twice, adding new chapters and dropping the critique of Lakatos.

Key figures

  • Paul Feyerabend: Austrian-born philosopher of science at Berkeley
  • Imre Lakatos: Friend and intended co-author, to whom the book is dedicated
  • Galileo Galilei: Subject of the book's central case study
  • Karl Popper: Feyerabend's former mentor, whose falsificationism the book criticizes
  • Thomas Kuhn: Contemporary historian of science who shared the idea of incommensurability

Summary

Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge was published in London in 1975 by New Left Books. It began as a long essay of 1970 and was meant to be one half of a joint book with Feyerabend's friend Imre Lakatos, For and Against Method, in which Lakatos would defend scientific rationality and Feyerabend attack it; Lakatos died in 1974, and Feyerabend dedicated the book to him. Its thesis is that the history of science shows no single method, no fixed set of rules, that scientists have always followed or could follow without blocking progress. Every rule proposed by philosophers, such as accepting only theories consistent with established ones or abandoning theories refuted by facts, has been broken by great scientists, and had to be broken for science to advance. Feyerabend calls his position epistemological anarchism and sums it up in the provocative slogan 'anything goes', which he later explained was not a positive rule he held but what a rationalist would be driven to say on looking honestly at history. He recommends 'counterinduction': developing hypotheses that contradict well-confirmed theories and accepted facts, because facts are themselves shaped by theories and some can only be exposed by an alternative. The central part of the book is a long case study of Galileo. Feyerabend argues that the observational evidence of Galileo's day, such as the 'tower argument' that a stone dropped from a tower falls straight down, counted against a moving earth; that Galileo overcame it not by new evidence alone but by changing the 'natural interpretations' through which observations were read, by appeal to a telescope whose workings were not then understood, and by persuasive rhetoric; and that this was a reasonable and fruitful way to advance a new view. Later chapters argue that rival comprehensive theories can be 'incommensurable', so that they cannot be compared by a neutral standard, and illustrate the idea with the change from the Homeric to later Greek ways of seeing. The book ends by arguing that in a free society science should not be set above other traditions, that state and science should be separated as state and church have been, and that citizens, not experts alone, should decide such questions; Feyerabend cites the revival of traditional Chinese medicine as a case where a non-scientific tradition proved valuable. Revised editions appeared in 1988 and 1993, the latter adding a discussion of the Galileo trial. The book provoked many sharply critical reviews and remains among the most widely read works in the philosophy of science. It is under copyright; the library stores no text and quotes nothing.

Virtues in this work

  • Fortitude: Feyerabend defended unpopular positions in the face of hostile reviews, answering critics at length in Science in a Free Society.
  • Humility: His central claim is that no method and no expert tradition is beyond question, so that even established science must remain open to challenge.

Plot or Argument

  • Science as an anarchistic enterprise

    Feyerabend argues that knowledge grows best without fixed methodological rules, since history shows that every rule has been violated with good results; the only 'rule' left is the slogan 'anything goes'.

  • Counterinduction

    Scientists should sometimes develop hypotheses that contradict well-established theories and accepted facts, because alternatives reveal hidden assumptions in the observations themselves.

  • Against the consistency condition

    Requiring new theories to agree with old ones protects the older theory, not the truth; no idea is so old or absurd that it cannot improve knowledge.

  • Galileo and the tower argument

    The falling stone seemed to refute the earth's motion. Galileo answered by changing the 'natural interpretations' that link observation to theory, introducing relative motion so that the observation no longer counted against him.

  • Galileo's telescope and propaganda

    Galileo used telescopic observations whose reliability had not been established and supported his view with rhetorical persuasion; Feyerabend argues these moves were reasonable in the circumstances.

  • Incommensurability

    Comprehensive world-views may be so different that their terms cannot be translated or compared by neutral criteria, as Feyerabend illustrates with archaic Greek art and thought.

  • Science in a free society

    Science is one tradition among many; in a democracy it should be separated from the state, its authority checked by citizens, and other traditions, including traditional medicine, given a hearing.

    Lessons

    • History tests philosophy of science

      Feyerabend measures methodological rules against what scientists actually did, especially Galileo, and argues that the rules fail the test. Whether or not one accepts his conclusions, his method requires philosophers to take the record of discovery seriously.

      • Why does Feyerabend think a study of Galileo can show that a rule of method is mistaken?
      • Can a rule be good even if great scientists sometimes broke it?
    • Observation is shaped by interpretation

      In the tower argument, the same observation of a falling stone seemed to support a stationary earth until Galileo changed how it was interpreted. Feyerabend uses the case to show that facts come already shaped by assumptions.

      • What did the falling stone seem to show to Galileo's opponents, and how did Galileo reinterpret it?
      • Are there observations in your own studies that depend on a theory to be understood?
      • If observations depend on theories, how can evidence decide between theories?
    • Who decides what counts as knowledge?

      Feyerabend's closing chapters ask whether scientific experts or citizens should decide what is taught and funded, and argue for separating science from the state. Critics answered that this undervalues the reliability of scientific results; the debate continues.

      • What does Feyerabend mean by separating science and state, and why does he compare it to separating church and state?
      • What reasons might be given for and against giving scientific experts special authority in public decisions?

    Context

    Philosophy of science in the 1960s centred on debates among Karl Popper's falsificationism, Thomas Kuhn's account of paradigms and revolutions, and Imre Lakatos's methodology of research programmes. Feyerabend had been close to Popper and was a friend of Lakatos. The book appeared amid wider debates in the 1960s and 70s over the authority of experts, university reform, and the place of science in society, which Feyerabend experienced as a teacher at Berkeley.

    Composition

    Feyerabend expanded his 1970 essay 'Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge', published in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, into a book intended as his half of a debate with Lakatos. He described the result as a collage drawn from earlier papers. New Left Books published it in 1975; a second, revised edition appeared from Verso in 1988 and a third in 1993, with a fourth edition (2010) carrying an introduction by Ian Hacking.

    Reception

    Many philosophers reviewed it critically, charging it with relativism or inconsistency; others, such as Arne Naess, welcomed it. Feyerabend replied to critics in Science in a Free Society (1978). The book has been translated into many languages and is regularly read alongside Kuhn. Its Galileo chapters drew attention beyond philosophy: in a 1990 lecture Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, later Pope Benedict XVI, quoted Feyerabend's judgment that the Church's verdict on Galileo had been reasonable in its time, which itself became a subject of public discussion.

    Comparisons

    • kuhn-the-structure-of-scientific-revolutions

      Kuhn and Feyerabend introduced the term 'incommensurable' at about the same time; Kuhn describes normal science within paradigms, while Feyerabend denies that any method or paradigm should constrain inquiry.

    • popper-the-logic-of-scientific-discovery

      Feyerabend began as a follower of Popper; Against Method argues that falsification, like every other rule, would have halted great discoveries if applied strictly.

    • galileo-selected-writings

      Galileo's own Dialogue and Starry Messenger are the primary texts behind Feyerabend's case study of the tower argument and the telescope.

    • polanyi-personal-knowledge

      Polanyi, like Feyerabend, emphasizes the personal and tacit elements in scientific judgment, but he defends the authority of the scientific community where Feyerabend challenges it.

    • mach-popular-scientific-lectures

      Feyerabend admired Mach as a scientist-philosopher who joined historical criticism to research; both stress that concepts change with history.

    • hempel-philosophy-of-natural-science

      Hempel gives a clear account of the confirmation and testing of hypotheses, the kind of methodology Feyerabend sets out to criticize.

    Quotes

    For Students

    A reading companion for classical Christian high school students. See the student guide.

    Reading Guide

    Watch for

    • How Feyerabend uses historical cases, not abstract argument alone, to challenge rules of scientific method.
    • The meaning of the slogan 'anything goes', and Feyerabend's later insistence that it was not a principle he held.
    • The tower argument and Galileo's reply through relative motion, which form the centre of the book.
    • The claim that observations come with 'natural interpretations' that can be changed.
    • The final argument for separating science and the state, and how it extends his view of method to politics.

    Key terms and names

    Epistemological anarchism
    Feyerabend's name for the view that no fixed rules of method should govern the growth of knowledge.
    Counterinduction
    Proposing hypotheses that contradict accepted theories or facts, to expose the assumptions hidden in them.
    Consistency condition
    The rule that new hypotheses should agree with accepted theories, which Feyerabend rejects.
    Natural interpretation
    The habitual ideas through which we read an observation, such as taking a falling stone's straight path as absolute.
    Tower argument
    The objection that a stone dropped from a tower would land far to the west if the earth rotated; Galileo answered it with relative motion.
    Incommensurability
    The claim that rival comprehensive theories may lack a common measure for direct comparison.

    Seminar Questions

    1. Comprehension What does Feyerabend mean by epistemological anarchism, and why does he think it serves the progress of knowledge?
    2. Comprehension What is the tower argument, and how, according to Feyerabend, did Galileo overcome it?
    3. Comprehension What does Feyerabend propose about the relation between science and the state?
    4. Interpretation Feyerabend says Galileo used persuasion as well as evidence. Does that make Galileo's success less rational, or does it change what we should count as rational?
    5. Interpretation If observations are shaped by interpretations, as Feyerabend argues, is there any way to settle a dispute between two theories?
    6. Interpretation Is 'anything goes' a rule, a joke, a conclusion of a reductio, or something else? Support your answer from the book's argument.
    7. Big Question Is there such a thing as a single scientific method, and if not, what makes science reliable?

    Faith Connections

    • 1 Thessalonians 5:21 (Scripture)

      Paul tells the Thessalonians to test everything and keep what is good. Feyerabend urges that no idea be dismissed untested; Paul joins the same openness to the duty of holding fast to what proves good.

    • Proverbs 18:17 (Scripture)

      'He that is first in his own cause seemeth just; but his neighbour cometh and searcheth him.' Feyerabend's case for alternatives that challenge an established theory echoes the proverb's point that a view is tested best by its rival.

    • Galileo, Letter to the Grand Duchess Christina (1615) (Great Conversation)

      Galileo argued that Scripture teaches how to go to heaven, not how the heavens go. Feyerabend's study of the Galileo affair, especially in the third edition, revisits the relations of faith, authority and natural knowledge that Galileo addressed.

    • Augustine, The Literal Meaning of Genesis I.19 (Church Fathers)

      Augustine warned Christians against asserting claims about nature that informed people know to be false. The warning bears on both sides of the Galileo case that Feyerabend analyses: humility about Scripture's purpose and care about what nature shows.

    Logic and Rhetoric

    Central argument: Every proposed rule of scientific method has been violated in the history of science, and some of those violations, as in Galileo's defence of the moving earth, were necessary for progress; observations are shaped by interpretations that only alternative theories can expose; therefore no fixed method should bind inquiry, the only rule compatible with history is 'anything goes', and science should not be given authority over other traditions in a free society.

    Rhetorical device: provocation and reductio. The slogan 'anything goes' is deliberately shocking; Feyerabend presents it as the conclusion a defender of fixed rules would be forced to reach after examining the historical cases, turning the rationalist's standards against themselves.

    Debate: Resolved: No single method can account for the progress of science.

    Writing Prompts

    Essay: Using Feyerabend's account of Galileo and the tower argument, explain why he concludes that fixed rules of method would have hindered science, and argue whether his conclusion follows from his historical evidence.

    Comparison with The Structure of Scientific Revolutions: Kuhn and Feyerabend both drew on the history of science and both spoke of incommensurable theories. Compare their accounts of how science changes and argue which gives a better explanation of the Copernican revolution.

    Medical Lens

    Against Method is not about medicine, but its final chapters use medicine as an example. Feyerabend points to the revival of traditional Chinese medicine in the People's Republic of China in the 1950s, when the state required it to be taught and practised alongside Western medicine, as a case where a tradition dismissed by scientific experts proved to contain useful knowledge, and he argues that patients and citizens should be free to choose among healing traditions. Critics replied that controlled testing, not tradition, must judge therapies. The argument belongs to wider debates on medical authority, patient choice and the evaluation of non-Western and traditional medicine.

    • Closing chapters (science in a free society)

      The state-sponsored revival of traditional Chinese medicine offered as an example of a non-scientific tradition with valuable results.

    • Closing chapters (science in a free society)

      Argument that laymen, not experts alone, should decide which traditions are taught and supported, including in matters of health.

    Creative Prompts

    • Dialogue

      Write a dialogue in which Galileo's opponent presents the tower argument and Galileo answers it, then add a third voice, Feyerabend's, explaining what the exchange shows about method.

    • Essay

      Feyerabend claims that great scientists broke every rule of method. Choose one scientific discovery you have studied and argue whether it followed a recognizable method.

    • Classroom

      Hold a structured debate on Feyerabend's proposal to separate science and the state, with one team presenting his case and another presenting his critics' case, each in its strongest form.

    Further Reading

    • Science in a Free Society, Paul Feyerabend

    • Killing Time: The Autobiography of Paul Feyerabend, Paul Feyerabend

    • For and Against Method (ed. Matteo Motterlini), Imre Lakatos and Paul Feyerabend

    • Feyerabend: Philosophy, Science and Society, John Preston

    Verification notes

    The book is under copyright and no text is stored. No quotations are given because the wording of the best-known lines could not be confirmed from a reliable primary source: the explanation of 'anything goes' as the 'terrified exclamation' of a rationalist is reported with different wording in different editions and secondary sources (checked at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Against_Method, which cites the 1st edition, and at the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/feyerabend/), so it is paraphrased. Publication history (1970 essay; 1975 New Left Books; 1988, 1993 and 2010 editions), the planned joint book with Lakatos, and biographical facts follow the Stanford Encyclopedia entry and standard accounts. The 1990 lecture by Cardinal Ratzinger citing Feyerabend on Galileo is well documented.

    • Text is under copyright; check quotations against an authorized edition before publication.
    • Chapter placement of the Chinese medicine discussion and the Galileo-trial chapter in the edition used (chapter numbering differs between editions).