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The Phenomenology of Mind
Part 2 of 2: Volume II. (BE). SPIRIT . 429-682 (part 11) to Volume II. (BE). SPIRIT . 429-682 (part 16). ‹ Part 1
The Phenomenology of Mind, trans. J. B. Baillie, 2 vols. (London: Swan Sonnenschein; New York: Macmillan, 1910), Internet Archive Cornell scans cu31924097557171 (vol. I) and cu31924091023832 (vol. II) · J. B. Baillie (1910)
Volume II. (BE). SPIRIT . 429-682 (part 11)
If we consider, by way of contrast to the mode of utterance indulged in by this self-transparent distracted type of mind, the language adopted by that simple, placid consciousness of the good and the true, we find that it can only speak in monosyllables when face to face with the frank and self-conscious eloquence of the mind developed under the influence of cvdture ; for it can say nothing to the latter that the latter does not know and say. If it gets beyond speaking in monosyllables, then it says the same thing that the cultivated mind expresses, but in doing so conomits,
* Diderot, Rameau's Neffe.
t The " pliilosoplier " in Diderot's Dialogue.
in addition, the folly of imagining that it is saying something new, something difierent. Its very syllables, "disgraceful, " "base," are this folly already, for the other says them of itself. This latter type of mind perverts in its mode of utterance everything that sounds the same, because this self -sameness is merely an abstraction, but in its actual reahty is intrinsically and inherently perversion. On the other hand, again, the unsophisticated mind takes under its protection the good and the noble (i.e. what retains its identity of meaning in beiug objectively expressed), and takes care of it in the only way here possible — that is to say, the good must not lose its value because it may be linked with what is bad or mingled with it, for to be thus associated with badness is its condition and necessity, and the wisdom of nature Hes in this fact. Yet this unsophisticated mind, while it intended to contradict, has merely, ia doing so, gathered into a trifling form the meaning of what spirit said, and put it in a manner which, by turning the opposite of noble and good into the necessary condition of noble and good, means, in an unthinking way, to state something else than that the so-called noble and good is by its very nature the reverse of itself, or that what is bad is, conversely, something excellent.
If the naive consciousness makes up for this barren, souUess idea by the concrete reahty of what is excellent, when it produces an example of what is excellent, whether in the form of a fictitious case or a true story, and thus shows it to be not an empty name, but an actual fact, then the imiversal reahty of perverted action stands in sharp contrast to the entire real world, where that example constitutes merely something
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quite isolated and particular, merely an espece, a sort of thing. And to represent the existence of the good and the noble as an isolated particular anecdote, whether fictitious or true, is the bitterest thing that can be said about it.
Finally, should the naive mind require this entire sphere of perversion to be dissolved and broken up, it cannot ask the individual to withdraw out of it, for even Diogenes in his tub [with his pretence of withdrawal] is under the sway of that perversion ; and to ask this of the particular individual is to ask him to do precisely what is taken to be bad, viz. to care for the self as particular. But if the demand to withdraw is directed at the universal individual, it cannot mean that reason must again give up the culture and development of spiritual conscious hfe which has been reached, that reason should let the extensive riches of its moments sink back into the naivete of natural emotion, and revert and approximate to the wild condition of the animal consciousness, which is also called the natural state of itmocence. On the contrary, the demand for this dissolution when addressed to the spirit realised in culture can only mean that it must qua spirit return out of its confusion into itself, and win for itself a still higher level of conscious Hfe.
In point of fact, however, spirit has already accomphshed this result. To be conscious of its own distraught and torn condition and to express itself accordingly, — this is to pour scornful laughter on its existence, on the confusion pervading the whole and on itself as well : it is at the same time this whole confusion dying away and yet apprehending itself to be doing so. This self-apprehending vanity of all reahty and of every
definite principle reflects the real world into itself in a twofold form : — in the particular self of consciousness quM particular, and ia the pure universahty of consciousness, in thought. According to the one aspect, mind thus come to itself has directed its gaze into the world of actual reahty, and makes that reahty its own purpose and its immediate content : from the other side, its gaze is in part turned solely on itself and against that world of reahty, in part turned away from it towards heaven, and its object is the region beyond the world.
In respect of that return into self the vanity of aU things is its own peculiar vanity, it is itself vain. It is self existing for its own sake, a self that knows not only how to sum up and chatter about everything, but with esprit and wit to hit off the contradiction that Hes in the heart of the aU so sohd seeming reahty, and the fixed determinations which judgment sets up ; and that contradiction is their real truth. Looked at formally it finds everything estranged from itself, self-existence is cut off from essential being (Ansich), what is intended and the purpose are separated from real truth, and from both again existence for another, what is ostensibly put forward is cut off from the proper meaning, the real fact, the true intention.
It thus knows exactly how to put each moment in antithesis to every other, knows in short how to express correctly the perversion that dominates all of them : it knows better than each what each is, no matter how it is constituted. Since it apprehends what is substantial from the side of that disunion and contradiction of elements combined within its natiu?e, but not from the side of this union itself, it under-
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stands very well how to pass judgment on this substantial reality, but has lost the capacity of truly graspiQg it.
This vanity needs at the same time the vanity of all things, in order to get from them consciousness of itself ; it therefore itself creates this vanity, and is the soul that supports it. State-power and wealth are the supreme purposes of its strenuous exertion, it is aware that through renunciation and sacrifice it is moulded into universal shape, that it attains universahty, and in possessing universahty finds general recognition and acceptance : state-power and wealth are the real and actually acknowledged sources of power. But its gaining acceptance thus is itself vain, and just by the fact that it gets the mastery over them it knows them to be not real by themselves, knows rather itself to be the power within them, and them to be vain and empty. That in possessing them it thus itself is able to stand apart from and outside them, — this is what it expresses in spirited languages ; and to express this is, therefore, its supreme interest, and the true meaning of the whole process. In such utterance this self, — in the form of a pure self not associated with or bound by determinations derived either from reality or thought, — comes consciously to be a spiritual entity having a truly universal significance and value. It is the condition in . which the nature of all relationships is rent asunder, and it is the conscious rending of them aU. But only by selfconsciousness being roused to revolt does it know its own peculiar torn and shattered condition ; and in its knowing this it has if so facto risen above that condition. In that state of self-conscious vanity all substantial content comes to have a negative significance, which can no
longer be taken in a positive sense. The positive object is merely the pure ego itself; and the consciousness that is rent in sunder is inherently and essentially this pure self-identity of self-consciousness returned to itself.
Belief and Puee Insight*
The spiritual condition of self-alienation exists in the sphere of culture as a fact. But since this whole has become estranged from itself, there hes beyond this sphere the nonactual region of pure consciousness, of thought. Its content consists of what has been reduced purely to thought, its absolute element is thinking. Since, however, thinking is in the first instance the element of this sphere, consciousness Tias merely these thoughts, but it does not as yet think them or does not know that they are thoughts : to consciousness they appear in the form of presentations, they are objects in the form of ideas. For it comes out of the sphere of actuahty into that of pure consciousness, but is itseK stiU to all intents and purposes in the sphere of actuahty with the determinateness that imphes. The conscious state of being rent and torn to pieces is still essentially and inherently the self-identity of pure consciousness not as a fact that itself is aware of but only as presented to us who are considering its condition. It has thus not as yet completed within itseK the process of rising above this condition, it is simply there ; and it stiU has within itself the opposite
* The contrast between these two elements is found both in the preReformation period and in the eighteenth century period ; — in the latter the contrast assumes perhaps its acutest form.
principle by which, it is conditioned, without as yet having become master of that principle through a mediating process. Hence the essential content of its thought is not taken to be an essential object merely in the form of abstract immanence {Ansich), but in the form of a common object, an object that has merely been elevated into another element, without having lost the character of an object that is not constituted by thought.
It is essentially distinct from the immanent nature which constitutes the essential being of the stoic type of consciousness. The significant factor for Stoicism was merely the form of thought as such, which has any content foreign to it that is drawn from reahty. In the case of the consciousness just described, however, the form of thought is not the significant element. Similarly it is essentially distinct from the inherent principle of the virtuous type of conscious hfe ; here the essential fact stands, no doubt, in a relation to reahty ; it is the essence of reahty itself : but it is no more than an unreahsed essence of it. In the above type of consciousness the essence, although no doubt beyond reahty, stands aU the same for an actual real essence. In the same way, the inherently right and good which reason as lawgiver estabhshes, and the universal operating when consciousness tests and examines laws — neither of these has the character of actual reahty.
Hence while pure thought fell within the sphere of spiritual cidture as an aspect of the estrangement characteristic of this sphere, as the standard in fact for judging abstract good and abstract bad, it has become enriched, by having gone through the process
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of the whole, with the element of reaKty and thereby with content. This reahty of its essential being, however, is at the same time merely a reality of pure consciousness, not of concrete actual consciousness : it is no doubt hfted into the element of thought, but this concrete consciousness does not yet take it for a thought ; it is beyond the reahty pecuhar to this consciousness, for it means flight from the latter.
In the form in which Keligion here appears — for it is rehgion obviously that we are speaking about — as the behef which belongs to the realm of culture, rehgion does not yet appear as it is truly and completely [an und fur sich). It has already come before us in other phases, viz. as the unhappy consciousness, as a form of conscious process with no substantial content in it. So, too, in the case of the ethical substance, it appeared as a behef in the nether-world. But a consciousness of departed spirits is, strictly speaking, not behef, not the inner essence subsisting in the element of pure consciousness away beyond the actual : there the behef has itself an immediate existence in the present ; its element, its substance is the family.
But at the stage we are now considering, rehgion is in part the outcome of the substance, and is the pure consciousness of that substance ; in part this pure consciousness is ahenated from its concrete actual consciousness, the essence from its existence. It is thus doubtless no longer the insubstantial process of consciousness ; but it has stiU the characteristic of opposition to reahty qua the given reahty in general, and of opposition to the reahty of self-consciousness in particular. It is essentially therefore merely a belief.
This pure consciousness of Absolute Being is a consciousness in alienation. Let us see more closely what is the characteristic of that whose other it is ; we can only consider it in connection with this other. In the first instance this pure consciousness seems to have over against it merely the world of actuahty. But since its nature is to flee from this actuahty, and thereby is characterised by opposition, it has this actuality inherent within its own being ; pure consciousness is, therefore, essentially in its very being self-ahenated, and behef' constitutes merely one side of it. The other side has already arisen too. For pure consciousness is reflexion out of the world of culture in such a way that the substantial content of this sphere, as also the separate fragments into which it falls, are shown to be what they inherently are, — essential modes of spiritual hfe, absolutely restless processes or determinate moments which are at once cancelled in their opposite. Their essential nature, bare consciousness, is thus the bare simpHcity of absolute distinction, distinction which as it stands is no distinction. Consequently it is pure self-existence not of a particular self, but essentially universal self, whose being consists in a restless process invading and pervading the stable existence of actual fact. In it is found the certainty that knows itself at once to be the truth ; there we have pure thought in the sense of absolute notion with all its power of negativity, which annihilates every objective existence that would claim to stand over against consciousness, and turns it into a form of conscious existence.
This pure consciousness is at the same time simple and undifferentiated as well, just because its distinction is no distinction. Being this form of bare and simple
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reflexion into self, however, it is the element of belief, in which, spirit has the special feature of positive universahty, of what is inherent and essential in contrast with that self-existence on the part of self-consciousness.
Forced back upon itself away from this unsubstantial world whose being is mere dissolution, spirit in its undivided unity is, when we consider its true meaning, at once the absolute movement, the ceaseless process of negating its appearance, as well as the essential substance thereof satisfied within itself, and the positive stabihty of that appearance. But, bearing as they inherently do the characteristic of ahenation, both these moments fall apart in the shape of a twofold consciousness. The former is pure Insight, the spiritual process concentrated and focussed in self-consciousness, a process which has over against it the consciousness of something positive, the form of objectivity or presentation, and which directs itself upon this presented object. The proper and pecuhar object of this insight is, however, merely pure ego.* The bare consciousness of the positive element, of unbroken self-identity, finds its object, on the other hand, in the inner reahty as such.
Pure insight has, therefore, in the first instance, no content within it, because it exists for itself by negating, everything in it ; to behef , on the other hand, belongs the content, but without insight. While the former dtjes not get away from self-consciousness, the latter to be sure has its content as well in the element of pure self-consciousness, but only in presentation, not in conceptions — in pure consciousness, not in pure selfconsciousness. Behef is, as a fact, in this way pure
* Kant : " Pure ego is the absolute unity of apperception."
consciousness of the essential reality, i.e. of the bare and simple inner nature, and is thus thought — ^the primary factor ia the nature of belief, which is generally overlooked.* The immediateness which characterises the presence of the essential reality within it is due to the fact that its object is essence, inner nature, i.e. pure thought, t This immediateness, however, so far as thinking enters consciousness, or pure consciousness enters into self-consciousness, maintains the significance of an objective being that hes beyond consciousness of self. It is because of the significance which immediacy and simplicity of pure thought thus retain in consciousness that the essential reaUty in the case of behef drops into being an objectively presented idea (Vorstellung), instead of being the content of thought, and comes to be looked at as a supersensible world, which is essentially an " other " for self-consciousness.
In the case of pure insight, on the other hand, the entrance of pure thought into consciousness has the opposite character : objectivity has the significance of a content that is merely negative, that cancels itself and returns into the self ; that is to say, only the self is properly object to self, or, to put it otherwise, the object only has truth so far as it has the form of self.
As belief and pure insight fall in common within, pure consciousness, they also in common involve the mind's return out of the concrete sphere of spiritual culture. There are three aspects, therefore, from which they show what they are. In one aspect each
* " Belief is a kind of knowledge."— i'ncyc/. : § 554. t Kant : " I am the essential reality when conscious of myself in pure thought.''
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is outside every relation, and has a being all its own ; in another each takes up an attitude towards the concrete actual world standing in antithesis to pure consciousness ; while in the third form each is related to the other inside pure consciousness.
In the case of behef the aspect of complete being, of being in-and-for-itself, is its absolute object, whose content and character we have already come to know. For it hes in the very notion of behef that this object is nothing else than the real world hfted into the universahty of pure consciousness. The articulation of this world, therefore, constitutes the organisation belonging to pure universality also, except that the parts in the latter case do not alienate one another when spirituahsed, but are complete reahties all by themselves, are spirits* returned into themselves and self-contained.
The process of their transition from one into the other is, therefore, only for us [who are analysing the process] an aUenation of the characteristic nature in which their distinction hes, and only for us, the observers, does it constitute a necessary series ; for behef, however, their distinction is a static diversity, and their movement simply a historical fact.
To deal shortly with the external character of their form : as in the world of culture state-power or the good was primary, so here the first and foremost moment is Absolute Being, spirit absolutely self-contained, so far as it is simple eternal substance, f But in the process of reahsing its constitutive notion, which consists in being spirit, that substance passes over into
* The "persons'' of the "Triuity.'' t God transcendent, God as Substance.
a form where it exists for an other ; its self-identity becomes actual Absolute Being, actuahsed in self-sacrifice ; it becomes a self, but a self that is transitory and passes away.* Hence the third stage is the return of self thus ahenated, the substance thus abased into its first primal simphcity of nature. Only when this is done is spirit presented and manifested as spirit, f
These distinct ultimate Reahties, when brought back by thought into self out of the flux of the actual world, are changeless, eternal spirits, whose being Hes in thinking the unity which they constitute. While thus torn away from self-consciousness, these Reahties all the same lay hold on it; for if the Ultimate Reahty were to be fixed and unmoved in the form of the first bare and simple substance, it would remain ahen to self-consciousness. But the laying aside, the " emptying," of this substance, and afterwards its spirit, involves the element of concrete actuahty, and thereby participates in the believing self-consciousness, or the beheving attitude of consciousness belongs to the real world.
According to this second condition, the beheving type of consciousness partly finds its actuahty in the real world of cvdture, and constitutes its spirit and its existence, which have been described ; partly, however, beUef takes up an attitude of opposition to this its own actuahty, looks on this as something vain, and is the process of canceUing and abohshing it. This process does not consist in the beheving consciousness having ingenious views about the perverted condition of that reahty; for it is bare and simple
* The God-man, Christ.
t God as Absolute Spirit an^Subject.
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consciousness, which reckons esprit and wit as something vain and empty, because this still has the real world for its purpose. On the contrary, in opposition to its placid realm of thought stands concrete actuahty as a soulless form of existence, which on that account has to be overcome in external fashion. This obedience through service and rewards, by canceHLng sense-knowledge and action, brings out the consciousness of unity with the self-complete and self-existing Being, though not in the sense of an actual perceived unity. This service is merely the incessant process of producing the sense of unity, a process that never completely reaches its goal in the actual present. The rehgious communion no doubt does so, for it is universal self-consciousness. But for the individual self-consciousness the realm of pure thought necessarily remains something away beyond its sphere of reahty ; or, again, since this remote region by the emptying, the "kenosis," of the eternal Being, has entered the sphere of actuahty, its actuahty is sensuous, non-conceptual. But one sensuous actuahty is ever indifferent and external to another, and what hes beyond has thus only received the further character of remoteness in space and time. The essential notion, however, — the concrete actuality of spirit directly present to itself — remains for behef an inner principle, which is all and effects all, but never itself comes to the hght.
In the case of pure insight, however, the principle, the essential notion {Begriff), is alone the real ; and this third aspect of behef — that of being an object for pure insight — is the specific relation in which the notion here appears. Pure insight itself has similarly to be considered partly by itself {an und fiir sich), partly in re-
lation to the real world — so far as the real world is still present in positive shape, viz. in the form of a sense of vanity — and lastly in that relation to belief aheady mentioned.
We have already seen what pure insight by itself is. Belief is unperturbed pure consciousness of spirit as the ultimate Eeahty ; pure insight is the self-consciousness of spirit as the ultimately real ; it knows the essentially real, therefore, not qua essence but qua Absolute Self. Its aim thus is to cancel every other kind of independence which falls without self-consciousness, whether that be the independence of the actually objective or of the inherently real, and to mould it into conceptual form. It is not merely the certainty of selfconscious reason assured of being all truth ; it knows that it is so.
In the form, however, in which the notion of pure insight meets us first, it is not yet reahsed. As a phase of consciousness it appears in consequence as something contingent, as something isolated and particTxlar, and its inmost constitutive nature appears as some purpose that it has to carry out and realise. It has to begin with the intention of making pure insight universal, i.e. of making everything that is actual into a notion, and a notion for every selfconsciousness.* The intention is pure, for its content is pure insight ; and this insight is similarly pure, for its content is merely the absolute notion, which finds no opposition in an object, and is not restricted in itseK. In the unrestricted notion there are found at once both the aspects— that everything objective is
* "Kant's philosophy is the enlightenment adapted so as to hecome a philosophical method."— Hegel, W.W. 15, p. 602.
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to signify the self-existent, self-consciousness, and that this is to signify something universal, that pure insight is to be the property of all self-consciousnesses. This second feature of the intention is so far a result of culture, in that in culture the distinctions of objective spirit, the parts and express determinations of its world, have come to naught, as well as the distinctions, which appeared as originally determinate natures. Genius, talent, special capacities in general, belong to the world of actuahty, in so far as this world contains still the aspect of being a herd of self-conscious individuals, where, in confusion and mutual violence, individuals cheat and struggle with one another over the contents of the real world.
The above distinctions doubtless have no place in it as genuine especes. Individuahty neither is contented with unreal "fact," nor has special content and purposes of its own. It signifies merely something rmiversaUy acknowledged and accepted, viz. ctdtivated and developed ; and the question of distinction is reduced to a matter of less or more energy, a distinction of quantity, i.e. a non-essential distinction. This last difference, however, has come to nothing, by the fact that the distinction in the state where consciousness was completely torn asunder, turned round into an absolutely quaUtative distinction. What is there the other for the ego is merely the ego itself. In this infinite judgment all the one-sidedness and peculiarity of the original self-existing self is extinguished; the self knows itseK qua pure self to be its own object ; and this absolute identity of both sides is the element of pure insight.
Pure insight, therefore, is the simple ultimate being imdifferentiated within itself, and at the same tirne the
universal achievement and production and a universal possession of all. In this simple spiritual substance self-consciousness gives itself and maintaias for itself ia every object the sense of this its own particularity or of action, just as conversely the individuahty of selfconsciousness is there identical with itself and universal. This pure insight is, then, the spirit that calls to every consciousness : be for yourself what you are essentially in yourself — rational.
II
ElSTLIGHTENMENT *
The peculiar object on whicli pure insigiit directs the active force of the notion is belief, this being a form of pure consciousness like itself and yet opposed to it in that element. But at the same time pure insight has a relation to the actual world, for, like belief, it is a return from the actual world into pure consciousness. We have first of aU to see how its activity is constituted, as contrasted with the impure intentions and the perverted forms of insight found in the actual world, f
We have touched abeady on the placid type of conscious Ufe, which stands in contrast to this turmoU of alternate self-dissolution and self-evolution ; it constitutes the aspect of pure insight and intention. This unperturbed consciousness, however, as we saw, has no special insight regarding the sphere of culture. The latter has itself rather the most painful feeling, and the truest insight about itself — the feeling that everything made secure crumbles to pieces, that every element of its existence is shattered to atoms, and every bone broken : moreover, it consciously expresses this feeling in words, pronounces judgment and gives luminous utterance concerning all aspects of its condition. Pure
* Enlightenment {Aufkl'drung) is the universalisation of the principle of " pure insight," and hence is logically the outcome of the preceding analysis.
t Cf. pp. 526-33.
insight, therefore, can have here no activity and content of its own, and thus can only take up the formal attitude of truly apprehending this ingenious insight proper to the world and the language it adopts. Since this language is a scattered and broken utterance and the pronouncement a fickle mood of the moment, which is again quickly forgotten, and is only known to be a whole by a third consciousness, this latter can be distinguished as pure insight only if it gathers those several scattered traces into a universal picture, and then makes them the insight of all.
By this simple means pure insight wiU resolve the confusion of this world. For we have found that the fragments and determinate conceptions and iudividuahties are not the essential nature of this actuahty, but that it finds its substance and support alone in the spirit which exists qua judging and discussing, and that the interest of having a content for this ratiocination and parleying to deal with alone preserves the whole and the fragments into which it falls. In this language which insight adopts, its self-consciousness is still particular, a self existing for its own sake ; but the emptiness of its content is at the same time emptiness of the self knowing that content to be vain and empty. Now, since the consciousness placidly apprehending all these sparkling utterances of vanity makes a collection of the most striking and penetrating phrases, the soul that still preserves the whole, the vanity of witty criticism, goes to ruin with the other form of vanity, the previous vanity of existence. The collection shows most people a better wit, or at least shows every one a more varied wit than their own, and shows that better knowledge and judging in general are some-
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thing universal and are now universally familiar. Thereby the siagle and only interest which was stiU found is done away with ; and individual Hght is resolved into universal insight.
StUl, however, knowledge of essential reahty stands secure above vain and empty knowledge; and pure insight, to begin with, appears in genuinely active form in so far as it enters into conflict with behef.
The Struggle of Enlightenment with supeestition*
The various negative forms wliich consciousness adopts, the attitude of scepticism, and that of theoretical and practical idealism, are inferior attitudes compared with that of pure insight and the expansion of pure insight — enhghtenment ; for pure insight is born of the substance of spirit, it knows the pure self of consciousness to be absolute, and enters into conflict with the pure consciousness of the Absolute Being of all reahty.
Since behef and insight are the same pure consciousness, but in form are opposed, — the reahty in the case of behef being a thought, not a notion, and hence something absolutely opposed to self-consciousness, while the reahty in the case of pure insight is the self — they are such that inter se the one is the absolute negative of the other.
As appearing the one against the other, all content falls to behef; for in its unperturbed element of thought each moment obtains definite subsistence. Pure insight, however, is in the first instance without any content; it involves rather the complete disappearance of content; but by its negative attitude towards what it excludes it will. make itself real and give itself a content.
* " We live in an age of enlightenment " (Kant). Cp. Hegel W W 15 introduction to "French Philosophy."
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It knows belief to be opposed to insight, opposed to reason and truth. Jvist as, for it, belief is in general a tissue of superstitious prejudices and errors; so it further sees the consciousness embracing all this content organised into a realm of error, in which false tosight is the general sphere of consciousness, immediate, naively unperturbed, and inherently imreflective. Yet all the while this false insight does have within it the moment of self-reflection, the moment of self-consciousness, separated from its simple naivete, and keeps this reflection in the background as an insight remaining by itself, and as an evil intention by which that that former conscious state is befooled. That mental sphere is the victim of the deception of a Priesthood, which carries out its envious vanity, jealous of beiag alone in possession of insight, and carries out its other selfish ends as well. At the same time this priesthood conspires with Despotism, which takes up the attitude of being the synthetic crude (begrifflos) unity of the real and this ideal kingdom — a singularly amorphous and inconsistent type of being, — and stands above the bad insight of the multitude, and the bad intention of the priests, and even combines both of these within itself. As the result of the stupidity and confusion produced amongst the people by the agency of priestly deception, despotism despises both and draws for itself the advantage of undisturbed control and the fulfilment of its desires, its humours, and its whims. Yet at the same time it is itself in this same state of murky insight, is equally superstition and error.
Enlightenment does not attack these three forms of the enemy without distinction. For since its essential nature is pure insight, which is per se universal, its
The Struggle of Enitghtenment with Superstition 55i
true relation to the other extreme is that in which, it is concerned with the common and identical element in both. The aspect of individual existence isolating itself from the miiversal naive consciousness is the antithesis of it, and cannot be directly affected by it. The will of a deceiving priesthood and an oppressive despot is, therefore, not primarily the object on which it directs its activity ; its object is the insight that is without wiU and without individualised isolated self-existence, the notion (Begriff) of rational self-consciousness, which has its existence in the total mental sphere, but is not yet there in the fullness of its true meaning {Begriff). Since, however, pure insight rescues this genuinely honest form of insight, with its naive simplicity of nature, from prejudices and errors, it wrests from the hands of bad intention the efiective realisation' of its powers of deception, for the exercise of which the incoherent and undeveloped (begrifjlos) consciousness of the general sphere provides the basis and raw material, while isolated self-existence finds its substance in the simple consciousness as a whole.
The relation of pure insight to the naive consciousness of absolute Eeahty has now a double aspect. On one side pure insight is inherently one and the same with it. On the other side, however, this naive consciousness lets absolute Reahty as weU as its parts dispose themselves at will in the simple element of its thought, and subsist there, and lets them hold only as its inherent nature and hence hold good in objective form. In this immanent being it disowns, however, independent existence for its own sake. In so far as, according to the first aspect, this behef is for pure insight inherently and essentially pure self-consciousness, and has to
552 phenomenology of MinA
become so expressly] merely for itself, pm:e insight finds in this constitutive notion of behef the element in which, instead of false insight, it reahses itself.
Since, from this point of view, both are essentially the same, and the relation of pure insight takes effect through and in the same element, the communication between them is direct and immediate, and their give and take an unbroken interfusion. Whatever pins and bolts may be otherwise driven into consciousness, it is in itseK this simphcity of nature in which everything is resolved, forgotten and unconstrained, and which, therefore, is absolutely amenable to the activity of the notion. The communication of pure insight is on that account comparable to a silent extension or the expansion, say, of vapour in the unresisting atmosphere. It is a penetrating infection, which did not previously make itself noticeable as something distinct from and opposed to the indifferent medium into which it insinuates its way, and hence cannot be averted. Only when the infection has become widespread is that consciousness ahve to it, which unconcernedly yielded to its influence. For what this consciousness received into itself was doubtless something simple, homogeneous, and uniform throughout it, but was at the same time the simphcity of seKreflected negativity, which later on also develops by its nature into something opposed, and thereby reminds consciousness of its previous state. This simple uniformity is the notion, which is simple knowledge that knows both itseK and its opposite, this opposite being, however, cancelled as opposite within the self-knowledge of the notion. In the condition, therefore, in which consciousness becomes aware of pure insight, this insight is already widespread.- The struggle with
it betrays the fact that the infection has done its work. The struggle is too late ; and every means taken merely makes the disease ■w;orse ; for the disease has seized the very marrow of spiritual hfe, viz. consciousness ia its ultimate principle (Begriff), or its pure inmost nature itseH. There is therefoxe no power left in conscious hfe to surmount the disease. Because it affects the very inmost being, whatever individual expressions remain, are repressed and allowed to subside and the superficial symptoms are smothered. This is immensely to its advantage; for it does not now squander its power in useless fashion, nor does it 'show itself unworthy of its true nature — which is the case when it breaks out into symptoms and particidar eruptions antithetic to the content of behef and the connexion of its external reahty. Rather, being now an invisible and unperceived spirit, it insinuates its way through and through the noble parts, and soon has got complete hold over all the vitals and members of the unconscious idol ; and then " some fine morning it gives its comrade a shove with the elbow, when, bash ! crash ! — and the idol is lying on the floor." * On some " fine morning," whose noon is not red with blood, if the infection has penetrated to every organ of spiritual hfe. It is then the memory alone that still preserves the dead form of the spirit's previous state, as a vanished history, vanished men know not how. And the new serpent of wisdom, raised on high before bending worshippers, has in this manner painlessly stripped ofi merely a shrivelled skin.
But this sUent steady working of the loom of spirit in the inner region of its substance, f its own action
* Rameau's Neffe. t In the Ufe of "feeling" and "emotion."
6S4 Phenomenology of Mind
hidden from itself, is merely one side of the realising of pure insight. Its expansion does not only consist in like going along with like ; and its realisation is not merely an unresisted expansion. The action of the principle of negation is at the same time essentially a developed process of self-distinction, which, being a conscious action, must set forth its moments in a definitely manifested expression, and must make its appearance in the form of sheer noise, and a violent struggle with an opposite as such.
We have, therefore, to see how pure insight and pure intention maintains its negative attitude towards that other which it finds standing opposed to it.
Pure insight and intention, operating negatively, can only be, — since its very principle is all essentiality and there is nothing outside it — the negative of itself. As insight, therefore, it passes into the negative of pure insight, it becomes untruth and unreason ; and as intention it passes into the negative of -puxe intention, becomes a he and sordid impurity of purpose.
It involves itself in this contradiction by the fact that it engages in a strife and thinks to do battle with some ahen external other. It merely imagines this, for its nature as absolute negativity Kes in having that otherness within its own seU. The absolute notion is the category ; it is the principle that knowledge and the object of knowledge are the same. In consequence, what pure insight expresses as its other, what it pronounces to be an error or a he, can be nothing else than its own self ; it can only condemn what itself is. What is not rational has no truth, or what is not comprehended through a notion, conceptually determined, is not. When reason thus speaks of some other than itself is, it
in fact speaks merely of itself ; it does not therein go beyond itseU.
This struggle with the opposite, therefore, combines m its meaning the significance of being its own actualisation. This consists just iu the process of unfolding its moments and taking them back into itself. One part of this process is the makitig of the distinction in which the insight of reason opposes itself as object to itself ; so long as it remains in this condition, it is at variance with itself. Qua pure insight it is without any content ; the process of its realisation consists in itself becoming content to itseK ; for no other can be made its content, because it is the category become self-conscious. But since this insight in the first instance' thinks of the content as in its opposite, and knows the content merely as a content, and does not as yet think of it as its own self, pure insight misconceives itself in it. The complete attainment of insight, therefore, has the sense of a process of coming to know that content as its own, which was to begin with opposed to itself. Its result, however, will be thereby neither the reestablishment of the errors it has fought, nor merely its original notion, but an insight which knows the absolute negation of itself to be its own proper reality, to be its self, or an insight which is its self-understanding notion.
This feature of the struggle of enhghtenment with errors, — that of fighting itself in them, and of condemning that in them which it asserts, — this is something for us who observe the process, or is what enlightenment and its struggle are in themselves imphcitly. The first aspect of this struggle, however, — the contamination and defilement of enlightenment through its pure self-
556 Phenomenology of Mind
identity accepting the attitude and function of destructive negation — this is how belief looks upon it; belief finds it simply lying unreason and malicious intent, just as enlightenment in the same way regards behef as error and prejudice.
As regards its content, it is in the first instance empty insight, whose content appears an external other to it. It meets this content, consequently, in the shape of something not yet its own, as something that exists quite independent of it, and is found in behef.
Enhghtenment, then, conceives its object in the first instance and generally in such a way as to take it as pure insight, and failing to recognise itself there, interprets it as error. In insight as such consciousness apprehends an object in such a manner that it becomes the inner being of conscious life, or becomes an object which consciousness permeates, in which consciousness maintains itself, keeps within itself, and is present to itseK, and, by its thus being the process of that object, brings the object into being. It is precisely this which enlightenment rightly declares belief to be, when enlightenment says that the Absolute Reality professed by belief is a being that comes from behef 's own conscioiisness, is its own thought, something produced from and by consciousness.* Enhghtenment, consequently, interprets and declares it to be error, to be a made-up invention about the very same thing as enhghtenment itself is.
Enhghtenment that seeks to teach behef this new wisdom does not, in doing so, tell it anything new.
* Cp. the view of God held by Fichte : also Feuerbach :— Wesen der Beligum.
For the object of belief itself is just this too, viz. a pure essential reahty of its own peculiar consciousness ; so that this consciousness does not put itself down for lost and negated in that object, but rather puts trust in it ; and this just means that it finds itself there as this particular consciousness, finds itself therein to be self-consciousness. If I put my trust in any one, his certitude of, himself is for me the certitude of myseK ; I know my self-existence in him, I know that he acknowledges it, and that it is for him both his purpose and his real nature. Trust, however, is beHef, because its consciousness has a direct relation to its object, and thus sees at once that it is one with the object, and in the object.
Further, since what is object for me is something in which I know myself, I am at the same time in that object reaUy in the form of another self-consciousness, i.e. one which has become in that object ahenated from its own particular individuation, from its natural and contingent existence, but which partly continues therein to be self-consciousness, and partly is there an essential consciousness just like pure insight.
In the notion of insight there hes not merely this, that consciousness knows itself in the object it looks at, and finds itseK directly there, without first quitting the thought element and then returning into itself ; the notion impKes as well that consciousness is aware of itself as being also the mediating process, aware of itseK as active, as the agency of production. Through this it gets the thought of this unity of self as self and object..
This very consciousness is also behef. Obedience and action make a necessary moment, through which the
558 Phenomenology of Mind
certainty of existence in Absolute Reality comes about. This action of belief does not indeed make it appear as if Absolute Reality is itself produced thereby. But the Absolute Reahty for belief is essentially not the abstract reality that lies beyond the beheving consciousness ; it is the spirit of the rehgious communion, it is the unity of that abstract reahty and self-consciousness. The action of the cormnunion is an essential moment in bringing about that it is this spirit of the communion. That spirit is what it is by the productive activity of consciousness, or rather it does not exist without being produced by consciousness. For essential as this process of production is, it is as truly not the only basis of Absolute Reahty; it is merely a moment. The Absolute Reahty is at the same time self-complete and self-contained {an und fur sich sdbst).
From the other side the notion of pure insight is seen to be something else than its own object ; for just this negative character constitutes the object. Thus from the other side it also expresses the ultimate Reahty of behef as something foreign to self-consciousness, something that is not bone of its bone, but is surreptitiously foisted on it hke a changeling child. But here enhghtenment is entirely foolish ; behef discovers it to be a way of speaMng which does not know what it is saying, and does not understand the facts of the case when it talks about priestly deception, and deluding the people. It speaks about this as if by means of some hocus-pocus of conjuring priestcraft there were foisted on consciousness as true Reahty something that is absolutely foreign, and absolutely ahen to it ; and yet says all the while that this is an essential reahty for consciousness, that
consciousness believes in it, trusts in it, and seeks to make it favourably disposed towards itself ; i.e. that consciousness therein sees its pure ultimate Being just as much as its own particular and universal individuahty, and creates by its own action this unity of itself with its essential reaHty. In other words, it directly declares that to be the very inmost nature of consciousness which it declares to be something aKen to consciousness.
How, then, can it possibly speak about deception and delusion ? By the fact that it directly expresses about behef the very opposite of what it asserts of belief, it if so facto really reveals itself to be the transparent he. How are deception and delusion to take place, where consciousness ia its very truth has directly and immediately the certitude of itself, where it possesses itself in its object, since it just as much finds as produces itself there ? The distinction no longer exists, even in words.
When the general question has been raised, whether it is permissible to delude a people, the answer, as a fact, had to be that the question is pointless, because it is impossible to deceive a people in this matter. Brass in place of gold, counterfeit instead of genuine coin may doubtless have been disposed of in many an instance ; many a one has stuck to it that a battle lost was a battle won; and hes of all sorts about things of sense and particular events have been credited for a time; but in the knowledge of that inmost reahty where consciousness finds the direct certainty of its own self, the idea of delusion is entirely baseless.
Let us see further how behef finds enhghtenment in the case of the different moments of its own con-
560 Phenomenology oj Mind
scions experience, to which the view just noted referred in the first instance only in a general way. These moments are pure thought, or, qvn object, absolute Being per se {an und fiir sich) ; then its relation, as a form of knowledge, to absolute Being, the vdtimate basis of its belief ; and finally its relation to absolute Being in its acts, i.e. its and " worship " service.* Just as pure insight has misconceived itself m belief as a whole and denied its own nature, we shall find it taking up in these moments, too, an attitude similarly perverted and distorted.
Pure insight assumes towards the absolute Reality of the believing mind a negative attitude. This Being is pure thought, and pure thought is estabhshed within itself as object or as the true Being; in the beUeving consciousness this immanent and essential reahty of thought preserves at the same time for the seK-existent consciousness the form of objectivity, but merely the empty form ; it exists in the character of something consciously "presented." To pure insight, however, since it is pure consciousness in its aspect of self existing for itself, this other appears as something negative of self-conscioUsness. This might, agaia, be taken either as the pure essential reahty of thought, or even as the being found in sense-experience, the object of sense-certainty. But since it is at the same time for the self, and this seH, qua self which has an object, is an actual consciousness, for insight the peculiar object as such is an ordinary existing thing of sense. This its object appears before it when it examines the ideas found in behef. It condemns these ideas
♦ Enlighteninent attacks the object and the basis of helief, and the mode of worship.
and in doing so condemns its own proper object. It really commits a wrong, however, against beUef ia so apprehending the object of belief as if it were its own ob j ect. According to this account it states regarding beUef that its absolute Being is a piece of stone, a block of wood, having eyes and seeing not, or again some bread-paste, which is obtained from grain grown on the field and transformed by men and set aside for that purpose; or in whatever other ways beUef anthromorphoses absolute Being, making it objective and representable.
Enlightenment, proclaiming itself as the pure and true, here turns what is held to be eternal Hfe and holy spirit into a concrete passing thing of sense, and contaminates it with the inherent nothingness of sense-experience— with an aspect and point of view which is not to be found at all in the worshipping attitude of behef, so that enhghtenment simply calumniates it by speaking of such an aspect. What behef reveres is for behef assuredly neither stone nor wood, nor bread-dough, nor any other sort of thing of time and sense. If enhghtenment thinks it worth while to say its object all the same is this as well, or even that behef is this in its inherent nature and in truth, then behef also knows that something which it is " as well," but for it this something lies outside its worship ; on the other hand, however, behef does not in general look on such things as stones, etc., as having an inherent and essential being at all, the Absolute Keahty of pure thought is for it alone something inherent.
The second moment is the relation of behef as a form of knowing consciousness to this ultimate ReaKty. As pure thinking consciousness behef has this Reahty
562 Phenomenology of Mind
immediately within itself. But pm:e consciousness is just as much a mediate relation of conscious certainty to truth, a relation constituting the basis of belief. For enlightenment this ground comes at the same time to be regarded as a chance knowledge of chance occurrences. The ground of knowledge, however, is the conscious universal, and in its ultimate meaning is absolute spirit, which in abstract pure consciousness, or thought as such, is merely absolute Being, but qua self -consciousness is the knowledge of itself. Pure insight sets up this conscious universal, seK-knowing spirit pure and simple, likewise as a negative element for self-consciousness. Doubtless this insight is itself pure mediate thought, i.e. thought mediating itself with itself, it is pure knowledge; but since it is pure insight, or pure knowledge, which does not yet know itself, i.e. for which as yet there is no awareness that it is this pure process of mediation, this process seems to insight, hke everything else constituting it, to be something external, an other. When reahsing its inherent principle, then, it develops this moment essential to it ; but that moment seems to it to belong to behef, and to be, in its character of an external other, a fortuitous knowledge of just such common historical actuahties. It thus here charges reUgious belief with basing its certainty on some particular historical evidence, which, considered as historical evidence, would assuredly not even warrant that degree of certainty about the matter which we get regarding any event mentioned in the newspapers. It further makes the imputation that the certainty in the case of reUgious behef rests on the accidental fact of the preservation of all this evidence : on the preservation of this evidence partly by means of paper, and partly
through the skill and honesty in transferring what is written from one paper to another, and lastly rests upon the accurate interpretation of the sense of dead words and letters. As a matter of fact, however, it never occurs to behef to make its certainty depend on such evidence and such fortuitous circumstances. Belief in its conscious assurance occupies a naive unsophisticated attitude towards its absolute object, knows it with a purity, which never mixes up letters, paper, or copyists with its consciousness of the Absolute Being, and does not make use of things of that sort to effect its union with the Absolute. On the contrary, this consciousness is the self-mediating, self-relating ground of its knowledge ; it is spirit itseK which bears witness of itself both in the inner heart of the individual consciousness, as weU as through the presence everjrwhere and in all men of behef in it. If behef wants to appeal to historical evidences in order to get also that kind of foundation, or at least confirmation, for its content which enlightenment speaks of, and is reaUy serious in thinking and acting as if that were an important matter, then it has eo ipso allowed itself to be corrupted and led astray by the insinuations of enhghtenment ; the . efforts it makes to secure a basis or support in this way are merely indications that show how it has been affected and contaminated by enlightenment.
There still remains the third aspect, the active relation of consciousness to Absolute Being, its forms of service.* This action consists in cancelling the particularity of the individual, or the natmral form of its selfexistence, whence arises its certainty of being pure self - consciousness, of being, as the result of its
» The cult.
564 Phenomenology of Mind
action, i.e. as a self -existing conscious individual, one with ultimate Reality.
Since in tkis action purposiveness and end get distinguished, and pure insight likewise takes up a negative attitude towards this action, and denies itself just as it did in the other moments, it must as regards purposiveness present the appearance of being stupid and unintelligent, since insight united with intention, accordance of end with means, appears to it as an other, as really the opposite of what insight is. As regards the end, however, it has to make badness, enjoyment, and possession, its purpose, and prove itself in consequence to be the impurest kind of intention, since pure intention, qua external, an other, is equally impure intention.
Accordingly we find that, so far as concerns purposiveness, enlightenment thinks it foohsh when the believing individual seeks to obtain the higher consciousness,— ^where there is no entanglement with natural enjoyment and pleasure, — ^by positively denying itself natural enjoyment and pleasure, and proving through its acts that it makes no denial of its contempt for them, but rather that the contempt is quite genuine.
In the same way enlightenment finds it foolish for consciousness to absolve itself of its characteristic of being absolutely individual, excluding all others, and possessing property of its own, by itself demitting its own property, for thereby it shows in reahty that this isolation is not really serious. It shows rather that itself is something that can rise above the natural necessity of isolating itself and of denying, in this absolute isolation of its own individual existence, that the others are one and the same with itseK.
Pure insight finds both purposeless as well as wrong. It is purposeless to renounce a pleasure and give away a possession, in order to show oneself independent of pleasure and possession; hence, in the opposite case, insight will be obhged to proclaim the man a fool, who, in order to eat, employs the expedient of actually eating. Insight agaiu thinks it wrong to deny oneself a meal, and give away butter and eggs not for money, nor money for butter and eggs, but just to give them away and get no return at all ; it understands a meal, or the possession of things of that sort, to be a self's proper object, an end of a self, and hence in fact understands itself to be a very impure intention which ascribes essential value to enjoyment and possessions of this kind. As pure insight it further maintains the necessity of rising above the condition of nature, above covetousness and its ways ; it only finds it foolish and wrong that this supremacy should have to be demonstrated by action. In other words this pure intention is in reahty a deception, which pretends to and demands an inner elevation, but declares that it is superfluous, fooHsh, and even wrong to be in earnest in the matter, to put this upHfting into concrete expression, into actual shape and form, and demonstrate its truth.
Pure insight thus denies itself both as pure insight, — for it abrogates directly purposive action, and as pure intention, — for it denies the intention of proving its independence of the ends of particular existence.
Thus, then, enhghtenment makes belief learn what it means. It takes on this appearance of being bad, because just by the fact of relation to an external other it gives itself a negative reahty, it presents itself as the opposite of itself. Pure insight and intention have to
566 Phenomenology of Mind
adopt this relational attitude, however, for that is their actualisation.
This realisation appeared, in the first instance, as a negative reality. Perhaps its positive reahty is better constituted. Let us see how this stands.
When all prejudice and superstition have been banished, the question arises what next ? What is the truth enhghtenment has diffused in their stead ? It has already given expression to this positive content in its process of exterminating error, for that ahenation of itself is equally its positive reahty.
In dealing with what for behef is Absolute Spirit, it interprets whatever sort of determination it discovers there as being wood, stone, etc., as particidar concrete things of sense. Since iu this way it conceives in general every characteristic, i.e. every content and filling, to be a finite fact, to be a human entity and a mental presentation, absolute Being on its view turns out to be a mere vacuum, to which can be attributed no characteristics, no predicates at all. In fact to marry such a vacuity with universal predicates would be essentially reprehensible; and it is just through such a union that the monstrosities of superstition have been produced. Keason, pure insight, is doubtless not empty itseH, since the negative of itself is present consciously to it, and is its content ; it is, on the contrary, rich in substance, but only in particularity and restrictions. The enlightened function of reason, of pure insight, consists in allowing nothing of that sort to appertain to Absolute Reahty, nor attributing anything of that Mnd to it : this fimction well knows how to put itself and the wealth of fiinitude in their place, and deal with the Absolute in a worthy manner.
In contrast with this colourless empty ReaHty there stands, as a second aspect of the positive truth of enlightenment, the particularity in general of conscious Hfe and of all that is : — a particularity excluded from an absolute Being, and standing by itseK as something entirely self-contained. Consciousness, which in its very earliest expression is sense-certainty and mere " opining," here comes back, after the whole course of its experience, to this same point, and is once agaia a knowledge of what is pure negative of itself, a knowledge of sense things, i.e. of existent entities which stand in indifference over against its own seK-existence. But here it is not an immediate naive consciousness ; it has become to itself iramediate. While at first the prey to every sort of entanglement, into which it is plunged by its gradually unfolding, and now led back to its first form by pure insight, it has arrived at this first state as the residt and outcome of the process. This sensecertainty, resting as it does on an insight into the nothingness of aU other forms of consciousness, and hence the nothingness of whatever is beyond senseexperience, — this sense-certainty is no longer a mere " opining," it is rather absolute truth. This nothingness of everything that transcends sense is doubtless merely a negative proof of this truth. But no other is admissible or possible, for the positive truth of sense-experience in itself is just the unmediated self-existence of the notion itself qzia object and an object in the form of otherness — the positive truth is that it is absolutely certain to every consciousness that it is and that there are other real things outside it, and that in its naive existence it, as well as these things too, are in and for themselves or absolute.
568 Phenomenology of Mind
Lastly, the third moment of the truth of enlightenment is the relation of the particular entities to Absolute Beiag, is the relation of the first two moments to one another. Insight, qua pure insight of what is identical or unrestricted, also transcends the unlike or diverse, i.e. transcends finite reahty, or transcends itself qua mere otherness. The " beyond " of this otherness it takes to be the void, to which it thus relates the facts of sense. In deternuniug this relation both the terms do not enter the relation as its content ; for the one is the void, and thus a content is only to be had through the other, through sense reaUty. The form the relation assumes, however, to the determination of which the aspect of immanent and ultimate being [Ansich) contributes, can be shaped just as we please ; for the form is something inherently and essentially negative, and therefore something self-opposed, being as well as nothing, inherent and ultimate {Ansich) as well as the opposite ; or, what is the same thing, the relation of actuahty to an inherent essential being qua something beyond, is as much a negating as a positing of that actuahty. Finite actuahties can, therefore, properly speaking, be taken just in the way people have need of them. Sense facts are thus related now positively to the Absolute qua something ultimate {Ansich), and sense reahty is itself ultimate fer se ; the Absolute makes them, fosters and cherishes them. Then, again, they are related to it as an opposite, that is to their own non-being ; in this case they are not something ultimate, they have being only for an other. Whereas in the preceding mode of consciousness the conceptions involved in the opposition took shape as good and bad, in the case of pure insight they pass into the more
abstract forms of what is per se {Ansich) and what is for an other being.
Both ways of deaHng with the positive as well as the negative relation of finitude to what is ultimate (Ansich) are, however, equally necessary as a matter of fact, and everything is thus as much something fer se {an sich) as it is something for an other : in other words everything is " useful."
Everjrthing is now at the mercy of other things, lets itself now be used by others, and exists for them ; and then again it, so to say, gets up on its hind legs, fights shy of the other, exists for itself on its own account, and on its side uses the other too.
From this, as a result, man, being the thing conscious of this relation, derives his true nature and place. As he is immediately, man is good, qua natural consciousness fer se, absolute qua individual, and all else exists for him : and further, — since the moments have the significance of universality for him qua self-conscious animal, — everything exists to pleasure and delight him, and, as he first comes from the hand of God, he walks the earth as in a garden planted for him. He is bound also to pluck the fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil ; he claims to have a use for it which distinguishes him from every other being, for, as it happens, his inherently good nature is so constituted that the superfluity of dehght does it harm, or rather his particularity contains as a factor in its constitution a principle that goes beyond it ; his particularity can overreach itself and destroy itself. To prevent this, he finds reason a useful means for duly restraining this self-transcendence, or rather for preserving himself when he does go beyond determinate
670 Phenomenology of Mind,
limits : for such is the force of consciousness. The enjoyment of this conscious and essentially universal being must, in manifold variety and duration, be itseK universal and not something determinate. The principle of measure or proportion has, therefore, the determinate function of preventing pleasure in its variety and duration from being quite broken ofi: i.e. the "measure" is determined with respect to immoderation.
As everything is useful for man, man is likewise useful too, and his characteristic determination consists in making himself a member of the human herd, of use for the common good, and serviceable to all. The extent to which he looks after his own interests is the measure with which he must also serve the purpose of others, and so far as he serves their turn, he is taking care of himseK : the one hand washes the other. But wherever he finds himself there he is in his right: he makes use of others and is himself made use of.
Different things are serviceable to one another in different ways. All things, however, have this reciprocity of utUity by their very nature, by being related to the Absolute in the twofold manner, the one positive, whereby they have a being all their own, the other negative, and thereby exist for others. The relation to Absolute Keahty, or Rehgion, is therefore of all fonns of profitableness the most supremely profitable;* for it is profiting pure and simple ; it is that by which all things stand — by which they have a being all their own — and that by which all things fall — have an existence for something else.
Behef, of course, fimds this positive outcome of
* Cp. 1 Timothy iv. 8 : "Godliness is profitable unto all things."
enlightenment as much an abomination as its negative attitude towards behef. This enhghtened insight into absolute ReaUty, that sees nothing in it but just absolute Reahty, the itre supreme, the great Void — this intention to find that everything in its inune-" diate existence is inherently real {an sich) or good, and finally to find the relation of the particular conscious entity to the Absolute Being, Eehgion, exhaustively summed up in the conception of profitableness — all this is for behef utterly and simply revolting. This special and pecuhar wisdom of enlightenment necessarily seems at the same time to the beheving mind to be sheer insipidity and the confession of insipidity ; because it consists in knowing nothing of absolute Being, or, what amounts to the same thing, in knowing this entirely accurate platitude regarding it, — that it is merely absolute Being, and, again, in knowing nothing but finitude, taking this, moreover, to be the truth, and thinking this knowledge about finitude quu truth to be the highest knowledge attainable.
Behef has a divine right as against enhghtenment, the right of absolute self -identity or of pure thought; and it finds itself utterly wronged by enlightenment ; for enhghtenment distorts all its moments, and makes them something quite different from what they are in it. Enhghtenment, on the other hand, has merely a human right as against behef, and can only put in a human claim for its own truth ; for the wrong it commits is the right of disunion, of discordance, and consists in perverting and altering, a right that belongs to the nature of self-consciousness in opposition to the simple ultimate essence or thought. But
572 Phenomenology of Mind
since the right of enlightenment is the right of selfconsciousness, it wiU not merely retaia its own right, too, in such a way that two equally vahd rights of spirit would be left standing in opposition to one another 'without either satisfying the claims of the other ; it will maintain the absolute right, because self-consciousness is the negative function of the notion (Begriff), a function which does not merely operate on its own account, but also gets control over its opposite. And because behef is a mode of consciousness, it will not be able to balk erdightenment of that right.
For enhghtenment' does not operate against the beheving mind with special principles of its own, but with those which beUef itself impHes and contains. Enhghtenment merely brings together and presents to behef its own thoughts, the thoughts that Ue scattered and apart within behef, all unknown to it. Enhghtenment merely reminds behef, when one of its own forms is present, of others it also has, but which it is always forgetting when the one is there. Enhghtenment shows itself to behef to be pure insight, by the fact that it, in a given determinate moment, sees the whole, brings forward the opposite element standing in direct relation to that moment and, converting the one into the other, brings out the principle operating negatively on both thoughts — the notion. It appeajs, therefore, to behef to be distortion and hes, because it shows up the other side in the moments of behef. Enhghtenment seems, in consequence, directly to make something else out of them than they are in their own particularity; but this other is equally essential, and in reahty is to be found in the beheving mind itself, only the latter does not think about it, but keeps it some-
where else. Hence neither is the result foreign to belief nor can behef reject its truth.
Enlightenment itself, however, which reminds belief of the opposite of its various separate moments, is just as little enhghtened regarding its own nature. It takes up a purely negative attitude to behef, so far as it excludes its own content from its own pure activity and takes that content to be negative of itself. Consequently, neither in this negative, in the content of behef, does it recognise itself, nor, for this reason, does it bring together the two thoughts, the one which it contributes and the one against which it brings the first. Since It does not know that what it condemns in the case of belief is directly its very own thought, it has its own being in the opposition of both moments, only one of which, — viz. in every case the one opposed to behef — it acknowledges, but cuts off the other from the first, just as behef does. Enhghtenment, consequently, does not bring out the unity of both as their unity, i.e. the notion ; but the notion arises before it and comes to hght of its own accord, in other words, enhghtenment finds the notion merely as something lying ready at hand. For in itself the process of reahsing pure insight is just this, that insight, whose essential nature is the notion, comes before itself to begin with in the shape of an absolute other, and repudiates itseK (for the opposite of the notion is an absolute opposite), and then out of this otherness comes to itself or comes to its notion.
Enhghtenment, however, is merely this process, it is the activity of the notion in still unconscious form, an activity which no doubt comes to itself qua, object, but takes this object for an external other, and does not even know the nature of the notion, i.e. does not know
574 Phenomenology of Mind
that it is the undifferentiated element which absolutely divides itseK.
As against behef, then, insight is the power of the notion in. so far as this is the active process of relating the moments lying apart from one another in behef ; a way of relating them in which the contradiction in them comes to hght. Herein hes the absolute right of the power which insight exercises over behef ; but the actuahty which it gives this power hes just in the fact that the beheving state of consciousness is itself the notion and thus itself recognises and accepts the opposite which insight produces and presents before it. Insight, therefore, has and retains right against behef, because it makes vahd in behef what is necessary to behef itself, and what behef contains within it.
At first enhghtenment asserts the moment of the notion to be an act of consciousness ; it maintains in the face of behef that the absolute Reahty behef accepts is a Reahty of the behever's consciousness qua a self, or tha,t this absolute Reahty is produced through consciousness. To the beheving mind its absolute Being is just as it is in itself for the behever, at the same time not as a foreign thing, standing there no one knows how or whence it came there. The trust and confidence of behef consists just in finding itself in absolute Reahty as a particular personal consciousness, and its obedience and service consist in acting so as to bring out that Reahty as its own Absolute. Enhghtenment, strictly speaking, only reminds behef of this, if behef goes beyond the action of consciousness and gives expression to the ultimate nature (Ansich) of absolute Being in abstracto.
But while enhghtenment no doubt puts alongside the one-sidedness of behef the opposite moment, viz. : — the
action of belief ia contrast to being — and being is all belief thinks about here, — and yet does not itself in doing so bring those opposite thoughts together, enlightenment isolates the pure moment of action, and declares that what belief takes to be per se ultimate (Ansich) is merely a product of consciousness. The isolated separate act opposed to this ultimate Being {Ansich) is, however, a contingent action, and, qua presentative activity, is a creating of fictions, — presented figurative ideas that have no being in themselves. And this is how enhghtenment regards the content of behef.
Conversely, however, pure insight equally says the very opposite. Siace insight lays stress on the moment of otherness which the notion contains, it declares the essential Reahty for behef to be one which is not in any way due to consciousness, is away beyond consciousness, foreign to it, and unknown. To behef, too, that Reahty has the same character. On one side behef trusts in it, and gets, in doing so, the assurance of its own self, on the other side it is imsearchable in all its ways and unattainable in its being.
Further, enhghtenment maintains against the beUeving mind a right which the latter concedes, when enhghtenment treats the object of the behever's veneration as stone and wood, or, in short, some finite anthropomorphic feature. For, since this consciousness is divided within itself in having a 'beyond' remote from actuahty and an immediate present embodiment of that remote beyond, there is also found in it, as a matter of fact, the view that sense-things have a value and significance in and for themselves (an und fur sich). But behef does not bring together these two ideas of
576 Phenomenology of Mind
what is " in and for itself," viz. that at one time what is "in and for itself" is for belief pure essential Reahty and at another time is an ordinary thing of sense. Even its own pure consciousness is affected by this last view ; for the distinctions of its supersensuous world, because dispensing with the notion, are a series of independent shapes and forms, and their activity is a happening, i.e. they exist merely in idea, merely as presentations, and have the characteristic of senseexistence.
Erdightenment on its side isolates actuality in the same way, treating it as a reahty abandoned by spirit ; isolates specific determinateness as some fixed immovable fiinite element, as if it were not a moment in the spiritual process of the real itself, were neither nothing, nor something with a being all its own, but something evanescent and transitory.
It is clear that the same is the case with regard to the ground of knowledge. The beheving mind recognises itself to be an accidental knowledge; for in behef the mind adopts an attitude towards contingencies, and absolute Reahty itself comes before beUef in the form of a presented idea of ordinary actual fact. Consequently behef is also a kind of certainty which does not carry the truth within it, and it confesses itself to be an imsubstantial consciousness of this kind, far short of being well assured of itself and authentically secure. This moment, however, beUef forgets in its immediate spiritual knowledge of absolute Reahty.
Enhghtenment, however, which reminds behef of all this, thinks again merely of the contingency of the knowledge and forgets the other — thinks only
of the mediating process which takes effect through an aKen third term, and does not think on that process wherein the immediate is itself the third term, through which it mediates itself with the other, viz. with itself.
Finally, on the view enlightenment takes of the action of behef, the rejection of enjoyment and possessions is looked upon as wrong and purposeless.
As to the wrong thus done, enlightenment preserves the harmony of the beheviag attitude in this that behef acknowledges the actual reahty of possessing property, keeping hold of it, and enjoying it. In insisting on its property, it behaves with all the more stubborn independence and exclusiveness, and in its enjoyment with all the more frank self-abandonment, since its rehgious act of giving up pleasure and property takes effect beyond the region of this actuality, and purchases for it freedom to do as it likes so far as that other sphere is concerned. This service, that consists in sacrificing natural impulses and enjoyments, in point of fact has no truth, owing to this opposition. The retention and the sacrifice subsist together side by side. The sacrifice is merely a "sign" which performs real sacrifice only as regards a small part, and hence in point of fact only representatively suggests sacrifice.
As for purposiveness, enhghtenment finds it pointless and stupid to throw away a possession in order to feel and to prove oneself to be free from all possession, to renounce an enjoyment in order to think and demonstrate that one is rid of all enjoyment. The believing mind itself takes the absolute act for a universal one. Not only does the action of its absolute Reahty
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578 Phenomenology of Mind
as its object appear something universal, but the individual consciousness, too, has to prove itself detached entirely and altogether from its sensuous nature. But throwing away a particular possession, giving up and disclaiming a particular enjoyment, is not acting universally in this way. And since in the action it is essentially the purpose, which is a universal, and the performance, which is a particular process, that had to stand in all their incompatibihty before consciousness, that action shows itself to be of a kind in which consciousness has no share, and consequently this way of acting is seen to be too naive to be an action at aU. It is too naive to fast in order to prove oneself quite indifferent to the pleasures of the table ; too naive to rid oneself, like Origen, of other bodily pleasure in order to show that pleasure is finished and done with. The act itself proves to be an external and a particular function. But desire is deeply rooted within the inner Hfe, and is a universal element ; its pleasure neither disappears with the instrument for getting pleasure nor by abstention from particular pleasures.
But enlightenment on its side here isolates the imreahsed inwardness as against the concrete actuality ; just as in the case of the devotion and direct intuition of belief, enlightenment holds fast to the externality of things of sense as against the inward attitude of belief. Enlightenment finds the main point in the intention, in the thought, and thereby finds no need for actually bringing about the liberation from natural ends. On the contrary, this inner sphere is itself the formal element that has its concrete fulfilment in natural impulses, which are justified simply by the
fact that they fall within, that they belong to universal being, to nature.
Enlightenment, then, holds irresistible sway over behef by the fact that the latter finds in its own constitution the very moments to which enhghtenment gives significance and vaUdity. Looking more closely at the action exerted by this force, its operation on behef seems to rend asunder the unity and happy harmony of trustfulness and immediate confidence, to pollute its spiritual fife with lower thoughts drawn from the sphere of sense, to destroy the feeling of calm security in its attitude of submission by introducing the vanity of understanding, of self-will, and self-fulfilment. But in point of fact, enhghtenment really brings to pass the abolition of that state of imthinking, or rather uncomprehended (begrifflos) cleavage, which finds a place in the nature of behef. The beheving mood weighs and measures by a twofold standard, it has two sorts of eyes and ears, uses two voices to express its meaning, it duphcates all ideas, without comparing and squaring the sense and meaning in the two forms used. Or we may say behef fives its fife amidst two sorts of perceptions, the one the perceptions of thought which is asleep, purely uncritical and uncomprehending, the other those of waking consciousness Hving solely and simply in the world of sense ; and in each of them it manages to carry on a household all its own.
Enhghtenment iUmninates that world of heaven with ideas drawn from the world of sense, pointing out there this element of finitude which behef cannot deny or repudiate, because it is self-consciousness, and in being so is the unity to which both kinds of ideas
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belong, and in which they do not fall apart from one another ; for they belong to the same indivisible simple self into which belief has passed, and which constitutes its life.
Belief has by this means lost the content which furnished its filling, and coUapses into an inarticulate state where the spirit works and weaves within itseK.* Behef is banished from its own kingdom ; this kingdom is sacked and plundered, since every distinction and expansion of it has rent the waking consciousness in its innermost nature, and claimed every one of its parts for earth, and returned them to the earth that owns them. Yet belief is not on that account satisfied, for this illumination has everywhere brought to light only what is individual, with the result that only insubstantial realities and finitude forsaken of spirit make any appeal to spirit.
Since belief is without content and cannot continue in this barren condition, or since, in getting beyond finitude, which is the sole content, it finds merely the empty void, it is a sheer longing : its truth is an empty beyond, for which there is no longer any appropriate content to be found, for everything is appropriated and connected in other ways.
Behef in this manner has in fact become the same as enhghtenment — the conscious attitude of relating a finite that inherently exists to an unknown and unknowable Absolute without predicates ; the difference is merely that the one is enhghtenment satisfied, while behef is enhghtenment unsatisfied.! It will yet be
* i.e. the life of feeling.
+ i.e. the contrast between belief and enlightenment becomes a contrast Loside enlightenment itself.
seen whether enhghtenment can continue in its state of satisfaction ; that longing of the troubled, beshadowed spirit, mourning over the loss of its spiritual world, hes in the background. Enhghtenment has on it this stain of unsatisfied longing : — in its empty Absolute Being we find this in the form of the pure object; in passing beyond its individual nature to an unfulfilled beyond, the fleck appears as an act and a process ; in the selflessness of what is " useful " it is seen in the form of an object fulfilled. Enlightenment will remove this stain : by considering more closely the positive result which constitutes the truth in ite case, we shall find that the stain is imphcitly removed already.
The True Eesult of Enlightenment*
The spirit ttat sullenly works and weaves without further distinctions within itself has thus passed into itself away beyond consciousness, which, again, has arrived at clearness as to itself. The first moment of this clearness of mind is determined, in regard to its necessity and constitution, by the fact that pure insight, or insight that is imphcitly and per se notion, actualises itself ; it does so when it gives otherness or determinateness a place in its own nature. In this manner it is negative pure insight, i.e. the negation of the notion; this negation is equally pure; and herewith has arisen the pure and simple " thing," the Absolute Being, that has no further determination of any sort. If we define this more precisely, insight in the sense of absolute notion is a distinguishing of distinctions that are not so any longer, of abstractions or pure notions that no longer support themselves but find a fiixed hold and a distinction only by means of the whole life of the process. This distinguishing of what is not distinguished consists just in the fact that the absolute notion makes itself its object, and as against that process asserts itself to be the essence. The essence hereby dispenses with the aspect wherein abstrac-
* The outcome is at once positive and negative — materialism and agnosticism : on the secular side, it is pure utilitarianism .
tions or distinctions are kept apart, and hence becomes pure thought in the sense of a pure thing.
This, now, is just the dull, silent, unconscious working and weaving of the spirit at the loom of its own being, to which behef, as we saw, sank back when it lost all di^inction ia its content. And this is at the same time thsijt movement of pure self-consciousness, in regard to wh|ch the essence is intended to be the absolutely external beyond. For, because this pure self-consciousness is a movement working with pure notions, with distinctions that are no distinctions, pure self-consciousness collap^s in fact into that imconscious working and weaving of spirit, i.e. into pure feeling, or pure thinghood.
The self-alienated notion — for the notion stiU stands here at the level of such aUenation — does not, however, know this identical nature constituting both sides, — the movement of seK-consciousness and its absolute Reahty, — does not know the identity of their nature, which, in point of fact gives them their very substance and subsistence. Since the notion is not aware of this insight, absolute ReaKty has significance and value merely in the form of an objective beyond, while the consciousness making these distinctions, and in this way keeping I the idtimate reahty outside itself, is treated as a finite consciousness.
Regarding that Absolute Being, enlightenment itself falls out with itself in the same way as it did formerly with behef, and is divided between the views of two parties. One party proves itself to be victorious by the fact that it breaks up into two parties ; for in that fact it shows it possesses within it the principle it combats, and consequently shows it has aboUshed
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584 Phenomenology of Mind
the one-sidedness with which it formerly made it^ appearance. The interest which was divided betwee^ it and the other, now falls entirely within it, and forgers the other, because that interest finds lying in it alone the opposition on which attention is directed. At the same time, however, the opposition has been hfpd into the higher victorious element, where it is cleared up and set forth. So that the schism that arisen in one party, and seems a misfortune, demonstrates rafher its good fortune.
The pure essence itself has in it no distinction ; consequently distinction is reached by two such pure essences being put forward for consciousness to be aware of, or by a twofold consciousness of the pure reahty. The pure absolute essence is only in pure thought, or rather it is pure thought itself, and thus absolutely beyond the finite, beyond self -consciousness, and is merely the ultimate essence in a negative sense. But in this way it is just being, the negative of selfconsciousness. Being negative of self-consciousness, it is also related to self-consciousness. It is external being, which, placed in relation to self-consciousness within which distinctions and determinations fall, preserves within it the distinctions, of being tasted, seen, and so on; and the relationship is that of senseexperience and perception.
Taking the point of departure from this senseexistence, into which that negative beyond necessarily passes, but abstracting from those various ways in which consciousness is related to sense-existence, there is left pure matter as that in which consciousness weaves and moves inarticulately within itself. In dealing with this, the essential point to note is that pure matter is
merely what remains over when we abstract from seeing, feeling, tasting, etc., i.e. it is not what is seen, tasted, felt, and so on ; it is not matter that is seen, felt, or tasted, but colour, a stone, salt, and so on. Matter is reaUy a pure abstraction ; and, being so, we have here the pure essential nature of thought, or pure thought itself, as the Absolute without predicates, undetermined, having no distinctions within it.*
The one kind of enlightenment calls absolute Being that predicateless Absolute, which exists in thought beyond the actual consciousness from which this enlightenment started ; the other calls it matter. If they were distinguished as Nature and Spirit or Grod, the unconscious inner working and weaving would have nothing of the wealth of developed hfe required in order to be nature, while Spirit or Grod would have no self-distinguishing consciousness. Both, as we saw, are entirely the same notion ; the distinction lies not in the objective fact, but purely in the diversity of starting-point adopted by the two thought-constructions, and in the fact that each keeps to a special point of view in the thought-process. If they rose above that, their thoughts woidd coincide, and they would find what to the one is, as it holds, a horror, and to the other a folly, is one and the same thing. For to the one, absolute Being, in its pure thought — or directly for pure consciousness — is outside finite consciousness, is the negative beyond of finite mind. If it would reflect that in part that simple immediacy of thought is nothing else than pure being, that in part, again, what is negative for consciousness is at the same
* Cp. Schopenliauer : " The absolute without predicates is just matter."
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time related to consciousness — that in the negative judgment the copula " is " also connects and holds together the two separated factors — it would come to see that this beyond, which the nature of an external existence impUes, stands in a relation to consciousness, and that in so doing this means the same as what is called pure matter. The missing moment of the present would then be secured.
The other enhghtenment starts from sense-existence ; it then abstracts from the sensuous relation of tasting, seeing, etc., and turns sense-existence into purely inherent being (Ansich), absolute matter, something neither felt nor tasted. This being has in this way become the inner reahty of pure consciousness, the ultimately simple without predicates ; it is the pure notion,, qiia notion whose being is in itself, or it is pure thought within itself. This insight in its conscious activity does not go through the process of passing from being, which is purely being, to an opposite in thought, which is the same as mere being, or does not go from the pure positive to the opposite pure negative ; since the positive is really piu^e simply and solely through negation, while the negative qita pure is selfidentical and one within itself, and precisely on that account positive.
Or again, these two have not come to the notion found in Descartes' metaphysics that in themselves being and thought are the same; they have not arrived at the thought that being, pure being, is not a concrete actual reahty, but pure abstraction, and conversely that pure thought, self-identity or inner essence, is partly the negative of self-consciousness, and consequently is being, and partly, qua immediate simple entity, is
likewise nothing else than being. Thought is thinghood, or thinghood is thought.
The real essence is here divided asunder in such a way that, to begin with, it appertains to two specifically distinct modes of thinking. In part, the real must hold distinction in itself ; in part, just by so doing, both ways of considering it merge into one ; for then the abstract moments, of pure being and the negative, by which their distinction is expressed, are united in the object with which these modes of treatment deal.
The universal common to both is the abstraction of pure self-thinking, of pure quivering within the self. This simple motion of rotating on its own axis is boimd to resolve itself into separate moments, because it is itseK only motion by distinguishing its own moments. This distinguishing of the moments leaves the mmioved [unity] behind as the empty shell of pure being, that is no longer actual thought, has no more life within it ; for qvia distinction this process is aU the content. The process, which thus puts itself outside that unity thereby constitutes, however, the shifting change — a change that does not return into itseK — of the moments of being-in-itself, of beingfor-another, and of being-for-seK — actual reahty in the way this is object for the concrete consciousness of pure insight — constitutes Utihty.
Bad as utihty may look to behef or sentimentahty or even to the abstraction that calls itself speculation, and takes to do with the ultimate, the inherent nature; yet it is that in which pure insight finds its realisation, and itself is the object for insight, an object which insight now no longer repudiates, and which, too, it does not put down as the void or the pure beyond. For
588 Phenomenology of Mind
pure insight, as we saw, is the Uvin.g notion itself, the self-same pure personaHty, distinguishing itseK within itself in such a way that each of the distinguished elements is itseK pure notion, i.e. is eo ipso not distinct ; it is simple imdifierentiated pure self-consciousness, which is for itself as well as in itself within an immediate unity. Its inherent being, its being in itself, is therefore not fixed and permanent, but at once ceases, in its distinction, to be something distinctive. A being of that kind, however, which is immediately without support and cannot stand of itself, has no being in itself, no inherent existence, it is essentially for something else, which is the power that consumes and absorbs it. But this second moment, opposed to that first one, disappears immediately too, like the first ; or, rather, qiia being merely for some other, it is the very process of disappearing, and is definitely affirmed as being that has turned back into itself, as being for itseK. This simple being-for-seK, however, qiui seK-identity, is rather an objective being, or is thereby for an other.
This nature of pure insight in thus unfolding and making expUcit its moments, in other words insight qua object, finds expression in the useful, the profitable. What is useful is a thing, something that subsists in itseK ; this being in itseK is at the same time only a pure moment : it is in consequence absolutely for something else, but is equally for an other merely as it is in itseK : these opposite moments return into the indivisible unity of being-for-seK. While, however, the useful doubtless expresses the notion of pure insight, it is all the same not insight as such, but insight as conscious presentation, or as object for insight. It is merely the restless shifting change of those moments, of which
one is indeed being returned into itself, but merely as being for itself, i.e. as abstract moment, appearing on one side over against the others. The useful itself does not consist in the negative fact of having these moments in their opposition at the same time undivided in one and the same respect, of having them as a form of thought fer se in the way they are qua pure insight. The moment of being-for-seK is doubtless a phase of usefulness, but not in the sense that it swamps the other moments, heing-per-se and being-for-another ; if so, it would be the whole self. In dealing with the useful, pure insight thus takes as object its own pecuhar notion in the pure moments constituting its nature; it is the consciousness of this metaphysical principle, but not yet its conceptual comprehension, it has not yet itself got to the unity of being and notion. Because the useful still appears before insight in the form of an object, insight has a world, not indeed any longer a world aU by itself and self-contained, but stUl a world all the same, which it distinguishes from itself. Only, since the opposites have come forth on the summit of the notion, the next step will be for them to collide with one another and for enhghtenment to experience the fruits of their deeds.
When we look at the object reached in relation to this entire sphere of spiritual life, we foimd the actual world of culture summed up in the vanity of selfconsciousness — in independent seK-existence, whose content is drawn from the confusion characteristic of culture, and which is still the individual notion, not yet the self-conscious {fiir sich) universal notion. Eeturned into itself, however, that (individual) notion is pure insight — pure consciousness qua pure self or
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negativity, just as belief, too, is pure consciousness, qua pure thought or positivity. Behef finds in that self the moment that makes it complete; — but, perishing through being thus completed, it is in pure iosight that we now see both moments as absolute Being, which is purely thought-constituted or is a negative entity, and as matter, which is the positive entity.
This completion still lacks that actual reahty of self-consciousness, which belongs to the vain and empty type of consciousness — the world out of which thought raised itself up to itself. What is thus wanting is reached in the aspect of utihty so far as pure insight secures positive objectivity there; pure insight is thereby a concrete actual consciousness satisfied within itself. This objectivity now constitutes its world, and is become the final and true outcome of the entire previous world, ideal as weU as real. The first world of spirit is the expansive reahn of spirit's self-dispersed existence and of certainty of seK in separate individual shapes and forms : just as nature disperses its fife in an endless multipKcity of forms and shapes, without the generic principle of aU the forms being present therein. The second world contains the generic principle, and is the reahn of the ultimate inherent nature (Ansichseyns) or the essential truth, over against that individual certainty. The third world, however, that of the profitable or the useful, is the truth which is certainty of self as well. The realm of the truth of behef lacks the principle of concrete actuahty, or of certainty of self in the sense of this individual self. But, again, concrete actuahty, or certainty of self qtia this individual, lacks the ultimate inherent nature (^nsic^). In the object of pure iosight both worlds are united. The useful
is the object so far as self -consciousness sees tkrough it and individual certainty of seK finds its enjoyment (its self-existence) in it ; self-consciousness sees into it in this manner, and this insight contains the true essence of the object (which consists in being something permeable to sight, something seen through, in other words, in being for an other). This insight is thus itself true knowledge ; and self-consciousness directly finds in this attitude universal certainty of itself as weU, has its pure consciousness in this attitude, in which truth as well as iromediateness and actuahty are united. Both worlds are reconciled and heaven is transplanted to the earth below.
Ill
Absolute Freedom and Terror*
Consciousness has found its notion in the principle of utility. But that notion is partly an object still, partly, for that very reason, still a purpose, of which consciousness does not yet find itself to be immediately possessed. Utihty or profitableness is stiU a predicate of the object, not a subject, not its immediate and sole actuahty. It is the same thing that appeared before when we found that self-existence (being-for-seU) had not yet shown itself to be the substance of the remaining moments, a process by which the useful would be primarily nothing else than the self of consciousness and this latter thereby in its possession.
This resumption of the form of objectivity which characterises the useful has, however, already taken effect impHcitly, and as the outcome of this immanent internal revolution there comes to hght the actual revolution of concrete actuahty, the new mode of conscious fife — absolute freedom.
This is so because in point of fact there is here no more than an empty semblance of objectivity separating self-consciousness from actual possession. For, in part, all the worth and permanence of the various specific members of the organisation of the world of actuahty and behef have as a whole returned into this simple
* Refers primarily to the regime under the French revolutionaries.
determination, which is their ground and their indwelling spirit : in part, however, this determinate element has nothing peculiarly its own left for itself, it is instead pure metaphysic, pure notion or knowledge of selfconsciousness. That is to say, from the inherent and specific nature of the useful qua object consciousness learns that its inherent nature, its being-in-itself, is essentially a being for another ; mere being fer se, since it is self-less, is ultimately and in truth a passive entity, or something that is for another self. The object, however, is present to consciousness in this abstract form of purely immanent being, of pure being-in-itself ; for consciousness is the activity of pure insight, the separate moments of which take the pure form of notions.
Self-existence, being-for-self, however, into which being for another returns, in other words the self, is not a self of what is called object, a self all its own and different from the ego : for consciousness qiia pure insight is not an individual self, over against which the object, in the sense of having a self all its own, could stand, but the pure notion, the gazing of the self into self, the hteral and absolute seeing itself doubled. The certainty of itseK is the universal subject, and its notion knowing itself is the essential being of all reahty. If the useful was merely the shifting change of the moments, without returm'ng into its own proper unity, and was hence still an object for knowledge to deal with, then it ceases to be this now. For knowing is itself the process and movement of those abstract moments ; it is the universal seK, the self of itself as well as of the object, and, being universal, is the unity of this process, a unity that returns into itself.
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Tkis brings on the scene spirit in tlie form of absolute freedom. It is the mode of self-consciousness which clearly comprehends that ia its certainty of self Ues the essence of all the component spiritual parts of the concrete sensible as well as of the supersensible world, or, conversely, that essential being and concrete actuaUty consist in the knowledge consciousness has of itself.
It is conscious of its pure personality and with that of all spiritual reality ; and all reahty is solely spirituahty ; the world is for it absolutely its own wUl, and this win is universal will. And further, this will is not the empty thought of will, which is constituted by giving a silent assent, or an assent through a representative, a mere symbol of willing ; it is a concretely embodied universal will, the will of aU individuals as such. For will is in itseH the consciousness of personality, of every single one ; and it has to be as this true concrete actual will, as self-conscious essential being of each and every personahty, so that each single and undivided does everything, and what appears as done by the whole is at once and consciously the deed of every single individual.
This undivided substance of absolute freedom puts itself on the throne of the world, without any power being able to offer effectual resistance. For since in very truth consciousness is alone the element which furnishes spiritual beings or powers with their substance, their entire system, which is organised and maintained through division into separate spheres and distinct wholes, has collapsed into a single whole, when once the individual consciousness conceives the object as having no other nature than that of self-conscious-
ness itself, or conceives it to be absolutely the notion. What made the notion an existential object was the distinguishing it into separate and separately subsisting areas or groups ; when, however, the object becomes a notion there is nothing fixedly subsisting left in it; negativity permeates and pervades all its moments. It exists in such a way that each individual consciousness rises out of the sphere assigned to it, finds no longer its inmost nature and function iu this isolated area, but grasps itself as the notion of will, grasps all the various groupiags as the essential expression of this will, and is iu consequence only able to realise itself in a work which is a work of the whole. In this absolute freedom all social ranks or classes, which are the component spiritual factors into which the whole is differentiated, are effaced and annulled ; the individual consciousness that belonged to any such group and exercised its will and found its fulfilment there, has removed the barriers confining it ; its purpose is the universal purpose, its language universal law, its work universal achievement.
The object and the element distinguished have here lost the meaning of utility, of profitableness, which was a predicate of all real being; consciousness does not commence its process with the object as a sort of ahen element after dealing with which it then and only then returns into itself ; the object it is aware of is consciousness itself. The opposition thus consists solely in the distinction of individual and universal consciousness. But the individual itself is directly on its own view that which had merely the semblance of opposition ; it is universal consciousness and will. The ulterior beyond that lies remote from this its actual reality.
596 Phenomenology of Mind
hovers over the corpse of the vanished and departed independence of what is real or believed to be, and hovers there merely as an exhalation of stale gas, of the empty itre suprSme.
By doing away with the various distinct spiritual groups, and the restricted and confined life of individuals, as weU as both its worlds, there thus remains merely the process of the universal self-consciousness within itseK as an interaction of its content, a reciprocal interaction between its universal form and personal consciousness. The universal wiU goes into itseH, is subjectivised, and becomes individual will, to which the universal law and universal work stand opposed. But this individual consciousness is equally and immediately conscious of itseK as universal wiU; it is fully aware that its own objective content is a law given by that will, a work performed by that will ; in exercising and carrying out its activity, in creating objectivity, it is thus doing nothing individual, but executing laws and functions of the state.
This process is consequently the interaction of consciousness with itself, in which it lets nothing break away and assume the shape of a detached object standing over against it. It follows from this, that it cannot arrive at a positive accomplishment of anything, either in the way of universal operations in language or in actual reahty, either in the shape of laws and universal regulations of conscious freedom, or of deeds and works of active freedom.
The accomplished result at which this freedom, that gives itself consciousness, might manage to arrive, would consist in the fact that such freedom qtia universal substance made itself into an object and an abiding
Absottcte Freedom and Terror 59"?
existence. This objective otherness would there be the differentiation which enabled it to divide itself iato stable spiritual groups and into separate fragments or members. These wholes or spheres would partly be the thought-constituted factors of a power that is difierentiated into legislative, judicial and executive ; but partly they would be the substantial elements we found in the real world of spiritual culture; and, since the content of universal action would be more closely taken note of, they would be the particidar areas or spheres of labour, which are further distinguished as specific social ranks or classes. Universal freedom, which would have differentiated itself in this manner into its various parts, and by the very fact of doing so would have made itself an existing substance, woidd thereby be free from particular individuaUties, and could apportion the plurality of individuals to its several parts.
The activity and being of personahty would, however, find itself by this process confined to a branch of the whole, to one kind of action and existence ; when placed in the element of existence, personahty would bear the meaniag of a determinate personahty ; it would cease to be in reality universal self-consciousness. Neither by the idea of submission to self-imposed laws, addressed in part to universal self-consciousness, nor by its being represented when legislation and universal action take place, does self-consciousness here let itself be mistaken about the actual truth, that itself lays down the law and itself accomplishes a universal and not a particular task. For in the case where the self is merely represented and ideally presented (vorgestellt), there it is not actual : where it is by proxy, it is not.*
* The essential principle of anarchy.
598 Phenomenology of Mind
Just as the individual seK-consciousness does not find itself in this universal work of absolute freedom qua existing substance, as httle does it find itself in the deeds proper and specific individual acts of will performed by this substance. For the universal to pass into a deed, it must gather itself into the single imity of individuality, and put an individual consciousness in the forefront ; for universal will is an actual concrete will only in a seK that is single and one. Thereby, however, all other individuals are excluded from the entirety of this deed, and have only a restricted share in it, so that the deed would not be a deed of real universal self-consciousness.
Universal freedom can thus produce neither a positive achievement nor a deed ; there is left for it only negative action ; it is merely the rage and fury of disappearance and destruction.
But the highest reahty of aU and the reahty most of all opposed to absolute freedom, or rather the sole object it is yet to become aware of, is the freedom and singleness of actual self-consciousness itself. For that universality which does not let itseK attain the reahty of organic difierentiation, and whose purpose is to maintain itself in unbroken continuity, distinguishes itself within itself all the while, because it is process or consciousness in general. Moreover on account of its own pecuHar abstraction, it divides itself into extremes equally abstract, into the cold unbending bare imiversahty, and the hard discrete absolute rigidity and stubborn atomic singleness of actual self-consciousness. Now that it is done with exterminating and destroying express organisation, and subsists on its own behalf, this is its sole object, an object that has no other content left, no other possession, existence and external exten-
sion, but is merely this knowledge of itself as absolutely I\ure and detached individual self. The point at which tie object can be laid hold of and understood is solely it&,abstract existence in general.
^he relation, then, of these two, siace they exist for then^elves indivisibly and absolutely and thus cannot arraage for a common part to act as a means for connecting them, is pure negation entirely devoid of mediation, |bhe negation, moreover, of theiudividual as a factor existing within the universal. The sole and only work and deed accomplished by universal freedom is therefore death— a death that achieves nothing, embraces nothing withia its grasp ; for what is negated is the unachieved, unful^ed punctual entity of the absolutely free self. It is thus the most cold-blooded mean and meaningless death 1 of all, with no more significance than cleaving a head of cabbage or swallowing a draught of water.
In this single expressionless syllable consists the wisdom of the government, the intelligence of the general will, when carrying out and executing its plans. The government is itself nothing but the self-estabUshed focus, the individual embodiment of the general will. Government, a power to will and perform proceeding from a single centre, wiUs and performs at the same time a determinate order and action. In doing so it, on the one hand, excludes other individuals from a share in its deed, and, on the other, thereby constitutes itself a form of government which is a specifically determinate wiU and eo ipso opposed to the universal will. By no manner of means, therefore, can it put itself forward as anything but a faction. The victorious faction only is called the government ; and just in that it is a faction lies the direct necessity of its overthrow ;
600 Phenomenology of Mind
and its being government makes it, conversely, into ^ faction and hence guilty. When the universal will holds to this concrete action of the government and holds this to be a crime which the government has committed aga&ist the universal wiU, then the government on its sid^ has nothing tangible and external left whereby to establish and show the guilt of the will opposing itself to it ; for what thus stands opposed to it as concrete actual umversal will is merely unreal abstract will, bare irit^tion. Being suspected, therefore, takes the place, or h^s the significance and effect, of being guilty ; and the external reaction against this reahty that hes in bare inward intention, consists in the fatuous barren destruction of this particvdar existent self, in whose case tjiere is nothing else to take away but its mere existence!
In this its characteristically pecuhar performance, absolute freedom becomes objective to itseH, and self-consciousness finds out what, this freedom is. In itself it is just this abstract seLf-consciousness, which destroys aU distinction and all fixedness of distinction within itself. It is object to itseK in this shape ; the terror of death is the direct apprehension (Anschauung) of this its negative nature. This its reahty, however, finds absolute free self-consciousness quite different from what its own notion of itself . was, viz. that the universal will is merely the positive substance of personahty, and that this latter knows itself in it only positively, knows itself preserved there. Rather for this self -consciousness, which qua pure insight completely separates its positive and negative nature — separates the unpredicated Absolute qtia pure thought and qtta pure matter — the absolute tran^ition from the one to the other is found here present within
its reality. The universal will, qua absolutely positive concrete self-consciousness — because it is this self-conscious actuahty raised to the level of pure thought or abstract matter — turns round into the negative entity, and shows itself at the same time to be what cancels and does away with self -thinking or self - consciousness.
Absolute freedom qua pure self-identity of universal will thus carries with it negation; but in doing so contains distinction in general, and develops this again as concrete actual difference. For pure negativity finds in the self-identical imiversal will the element of subsistence, or the substance in which its moments get their realisation ; it has the matter which it can turn into the specific nature of the substance ; and in so far as this substance has manifested itself to be the negative element for the individual consciousness, the organisation of the spiritual groups or " masses " of the substance, to which the plurality of conscious individuals is assigned, thus takes shape and form once more. These individuals, who felt the fear of death, their absolute lord and master, submit to negation and distinction once more, arrange themselves into groups, and return to a restricted and apportioned task, but thereby to their substantial reahty.
Out of this tumult spirit would be thrown back upon its starting-point, the ethical world and the real world of spiritual culture, which would thus have been merely refreshed and rejuvenated by the fear of the lord, that has again entered their hearts. Spirit would have anew to traverse and continually repeat this cycle of necessity, if only complete interpenetration of self-consciousness and the substance were
602 Phenomenology of Mind
the final resiilt. In such an interpenetration self-consciousness might seek to experience the force of its universal nature operating negatively upon it, would try to know and find itself not as this particular selfconsciousness but only as universal, and hence, too, would be able to endure the objective reaUty of universal spirit, a reality, excluding self-consciousness qva particular.
But this is not the form the final result assumes. For va. absolute freedom there was no reciprocal interaction either between an external world and consciousness, which is absorbed va. manifold existence or sets itself determinate purposes and ideas, or between consciousness and an external objective world, be it a world of reality or of thought. What that freedom contained was the world absolutely in the form of consciousness, as a universal wiU, and, along with that, self-consciousness gathered out of all the dispersion and manifoldness of existence or all the manifold ends and judgments of mind, and concentrated into the bare and simple self. The form of culture, which it attains ia iuteraction with that essential nature, is, therefore, the grandest and the last, is that of seeing its pure and simple reality immediately disappear and pass away into empty nothingness.* In the sphere of culture itself it does not get the length of viewing its negation or alienation in this form of pure abstraction ; its negation is negation with a filling and a content — either honour and wealth, which it gains in the place of the self that it has alienated from itseK ; or the language of esprit and insight, which the distraught consciousness acquires ; or, again, the negation is the heaven of belief or the element
* Kant's " tMng in itself" t
of utility belongiQg to the stage of enlightenment. AU these determinate elements disappear with the disaster and ruin that overtake the self in the state of absolute freedom ; * its negation is meaningless death, sheer horror of the negative which has nothing positive in it, nothing that gives a fiUing.
At the same time, however, this negation in its actual manifestation is not something ahen and external. It is neither that universal background of necessity in which the moral world is swamped, nor the particular accident of private possession, the whims and himaours of the owner, on which the distraught consciousness finds itself dependent ; it is universal will, which in this its last abstraction has nothing positive, and hence can give nothing in return for the sacrifice. But just on that account this will is in unmediated oneness with self-consciousness, it is the pure positive because it is the pure negative ; and that meaningless death, the insubstantial, vacuous negativity of self, in its inner constitutive principle, turns round into absolute positivity. For consciousness, the immediate imity of itself with universal wiU, its demand to see and find itseK as a determinate particular focus in the universal will, is changed and converted into the absolutely opposite experience. What it loses there, is abstract being, the immediate existence of that insubstantial focus ; and this vanished immediacy is the universal will as such which it now.-knows itself to be, so far as it is superseded and cancelled immediacy, so far as it is pure knowledge or pure wiU. By this means it knows that wiU to be itself, and knows itself to be essential reahty; but not as the immediate essence, not will as revolutionary
* In the sense of abstract autonomy.
604 ' Phenomenology of Mind
government or anarchy straggling to establish an anarchical constitution, nor itself as a centre of this faction or the opposite : the universal wiU is its pure knowing and willing, and it is universal wiU qua this pure knowledge and voUtion. It does not lose itseK there, for pure knowledge and voKtion is it qva atomic point of consciousness. It is thus the interaction of pure knowledge with itself ; pure knowledge qua essential reality is universal wiU, while this essence is simply and solely pure knowledge. Self-consciousness is thus pure knowledge of essential reaKty in the sense of pure knowledge. Furthermore, qua particular self it is merely the form of the subject or concrete real action, a form which by it is known as form. In the same way objective reality, " being," is for it absolutely self-less form ; for that objective' reahty would be what is not known : this knowledge, however, knows knowledge to be the essential fact.
Absolute freedom has thus squared and balanced the opposition of universal and particular wiU with its own nature. The seH-ahenated type of mind, driven to the acme of its opposition, where pure vohtion and the purely voKtional agent are stUl kept distinct, reduces that opposition to a transparent form, and therein finds itself.
Just as the realm of the real and actual world passes over into that of beHef and insight, absolute freedom leaves its self-destructive sphere of reaKty, and passes over into another land of self-conscious spirit, where in this unreaKty freedom is taken to be and is accepted as the truth. In the thought of this truth spirit refreshes and revives itself (so far as spirit is thought and remains so), and knows this being which self-
consciousness involves [viz. thought] to be the complete and entire essence of everything. The new form and mode of experience that now arises is that of the Moral Life of Spirit.
c
Spirit in the Condition of being Certain of Itself :
Morality
[The following section deals with the final and highest stage in the life of finite spiritual experience as realised in the concrete form of a historical society. Here the substance of the social order is the real content of the seK-conscious individual : that substance has become subjectified ; we have therefore a self-contained spiritual subject. The discordance involved in the sphere of culture and enlightenment is overcome by the self knowing and realising itseK as a completely universal self-determining free will, its world within itself, and its self its own world. Each reflects the whole (the totality of social life) in itself so perfectly that what it does is transparently the doing of the whole as much as its own doing. Such a sphere of spiritual existence is Morality, the all-sufficient spiritual order of the finite spirit as an individual The meaning assigned to " morality " here is that expressed by Kant when he says that morality is "the relation of actions to the autonomy of the will, i.e. to possible universal legislation through maxims of the will" In other words, all the universality constituting the interrelations of finite spirits in a society are epitomised in the soul of the acting individual, who can thus quite legitimately, loot upon itself as the self -regulating source of all universal conditions of action.
It is inevitable that such a concrete mode of experience should have various aspects and should pass through various stages in the process of fully realising its nature. The individual may lay exclusive stress on the self-completeness which he possesses through being the source and origin of his own laws. His seM-legislative function, just because it carries with it the sense of universality, may appear so supremely important that all the actual detaQ of his life comes to be treated as external, indifferent, and contingent. This detail no doubt is essential to give body and substance to his spiritual individuality, but the universality of his will so far transcends each and every detail of content as to seem by itseK the sole and all-sufficient reality of his being. The content of his life only enters into consideration as an element to be regulated and made to conform to the universal : the relation so constituted between content and universal is
found in the consciousness of Duty. Since the content is thus subordinate, though absolutely essential to give even meaning to the idea and the " fulfilment " of duty, and since the universal is the supremely important fact, not merely is duty to be fulfilled for duty's sake, but the duty in question is pure duty. The " good will " is the purely universal wUl, and is the only will in the world from this point of view.
In the first section (a) Hegel analyses this phase of the moral life.
The historical material the writer has in mind is a moral attitude which came into prominence at the time of the Romantic movement towards the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century. It found its philosophical expression in the moral theories of Kant and Fichte ; and Lessing may be taken as a typical representative in literature of the same attitude.]
Spirit in the Condition of being Certain of Itself :
Morality
The etMcal order of the community found its consummation and its truth in the type of spirit existing in mere solitude and separation within it — the individual self. This legal person, however, has its substance and its fulfilment outside that ethical order. The process of the world of culture and beUef does away with this abstraction of a mere person ; and by the completion of the process of estrangement, by reaching the extremity of abstraction, the self of spirit finds the substance become first the universal will, and finally its own possession. Here, then, knowledge seems at last to have become entirely at one with the truth at which it aims ; for its truth is this knowledge itself. All opposition between the two sides has vanished, and that, too, not for us (who are tracing the process), not merely implicitly, but actually for self-consciousness itself. That is to say, knowledge has itself got the mastery over the opposition which consciousness had to face. This rests on the opposition between certainty of self and the object. Now, however, the object for it is the certainty of seK, knowledge : just as the certainty of itself as such has no longer ends of its own, is no longer conditioned and determinate, but is pure knowledge.
Self-consciousness thus now takes the knowledge of itself to be the substance itself. This substance is, for it, at once immediate and absolutely mediated in one
indivisible unity. It is immediate — just ia the way the " ethical " consciousness knows and itself does its duties, and is bound to the substance as to its own nature : but it is not character, just as that ethical consciousness, which iu virtue of its immediacy is a determinate type of spirit, belongs merely to one of the essential features of ethical hfe, and has the pecuharity of not being conscious exphcit knowledge. It is, again, absolute mediation, as involving the conscious processes of culture and beUef ; for it is essentially the movement of the hfe of self to transcend the abstract form of immediate existence, and become consciously universal — and yet to do so neither by simply estranging and rending itself as well as reaUty, nor by fleeing from it. Rather, it is directly and immediately present in its very substance ; for this substance is its knowledge, it is the pure certainty of self become transparently visible. And just this very immediacy, which constitutes its actual reaUty, is the entire actuahty; for the immediate is being, and qua pure immediacy, immediacy made transparent by thoroughgoing negation, this immediacy is pure being, is being in general, is aU being.
Absolute essential Being is, therefore, not exhausted by the characteristic of being the simple essence of thought; it is all actuality, and this actuaUty exists merely as knowledge. What consciousness did not know would have no sense and can be no power in its life. Into its self-conscious knowing wiU, all objectivity, the whole world, has withdrawn. It is absolutely free in that it knows its freedom ; and just this very knowledge of its freedom is its substance, its pur ose, its sole and only content.
The Moral View of the World
Self-consciousness knows and accepts duty as the Absolute. It is bound by that alone, and this substance is its own conscious life pure and simple ; duty cannot, for it, take on the form of something ahen and external. When thus shut up and confined within itself, however, moral self-consciousness is not yet affirmed and looked at as conscdousness* The object is immediate knowledge, and, being thus permeated purely by the self, is not object. But, this knowledge being essentially mediation and negativity, there is imphed in its very conception relation to some otherness ; and thus it is consciousness. This other, because duty constitutes its sole essential purpose and objective content, is a reahty completely devoid of significance for consciousness. But again because this consciousness is so entirely confined within itself, it takes up towards this otherness a perfectly free and detached attitude ; and the existence of this other is, therefore, an existence completely set free from self-consciousness, and in like manner relating itself merely to itself. The freer self-consciousness becomes, the freer also is the negative object of its consciousness. The object is thus a complete world within itself, with an individuality of
* i.e. there is not the opposition of an object to subject which consciousness requires.
6io
its own, an independent whole of laws peculiar to itself, as well as an independent procedure and an unfettered active realisation of those laws. It is altogether a nature, a nature whose laws and also whose action belong to itself as a being which is not disturbed about the moral seH-consciousness, just as the latter is not troubled about it.
Starting with a specific character of this sort, there is formed and estabhshed a moral outlook or point of view which consists in a process of relatiag the imphcit aspect of morahty {moralisches Ansichseyn) and the expUcit aspect {moralisches Fiirsichseyn). This relation presupposes both thorough reciprocal indifierence and specific independence as between nature and moral purposes and activity ; and also, on the other side, a conscious sense of duty as the sole essential fact, and of nature as entirely devoid of independence and essential significance of its own. The poiat of view or attitude of the moral life consists in the development of these moments, which are involved in this relation of such entirely antithetic and contradictory presuppositions.
To begin with, then, the moral consciousness in general is presupposed. It takes duty to be the essential reality : itself is actual and active, and in its actuahty and action fulfils duty. But this moral consciousness, at the same time, finds before it the assumed freedom of nature : it learns by experience that nature is not concerned about giving consciousness a sense of the unity of its reahty with that of nature, and hence discovers that nature may let it become happy, but perhaps also may not. The non-moral consciousness on the other hand finds, by chance perhaps, its reahsa-
612 Phenomenology of Mind
tion where the moral consciousness sees merely an occasion for acting, but does not see itself enjoying through its action the success of performance and the satisfaction of achievement. It therefore finds reason for bewailing a situation where there is no correspondence between itself and existence, and lamenting the injustice which confines it to having its object merely in the form of pure duty but refuses to let it see this object and itself actually realised.
The moral consciousness cannot renounce happiness and drop this element out of its absolute purpose. The purpose, which is expressed as duty pure and simple, essentially imphes retention of individual selfconsciousness and maintenance of its claims. Individual conviction and knowledge thereof constituted a fundamental element in moraHty. This element in the objectified purpose, in duty fulfilled, is the particular consciousness seeing itseK as actually realised. In other words, this moment is that of enjoyment, which thus hes in the very principle of morahty, not indeed of morahty in the sense of immediate feeling and sentiment, but in the principle of the actualisation of morahty. Owing to this, however, enjoyment is also involved in moral sentiment, for morahty seeks, not to remain sentiment as opposed to action, but to act or reahse itself. Thus the purpose, expressed as a whole along with the consciousness of its elements or moments, is that duty fulfilled shaU be both a purely moral act and a realised individuahty, and that nature, the aspect of particularity in contrast with abstract purpose, ■ shall be one with this purpose.
While experience must necessarily bring to hght the disharmony between the two aspects, seeing that nature
is detached and apart, nevertheless duty is alone the essential fact and nature by contrast is devoid of selfhood. That purpose in its entirety, which the harmony of the two constitutes, contains within it actuaUty itself. It is, at the same time, the thought of actuahty. The harmony of morahty and nature, or — seeing that nature is taken account of merely so far as consciousness finds out nature's unity with it — the harmony of morahty and happiness, is thought of as necessarily existing ; it is -postulated. For to postulate or demand means that something is thought to be which is not yet actual, — a necessity affecting, not the conception qua conception, but existence. But the requirement or necessity is at the same time essentially a relation through the conception. The existence demanded thus belongs, not to something present in the . mind of some chance individual consciousness, but is imphed in the very notion of morahty itself, whose true content is the unity of pure with individual consciousness. It falls to the individual consciousness to see that this unity is, for it, an actuaUty : — ^happiness as regards the content of the purpose, and existence in general as regards its form. The existence thus demanded — the miity of both — is therefore not a wish, nor, looked at qua purpose, is it of such a kind as to be stiU uncertain of attainment ; the purpose is rather a demand of reason, or an immediate certainty and presupposition of reason.
The first experience above referred to and this postulate are not the only experience and postulate ; a whole rormd of postulates comes to hght. For nature is not merely this completely detached external mode in which, as a bare pure object, consciousness has to realise its purpose. Consciousness is -per se essentially
614 Phenomenology of Mind
sometliing for which this other detached reality exists, i.e. it is itsdf something contiagent and natural. This nature, which is properly its own, is sensibility, which, taking the form of volition, iu the shape of Impulses and Inchnations, has by itself a determinate essential being of its own, i.e. has specific particiilar purposes, and thus is opposed to abstract will with its pure purpose. In contrast with this opposition, however, pure consciousness rather takes the relation of sensibility to it, the absolute unity of sensibihty with it, to be the essential fact. Both of these, pure thought and sensibility, are essentially and inherently one consciousness, and pure thought is just that for which and in which this pure unity exists ; but for it qua consciousness the opposition between itself and its impulses holds. In this conflict between reason and sensibility, the essential thing for reason is that the conflict should be resolved, and that the unity of both should come out as a result : not the original unity which consisted in both the opposites being in one individual, but a unity which arises out of the Icnawn opposition of the two. So attained, such a unity is then the actual morahty ; for in it is contained the opposition through which the self is a consciousness, or first becomes concrete and in actual fact self, and at the same time universal. In other words, we find there expressed that process of mediation which, as we see, is essential to morality.
Since, of the two factors in opposition, sensibility is otherness out and out, is the negative, while, on the other hand, pure thought of duty is the ultimate essence which cannot possibly be surrendered in any respect, it seems as if the unity produced can be brought about only by doing away with sensibility. But since
sensibility is itself a moment of this process of producing the unity, is the aspect of actuahty, we have, in the first instance, to be content to express the unity in tkis form — sensibility should be in conformity with morality.
This unity is likewise a postulated existence ; it is not there as a fact ; for what is there is consciousness, or the opposiiion of sensibiHty and pure consciousness. All the pame, the unity is not a something per se like the first postulate, in which free external nature constitutes an aspect and the harmony of nature with moral consciousness in consequence falls outside the latter. Rather, nature is here that which lies within consciousness ; and we have here to deal with morahty (MoraUtdt) as such, with a harmony which is the active self's very own. Consciousness has, therefore, of itself to bring about this harmonious unity, and " to be always making progress ia moraUty." The completion of this result, however, is pushed away into the remote infinite, because if it actually entered the hfe of consciousness as an actual fact, the moral consciousness would be done away with. For morahty is only moral consciousness qua negative force; sensibiHty has merely a negative significance for the consciousness of pure duty, it is something merely " not in conformity with " duty. By attaining that harmony, however, morality qtia consciousness, i.e. its actuahty, passes away, just as in the moral consciousness or actuality its harmony vanishes. The completion is, therefore, not to be reached as an actual fact ; it is to be thought of merely as an absolute task or problem, i.e. one which remains a problem pure and simple. Nevertheless, its content has to be thought as some-
616 -Phenomenology of Mind
thing which unquestionably has to be, and must not' remain a problem : whether we imagine the moral consciousness quite cancelled in the attainment of this goal, or not. Which of these exactly is the case, x;annot very well be clearly distinguished in the din/ distance of infinitude, to which the attainment of tie end has to be postponed, just because we cannot/decide the point. We shall be, strictly speaking, bfiund to say that a definite idea on the matter ougHt to be of no interest and ought not to be sought foy, because this leads to contradictions — the contradictiorj' in speaking of an undertaking that at once ought toAremain an undertaking and yet ought to be carried oi^t, and the contradiction in speaking of a morahty w^ch is not consciousness, i.e. which is no longer actual. By adopting the view, however, that morality when completed woidd contain a contradiction, the sacredness of moral truth would be seriously affected, and an unconditional duty would appear something unreal.
The first postulate was the harmony of morahty and objective nature — the final purpose of the world : the other was the harmony of morahty and will in its sensuous form, in the form of impulse, etc. — the final purpose of self-consciousness as such. The former is the harmony in the form of impUcit immanent existence ; the latter, the harmony in the form of exphcit self-existence. That, however, which connects these two extreme final purposes which are thought, and operates as their mediating ground, is the process of concrete action itself. They are harmonies whose moments in their abstract distinctiveness from each other have not yet become definitely objective : this takes place in concrete actuahty, in which the aspects
appear in consciousness proper, each as the other of the other. The postulates arising by this means contain harmonies which are now completely reahsed and objective, whereas formerly they were merely separated into imphcit and expKcit, immanent and self-existent.
The moral consciousness, qua bare and simple knowledge and willing of pure duty, is brought, by the process of acting upon an object opposed to that abstract simpUcity, into relation with the manifold actuahty which various cases present, and thereby assumes a moral attitude varied and manifold iu character. Hence arise, on the side of content, the plurahty of laws generally, and, on the side of form, the contradictory powers of intelligent knowing consciousness and of a being devoid of consciousness.
To begin with, as regards the plurahty of duties, it is merely the aspect of pure or bare duty in them which in general appeals to the moral consciousness as being of significance : the many duties qua many are determinate and, therefore, are not, as such, anything sacred for the moral consciousness. At the same time, however, being necessary, in virtue of the very nature of action which imphcates a manifold actuahty, and hence manifold types of moral attitude, those many duties must be looked on as having a substantial existence and value. Furthermore, since they can only exist in a moral consciousness, they exist at the same time in another consciousness than that for which only pure duty quu bare duty is sacred and self-sufficient.
It is thus postulated that there is another consciousness which renders them sacred, or which knows them as duties and wills them so. The first maintains pure duty indifierent towards aU specific content, and duty
618 Phenomenology of Mind
consists merely in being thus indifferent towards it. The other, however, contains the equally essential relation to the process of action, and the necessity, therefore, of determinate content : since duties for this other mean determinate duties, the content is thus, for it, just as essential as the form in virtue of which the content is a duty at all. This consciousness is, consequently, such that in it the universal and the particular are, through and through, one ; its essential principle is thus the same as that of the harmony of morahty and happiness. For this opposition between morahty and happiness expresses in like manner the separation of the self-identical moral consciousness from that actuality which, qua manifold existence, opposes and conflicts with the simple nature of duty. While, however, the first postulate expresses merely the objective existential harmony between morality and nature, because nature is therein the negative of self-consciousness, is the aspect of existence, this inherent harmony, on the other hand, is now ajESrmed essentially as a mode of consciousness. For existence now appears as the content of duty, as that in the determinate duty which gives it specific determinateness. The uumanent harmony is thus the unity of elements which, qva simple ultimate elements, are essentially thought-created, and hence cannot exist except in a consciousness. This latter becomes now a master and ruler of the world, who brings about the harmony of morality and happiness, and at the same time sanctifies duties in their multiplicity. To sanctify these duties means this much, that the consciousness of pure duty cannot straightway and directly accept the determinate or specific duty as sacred ; but because a specific duty,
owing to the natiire of concrete action which is something specific and definite, is all the same necessary, its necessity falls outside that consciousness and holds inside another consciousness, which thus mediates or connects determinate and pure duty, and is the reason why that specific duty also has vahdity.
In the concrete act, however, consciousness proceeds to work as this particular self, as completely individual : it directs its activity on actual reahty as such, and takes this as its purpose, for it wants to perform something definite. " Duty in general " thus falls outside it and within another being, which is the consciousness and sacred lawgiver of pure duty. The consciousness which acts, just because it acts, accepts the other consciousness, that of bare duty, and admits its vahdity immediately ; this pure duty is thus a content of another consciousness, and is only indirectly or in a mediate way sacred for the active consciousness, viz. in virtue of this other consciousness.
Because it is established in this manner that the vahdity, the bindingness, of duty as something whoUy and absolutely sacred, falls outside the actual consciousness, this latter thereby stands altogether on one side as the incomplete moral consciousness. Just as, in regard to its knowledge, it is aware of itself as that whose knowledge and conviction are incomplete and contingent ; in the same way, as regards its willing, it feels itself to be that whose purposes are affected with sensibihty. On account of its " unworthiness," therefore, it cannot look on happiness as something necessary, but as a something contingent, and can only expect happiness as the result of " grace."
But though its actuality is incomplete, duty is still, so
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far as its pure will and knowledge are concerned, held to be the essential truth. In principle, therefore, so far as the notion is opposed to actual reahty, in other words, in thought, it is perfect. The absolute truth [duty] is, however, just this object of thought, and is something postulated beyond the actual. It is therefore the thought in which the morally imperfect knowledge and will are held to be perfect, and — since it takes this imperfection to have full weight — lq which, consequently, happiness is meted out according to " worthiness," i.e. according to the " merit " ascribed.
This completes the meaning of the moral attitude. For in the conception of moral self-consciousness the two aspects, pure duty and actual reahty, are aflBrmed of a single unity, and thereby the one, like the other, is put forward, not as something self-complete, but as a moment, or as cancelled and transcended. This becomes consciously expUcit in the last phase of the moral attitude or point of view. Consciousness, we there saw, places pure duty in another form of being than its own consciousness, i.e. it regards pure duty partly as something ideally presented, partly as what does not by itself hold good — iudeed, the non-moral is rather what is held to be perfect. In the same way it affirms itself to be that whose actuaUty, not being in conformity with duty, is transcended, and, qua transcended, or in the presented idea of what is absolute [pure duty], no longer contradicts morahty.
For the moral consciousness itseK, however, its moral attitude does not mean that consciousness therein develops its own proper notion and makes this its object. It has no consciousness of this opposition either as regards the form or the content thereof ; the elements
composing this opposition it does not relate and compare with one another, but goes forward on its own course of development, without being the connecting priticiple of those moments. For it is only aware of the essence pure and simple, i.e. the object so far as this is duty, so far as this is an abstract object of its pure consciousness qua pxire knowledge — ia other words, it is only aware of this object as itself. Its procedure is thus merely that of thinking, not conceiving, is by way of thoughts not notions. Consequently it does not yet find the object of its actual consciousness transparently clear to itself ; it is not the absolute notion, which alone grasps otherness as such, its absolute opposite, as its very self. Its own reaUty, as well as aU objective reahty, no doubt is held to be something unessential ; but its freedom is that of pure thought, in opposition to which, therefore, nature has likewise arisen as something equally free. Because both are found in like manner within it — both the freedom which belongs to [external] being and the inclusion of this existence within consciousness— its object comes to be an existing object, which is at the same time merely a thought-product. In the last phase of its attitude or point of view, the content is essentially so constituted that its being has the character of something presented, an idea, and this imion of being and thinking is expressed as what in fact 'it is, viz. — Presentation.
When we look at the moral view of the world in such a way that this objective result is nothing else than the very principle or notion of moral self-consciousness which it makes objective to itself, there arises through this consciousness concerning the form of its origin another mode of exhibiting this view of the world.
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The first stage, which forms the starting point, is the actual moral self-consciousness, or is the fact that there is such a self-consciousness at all. For the notion establishes moral self -consciousness m. the form that, for it, all reaUty in general has essential being only so far as such reaUty is in conformity with duty; and that notion establishes this essential element as knowledge, i.e. in immediate unity with the actual self. This unity is thus itself actual, is a moral actual consciousness. The latter, now, qua consciousness, presents its content to itself as an object, viz. as the final purpose of the world, as the harmony of morality with all reahty. Since, however, it represents this unity as object and is not yet the complete notion, which has the object as such in its grasp, this imity is taken to be something negative of or opposed to self-consciousness, i.e. the unity falls outside it, as something beyond its actual reahty, but at the same time of such a nature as to be also existent, though merely thought of.
This self-consciousness, which, qua self-consciousness, is something other than the object, thus finds itself left with the want of harmony between the conswHOusness of duty and actual reahty, a reahty, too, which is its own. The proposition consequently now runs thus: "there is no morally complete actual self-consciousness"; and, since what is moral only is in the long run so far as it is complete, — for duty is the pure unadulterated ultimate element (Ansich), and morahty consists merely in conformity to this pure principle — the second proposition runs : " there is no morally actual existence at all."
Since, however, in the third place, it is a self, it is inherently the unity of duty and actual reahty. This
unity thus becomes its object, as completed morality — but as something beyond its actual reaUty, and yet a " beyond" which still ought to be real.
In this final stage and last expression of the synthetic unity of the two first propositions, the self-conscious reahty, as well as duty, is only aflfirmed as a transcended or superseded moment. For neither of them is alone, neither is isolated ; on the contrary, these factors, whose essential characteristic hes in being free from one another, are thus each in that unity no longer free from the other ; each is transcended. Hence, as regards content, they become, as such, object, each of them holds good for the other; and, as regards form, they become such that this interchange on their part is, at the same time, merely in idea, is merely ideally presented. Or, again, the -actually non-moral, because it is, at the same time, pure thought and elevated above its own actual reahty, is in idea still moral, and is taken to be entirely sufl&cing. In this way the first proposition, that there is a moral self-consciousness, is reinstated, but bound up with the second that there is none ; that is to say, there is one, but merely in idea. In other words, there is indeed none, but it is all the same allowed by some other consciousness to pass for one.
Dissemblance
[The first stage fails as it stands to do complete justice to the full meaning of morality. Both elements in the spiritually complete individual are essential, and each has to be recognised. The universal must be objectified in nature ("external nature" and "sensibility"), and nature must be subjectivised in spirit. Another condition or stage of the moral consciousness, therefore, is found where the equality of value of the elements of the moreil consciousness is admitted, without these elements being completely fused into a single and total attitude. The universal is realised in many ways and forms, and each is accepted in turn as the true moral reality. The mind passes from one to the other ; when one is accepted the other is set aside. The moral consciousness tries, so to say, to hide from itself the endless diversity of its appearances, simply because it clings tenaciously to the idea that the inherent self-completeness of itself is a unity ^er se which can only admit diversity on sufferance. Formerly it eliminated all diversity by eliminating the source of diversity — nature. Here it is forced to admit diversity, and yet cannot give up the claim to be an abstract single unity independent of difi'erence. Thus its condition here is a mixture of self-realisation and self-sophistication — a condition which Hegel characterises as "Dissemblance," and which borders upon and may pass into "Hypocrisy." Hegel regards this attitude as the inevitable outcome of the preceding.]
Dissemblance *
In the moral attitude of experience we see, on one side, consciousness itself produce its object in a conscious way. We find that neither does it pick up the object as something external, nor does the object come before it in an unconscious manner. Rather, consciousness throughout proceeds on a certain basis, and from this estabhshes the objective reahty. It thus knows this objective element to be itself, for it is aware of itself as the active agent producing this object. It seems, in consequence, to attain here its peace and satisfaction, for this can only be found where it does not need to go any more beyond its object, because this object no longer goes beyond it. On the other side, however, it really puts the object away outside itself, as something beyond itself. But this latter self-contained entity is at the same time put there as something that is not detached from self-consciousness, but really there on behalf of and by means of it.
The moral attitude is, therefore, in fact nothing else than the developed expression of this ftmdamental contradiction in its various aspects. It is — ^to use a Kantian phrase which is here most appropriate — a "perfect
* Verstellung : It is not possible to bring out exactly by an English word the verbal play involved in Hegel's interpretation of the state of mind here discussed. Hegel has, in the course of his analysis, used the mean-, ing implied in the general term " stellen" to explain by contrast the specific nuance of the purely moral attitude conveyed by the term verstellen.
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nest " of inconsistencies and contradictions.* Consciousness, in developing tMs situation, proceeds by fixing definitely «ne moment, passing thence immediately over to anothet and doing away with the first. But, in the way it has now set up this second moment, it also " shifts " (verstelU) this again, and really makes the opposite the essential element. At the same time, it is conscious of its contradiction and of this displacement, for it passes from one moment, immediately in its relation to this very moment, right over to the opposite. Because a moment has for it no reality at all, it affirms that very moment as real : or, what comes to the same thing, in order to assert one moment as 'per se existent, it asserts the opposite as the per se existent. It thereby confesses that, as a matter of fact, it is in earnest about neither of them. The various moments of this fraudulent process we must look at more closely.
Let us allow the assumption, that there is an actual moral consciousness, to rest on its own basis in the first instance, because the assumption is not directly made with reference to something preceding ; and let us turn to the harnaony of morahty and nature — the first postulate. It is to be immanent, not expKcitly for actual conscious life, not really present ; the present is rather simply the contradiction between the two. In the present, moraUty is taken to be something at hand, and actual reality to be so situated or " placed " that it is not in harmony with morality. The concrete moral consciousness, however, is active, consists in acting ; that is what constitutes the actuality of its morahty. In the very process of acting,
* An expression used by Kant of the " cosmological proof/'
however, that " place " or semblance is immediately " displaced," is dissembled ; for action is nothing else than the actuahsation of the inner moral purpose, nothing but the production of an actuahty constituted and determined by purpose ; in other words, the production of the harmony of moral purpose and reahty itself. At the same time the performance of the action is a conscious fact, it is the " presence " of this unity of reahty and purpose ; and because in the completed act consciousness reahses itself as a given particular consciousness, or sees existence return into itself qua particular — and in this consists the nature of enjoyment — there is, eo ipso, also contained in the reahsation of moral purpose that form of its realisation which is called enjoyment and happiness.
Action thus,, as a fact, fulfils directly what it was asserted could not take place at all, fulfils what was to be merely a postulate, was to he merely " beyond." Consciousness, therefore, expresses through its deed that it is not in earnest in making the postulate, since the meaning of acting is really that it makes a present fact of what was not to be in the present. And, since the harmony is postulated for the sake of the action — for what is to become actual through action must be imphcit, otherwise the actuahty would not be possible — the connexion of action with the postulate is so constituted that, for the sake of the action, i.e. for the sahe of the actual harmony of purpose and reality, this harmony is put forward as not actual, as far away, as " beyond."
Since action does take place, the want of adaptation between purpose and reahty is thus in general not taken seriously. Action itself, on the other hand, does seem
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to be taken seriously. But, as a matter of fact, the actual deed done is the action of a particular consciousness, and so is itself merely something particular, and the result contingent. The end of reason, however, being the aU-comprehensive universal end, is nothing short of the entire world — a final purpose which goes far beyond the content of this particular act, and therefore is to be placed altogether above anything actually done. Because the universal best ought to be carried out, nothing good is done. In point of fact, however, the nothingness of actual action and the reahty of the entire purpose alone, which are here upheld— these are on all hands again " shifted " or dissembled. The moral act is not something contingent and restricted ; its essential nature hes in pure duty. This pure duty constitutes the sole entire purpose ; and the act, whatever may be the limitation of the content, being the actuahsation of that purpose, is the accompUshment of the entire absolute purpose. Or, if again we take the reahty in the sense of nature, which has laws of its own and stands over against pure duty, and take it in such a way that duty cannot reahse its law within nature, then, since duty as such is the essential element, we are, when acting, not in fact concerned about the accomphshment of pure duty which is the whole purpose ; for the accomphshment would then rather have as its end not pure duty, but the opposite, viz. reahty. But there is again a " shifting " from the position that it is not reahty with which we have to do. For, by the very notion of moral action, pure duty is essentially an active consciousness. Action thus ougJit certainly to take place, absolute duty ought to be expressed in the whole of nature, and " moral law " to become " natural law."
If, then, we allow this highest good to stand for the essentially real, consciousness is not altogether in earnest with morahty. For, in this highest good, nature has not a different law from what morahty has. Moral action itself, in consequence, drops, for action takes place only under the assumption of a negative or opposiag element which is to be cancelled by means of the act. But if nature conforms to the moral law, then undoubtedly this moral law would be violated by actiug, by canceUing what already exists.
On that mode of interpretation, then, there has arisen as the essential situation one which renders moral action superfluous and in which moral action does not take place at aU. Hence the postulate of the harmony between morahty and reahty — a harmony involved in the very notion of moral action, which means bringing the two into agreement — finds on this view, too, an expression which takes the form : — " because moral action is the absolute purpose, the absolute purpose is — that moral action do not take place at aU."
If we put these moments together, through which consciousness has gone on presenting its ideas of its moral Hfe, we see that it cancels each one again in its opposite. It starts from the position that, for it, morahty and reahty do not make a harmony ; but it is not in earnest with that, for in the moral act it is conscious of the presence of this harmony. But neither is it in earnest with this action, since the action is something particular ; while it has such a high purpose, the highest good. This, however, is once more merely a dissemblance of the actual fact, for thereby all action and all morahty would fall to the ground. In other words, it is not strictly in earnest with moral action ; on the con-
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trary, it really feels that, what is most to be wished for, the absolutely desirable, is that the highest g6od were carried out and moral action superfluous.
From this result consciousness must go on still fxirther in its contradictory procedure, and must of necessity again dissemble the aboHtion of moral action. Morality is the inherently essential (Ansich.) ; in order that it may have place, the final end of the world cannot be carried out ; rather, the moral consciousness must exist for itself, and must find lying before it a nature opposing it. But it must per se be completed. This leads to the second postulate of the harmony of itself and sensibihty, the " nature " immediately within it. Moral seK-consciousness sets up its purpose as pure purpose, as independent of inchnations and impulses, so that this bare purpose has abolished within itself the ends of sensibihty. But this cancelling of the element of sense is no sooner set up than it is again dissembled. The moral consciousness acts, it brings its purpose into reahty ; and selfconscious sensibihty, which should be done away with, is precisely the mediating element between pure consciousness and reahty — ^is the instrument used by the former for the realisation of itself, or is the organ of what is called impulse, inclination. It is thus not really in earnest in cancelling inclinations and impulses, for these are just self-consciousness making itself actual. Moreover, they ought not to be suppressed, but merely to be in conformity with reason. They, are, too, in conformity with it ; for moral action is nothing else than self-realising consciousness — consciousness taking on the form of an impulse, i.e. it is inttmediately the realised, actually present harmony
of impulse and morality. But, in point of fact, the impulse is not only this empty conscious form, which might possibly have within itself a spring of action other than the impulse in question, and be driven on by that. For sensibUity is a kind of nature, which contains within itself its own laws and springs of action : consequently, moraKty cannot seriously mean to be the inciting motive {Triebfeder) for impulses (Triebe), the angle of inchnation for inclinations. For, since these latter have their own fixed character and peculiar content, the consciousness, to which they were to conform, would rather be in conformity with them — a conformity which moral self-consciousness declines to adopt. The harmony between the two is thus merely imphcit and postulated.
In moral action the realised or present harmony of morality and sensibiHty was set up at one moment, and at the next is " displaced." The harmony is in a misty distance beyond consciousness, where there is nothing more to be accurately distinguished or grasped ; for, to grasp this unity, which we have just tried to do, has proved impossible.
In this merely ioxmanent or imphcit harmony, how^ ever, consciousness gives up itself altogether. This immanent state is its moral completion, where the struggle of morality and sensibUity has ceased, and the latter is in conformity to the former in a way which cannot be made out. On that account, this completion is again merely a dissemblance of the actual case ; for in point of fact moraKty would be really giving up itself in that completion, because it is only consciousness of absolute purpose qtca pure and simple purpose, i.e. in opposition to all other purposes. MoraKty is both the
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activity of this pure purpose, and at the same time the consciousness of rising above sensibility, of being mixed up with sensibihty and of opposing and strugghng with it. That this moral completion is not taken seriously is directly expressed by consciousness in the fact that it shifts this completion away into infinity, i.e. asserts that the completion is never completed.
Thus it is really only the middle state of being incomplete that is admitted to have any value : a state nevertheless which at least ought to be one of progress towards completion. Yet it cannot be so ; for advancing in morahty would mean approaching its annihilation and disappearante. For the goal would be the nothingness above mentioned, the abohtion of morahty and consciousness itself : but to come ever nearer and nearer to nothing means to decrease. Besides, " advancing " would, in general, in the same way as " decreasing, " introduce distinctions of quantity into morahty: but these are quite inadmissible in such a sphere. In morahty qua mode of consciousness which takes the ethical end to be pure duty, we cannot think at all of difference, least of all of the superficial difference of quantity : there is only one virtue, only one pure duty, only one morahty.
Since, then, it is not moral completion that is taken seriously, but rather the middle state, i.e., as just explained, the condition of no morahty, we thus come by another way back to the content of the first postulate. For we cannot perceive how happiness is to be demanded for this moral consciousness on the ground of its worthiness to be happy. It is well aware of its not being complete, and cannot, therefore, in point of fact, demand happiness as a desert, as something of
which it is worthy. It can ask happiness to be given merely as an act of free grace, i.e. it can only ask for happiness as such, and as a substantive element by itself ; it cannot expect it except as the result of chance and caprice, not because there is any absolute reason of the above sort. The condition of non-morahty herein expresses just what it is — that it is concerned, not about morahty, but about happiness alone, without reference to morahty.
By this second aspect of the moral point of view, the assertion of the first aspect, wherein disharmony between morality and happiness is presupposed, is also cancelled. One may pretend to have found by experience that in the actual present the man who is moral often fares badly, while the man who is not, often comes ofi happily. Yet the middle state of incomplete morality, the condition which has proved to be the essential one, shows clearly that this perception that morahty fares badly, this experience which ought to be but is not, is merely a dissemblance of the real facts of the case. For, since morality is not completed, i.e. since morahty in point of fact is not, what can there be in experience that morahty should fare badly ?
Since, at the same time, it has come out that the point at issue concerns happiness alone, it is manifest that, in making the judgment, '' the man who has no morahty comes off well," there was no intention to convey thereby that there is something wrong in such a case. The designation of an individual as one devoid of morahty necessarily falls to the ground, when morahty in general is incomplete ; such a characterisation rests, indeed, on pure caprice. Hence the sense and content of that judgment of experience is simply this, that
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happiness as such should not have fallen to some who got it, i.e. the judgment is an expression of envy, which is assimiing the covering cloak of morahty. The reason, however, why we think good luck, as we call it, should fall to the lot of others is good friendship, which ungrudgingly grants and wishes them, and wishes itself too, this favour, this accident of good fortune.
Morahty, then, in the moral consciousness, is not completed. This is what is now estabhshed. But its essence consists in being merely what is complete, and so pure morahty : incomplete morahty is, therefore, impure, in other words, is Immorahty. Morahty itself thus exists in another being than the actual concrete consciousness. This other is a holy moral legislator.
Morahty which is not completed in consciousness, the morahty which is the reason for making those postulates, means, in the first instance, that morahty, when it is set up as actual in consciousness, stands in relation to something else, to an existence, and thus itself preserves and implies otherness or distinction, whence arises a manifold plurahty of moral commands. The moral self-consciousness at the same time, htDwever, looks on these many duties as unessential ; for it is concerned with merely the one pure duty, and this plurahty of duties, so far as they are determinate duties, have no true reahty for self-consciousness. They can thus have their real truth accepted only in another consciousness, and are (what they are not for the actual moral self-consciousness) sacred through a holy lawgiver.
But this, too, is again merely a dissembhng of the actual fact. For moral self-consciousness is to itself
the absolute, and duty is simply and solely what it knows to be duty. It, however, recognises only pure duty as duty : what is not sacred iu its view is not in itself sacred at all, and what is not per se sacred cannot be rendered so by some being that is sacred. Moral consciousness, further, is not really serious in allowing something to be made sacred by another consciousness than its own. For, only that is without quahfication sacred in its eyes which is made sacred through its own action, and is sacred within it. It is thus just as httle in earnest in treating this other being as a holy being ; for this would mean that, within it, something was to attain an essential significance, which, for the moral consciousness, i.e. in itself, has none.
If the sacred being was postulated, in order that duty might have .binding vahdity within the moral consciousness, not qua pure duty, but as a plurahty of specific duties, then this must again be dissembled and the other being must be solely sacred in so far as only pure duty has binding validity within the moral consciousness. - Pure duty has also, in point of fact, vahdity and bindingness only in another being, not in the moral consciousness. Although, within the latter, pure moraUty seems alone to hold good, stUl this must be put right in another form, for it is, at the same time, a natural consciousness. Morahty is, in it, affected and conditioned by sensibility, and thus is not by itself self-contained, but a contingent result of free will; in it, however, qua pure will, morahty is a contingency of knowledge. Taken by itself, therefore, morality is in another being, is self-complete only in another reality than the actual moral consciousness. This other being, then, is here absolutely complete
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morality, because in its case moraKty does not stand ia relation to nature and sensibility. Yet the reality of pure duty lies in its actualisation in. nature and sensibility. The moral consciousness accounts for its incompleteness by the fact that morality, in its case, has a positive relation to nature and sensibihty, since it holds an essential moment of morahty to be that morahty should have simply and solely a negative relation towards nature and sensibility. The pure moral being, on the other hand, because far above the struggle with nature and sense, does not stand in a negative relation to them. Thus, ia poiat of fact, the positive relation to them alone remains in its case, i.e. there remains just what a moment ago passed for the incomplete, for what was not moral. Pure morahty, however, entirely cut off from actual reahty so as hkewise to be even without positive relation to reahty, would be a blank unreal abstraction, where the very notion of morahty, which consists in thinking of pure duty and in willing and doing, would be absolutely done away with. This other being, so purely and entirely moral, is again, therefore, a mere dissemblance of the actual fact, and has to be given up.
In this purely moral being, however, the moments of the contradiction, in which this synthetic ideational process is carried on, come closer together. So, hkewise, do the opposites taken up alternately, now this and also that, and also the other, opposites which are allowed to follow one after the other, with one opposite constantly set aside by another, yet without these ideas ever being brought together. So close do they come, that consciousness here has to give up its moral view of the world and retreat within itself.
It knows its morality as incomplete because it is affected by an opposing sensibility and nature, wbich partly perturb morality as such, and partly give rise to a plurality of duties, by which, in concrete cases of real action, consciousness finds itself embarrassed. For each case is the concrete focus of many moral relations, just as an object of perception in general is a thing with many quahties. And since a determinate duty is a purpose, it has a content ; its content is a part of the purpose, and so morahty is not pure morahty. This latter, then, has its real existence in some other being. But such reahty means nothing else than that morality is here self-complete, in itself and for itseK — for itself, i.e. is morahty of a consciousness : in itself, i.e. has existence and actuality.
In that first incomplete consciousness, morahty is not realised and carried out. It is there something immanent and imphcit, in the sense of a mere thoughtelement ; for it is associated with natiLre and sensibihty, with the actuaUty of [external] existence and conscious hfe, which constitutes its content ; and natm-e and sensibihty are morally nothing. In the second, morahty is present as completed, and not in the form of an unrealised thought-element. Biit this completion consists just in the fact that morality has reahty in a consciousness, in the sense of free reahty, objective existence in general, is not something empty, but filled out, full of content. That is to say, the completion of morahty is placed in this, that what a moment ago was characterised as morally nothing is found present in morahty and inherent in it. It is at one time to have vahdity simply and solely as the unreahsed thought-element, a product of pure abstraction ; but, on the other hand, is jiist as
Volume II. (BE). SPIRIT . 429-682 (part 13)
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certainly to have in this form, no validity at all : its true nature is to consist in being opposed to reality, detached altogether therefrom, and empty, and then again to consist in being actual reality.
The syncretism, or fusion, of these contradictions, which is expressed in extenso in the moral attitude of experience, collapses internally, since the distinction on which it rests— its distinction from something which must be thought and stated as a necessity, and is yet at the same time not essential — passes into one which does not any longer exist even in words. What, at the end, is aflfirmed to be something with different aspects, both to be nothing and also real, is one and the very same — existence and reahty. And what is to be absolute only as something beyond actual existence and actual consciousness, and at the same time to be only in consciousness and so, qua beyond, nothing at aU — this absolute is pure duty and the knowledge that pure duty is the essentially real. The consciousness, which makes this distinction that is no' distinction, which announces actuality to be at once what is nothing and what is real, pronounces pure morahty to be both the ultimate truth and also to be devoid of all true reality, and expresses together in one and the same breath ideas which it formerly separated — such a consciousness itself proclaims that it is not in earnest with this characterisation and separation of the moments of self and inherent reality. It shows, on the contrary, that, what it aimounces as absolute existence apart from consciousness, it really keeps enclosed within the self of self-consciousness ; and that, what it gives out as something entirely in thought or absolutely inherent and imphcit, it just for that reason takes to be something which has no truth at all.
It becomes clear to consciousness that placing these moments apart from each other is mentally " displacing" them, is a dissemblance, and it would be hypocrisy were it reaUy to keep to this. But, being pure moral seK-consciousness, it flees from this discordance between what it represents and what constitutes its essential nature, flees from this untruth, which gives out as true what it holds to be untrue, and, tuxning away with abhorrence, it hastens back into itself. The consciousness, which scorns such a moral idea of the world, is pure Conscience (Gewissen) : it is, in. its inmost being, simply spirit consciously assured or " certain " (gemss) of itself, spirit which acts directly in the Hght of this assurance, which acts conscientiously {gemssenJiaft), without the intervention of those ideas, and finds its true natxire.in this direct immediacy.
While, however, this sphere of dissemblance is nothing else than the development of moral seK-consciousness in its various moments and is consequently its reality, so too this self-consciousness, by returning into itself, will become, in its inmost nature, nothing else. This returning into itself, indeed, simply means that it has come to be conscious that its truth is a pretended truth, a mere pretence. As returning into itself it had to be always giving out this pretended truth as its real truth, for it had to express and display itself as an objective idea ; but it had to know aU the same that this is merely a dissemblance. It would consequently be, in point of fact, hypocrisy all the while, and its abhorrence of such dissemblance would be itself the first expression of hypocrisy.
Conscience: the "Beautiful Soul": Evil and the fokgiveness of it
[The one-sidedness of each of the preceding stages is removed when the moral consciousness assumes the attitude of Conscience. Here the individual is at once self-legislating and yet sure of the unity and seKcompleteness of its own will in the midst of all diversity of moral content. The immediacy involved in the idea of a " self -legislating" will appears in the perceptual directness of the action of conscience : it " sees " what is right and does the right without hesitation. But it is not an abstract " faculty " of willing independent of the varied content of the individual's moral experience. The universality of the individual permeates and pervades all the content of his being, and makes him a concrete moral individuality, at home with himself in the smallest detail as well as in the larger issues of his self -complete spiritual existence. Conscience, as Butler says, is a ' system ' or ' constitution,' analogous in the case of the individual to the objectified system of the state and its institutions. The self-deception of the second one-sided phase of moral experience seems also to have no place in Conscience, for Conscience is the transparent and selfrevealing unity in all the content of moral individuality. Only on this condition can it be absolutely confident and certain of itself in all its functions, and this certainty of itself is the inalienable characteristic of conscience. It thinks it cannot be deceived about itself, can neither delude itself nor others, but freely realises all that it professes to be and professes to be all that it realises. It is thus the supreme achievement of finite spiritual existence ; but it has no meaning apart from the existence of finite spirit in the form of society.
Its very conditions, however, give rise to delusion and deception of another kind. For, so complete is its world and its life that it may attempt to cut itself off from the concrete substance of actual society which alone makes possible the existence of conscience. It then tries to cultivate goodness in solitary isolation from the actual social whole. This is the attitude of the " beautiful soul," a type of spiritual life cultivated by the "Moravians," and familiar during the Komantic movement. Novalia is the best-known example ; the classical interpretation of the mood was
given in Goethe's Mdsters Lehrjahre, Bk. 6. It has the self-confidence and individual inspiration of Conscience, but frankly rejects the concrete objectivity which secures for Conscience liberation from mere subjectivity. The very rejection of objectivity is the only achievement of the " beautiful soul," and is held to be the greatest triumph of its selfconscious freedom. It flees from concrete moral action, and luiuriates in a state of self-hjrpnotised inactivity. Still it takes up this attitude in the interests of " pure goodness," and hence in withdrawing from the lowly deeds of the daily moral life it indulges all the more in the self-cloistered cult of the beauty of holiness. It is moral individualism- turned into mystic self-absorption. Hegel's analysis brings out that this type of spirit is in principle as it was in fact the direct ally of moral evil. For
(1) its refusal to act means indifference to all action, good and bad alike, and the rejection of the demands of duty is precisely immorality :
(2) its self-closed isolation destroys the very principle of true morality, universality of will, recognition and acknowledgment by others of the claims of the individual will.
But this extremity of finite spiritual experience is the opportunity of Absolute Spirit. The attitude of this mystical moral individuality is indirectly an indication of the finitude of the moral point of view and therefore of its failure to supply the absolute self-completeness which spirit requires. The very consciousness by finite spirit of its inherent incompleteness is implicitly a consciousness of the Absolute Spirit. The consciousness of Absolute Spirit is the attitude of experience known as Religion.]
VP^. II.— Q
Conscience : the " Beatttiful Soul " : Evil and THE Forgiveness of it
The antinomy in the moral view of the world — viz. that there is a moral consciousness and that there is none, or that the validity, the bindingness, of duty has its ground beyond consciousness, and conversely only takes effect in consciousness — these contradictory elements had been combined in the idea, in which the non-moral consciousness is to pass for moral, its contingent knowledge and wiU to be accepted as fuUy sufficing, and happiness to be its lot as a matter of grace. Moral selfconsciousness took this self-contradictory idea not upon itself, but transferred it to another being. But this putting outside itself of what it must think as necessary is as much a contradiction in form as the other was in content. But that which appears as contradictory, and that in the division and again dissolution of which hes the round of activity peculiar to the moral attitude, are inherently the same : for pure duty qua pure knowledge is nothing else than the self of consciousness, and the self of consciousness is existence and actuahty ; and, in the same way, what is to be beyond actual consciousness is nothing else than pure thought, is, in fact, the self. Because this is so, seKconsciousness, for us or f&r se, passes back into itself, and becomes aware that that being is its self, in which the actual is at once pure knowledge and pure duty.
It takes itself to be absolutely vaHd in its contingency, to be that which knows its immediate particular existence as pure knowledge and action, as the true objective reaUty and harmony.
This self of Conscience, the phase of spiritual life immediately certaia of itself as absolute truth and objective being, is the third type of spiritual self. It is the outcome of the third sphere of the spiritual world,* and may be shortly contrasted with the two former types of self.
The totality or actuahty which is revealed as the final result of the ethical world, the world of the social order, is the self of a Person, ethical personaUty : its existence Kes in its being recognised and acknowledged. As the person is the self devoid of substance, its existence is abstract reality too. The person has a definite standing, and that directly and unconditionally : its self is the point in the sphere of its existence which is immediately at rest. That point is not torn away from its imiversahty ; the two [the particular focus and its universahty] are therefore not in a relational process with regard to one another : the universal is in it without distinction, and is neither the content of the self, nor is the self filled by itself.
The second self is the final truth and outcome of a world of culture, is spirit that has recovered itself after and through disruption, is absolute freedom. In this self, the former immediate unity of indi^ddual existence and miiversahty finds its elements separated from one another. The universal, which remains at the same time a purely spiritual entity, the state of recogmtion or
* Viz. Morality, the first being the Ethical Order of Society, the second the sphere of OuUure.
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universal will and universal knowledge — the universal is object and content of the seK, and its universal actuality. But the universal has not there the form of existence detached from the seK : in this mode of seK it therefore gets no filling, no positive content, no world.
Moral self-consciousness, indeed, lets its universal aspect get detached, so that this aspect becomes a nature of its own ; and at the same time it retains this imiversahty within itself in a superseded form. But it is merely a game of dissembling ; it constantly interchanges these two characteristics. In the form of Conscience, with its -certainty of itself, it first finds the content to fill the former emptiness of duty as well as the emptiness of right and the empty universal will. And because this certainty of self is at the same time immediacy, it finds in conscience definite existence.
Having reached this level of its truth, moral seKconsciousness then leaves, or rather supersedes, this state of internal division and self-separation, whence arose dissimulation — the separation of its inherent being from the self, of pure duty, qua pure purpose, from reahty qua a nature and a sensibihty opposed to mere purpose. It is, when thus returned into itself, concrete moral spirit, which does not make for itself a bare abstract standard out of the consciousness of pure duty, a standard to be set up against actual conscious life ; on the contrary, pure duty, as also the sensuous nature opposed to pure duty, are superseded moments. This mode of spirit, in its immediate unity, is a moral being making itself actual, and an act is immediately a concrete embodiment of morality.
Given a case of action ; it is an objective reality for the knowing mind. The latter, qua conscience, knows
it in a direct concrete manner ; and at the same time it is merely as conscience knows it to be. When knowledge is something other than its object, it is contingent va. character. Spirit, however, which is sure of its self, is not at aU an accidental knowledge of that Mnd, is not a way of producing inside its own being ideas from which reality is divorced. On the contrary ; since the separation between what is essential or inherent and self has been given up, a case of moral action falls, just as it is per se, directly within immediate conscious certainty, the sensible [feeKng] form of knowledge, and it merely is per se as it is in this form of knowledge.
Action, then, qua reahsation, is in this way the pure form of will — the bare conversion of reahty, in the sense of a given case, into a reahty that is performed and done, the conversion of the bare state of objective knowledge into one of knowledge about reality as something produced and brought about by consciousness. Just as sensuous certainty is directly taken up, or rather converted, into the essential Hfe and substance of spirit, this other transformation is also simple and unmediated, a transition made through pure conception without changing the content, the content being conditioned by some interest on the part of the consciousness knowing it. ^
Further, conscience does not break up the circimistances of the case into a variety of duties. It does not operate as the positive general medium, in which the manifold duties, each for itself, would keep their substantial existence undisturbed. If it did so, either no action could take place at all, because of each concrete case in general containing opposition, and, in the specific case of morality, opposition of duties, — and hence there would
646 Phen,omenology of Mind
always be one side injured, one duty violated, when the act took definite shape : or else, if action did take place, the violation of one of the conflicting duties would be the actual result brought about. Conscience is rather the negative single unity, it is the absolute self, which does away with this variety of substantial moral constituents. It is simple action in accordance with duty, action which does not fulfil this or that duty, but knows and does what is concretely right. It is, therefore, in general, and for the first time in moral experience, moral action as action, and into this the previous stage of mere consciousness of morality without action has passed.
The concrete shape which the act takes may be analysed by a conscious process of distinction into a variety of properties, i.e. in this case into a variety of moral relationships ; and these may either be each expressly held to be absolute (as each must be if it is to be duty) or, again, subjected to comparison and criticisna- In the simple moral action arising from conscience, duties are shed so promiscuously that the isolated independence of aU these separate entities is immediately destroyed, and the process of critically considering and worrying about what our duty is finds no place at all in the unshaken certainty of conscience.
Just as httle, again, do we find in conscience that fluctuating imcertainty of mind, which puts now socalled " pure " morahty away from itself, assigning it to some other holy being, and takes itself to be unholy, and then again, on the other hand, puts this moral purity within itself, and places in that other the connexion of the sensuous with the moral element.
It renounces aU these semblances and dissem- >
blances (Stellungen und Verstellungen) characteristic of tile moral point of view, when it gives up thinking that there is a contradiction between duty and actual reahty. According to this latter state of mind, I act morally when I am conscious of performing merely pure duty and nothing else but that : i.e. in fact, when I do not act. When, however, I really act, I am conscious of an "other," of a reahty which is there before me, and one which I want to bring about ; I have a definite end and fulfil a definite duty. There is something else therein than the pure duty, which alone was supposed to be kept ia view.
Conscience, on the other hand, is the sense that, when the moral consciousness declares pure duty to be the essence of its action, this bare purpose is a dissemblance of the actual fact. For the real fact is that bare duty consists in the empty abstraction of pure thought, and finds its reahty and content solely in some definite actual existence, an actuahty which is actuahty of consciousness itself — not of consciousness in the sense •of a thought-entity, but as an individual. Conscience, for its own part, finds its truth to he in the direct certainty regarding itseH. This immediate concrete certainty of itself is true reahty. Looking at this certainty from the point of view of the opposition which consciousness involves, its own inxmediate particularity constitutes the content of moral action ; and the form of moral action is just this very self as a pure process, viz. as the process of knowing, in other words, is private individual conviction.
Looking more closely at the imity and the significance of the moments of this stage, we find that moral consciousness conceived itself merely in the form of
64S Phenomenology of Mind
the inherent principle, or as ultimate essence ; qim conscience, however, it lays hold of its expHcit individual self-existence {Pursichseyn), or its self. The contradiction involved in the moral point of view is resolved, i.e. the distinction, which lay at the basis of its peculiar attitude, proves to be no distinction, and melts into the process of pure negativity. This process of negativity is, however, just the self : a single simple self which is at once pure knowledge and knowledge of itself as this individual conscious life. This self constitutes, therefore, the content of what formerly was the empty essence ; for it is something actual and concrete, which no longer has the significance of being a nature alien to the ultimate essence, a nature independent and with laws of its own. As the negative element, it introduces distinction into the pure essence, a definite content, and one, too, which has a value in its own right as it stands.
Further, this seH is, qua pure self-identical knowledge, the imiversal without qualification, so that just this knowledge, being its very own knowledge, being conviction, constitutes duty. Duty is no longer the universal appearing over against and opposed to the self ; duty is known to have in this condition of separation and opposition no vahdity. It is now the law, which exists for the sake of the self, and not the self for the sake of the law. The law and duty, however, have for that reason not only the significance of existing on their own account, but also of being inherent and essential ; for this knowledge is, in virtue of its identity with itself, just what is inherently essential. This inherent being gets also separated in consciousness from that direct and immediate imity with
self -existence : so contrasted and opposed, it is objective being, it is being for sometliing else.
Duty itseK now, qua duty deserted by the self, is known and thought to be merely a moment ; it has ceased to mean absolute being, it has become degraded to something which is not a self, does not exist on its own account, and is thus what exists for something else. But this existing-for-something-else remains just for that reason an essential moment, because self, quu consciousness, constitutes and establishes the opposition between existence-for-self and existencefor-another ; and now duty essentially means something immediately actual, and is no longer a mere abstract consciousness of duty.
This existence for something else is, then, the inherently essential substance distinguished from the self. Conscience has not given up pure duty, the abstract impKcit essence : pure duty is the essential moment of relating itself, qua universaUty, to others. Conscience is the common element of distinct self-consciousnesses ; and this is the substance in which the act secures subsistence and reahty, the moment enabling recognition by others to take place. The moral selfconsciousness does not possess this moment of recognition, of pure consciousness which has definite existence ; and on that account really does not " act " at all, does not effectually actuahse anything. Its inherent nature is for it either the abstract imreal essence, or else existence in the form of a reahty which has no spiritual character. The actual reality of conscience, however, is one which is a self, i.e. an existence conscious of itself, the spiritual element of being recognised. Doing something is, therefore, merely the translation
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of its particular content into that objective element where it is universal and is recognised, and this very fact, that the content is recognised, makes the deed an actuahty. The action is recognised and thereby real, because the actual reahty is immediately bound up with conviction or knowledge ; or, m other words, knowledge of its purpose is immediately and at once the element of existence, universal recognition. For the essence of the act, duty, consists in the conviction conscience has about it. This conviction is just the inherent principle itself ; it is inherently universal selfconsciousness — in other words, is recognition and hence reality. The result achieved under conviction of duty is therefore directly one which has substantial solid existence. Thus, we hear nothing more there about good iatentiou not coming to anythitig definite, or about the good man faring badly. What is known as duty is carried out completely and becomes an actual fact, just because what is dutiful is the universal for all selfconsciousnesses, that which is recognised, acknowledged, and thus objectively is. Taken separately and alone, however, without the content of self, this duty is existence-for-another, the transparent element, which has merely the significance of an unsubstantial idtimate factor in general.
If we look back on the sphere where in general spiritual reality made its appearance, we find that the principle involved was that the utterance of individuahty is the absolutely real, the ultimately self-sufficing. But the shape which, in the first instance, gave expression to this notion, was the " honest consciousness " * which was occupied and
* v.p. 402 S.
concerned with abstract " fact itself." This " fact itself " was there a predicate. In conscience, however, it is for the first time a Subject, which has put all aspects of consciousness in it, and for which all these moments, substantiahty in general, external existence, and essence of thought, are contained in this certainty of itself. The " fact itself " has substantiahty in general in the ethical order (Sittlichkeit), external existence in culture, self-knowing essence of thought in moraKty ; and in conscience it is the Subject, which knows these moments within itself. While the " honest consciousness " is for ever grasping merely the bare and empty " fact itself," conscience, on the other hand, secures the " fact itself " in its fullness, a fullness which conscience of itself supphes. Conscience has this power through its knowing the moments of consciousness as moments, and controlling them because it is their negative essential principle.
When conscience is considered in relation to the particular features of the opposition which appears in action, and when we consider its consciousness regarding the nature of those features, its attitude towards the reahty of the particular case where action takes eSect is, in the first instance, that of knowledge. So far as the aspect of imiversahty is present in such knowledge, it is the business of conscientious action, qiia knowledge, to compass the reality before it in an unrestricted exhaustive manner, and thus get to know exactly the circumstances of the case, and give them due consideration. This knowledge, however, since it is aware of universahty as a moment, is in consequence a kind of knowledge of these circumstances which is conscious aE the while of not embracing
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them, is conscious of not being conscientious in its procedure. The genuinely universal and pure relation of knowledge would be one towards something not opposed, a relation to itself. But action through the opposition essentially impHed in action is related to what negates consciousness, to a reality existing fer se. Contrasted with the simple nature of pure consciousness, the absolute other, extemahty, muItipHcity per se, is a sheer plurality of circumstances which breaks up indefinitely and spreads in all directions — backwards in their conditions, sidewards in their associations, forwards in their consequences.
The conscientious mind is aware of this state of afiairs and of its relation thereto, and knows it is not acquainted to the full and complete extent required with the case in which its action takes efiect, and knows that its pretence of conscientiously weighing and considering all the circumstances is futile. This acquaintance with and consideration of all the circumstances, however, are not entirely absent : but they are merely present as a moment, as something which is only for others : and the conscientious mind holds its incomjolete knowledge to be sufficient and complete, merely because it is its own knowledge.
In a similar way is constituted the process in connection with the universaKty of the essential principle, the universahty by which the content is characterised when determined through pure consciousness. Conscience, when it goes on to act, takes, up a relation to the various sides of the case. The case breaks up into separate elements, and the relation of pure consciousness towards it does the same : whereby the multiplicity characteristic of the case
becomes a multipKcity of duties. Conscience knows that it has to select and decide amongst them ; for none of them specifically, in its content, is an absolute duty ; only duty puxe and simple is so. But this abstract entity has, in its reaUsation, come to denote self-conscious ego. Spirit certain of itself is at rest within itself in the form of conscience, and its real universahty, its duty, Ues in its bare conviction concerning duty. This bare conviction as such is as empty as pure duty, pure in the sense that nothing within it, no definite content, is duty. Action, however, has to take place, the individual must determine to do something or other ; and spirit which is certain of itself, in which the inherent principle has attained the significance of self-conscious ego, knows it has this determination, this, specific content, within the immediate certainty of its own self. This certainty, being a determination and a content, is " natural " consciousness, i.e. the various impulses and inclinations.
Conscience admits no content as absolute for it, because it is absolute negativity of all that is definite. It determines from itself alone. The circle of the self, however, within which determinateness as such falls, is so-called " sensibility " : in order to get a content out of the immediate certainty of self, there is no other means to be found except sensibility.
Everything that in previous modes of experience was presented as good or bad, law and right, is something other than immediate certainty of seK ; it is a universal, which is now a relative entity, an existence-foranother. Or, looked at otherwise, it is an object which, while connecting and relating consciousness with itself, comes between consciousness and its own proper truth,
654 Phenomenology of Mind
apd instead of that object being the immediacy of consciousness, it rather cuts consciousness off from itself.
For conscience, however, certainty of self is the pure, direct, and immediate truth : and this truth is thus its immediate certainty of self presented as content ; i.e. its truth is altogether the caprice of the individual, and the accidental content of his \mconscious natural existence [his sensibility].
This content at the same time passes for essential moral reahty, for duty. For pure duty, as was found when testing and examining laws,* is utterly indifferent to every content, and gets along with any. Here it has at the same time the essential form of self-existence, of existing on its own account : and this form of individual conviction is nothing else than the sense of the emptiness of pure duty, and the consciousness that this is merely a moment, that its substantial independence is a predicate which finds its subject in the individual, whose caprice gives pure duty content, can connect every content with this form, and attach its feeUng of conscientiousness to any content.
An individual increases his property in a certain way. It is a duty that each should see to the maintenance of himself and family, and no less ensure the possibihty of his being serviceable to his neighbours and of doing good to those standing in need. The individual is aware that this is a duty, for this content is directly contained in the certainty he has of himself. He perceives, further, that he fulfils this particular duty ia this particular case. Other people possibly consider the specific way he adopts as fraud : they hold by other sides of the concrete case presented, while he holds firmly to
* v.p. 418 ff.
this particular side of it by the fact of his being conscious that the increase of property is a pure and absolute duty.
In the same way there is fulfilled by the individual, as a duty, what other people call violence and wrongdoing— the duty of asserting one's independence against others : and, again, the duty of preserving one's hfe, and maintaining the possibility of being useful to one's neighbours. Others call this cowardice, but what they call corn-age reaUy violates both these duties. But cowardice cannot be so stupid and thoughtless as not to know that the maintenance of hfe and the possibihty of being useful to others are duties — so inept as not to be convinced of the dutifulness of its action, and not to know that dutifuhiess consists in knowledge. Otherwise it would commit the absurdity of being without morahty. Since morahty hes in the consciousness of having fuifiJled one's duty, this will not be lacking when the action is what is called cowardice any more than when it is what is called courage. As the abstraction called " duty " is capable of every content, it is quite equal to this latter content. The agent acting knows what he does to be duty, and since he knows this, and conviction as to duty is just dutifulness, he is thus recognised and acknowledged by others. The act thereby becomes accepted as vahd and has actual existence.
It is of no avail to object to this freedom — which puts one kind of content as well as any other into this universal inert receptacle of pure duty and pure knowledge— by asserting that another content ought to have been put there. For whatever the content be, each content has upon it the stain of determinateness from
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which pure knowledge is free, which pure knowledge can disregard just as readily as it can take up every determiaateness in turn. Every content, through its being determiuate, stands on the same footing with every other, even though it seems to have precisely the character that the particularity in the content is cancelled. It may well seem — since in concrete cases duty breaks regularly into opposition, and, by doing so, sunders the opposites particularity and universahty — that the' duty, whose content is the universal as such, contains on that account, if so facto, the nature of pure duty, and that thus form and content are here entirely in accord. On this view, it might seem that, e.g., acting for the universal good, for what is the best for all, is to be preferred to acting for what is the best for the individual. But this universal duty is in its entirety what is present as self-contained actual substance, in the form of [estabhshed] law and right, and holds good independently of the individual's knowledge and conviction and unmediate interest. It is thus precisely that against the form of which morahty as a whole is directed. As regards its content, however, even this is determinate in character, in so far as the " universally best " is opposed to the " individual best." Consequently, its law is one from which conscience knows itself to be absolutely free, and it gives itself the absolute privilege to add and pare, to neglect as well as fulfil it.
Then, again, the above distinction of duty towards the individual and duty towards the imiversal is not something fixed and final, when we look at the nature of the opposition in question. On the contrary, what the individual does for himself is to the advantage of the
universal as well. The more he looks after his own good, not only is there the greater possibility of his usefulness to others : his very reality consists merely in his living and existing in connection with others. His individual enjoyment means ultimately and essentially putting what is his own at the disposal of others, and helping them to secure their enjojoaent. In fulfilling duty to individuals, and hence duty to sell, duty to the general thus also gets fulfilled. Weighing, considering, comparing duties, should this appear here, would take the line of calculating the advantage which the general would get from any given action. But there can be no such process ; partly because morahty would thereby be handed over to the inevitable contingency characteristic of mere " insight " ; partly because it is precisely the nature of conscience to have done with aU this calculating and weighing of duties, and to decide directly from itself without reasons of any kind.
In this way, then, conscience acts and maintains itself in the unity of its essential being and its objective existence for itself, in the unity of pure thought and individuahty : it is spirit certain of itself, which inherently possesses its own truth, within itself, in its knowledge, a knowledge in the sense of knowledge of its duty. It maintains its being therein by the fact that the positive element in the act, the content as well as form of duty and the knowledge of duty, belong to the self, to the certainty of itself. What, however, seeks to come before the self with an inherent being of its own is held to be not truly real, merely a transcended element, only a moment. Consequently, it is not universal knowledge in general
658 Phenomenology of Mind
that has a value, but what is known of the circumstances. It puts into duty, which is the universal immanent essence, the content which it derives from its natural individuahty ; for the content is one that is present in its own being. This content, in virtue of the tmiversal mediimi whereia it exists, becomes the duty which it carries out, and empty bare duty is, through this very fact, aflSrmed to be something transcended, a moment. This content is its emptiness, transcended and cancelled, i.e. is the fulfilling of pure duty.
But at the same time conscience is detached from every possible content. It absolves itself from every specific duty, which would try to pass for a law. In the strength of its certainty of itself, it has the majesty of absolute self-sufficiency, of absolute avrapKeia, to bind or to loose. This self-determination is at once, therefore, absolute conformity to duty. Duty is the knowledge itself ; this pure and simple selfhood, however, is the immanent principle and essence ; for this inherent principle is pure self-identity, and self -identity Hes in this consciousness.
This pure knowledge is immediately objective, is existence-for-another ; for, qita pure self-identity, it is immediacy, it is objective being. This beiag, however, is at the same time pure universality, the selfhood of aU : in other words, action is acknowledged, and hence actual. This being forms the element by which conscience directly stands on a footing of equahty with every self-consciousness ; and this relation means not an abstract impersonal law, but the self of conscience.
In that this right which conscience does is at the same time, however, a fact for others, a disparity seems
to affect conscience. The duty which it fulfils is a determinate content; that content is, no doubt, the self of consciousness, and so its knowledge of itself, its identity with its self. But when fulfilled, when planted in the general element of existence, this identity is no longer knowledge, no longer this process of distinction which directly and at the same time does away with its distinctions. Rather, in the sphere of existence, distinction is set up as subsistent, and the act is a determinate specific one, not identical with the element of everybody's self-consciousness, and hence not necessarily acknowledged and recognised. Both aspects, conscience qiut acting, and the general consciousness acknowledging this act to be duty, stand equally loose from the specific character belonging to this deed. On account of this freedom and detachment, the relation of the two within the common medium of their connection is rather a relationship of complete disparity — as a result of which, the consciousness doing and owning the act finds itself m complete uncertainty regarding the spirit which does the act and is " certain of itseK." This spirit acts and places in. existence a particular determinate characteristic ; others hold to this existence, as its truth, and are therein certain of this spirit ; it has therein expressed what it takes to be its duty. But it is detached and free from any specific duty ; it has, therefore, left the point where other people think it actually to be ; and this very medimn of existence and duty as inherently existing are held by it to be merely transitory moments. What it thus places before them, it also " displaces " again, or rather has, CO ipso, inamediately " displaced." For its reahty is, for it, not the duty and determinate content thus
660 Phenomenology of Mind
put forward, but rather is the reality which it has in its absolute certainty of itseK.
The other self -consciousnesses do not know, then, whether this particular conscience is morally good or is wicked ; or, rather, not merely can they not know this conscience, but they must take it to be also wicked. For just as it stands loose to the determinate content of duty, and detached from duty as inherently existing, so do they hkewise. What is placed before them, they themselves know how to " displace " or dissemble : it is something expressing merely the self of another individual, not their own : they do not merely know themselves to be detached and free from it, but have to resolve and dissipate it within their own consciousness, reduce it to nothingness by judgments and explanations in order to preserve their own seK.
But the act of conscience is not merely this determination of existence, a determinate content forsaken by the pure self. What ought to be binding as duty and get recognised as such, only is so through knowledge and conviction as to its being duty, by knowledge of self in the deed done. When the deed ceases to have in it this element of self, it ceases to be what is alone its essential nature. Its existence, if deserted by this consciousness of self, would be an ordinary reahty, and the act would appear to us a way of fulfilling one's pleasure and desire. What ought to exist has here essentiahty only by its being known to be individuahty giving itself expression. And its being thus known is the fact acknowledged and recognised by others, and is that which as such ought to have existence.
The self enters existence as self. The spirit which is certain of itself exists as such for others ; its immediate
act IS not what is accepted and real ; what is acknowledged by others is, not the determinate element, not the inherent being, but solely and simply the self knowing itself as such. The element which gives permanence and stabiUty is universal seK-consciousness. What enters this element cannot be the effect of the act : the latter does not last there, and maintains no permanence : only self-consciousness is what is recognised and gains concrete reaUty.
Here again,* then, we see Language to be the form in which spirit finds existence. Language is the way self-consciousness exists for others ; it is self-consciousness which is there immediately present as such, and in the form of this actual universal self-consciousness. Language is self separating itself from itself, which comes objectively before itself as the pure ego identical with ego, which at once maintains itself in this objective form as this actual self, and at the same time fuses directly with others and is their self-consciousness. The self perceives itself at the same time that it is perceived by others : and this perceiving is just existence which has become a self.
The content, which language has here obtained, is no longer the self we found in the world of culture, perverted, perverting, and distraught. It is spirit which, having returned to itself, is certain of itself, certain in itself of its truth, of its own act of recognition, and of being recognised as this knowledge. The language of the ethical spirit of society is law, and simple command and complaint, which is but a tear shed over necessity. Moral consciousness, on the other hand, remains dumb, shut up within its inner life ; for self has no existence
* v.p. 612 ff.
662 Phenomenology of Mind,
as yet in its case : rather existence and self there stand, in the first instance, in external relation to each other. Language, however, comes forward merely as the mediating element between independent self-consciousnesses recognised and acknowledged ; and the existent self means immediately universal recognition, means recognition in manifold ways and in this very manifoldness simple recognition. What the language of conscience contains is the self knowing itself as essential reahty. This alone is what that language expresses, and this expression is the true reaKsation of " doing " anything, and renders the act valid and acceptable. Consciousness expresses its conviction : in this conviction alone is the action duty : it holds good as duty, too, solely by the conviction being expressed. For universal self-consciousness stands detached from the specific act which merely exists : the act qtca existence . means nothing to it : what it holds of importance is the conviction that the act is a duty ; and this appears concretely in language.
To realise the act means here not translating its content from the form of purposie, or subjectivity, into the form of abstract reahty : it means translating it from the form of immediate certainty of self, which takes its knowledge, its self-existence, to be the essential fact, into the form of the assurance that consciousness is convinced of its duty, and, being conscience, knows of itself what duty is. This assurance thus guarantees that it is convinced of its conviction being the essential fact.
Whether the assurance, that it acts from conviction of duty, is true, whether that really is duty which is done — these questions or doubts have no meaning if
directed against conscience. In the case of the question, whether the assurance is true, it would be assumed that the inner intention is different from the one put forward, i.e. that the wilUng of a particular self can be separated from duty, from the will of the universal and pure consciousness : the latter will would in that case be a matter of words, while the former would be strictly the real moving principle of the act. But such a distinction between the imiversal consciousness and the particular self is precisely what has been cancelled, and the superseding of it constitutes conscience. Immediate knowledge on the part of self which is certain of itself is law and duty. Its intention, by being its own intention, is what is right. AU that is required is that it should know this, and state its conviction that its knowledge and wiU are the right. The expression of this assurance ipso facto cancels the form of its particularity. It recognises thereby the necessary universality of the self. In that it calls itself conscience, it calls itself pure self-knowledge and pure abstract will, i.e. it calls itself a universal knowledge and will which acknowledges and recognises others, is like them — for they are just this pure self-knowledge and will— and which is on that account also recognised by them. In the willing of the self which is certain of itself, in this knowledge of the self as the essential reahty, lies the essence of the right.
When any one says, therefore, he is acting from conscience, he is saying what is true, for his conscience is the self which knows and wills. He must, however, necessarily say so, for this self has to be at the same time universal self. It is not universal in the content o f the act : for this content is per se indifferent on
664 Phenomenology of Mind
account of its being specific and determinate. The universality lies in the form of the act. It is this form which is to be affirmed as real : the form is the self, which as such is actual in language, pronounces itself to be the truth, and just by so doing acknowledges all other selves, and is recognised by them.
Conscience, then, in its majestic sublimity above any specific law and every content of duty, puts whatever content there is into its knowledge and willing. It becomes moral genius and originaUty, which takes the inner voice of its immediate knowledge to be a voice divine ; and since in such knowledge it directly knows existence as well, it is divine creative power, which contains hving force in its very conception. It is in itself, too, divine worship, " service of God," for its action consists in beholding this its own proper divinity.
This sohtary worship, this " service of God " in sohtude of soul, is at the same time essentially " service of God " in pubUc, on the part of a religious community ; and pure inward self-knowledge and perception of self pass to being a moment of consciousness.* To behold itself is to exist objectively, and this objective element is the utterance of its knowledge and wiU in a universal way. Through such expression the self becomes estabUshed sand accepted, and the act becomes an effective deed, a deed carrying out a definite result. What gives reahty and subsistence to its deed is universal selfconsciousness. When, however, conscience finds expression, this puts the certainty of itself in the form of pure self and thereby as imiversal self. Others let the act
* i.e. into a state which implies distinction and opposition of subject and object.
hold as vaKd, owing to the expKcit terms in which the self is thus expressed and acknowledged to be the essential reahty. The spirit and the substance of their community are, thus, the mutual assurance of their conscientiousness, of their good intentions, the rejoicing over this reciprocal purity of purpose, the quickening and refreshment received from the glorious privilege of knowing and of getting expression, of fostering and cherishing a state so altogether excellent and desirable.
So far as this sphere of conscience still distinguishes its abstract consciousness from its self-consciousness, its hfe is merely hid in God. God is indeed immediately present to its mind and heart, to its self. But what is revealed, its actual consciousness and the mediating process of this consciousness, is, to it, something other than that hidden inner hfe and the immediacy of God's presence. But, with the completion of conscience, the distinction between its abstract consciousness and its self-consciousness is done away. It knows that the abstract consciousness is just this self, this individual self-existence which is certain of itself : that the very difference between the terms is abolished in the immediateness of the relation of the self to the ultimate Being, which, when placed outside the seH, is the abstract essence, and a Being concealed from it. For a relation is mediate when the terms related are not one and the same, but each is a different term for the other, and is one only with the other in some third term: an immediate relation, however, means, in fact, nothing else than the unity of the terms. Having risen above the meaningless position of holding these distinctions, which are not distinctions at all, to be stiU such, consciousness knows the immediateness of
666 Phenomenology of Mind
the presence of ultimate Being within it to be the unity of that Being and its self : it thus knows itself to be the Uving inherent reahty, and takes its knowledge to be Rehgion, which, qua knowedge viewed as an object or knowledge with an objective existence, is the utterance of the religious communion regarding its own spirit.
We see then, here, seLf-consciousness withdrawn into the inmost retreats of its being, with aU externality, as such, gone and vanished from it — returned into the intuition of ego as altogether identical with ego, an intuition where this ego is all that is essential, and all that exists. It is absorbed in this conception of itself ; for it is driven to the extreme limit of its extreme positions, and in such a way that the moments distinguished, moments through which it is real or stiU consciousness, are not merely for us these bare extremes; rather what it is for itself, and what, to it, is inherent, and what is, for it, existence — aU these moments evaporate into abstractions. They have no longer stabihty, no substantial existence for this phase of consciousness. Everything, that was hitherto for consciousness essential, has reverted into these abstractions. When clarified to this degree of transparency, consciousness exists in its poorest form, and the poverty, constituting its sole and only possession, is itself a process of disappearance. This absolute certainty into which the substance has been resolved is absolute untruth, which collapses within itself ; it is absolute seK-consciousness, in which consciousness [with its relation of self and object] is submerged and goes under.
Looking at this absorption and disappearance from
within, the inherent and essential substance is, for consciousness, knowledge in the sense of its knowledge. Being consciousness, it is split up into the opposition between itself and the object, which is, for it, the essentially real. But this very object is what k perfectly transparent, is its seK ; and its consciousness is merely knowledge concerning itself. AU Hfe and all spiritual truth have returned into this self, and have lost their difference from the ego. The moments of consciousness are therefore these extreme abstractions, of which none holds its ground, but each loses itseK ia the other and produces it. We have here the process of the " imhappy soul," * iu restless change with seH ; in the present case, however, this is a conscious experience going on inside itself, fidly conscious of being the notion of reason, while the "unhappy soul" above spoken of was only reason imphcitly. The absolute certainty of self thus finds itself qua consciousness, converted directly into a dying sound, a mere objectification of its subjectivity or self-existence. But this world so created is the utterance of its own voice, which in Kke manner it has directly heard, and the echo of which ordy returns to it. . This return does not therefore mean that the self is there in its true reaKty {an und filr sich) : for the real is, for it, not an inherent being, is no per se, but its very self. Just as httle has consciousness itself existence, for the objective aspect does not succeed in becoming something negative of the actual self, in the same way as this self does not reach complete actuahty. It lacks force to externahse itself, the power to make itself a thing, and endure existence. It hves in dread of staining the radiance of its inner being by action and
* v.p. 200 ff.
668 Phenomenology of Mind
existence. And to preserve the purity of its heart, it flees from contact with actuahty, and steadfastly perseveres in a state of self-willed impotence to renomice a self which is pared away to the last point of abstraction, and to give itself substantial existence, or, in other words, to transform its thought into being, and commit itself to absolute distinction [that between thought and being]. The hollow object, which it produces, now fills it, therefore, with the feeUng of emptiness. Its activity consists in yearning ; it merely loses itself ia becoming an unsubstantial shadowy object, and, rising above this loss and faUing back on itself, finds itself merely as lost. In this transparent purity of its moments it becomes a sorrow-laden " beautiful soul," as it is called ; its Kght dims and dies within it, and it vanishes as a shapeless vapour dissolving into thin air.*
This silent fusion of the pithless unsubstantial elements of evaporated life has, however, stUl to be taken in the other sense of the reahty of conscience, and in the way its process actually appears. Conscience has to be considered as acting. The objective moment in this phase of consciousness took above the determinate form of universal consciousness. The knowing of self is, qua this particular self, different from another self. Language in which aU reciprocally recognise and acknowledge each other as acting conscientiously — this general equaHty breaks up into the inequahty of each individual existing for himself ; each consciousness turns from its universaHty back into itself, each is just as much reflected absolutely into itseK as it is universal. By this means there necessarily comes about
* Cf. Hegel's remarks on Jacobi's conception of the " beautifiiil soul " : WW X., 1, p. 303.
the opposition of individuality to other individuals and to the universal. And this relation and its procedure we have to consider.
Or, agaia, this universaHty and duty have the absolutely opposite significance ; they signify determinate individuahty, exempting itself from what is universal, individuaUty which looks on pure duty as universaUty that has appeared merely on the surface and is turned on its outside : " duty is merely a matter of words," and passes for that whose being is for something else. Conscience, which in the first instance takes up merely a negative attitude towards duty, qva a given determinate duty, feels itseK detached from it. But since conscience fills empty duty with a determinate content drawn from its own seK, it is positively aware of the fact that it, qua this particular self, makes its own content. Its pure self, as it is empty knowledge, is without content and without definiteness. The content which it supphes to that knowledge is drawn from its own self, qna this determinate self, is drawn from itself as a natural individuahty. In speaking of the conscientiousness of its action, it is doubtless aware of its pure seK, but in the purpose of its action — a purpose which brings in a concrete content — it is conscious of itself as this particular individual, and is conscious of the opposition between what it is for itself and what it is for others, of the opposition of universahty or duty and its state of being reflected into self away from the universal.
While in this way the opposition, into which conscience passes when it acts, finds expression in its inner Kfe, the .opposition is at the same time disparity on its outer side, in the sphere of existence — the disparity
670 Phenomenology of Mind
or discordance of its particular individuality with reference to another individual. Its special peculiarity consists in the fact that the two elements constituting its consciousness — viz. the seK and the inherent nature {Ansich) — are unequal in value and significance within it ; in being accepted as vahd, they are so determined that certainty of self is the essential fact as against the inherent nature, or the universal, which is taken to be merely a moment. Over against this internal determination there thus stands the element of existence, the universal consciousness ; and for this latter it is rather universaUty, duty, which is the essential fact, while individuaUty, which exists for itself and is opposed to the imiversal, has merely the value of a superseded moment. The first consciousness is held to be Evil by the consciousness which thus stands by the fact of duty, because of the lack of congruity or identity of its internal subjective Ufe with the universal ; and since at the same time the first consciousness declares its act to be identity with itself, to be duty and conscientiousness, it is held by that universal consciousness to be Uyfocrisy.
The course taken by this opposition is, in the first instance, the formal reinstatement of the identity between what the evil consciousness is in its own nature and what it declares itself to be. It has to be made manifest that it is evil, and its objective existence thus made congruent with its real nature ; the hypocrisy must be unmasked. This return of the disparity, present in hypocrisy, into the state of congruency or identity is not at once brought to pass by the mere fact that, as people usually say, hypocrisy just proves, its reverence for duty and virtue -through assuming the appearance of them, and using this as
a mask to hide itself from its own consciousness no less than from another — as if, in this acknowledgment and recognition in itself of its opposite, eo ipso congruency and agreement were implied and contained. Yet even then it is just as truly done with this recognition in words and is reflected into seH ; and in the very fact of its usiag the inherent and essential reality merely as something which has a significance for another consciousness, there is really impHed its own contempt for that inherent principle, and the demonstration of the worthlessness of that reality for all. For what lets itself be used as an external instrument shows itself to be a thing, which has within it no proper weight and worth of its own.
Moreover, this congruency or identity, is not brought about either by the evil consciousness persisting onesidedly in its own state, or by the judgment of the universal consciousness. If the former disclaims the consciousness of duty, and maintains that what the latter pronounces to be baseness, to be absolute discordance with universality, is an action according to inner law and conscience, then, in this onesided assurance of identity and concord, there still remains its want of agreement with the other, since this other universal consciousness certainly does not beheve the assurance and does not acknowledge it. In other words, since onesided insistence on one extreme destroys itseK, evil would indeed thereby confess to being evil, but in so doing would at once cancel itseK and cease to be hypocrisy, and so would not qva hypocrisy be unmasked. It confesses itself, in fact, to be evil by asserting that, while opposing what is recognised as universal, it is acting according to inner
672 Phenomenology of Mind
law and conscience. For were this law and conscience not the law of its particularity and caprice, it would not be something inward, something private, but what is universally accepted and acknowledged. When, therefore, any one says he acts towards others from a law and conscience of his own, he is saying, in point of fact, that he is abusing and wronging them. But actual conscience is not this insistence on a knowledge and a will which are opposed to what is universal ; the universal is the element of its existence, and its very language pronounces its action to be recognised duty.
Just as little, when the universal consciousness emphasises and persists in its own judgment, does this unmask and dissipate hypocrisy. When that universal consciousness stigmatises hypocrisy as bad, base, and so on, it appeals, in passing such a judgment, to its own law, just as the evil consciousness, on its side, does too. For the former law makes its appearance in opposition to the latter, and thereby is a particular law. It has, therefore, no antecedent claim over the other law; rather it legitimises this other law. Hence the universal consciousness, by thus emulating the other, does precisely the opposite of what it means to do : for it shows that its so-called " true duty," which ought to be universally acknowledged, is something not acknowledged and recognised, and consequently it grants the other an equal right of independently existing on its own account.
This judgment [of universal consciousness], however, has, at the same time, another side to it, from which it leads the way to the dissolution of the opposition in question. Consciousness of the universal does not proceed, qua real and qua acting, to deal with the evil
consciousness ; for this latter, rather, is the real. In opposing the latter, it is a consciousness which is not entangled in the opposition of particular and universal involved in action. It stays within the universahty of thought, takes up the attitude of an apprehending intelHgence, and its first act is merely that of judgment. Through this judgment it now places itself, as was just observed, alongside the first consciousness, and the latter, through this identity, this likeness, between them, comes to see itself in this other consciousness. For iu the attitude of apprehension consciousness of duty is passive. Thereby it is in contradiction with itself as the absolute wiU of duty, as the self that determines absolutely from itself. It may well preserve itself in its purity, for it does not act ; it is hypocrisy, which wants to see the fact of judging taken for the actual deed, and instead of proving its uprightness and honesty by acts does so by expressing fine sentiments. It is thus constituted entirely in the same way as that against which the reproach is made of putting its phrases in place of duty. In both cases alike the aspect of reaUty is distinct from the express statements — in the one case owing to the selfish purpose of the action, in the other through failure to act at all, a result which is inevitable when there is mere talk about duty, for duty without deeds is altogether meaningless. The act of judging, however, has also to be looked at as a positive act of thought and has a positive content : this aspect makes the contradiction present in the apprehending consciousness and its identity with the first consciousness stiU more complete. The active consciousness declares its specific deed to be its duty, and the consciousness that passes judgment cannot deny
VOL. 11.— s
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this ; for duty as such is form void of all content and capable of any. In other words, concrete action, inherently implying diversity in its naanysidedness> involves the universal aspect, which is that which is taken as duty, just as much as the particular, which constitutes the share and interest the individual has in the act. The consciousness expressing its judgment does not now stop at the former aspect of duty and rest content with the knowledge which the active agent has of this, viz. that this is its duty, the condition and the status of its reahty. It holds on to the other aspect, diverts the act into the inner realm, and explains the act from selfish motives and from its inner intention, an intention different from the act itself. As every act is capable of treatment in respect of its dutifulness, so, too, each can be considered from this other point of view of particidarity ; for as an act it is the actuahty of an individual.
This process of judging, then, takes the act out of the sphere of its objective existence, and turns it back into that of the inner realm, into the form of specific and individual particularity. If the act carries glory with it, then the inner aspect is judged as love of fame. If it altogether fits in with the position and status of the individual, without going beyond this position, and is so constituted that the individuahty in question does not have the position hanging on to it as an external appendage, but through itself suppUes the content to this universaKty, and by that very process shows itself to be capable of a higher status — ^then the inner nature of the act is judged as ambition ; and so on. Since, in the act in general, the individual who acts comes to see himself in objective form, or gets the feeling of his
own being in his objective existence and thus attains enjoyment, the judgment on the act finds the inner nature of it to be an impulse towards personal and private happiness, even though this happiness were to consist merely ia umer moral vanity, the enjoyment of a sense of personal excellence, and in the foretaste and hope of a happiness to come.
No act can escape being judged in such a way ; for " duty for duty's sake," this bare purpose, is something unreal. What reaHty it has lies in the deed of some individuality, and the action thereby has in it the aspect of particularity. No hero is a hero to his valet, not, however, because the hero is not a hero, but because the valet is — the valet, with whom the hero has to do, not as a hero, but as a man who eats, drinks, and dresses, who, in short, appears as a particular individual with certain personal wants and idiosyncrasies. In the same way, there is no act in which that process of judgment cannot oppose the particular aspect of the individuahty to the universal aspect of the act, and set the valet of morahty against the hero who does the act.*
The consciousness, that so passes judgment, is in consequence itself base and mean, because it divides the act up, and brings out and holds on to its inherent inconsistency and self-discordance. It is, furthermore, hypocrisy, because it gives out this way of judging, not as another fashion of being wicked, but as the correct consciousness of the act ; sets itself up, in its unreality, in this vanity of knowing weU and better, far above the deeds it decries ; and wants to find its mere words without deeds taken for an admirable kind of reaHty.
On this account, then, putting itself on a level with
* Cp. with above Philosophy of History, Intra. (Bng. trans., p. 32 ff.)
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the agent on whom it passes judgment, it is recognised by the latter as the same as himself. This latter does not merely find himseli apprehended as something ahen or external to, and unlike or discordant with that other : but rather finds the other in its pecuhar constitutive character identical with himself. Seeing this similarity and giving this expression, he openly declares himseK to the other, and expects in Uke manner that the other, having in point of fact put itself on the same level, wiU respond in the same terms on its side, will give voice to the likeness found within it, and that thus the state of mutual recognition will be brought about. His confession is not an attitude of abasement or humihation before the other, is not flinging himseK away. For to give the matter expression in this way has not the one-sided character which would fix; and establish his disparity with the other : on the contrary, it is solely because of seeing the likeness of the other to him that he gives himself utterance. In making his confession he announces, from his side, their common Hkeness, and does so for the reason that language is the existence of spirit as an immediate self. He thus expects that the other will make its own contribution to this manner of existence.
But the admission on the part of the one who is wicked, " I am so," is not followed by a reply making a similar confession. This was not what that way of judging meant at aU : far from it ! It repels this community of natiu?e, and is the " hardheartedness," which keeps to itself and rejects aU continuity with the other. By so doing the scene is changed. The one who made the confession sees himself thrust off, and takes the other to be in the wrong when he refuses to
let his own inner nature go forth in the objective shape of an express utterance, opposes and contrasts the beauty of his own soul with the wicked individual, and opposes to the confession of the penitent the stiffnecked attitude of the self-consistent equable character, and the rigid silence of one who keeps himself to himself and refuses to throw himself away for some one else. Here we find asserted the highest pitch of revolt to which a spirit certain of itself can reach. For it beholds itself, qua this bare self-knowledge, in another conscious being, and in such a way that the external form of this other is not an unessential " thing," as in the case of an object of wealth, but thought ; knowledge itself is what is opposed to it. It is this absolutely unbroken continuity of pure knowledge which refuses to estabhsh commimication with an other, which had, ipso facto, by making its confession, renounced separate isolated self-existence, had aflfirmed its particularity to be cancelled, and thereby estabUshed itself as continuous with the other, i.e. established itself as universal. The other, however, retains in its own case and reserves to itself its uncommunicative, isolated independence : in the case of the individual making the confession it retains just the very thing which that individual has already cast away. It thereby proves itself to be a form of consciousness which has forsaken and denies the very nature of spirit ; for it does not understand that spirit, in the absolute certainty of itself, is master and lord over every deed, and over all reality, and can reject and cast them off and make them as if they had never been. At the same time, it does not see the contradiction it is committing in not allowing a rejection, which has been
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made in express language, to pass for genuine rejection, wliile itself kas the certainty of its own spiritual Hfe, not in a concrete real act, but in its inner nature, and finds the objective existence of this inner being in the mere utterance of its own judgment. It is thus its own self which checks that other's return from the act to the spiritual objectivity of spoken utterance, and to spiritual identity and agreement, and by its stifEness produces the discordance and dissimilarity which still remain.
Now, so far as the spirit which is certain of itself, in the form of a " beautiful soul," does not possess the faculty of relinquishing the self-absorbed uncommunicative knowledge of itself, it cannot attain to any identity with the consciousness that is repulsed, and so cannot succeed in seeing the unity of its seK in another hfe, cannot reach objective existence. The equahty comes about, therefore, merely in a negative way, as a state of being devoid of spiritual character. The "beautiful soul," then, has no concrete reahty ; it subsists in the contradiction between its pure self and the necessity felt by this self to externalise itself and turn into something actual; it exists in the immediacy of this rooted and fixed opposition, an immediacy which alone is the middle term mediating and reconciling an opposition which has arisen to its pure abstraction, and is pure being or empty nothingness. Thus the " beautiful soul," being conscious of this contradiction in its unreconciled immediacy, is unhinged, disordered, and runs to madness, passes away in yearning, and is consimied in pining inanition.* Thereby it gives up, as a fact, its
* This was the actual fate of Novalis, the " St. John of Romanticism " (d. 1801, sBt. 29). Cp. Hegel's remarks on Novalis WW X., 1, p. 201 : XVI., p. 500.
stubborn insistence on its own isolated self-existence, but only to bring forth the soulless, spiritless unity of abstract being.
The true, that is to say the self-conscious and actual, balance or adjustment of the two sides is necessitated by, and already contained in the foregoing. Breaking the hard heart and raising it to the level of universality is the same process which appeared in the case of the consciousness that expressly made its confession. The wounds of the spirit heal and leave no scars behind. The deed is not something imperishable ; the spirit takes it back into itself ; and the aspect of particularity present in it, whether in the form of an intention or of an existential negativity and limitation, immediately passes away. The process of actually realising self, the form of its act, is merely a moment of the whole ; and the same is true of the knowledge functioning through judgment, and establishing and maintaining the distinction between the particular and universal aspects of action. The evil consciousness, spoken of, definitely yields up and relinquishes itself, or sets itseK down as a moment, being drawn into the way of express confession by seeing itself in another. This other, however, must have its onesided, imaccepted, and imacknowledged judgment broken down, just as the former has to abandon its onesided unacknowledged existence in a state of particularity and isolation. And as the former displays the power of spirit over its reality, so this other must manifest the power of spirit over its constitutive and determinate notion.
The latter, however, renounces thought that divides and separates, and the rigid imperviousness of imcom-
^80 Phenomenology of Mini
municative self-existence, for the reason that, in point of fact, it sees itself in the first. That which, in this way, abandons its reahty and makes itself into a superseded particular "this" (Diesen), shows itself thereby to be, in fact, universal. It turns away from its external reality back into itself as inner essence ; and there the universal consciousness thus knows and finds itself.
The forgiveness it extends to the first is the renunciation of self, of its unreal being, since it identifies this unreal nature and that other element of real action, and recognises what was called bad — a determination assigned to action by thought — ^to be good ; or rather it lets go and gives up this distinction of determinate thought with its self -determining isolated judgment, just as the other foregoes determining the act in isolation and for its own private behoof. The word of reconciliation is the objectively existent spirit, which sees and immediately apprehends the pure knowledge of itself qua universal being in its opposite, in the pure knowledge of itself qua absolutely seK-confined single individual — a reciprocal recognition which is Absolute Spirit.
Absolute Spirit enters existence merely at the culminating point at which its pure knowledge about itself is the opposition and interchange with itself. Knowing that its pure knowledge is the abstract essential reahty. Absolute Spirit is this knowing duty in absolute opposition to the knowledge which knows itself, qua absolute singleness of self, to be the essentially real. The former is the pure continuity of the universal, which knows the individuality, that thinks itself the real, to be inherently null and naught, to be evil. The latter, again, is absolute discreteness, which thinks
itself absolute in its pure oneness, and thinks the universal is the unreal which exists only for others. Both aspects are refined and clarified to this degree of purity, where there is no self-less existence left, no negative of consciousness in either of them, where, instead, the one element of " duty " is the self-identical character of its self-knowledge, and the other element of "evil" equally has its purpose in its own inner being and its reahty in its own mode of utterance. The content of this utterance is the substance that gives it subsistence ; the utterance is the assurance and asseveration of the certainty of spirit within its own self.
These spirits, both certain of themselves, have each no other purpose than its own pure self, and no other reality and existence than just this pure self. But they are stiU different, and the difference is absolute, because holding within this element of the pure notion. The difference is absolute, too, not merely for us [tracing the experience], but for the notions themselves which stand in this opposition. For while these notions are indeed determinate and specific relatively to one another, they are at the same time in themselves universal, so that they compass the whole range of the self ; and this self can have no other content than this its own determinate constitution, which neither transcends the self nor is more restricted than it. For the one aspect, the absolutely universal, is pure self-knowledge as well as the other, the absolute discreteness of single individuahty, and both are merely this pure self-knowledge. Both determinate aspects, then, are cognitive pure notions which know qiui notions, whose very constitution consists in inunediately knowing, or, in other words, whose relationship and opposition is the Ego. Because of this
682 Phenomenology of Mind
they are for one another these absolutely opposed elements ; it is what is completely inner that has in this way come iato opposition to itself and entered objective existence ; they constitute pure knowledge, which, owing to this opposition, takes the form of consciousness. But as yet it is not self -consciousness. It obtains this actualisation in the course of the process through which this opposition passes. For this opposition is really itsdlf the indiscrete continuity and identity of ego = ego ; and each by itself inherently cancels itself just through the contradiction in its pure universality, which, while implying continuity and identity, at the same time stiU resists its identity with the other, and separates itself from it. Through this relinquishment of separate selfhood, the knowledge, which in its existence is in a state of diremption, returns into the unity of the self ; it is the concrete actual Ego, imiversal knowledge of self in its absolute opposite, in the knowledge which is internal to and within the self, and which, because of the very purity of its separate subjective existence, is itself completely universaL The reconciling affirmation, the " y6s," with which both egos desist from their existence in opposition, is the existence of the ego expanded into a duahty, an ego which remains therein one and identical with itself, and possesses the certainty of itself in its complete relinquishment and its opposite : it is Grod appearing ia the midst of those who know themselves in the form of pure knowledge.
(CC) RELIGION
[The appearance of Absolute Spirit as a principle constituting on its own account a distinctive stage of experience is at once a demand of the preceding development and a condition of making experience selfcomplete. Finite or socialised spiritual existence is at its best incapable of establishing the truth that " Spirit is the only reality " ; for the more finite spirit approximates to the state of claiming to be self-contained the more is it dependent on universal self-consciousness. A trans-finite or Absolute Spiritual Being as such is thus necessary to realise and sustain the fullness of meaning which finite spirit possesses. Moreover, if " the truth is the whole," and only so is tmth self -complete and self -explaining, and, if reality is essentially spiritual— then experience only finds its complete meaning realised in the principle of Absolute Spirit. Hence the final stage of the Phenomenology of experience is the appearance therein of Absolute Spirit. Moreover, Absolute Spirit, in its ovm distinctive existence, could only appear at the end of the process of experience, for the whole of that process is required to reveal and to constitute the substance of which the Absolute consists. But the peculiarity of the stage now reached is that here the Absolute operates in its undivided totality to form a definite type of experience ; or, in the language of the text, we have the Absolute here " conscious of its self." No doubt, in all the previous stages, "consciousness," " self -consciousness," " reason," " spirit," the Absolute has been implied as a limiting principle, at once substantiating and determining the boundaries of each stage : hence each stage had an Absolute of its own, the character of which was derived in each case from the peculiarity of the stage in question. Now, however, we have the Absolute by itself, in its single self-completeness, as the sole formative factor of a certain type of experience.
The Absolute, then, in its own seK-complete reality appears as the constitutive principle of experience. The experience here is the selfconsciousness of Absolute Spirit; it appears to itself in all its objects. Since all the modes of finitude hitherto considered (consciousness, selfconsciousness, etc.) are embraced in its single totality, it may use each and all of these various modes as the media through and in which to appear.
684 Phenomenology of Mind
Whea it appears in and through theae modes of finitude we have the attitude of Religion. Since these modes, as we saw, differ, the religious attitude differs ; and accordingly we have various types or forms of religion.
Each of these forms, in and through which the Absolute appears, is circumscribed in its nature and process ; each is per se inadequate to the revelation of complete absolute self-consciousness : hence the variety of religions is necessitated by and is indirectly due to the failure of any one type and the inadequacy of every single type to reveal the Absolute completely. A form of appearance or self-manifestation of the Absolute is therefore demanded which will reveal Absolute Spirit adequately to itself as it essentially is in itself. Here it will know itself, so to say, face to face, and with perfect completeness. This form is Absolute KnowledgeHence Eeligion and Absolute Knowledge are the final stages in the argument of the Phenomenology. The former is dealt' with in the immediately succeeding section (VII) and its various subsections ; the latter forms the subject of the concluding section (VIII) of the work.]
VII
Religion in General
IN the forms of experience hitherto dealt with — which are distinguished broadly as Consciousness, Self-consciousness, Reason, iand Spirit — ^Rehgion also, the consciousness of Absolute Being in general, has no doubt made its appearance. But that was from the point of view of consciousness, when it has the Absolute Being for its object. Absolute Being, however, in its own distinctive nature, the Self-consciousness of Spirit, has not appeared in those forms.
Even at the plane of Consciousness, viz. when this takes the shape of " Understanding," there is a consciousness of the supersensuous, of the inner being of objective existence. But the supersensible, the eternal, or whatever we care to call it, is devoid of selfhood. It is merely, to begin with, something universal, which is a long way stiU from being spirit knowing itseH as spirit.
Then there was Self-consciousness, which came to its final shape in the " bereft soul," the " imhappy consciousness " ; that was merely the pain and sorrow of spirit wrestling to get itself out into objectivity once more, but not succeeding. The \xmtj of individual self-consciousness with its unchangeable Being, which is what this stage arrives at, remains, in consequence, a " beyond," something afar ofi.
686 Phenomenology of Mind
The immediate existence of Reason (which we found arising out of that state of sorrow), and the special shapes which reason assumes, have no form of religion, because seK-consciousness in the case of reason knows itself or looks for itself in the direct and immediate present.
On the other hand, in the world of the Ethical Order, we met with a type of religion, the rehgion of the nether world. This is behef in the fearful and unknown darkness of Fate, and in the Eumenides of the spirit of the departed : the former being pure negation taking the form of universahty, the latter the same negation but in the form of particularity. Absolute Being is, then, in the latter shape no doubt the self and is present, as there is no other way for the self to he except - present. But the particular self is this particular ghostly shade, which keeps the universal element, Fate, separated from itself. It is indeed a shade, a ghost, a cancelled and superseded particular, and so a universal self. But that negative meaning has not yet turned round into this latter positive significance, and hence the self, so cancelled and transcended, still directly means at the same time this particular being, this insubstantial reality. Fate, however, without self remains the darkness of night devoid of consciousness, which never comes to draw distinctions within itself, and never attains the clearness of self-knowledge.
This behef in a necessity that produces nothingness, this behef in the nether world, becomes belief in Heaven, because the self which has departed must be united with its imiversal nature, must unfold what it contains in terms of this universahty, and thus
become clear to itself. This Idiigdom of belief, however, we saw unfold its content merely in the element of reflective thought (Denhen), without bringing out the true notion (Begriff) ; and we saw it, on that account, perish in its final fate, viz. in the rehgion of enUghtenment. Here in this type of rehgion, the supersensible beyond, which we found in " understanding," is reinstated agaia, but in such a way that self -consciousness rests and feels satisfied in the mundane present, not in the " beyond," and thinks of the supersensible beyond, void and empty, unknowable, and devoid of aU terrors, neither as a self nor as power and might.
In the rehgion of Morahty it is at last reinstated that Absolute Reahty is a positive content ; but that content is bound up with the negativity characteristic of the enhghtenment. The content is an objective being, which is at the same time taken back into the self, and remains there enclosed, and is a content with internal distinctions, while its parts are just as immediately negated as they are posited. The final destiny, however, which absorbs this contradictory process, is the self conscious of itself as the controlling necessity {Schicksal) of what is essential and actual.
Spirit knowing its self is in rehgion primarily and immediately its own pure self-consciousness. Those modes of it above considered — " objective spirit," " spirit estranged from itself " and " spirit certain of its seH " — together constitute what it is in its condition of consciousness, the state in which, being objectively opposed to its own world, it does not therein apprehend and consciously possess itself. But in Conscience it brings itself as well as its objective world as a whole
688 Phenomenology of Mind
into subjection, as also its idea * and its various specific conceptions ; t ^.nd is now self-consciousness at home with itself. Here spirit, represented as an object, has the significance for itself of being Universal Spirit, which contains within itself all that is ultimate and essential and all that is concrete and actual ; yet is not m the form of freely subsisting actuality, or of the detached independence of external nature. It has a shape, no doubt, the form of objective being, in that it is object of its own consciousness ; but because this being is put forward in rehgion with the essential character of being self-consciousness, the form or shape assmned is one perfectly transparent to itself ; and the reaUty spirit contains is enclosed in it, or transcended in it, just in the same way as when we speak of " all reaUty " ; its reahty is imiversal reahty in the sense of a product of thought.
Since, then, in rehgion, the peculiar characteristic of what is properly consciousness of spirit does not have the form of detached and external otherness, the existence of spirit is distinct from its self-consciousness, and its actual reaUty proper falls outside rehgion. There is no doubt one spirit in both, but its consciousness does not embrace both together ; and rehgion appears as a part of existence, of acting, and of striving, whose other part is the hfe hved within its own actual world. As ,we now know that spirit in its own world and spirit conscious of itself as spirit, i.e. spirit in the sphere of rehgion, are the same, the completion of rehgion consists in the two forms becoming identical with one another : not merely in its reahty being grasped and embraced by rehgion, but conversely — it, as spirit
* Vorstellung. t Begriff.
conscious of itself, becomes actual to itself, and real object of its own consciousness.
So far as spirit in religion presents itself to itself, it is indeed consciousness, and the reality enclosed within it is the shape and garment in which it clothes its idea of itself. The reahty, however, does not in this presentation get proper justice done to it, that is to say, it does not get to be an independent and free objective existence and not merely a garment. And conversely, because that reahty lacks within itseK its completion, it is a determinate shape or form, which does not attain to what it ought to reveal, viz. spirit conscious of itself. That its form might express spirit itself, the form would have to be nothing else than spirit, and spirit would have to appear to itself, or to be actual, as it is in its own essential being. Only thereby, too, would be attained — ^what may seem to demand the opposite — that the object of its consciousness has, at the same time, the form of free and independent reahty. But only spirit which is object to itself in the shape of Absolute Spirit, is as much aware of being a free and independent reahty as it remains therein conscious of itself.
Volume II. (BE). SPIRIT . 429-682 (part 14)
Since in the first instance seK-consciousness and consciousness simply, rehgion, and spirit as it is externally in its world, or the objective existence of spirit, are distinct, the latter consists in the totahty of spirit, so far as its moments are separated from each other and each is set forth by itseK. These moments, however, are consciousness, self-consciousness, reason, and spirit — spirit, that is, qua immediate spirit, which is not yet consciousness of spirit. Its totahty, taken all together, constitutes the mundane existence of spirit as a whole ;
690 Phenomenology of Mind
spirit as such contaiop the previous separate embodiments in the form of universal determinations of its own being, in those moments just named. Religion presupposes that these have completely run their course, and is their simple totahty, their absolute Self and soul.
* The course which these traverse is, moreover, in relation to rehgion, not to be pictured as a temporal sequence. It is only spirit in its entirety that is in time, and the shapes assumed, which are specific embodiments of the whole of spirit as such, present themselves in a sequence one after the other. For it is only the whole which properly has reaUty, and hence the form of pure freedom relatively to anything else, the form which takes expression as time. But the moments of the whole, consciousness, . self-consciousness, reason, and spirit, have, because they are moments, no existence separate from one another.
Just as spirit was distinct from its moments, we have further, ia the third place, to distinguish from these moments their specific individuated character. Each of those moments, m itself, we saw broke up again in a process of development aU its own, and took various shapes and forms : as e.g. in the case of consciousness, sensuous certainty and perception were distinct phases. These lattei; aspects faU apart in time from one another, and belong to a specific particidar whole. For spirit descends from its universahty to assume an, individual form through specification, by determination. This determination, or mediate element, is consciousness, self-
♦ The two following paragraphs form a break in the analysis, and may be regarded as an explanatory note.
consciousness, and so on. Now the forms assumed by these moments constitute iadividuality. Hence these exhibit and reveal spirit in. its individuahty or concrete reahty, and are distinguished ia time from one another, though in. such a way that the succeeding retains within it the preceding.
While, therefore, rehgion is the completion of the Ufe of spirit, its final and complete expression, into which, as being their groimd, its individual moments, consciousness, self-consciousness, reason, and spirit, return and have returned, they, at the same time, together constitute the objectively existing realisation of spirit in its totahty ; as such spirit is real only as the moving process of these aspects which it possesses, a process of distinguishing them and returning back into itself. In the process of these universal moments is contained the development of rehgion generally. Since, however, each of these attributes was set forth and presented, not only in the way it in general determines itself, but as it is in and for itself, i.e. as, within its own being, running its course as a distinct whole — there has thus arisen not merely the development of rehgion generally; those independently complete processes pursued by the individual phases and stages of spirit contain at the same time the determinate forms of rehgion itself. Spirit in its entirety, spirit in rehgion, is once more the process from its immediacy to the attainment of a knowledge of what it imphcitly or immediately is ; and is the process o£ attaining the state where the shape and form, in which it appears as an object for its own consciousness, wiU be perfectly identical with and adequate to its essential nature, and where it will behold itseK as it is.
692 Phenomenology of Mind
In this development of religion, then, spirit itseK assumes definite forms, which constitute the distinctions involved in this process : and at the same time a determinate or specific form of religion has likewise an actual spirit of a specific character. Thus, if consciousness, seH-consciousness, reason, and spirit belong to selfknowing spirit in general, in a similar way the specific shapes, which self-knowing spirit assumes, appropriate and adopt the distinctive forms which were specially developed in the case of each of the stages — consciousness, self-consciousness, reason, and spirit. The determinate shape, assumed in a given case by religion, appropriates, from among the forms belonging to each of its moments, the one adapted to it, and makes this its actual spirit. This one determinate attitude of rehgion pervades and permeates all aspects of its actual existence, and stamps them with this common feature.
In this way the arrangement now assumed by the forms and shapes which have thus far appeared, is different from the way they appeared in their own order. On this point we may note shortly at the outset what is of chief importance. In the series we considered, each moment, exhaustively elaborating its entire content, evolved and formed itself into a single whole within its own peculiar principle. And knowledge was the inner depth, or the spirit, wherein the elements, having no subsistence of their own, possessed their substance. This substance, however, has now at length made its appearance ; it is the deep life of spirit certain of itself ; it does not allow the principle belonging to each individual form to get isolated, and become a whole within itself : rather it collects all
these moments into its own content, keeps them together, and advances within this total wealth of its concrete actual spirit ; while aU its particular moments take into themselves and receive together in common the like determinate character of the whole. This spirit certain of itself and the process it goes through — this is their true reahty, the independent self-subsistence, which belongs to each individually.
Thus while the previous linear series in its advance marked the retrogressive steps in it by knots, but thence went forward again in one linear stretch, it is now, as it were, broken at these knots, these universal moments, "and radiates into many lines, which, being bound together into a single bundle, combine at the same time symmetrically, so that the similar distinctions, in which each separately took shape within its own sphere, meet together.
For the rest, it is self-evident from the whole argument, how this co-ordination of universal directions, just mentioned, is to be understood; so that it becomes superfluous to remark that these distinctions are to be taken to mean essentially and only moments of the process of development, not parts. In the case of actual concrete spirit they are attributes of its substance ; in rehgion, on the other hand, they are only predicates of the subject. In the same way, indeed, all forms in general are, in themselves or for us, contained in spirit and contained in every spirit. But the main point of importance, in dealing with its reahty, is solely what determinate character it has in its consciousness, in which specific character it has expressed its self, or in what shape it knows its essential nature.
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The distinction made between actual spirit and that same spirit which knows itself as spirit, or between itself qua consciousness and qua self-consciousness, is transcended and done away with in the case where spirit knows itself in its real truth. Its consciousness and its self-consciousness have come to terms. But, as religion is here to begin with and immediately, this distinction has not yet reverted to spirit. It is merely the conception, the principle, of rehgion that is established at first. In this the essential element is self-consciousness, which is conscious of being all truth, and which contains all reahty within that truth. This self-consciousness, being consciousness [and so aware of an object], has itseK for its object. Spirit, which knows itself in the first instance immediately, is thus to itself spirit in the form of immediacy ; and the specific character of the shape in which it appears to itself is that of pure simple being. This being, this bare existence, has indeed a filling drawn neither from sensation or manifold matter, nor from any other one-sided elements, purposes, and determinations ; its filling is solely spirit, and is known by itself to be all truth and reahty. Such filling is in this first form not in agreement or identity with its own shape ; spirit qua ultimate Keahty is not in accord with its consciousness. It is actual only as Absolute Spirit, when it is also to itself in its truth as it is in its certainty of itself, or, when the extremes, into which spirit qua consciousness faKs, exist for one another in spiritual shape. The embodiment adopted by spirit qaa object of its own consciousness, remains filled, by the certainty of spirit, and this self-certainty constitutes its substance. Through this content, the degrading of the object to
bare objectivity, to the form of sometlung that negates self-consciousness, disappears. The immediate unity of spirit with itself is the fundamental basis, or pure consciousness, ioside which consciousness breaks up into its constituent elements [viz. an object with subject over agaiost it]. In this way, shut up within its pure self-consciousness, spirit does not exist in rehgion as the creator of a nature in general; rather what it produces in the course of this process are its forms and shapes qua spirits, which together constitute all that it can reveal when it is completely manifested. And this process itself is the development of its perfect and complete actuahty through the individual aspects thereof, i.e. through its imperfect modes of reahsation.
The first reahsation of spirit is just the principle and notion of religion itself — reUgion as immediate and thus Natural Rehgion. Here spirit knows itself as its object in a " natural " or immediate shape. The second realisation, is, however, necessarily that of knowing itself in the shape of transcended and superseded natural existence, i.e. in the form of self. This is the Rehgion of Art or productive activity. For the shape it adopts is raised to the form of self through the productive activity of consciousness, by which this consciousness beholds in its object its own action, i.e. sees the self. The third realisation, finally, cancels the one-sidedness of the first two : the self is as much an inmiediate self as the immediacy is a self. If spirit in the first is in the form of consciousness, and in the second in that of self-consciousness, it is in the third in the form of the unity of both ; it has then the shape of what is completely self-contained {An-und Fursichseyns) ; and since it is thus presented as it
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is in and for itself, this is the sphere of Revealed Religion. Although spirit, however, here reaches its true shape, the very shape assumed and the conscious presentation are an aspect and phase still unsurmounted ; and from this spirit has to pass over into the hfe of the Notion, in order therein completely to resolve the form of objectivity, in the notion, which embraces within itself this its own opposite.
It is then that spirit has grasped its own principle, the notion of itself, as so far only we [who analyse spirit] have grasped it ; and its form, the element of its existence, since this form is the notion, is then spirit itself.
Natural Religion
[Tie arrangement of the analysis of Religion and tie divisions into the various subsections are, as indicated in the preceding note (p. 683), determined by the general development of experience. That development is from the immediate through mediation to the fusion of immediacy and mediation. The stages of the development of experience are Consciousness, Self-consciousness, Reason, the latter leading to its highest level — finite Spiritual existence. The development of Religion follows these various ways in vsrhich objects are given in experience, and the three chief divisions of Religion are determined accordingly : Natural Religion is religion at the level of Consciousness; Art, Religion at the level of Self -consciousness ; Revealed Religion is Religion at the level of Reason and Spirit. Each of these is agaiu subdivided, and the subdivision foUows more or less closely the various subdivisions of these three ultimate levels of experience— Consciousness, Thus, in Natural Religion, we have Religion at the level of Sense-certainty — " Light " : Religion at the level of Perception— " Life " : and Religion at the level of Understanding — the reciprocal relation constituted by the " play of forces " appears as the relation of the " Artificer " to his own product.
The general principle is not worked out in detail, with the same obviousness, in the case of the other two primary types of Religion — ^Art and Revealed Religion. But the same general method of development is pursued in these cases.
The historical material before the mind of the writer is, as might be expected, the various religions which have historically appeared amongst mankind These religions are treated, however, as illustrations of principles dominating the religious consciousness in general, rather than as merely historical phenomena.
"With the succeeding argument should be read Hegel's Philosophy of Religion, Part II, Sections I and II, and Part III.]
NATUEAi Religion*
Spirit knowing spirit is consciousness of itseK ; and is to itself in the form of objectivity. It is ; and is at the same time self-existence {Fursichsein). It is for self; it is the aspect of self -consciousness, and is so in contrast to the aspect of its consciousness, the aspect by which it relates itself to itself as object. In its consciousness there is the opposition and in consequence the specificity of the form in which it appears to itself and knows itself. It is with this specificity that we have alone to do in considering religion ; for its essential unspecified principle, its abstract notion, has already come to light. The distinction of consciousness and selE-consciousness, however, falls at the same time within this notion. The form or shape of rehgion does not contain the existence of spirit in the sense of its being nature detached and free from thought, nor in the sense of its being thought detached from existence. The shape assumed by rehgion is existence contained and preserved in thought, as well as a thought-content which is consciously existent:
It is by the determinate character of this form, in which spirit knows itself, that one rehgion is distinguished from another. But we have at the same time to note that the systematic exposition of this knowledge about itself, in tertns of this particular specific character, does not as a fact exhaust the whole
* Primarily Oriental religion.
meaning of a given actual reKgion. The series of different religions, which. wiU come before us, just as much sets forth again merely the different aspects of a single rehgion, and indeed of every particular reKgion, and the ideas, the conscious processes, which seem to mark off one concrete religion from another, make their appearance in each. All the same the diversity must also be looked at as a diversity of rehgion. For while spirit hves in the distinction of its consciousness and its self-consciousness, the process it goes through finds its goal in the transcendence of this fimdamental distinction and in giving the form of self-consciousness to the -given shape which is object of consciousness. This distinction, however, is not eo ipso transcended by the fact that the shapes, which that consciousness contains, have also the element of seH ia them, and that God is represented as self-consciousness. The consciously presented self is not the actual concrete self. In order that this, like every other more specific determiaation of the form, may in truth belong to this form, it has partly to be put into this form by the action of selfconsciousness, and partly the lower determination must show itself to be cancelled and transcended and comprehended by the higher. For what is consciously presented {VorgstdU) only ceases to be something " p-esented " and ahen, external, to its knowledge, by the self having produced it, and so viewing the determination of the object as its own determination, and hence seeing itself in that object. By this operation, the lower determiaation [that of being something " presented "] has at once vanished ; for doing anything is a negative process which is carried through at the expense of something else. So far as that lower determination
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still continues to appear, it has withdrawn into what is without any essential significance : just as, on the other hand, where the lower still predominates, while the higher is also present, the one co-exists in a self-less way alongside of the other. While, therefore, the various ideas falling within a . particular rehgion no doubt exhibit the whole course its forms take, the character of each is determined by the particular unity of consciousness and self -consciousness ; that is to say, by the fact that self-consciousness has taken into itself the determination belonging to the object of consciousness, has, by its own action, made that determination altogether its own, and knows it to be the essential one as compared with the others.
The truth of behef in a given determination of the religious spirit shows itself in this, that the actual spirit is constituted after the same manner as the form in which spirit beholds itself in religion ; thus e.g. the incarnation of God, which is found in Eastern reUgioii, has no truth, because the concrete actual spirit of this religion is without the reconcihation this principle imphes.
It is not in place here to return from the totality of specific determinations back to the particular determination, and show in what shape the plenitude of all the others is contained within it and within its particular form of rehgion. The higher form, when put back under a lower, is deprived of its significance for self-conscious spirit, belongs to spirit merely in a superficial way, and is for it at the level of a presentation. The higher form has to be considered in its own pecuHar significance, and dealt with where it is the principle of a particular rehgion, and is certified and approved by its actual spirit.
a God as Light*
Spirit, as the absolute Being, which is self-consciousness— or the self-conscious absolute Being, which is all truth and knows all reality as itself — is, to begin with, merely its notion and principle in contrast to the reahty which it acquires in the process of its conscious activity. And this conception is, as contrasted with the clear dayhght of that exphcit development, the darkness and night of its inner hf e ; in contrast to the existence of its varioiis moments as independent forms and shapes, this notion is the creative secret of its birth. This secret has its revelation within itself ; for existence has its necessary place in this notion, because this notion is spirit knowing itself, and thus possesses in its own nature the moment of being consciousness and of presenting itseK objectively. We have here the pure ego, which, in externalising itself, in seeing itself qua universal object, has the certainty of self ; in other words, this object is, for the ego, the fusion of all thought and all reality.
When the first and immediate cleavage is made within self-knowing Absolute Spirit, its form assumes that character which belongs to immediate consciousness or to sense-certainty. It beholds itself in the form of being ; but not being in the sense of what is without
* Parsee religion.
702 Phenomenology of Mind
spirit, containing only the contingent qualities of sensation— the kind of being that belongs solely to sensecertainty. Its beiag is filled with the content of spirit. It also includes within it the form which we found in the case of immediate self-consciousness, the form of lord and master,* with reference to the self -consciousness of spirit which retreats from its object.
This being, haviag as its content the notion of spirit, is, then, the mode of spirit iu relation simply to itseK — the form of having no special form at aU. In virtue of this characteristic, this mode is the pure aU-containing, all-sufiusing Light of the Bast, which preserves itself in its formless indeterminate substantiahty. Its counterpart, its otherness, is the equally simple negative — Darkness. The processes of its own self-abandonment, its creations in the unresisting element of its counterpart, are bursts of Light. At the same time in their ultimate simphcity they are its way of becoming something for itself, its return from its objective existence, streams of fire consuming its embodiment. The distinction, which it gives itself, no doubt thrives abundantly on the substance of existence, and grows into and assumes the diverse forms of nature. But the essential simphcity of its thought rambles and roves about inconstant and inconsistent, enlarges its bounds to measureless extent, and its beauty heightened to splendour is lost in its sublimity.!
The content, which this state of mere being involves, its perceptive activity, is, therefore, an unreal byplay on this substance which merely rises, without descending into itself to become subject and secure
* Term applied in e.g. Judaism and Mohammedanism, t Cp. PMlos. ofRelig., WM., XI, 403, 404, 411.
firmly its distinctions througli the self. Its deternunations are merely attributes, which do not succeed in attaining independence ; they remain merely names of the One, called by many names. This One is clothed with the manifold powers of existence and with the shapes of reahty, as with a soulless, selfless ornament ; they are merely messengers of its mighty power,* claiming no wiU of their own, visions of its glory, voices in its praise.
This revel of heaving hfef must, however, assume the character of distinctive seK-existence, and give enduring subsistence to its fleeting forms. Immediate being, in which it places itseK over against its own consciousness, is itself the negative destructive agency which dissolves its distinctions. It is thus in truth the Self ; and spirit therefore passes on to know itseH in the form of self. Pure Light scatters its simphcity as an infinity of separate forms, and presents itself as an offering to seLf-esdstence, that the individual may have sustainment in its substance.
* Angels. t Cp. Enci/., § 389.
Plants and Ajshmals as Objects of Religion*
Self-conscious spirit, passing away from abstract, formless Essence and going into itself — or, in other words, having raised its immediacy to the level of Self — ^makes its simple miity assume the character of a manifold of self-existing entities, and is the Rehgion of spiritual Sense-Perception. Here spirit breaks up into an innumerable plurahty of weaker and stronger, richer and poorer spirits.' This Pantheism, which, to begin with, consists in the quiescent stabihty of these spiritual atoms, passes into a process of active internal hostihty. The innocence, which characterises the flower and plant rehgions, and which is merely the selfless idea of Self, gives way to the seriousness of struggling warring hfe, to the guilt of animal rehgions ; the quiescence and impotence of merely contemplative individuahty pass into the destructive violence of separate self-existence.
It is of no avail to have removed the lifelessness of abstraction from the things of perception, and to have raised them to the level of reahties of spiritual perception : the animation of this spiritual kingdom has death in the heart of it, owing to the fact of determinateness and the inherent negativity, which invades and trenches upon their innocent and harmless indifEerence to one another. Owing to this determinateness
* Primarily religions of India.
and negativity, the dispersion of passive plant-forms into manifold entities becomes a hostile process, in which the hatred stirred up by their independent selfexistence rages and consimies.
The actual self-consciousness at work in this dispersed and disintegrated spirit, takes the form of a multitude of individualised mutually-antipathetic folkspirits, who fight and hate each other to the death, and consciously accept certain specific forms of animals as theix essential reality, their god * : for they are nothing else than spirits of animals, their animal hfe separate and cut ofi from one another, and with no universaUty consciously present in them.
The characteristic of purely negative independent self-existence, however, consumes itself in this active hatred towards one another ; and through this process, involved in its very principle, spirit enters into another shape. Independent self-existence cancelled and abolished is the form of the object, a form which i^ produced by the self, or rather is the self produced, the self -consuming self, i.e. the seK that becomes a "thing." The agent at work, therefore, retains the upper hand over these animal spirits merely tearing each other to pieces ; and his action is not merely negative, but composed and creative. The consciousness of spirit is, thus, now the process which is above and beyond the immediate inherent [universal] nature, as well as transcends the abstract self-existence in isolation. Since the impHcit inherent natiire is relegated, through opposition, to the level of a specific character, it is no longer the proper form of Absolute Spirit, but a reaKty which its consciousness
* Sacred animals in Indian religion, YOt. n.— V
706 Phenomenology of Mind
finds lying over against itseK as an ordinary existing fact and cancels; at the same time this consciousness is not merely this negative cancelling seK-existent being, but produces its own objective idea of itself, — selfexistence put forth in the form of an object. This process of production is, all the same, not yet perfect production ; it is a conditioned activity, the forming of a given material.
The Artificer*
Spirit, then, here takes the form of the artificer, and its action, when producing itself as object, but without having as yet grasped the thought of itself, is an instinctive kind of working, like bees building their cells.
The first form, because immediate, has the abstract character of " understanding," and the work accomphshed is not yet in itself endued with spirit. The crystals of Pyramids and Obelisks, simple combinations of straight lines with even surfaces and equal relations of parts in which incommensurabihty of curvature is set aside — these are the works produced in strict geometrical form by this artificer. Owing to the purely abstract intelligible nature of the form, it is not in itself the true significance of the form ; it is not the spiritual seK. Thus, either the works produced only receive spirit into them as an ahen, departed spirit, one that has forsaken its living suffusion and permeation with reahty, and, being itself dead, enters into these hfeless crystals ; or they take up an external relation to spirit as something which is itself external and not there as spirit — they are related to it as to the orient Light, which throws its significance on them.
The separation of elements from which spirit as
* Egyptian religions.
708 Phenomenology of Mind
artificer starts — tlie separation of the implicit essential nature, wMch becomes the material it works upon, and independent self-existence, which is the aspect of self-consciousness at work — this division has become objective in the restdt achieved. Its further endeavour has to be directed to cancelling and doing away with this separation of soul and body ; it must strive to clothe and give embodied shape to soul fer se, and endow the body with soid. The two aspects, since they are brought closer to one another, bear towards each other, in this condition, the character of ideally presented spirit and of enveloping shell. Spirit's oneness with itself contains this opposition of individuahty and imiversahty. Since the aspects of the work produced become closer by performance of it, there comes about thereby at the same time the other fact, that the work gets nearer to the self-consciousness performing it, and that the latter attains in the work knowledge of itself as it truly is. In this way, however, the work merely constitutes to begin with the abstract side of the activity of spirit, which does not yet perceive the content of this activity within itseH but in its work, which is a "thing." The artificer as such, spirit in its entirety, has not yet appeared ; the artificer is stiU the inner, hidden reaKty, which qtia entire is present only as broken up into active self-consciousness and the object it has produced.
The surrounding habitation, external reahty, which to begin with is raised merely to the abstract form of the understanding, is worked up by the artificer and made into a more animated form. The artificer employs plant hfe for this purpose, which is no longer sacred, as in the previous case of inactive impotent
pantheism ; rather, the artificer, who holds himself to be the self-existent reality, takes that plant hfe as something to be used and degrades it to an external aspect, to the level of an ornament. But it is not turned to use without some alteration: for the worker producing the self-conscious form destroys at the same time the transitoriness, inherently characteristic of the immediate existence of this hfe, and brings its organic forms nearer to the more exact and more universal forms of thought. The organic form, which, left to itself, grows and thrives in particularity, being on its side subjugated by the form of thought, elevates in turn these straight-lined and level shapes into more animated roimdedness — a blending which becomes the root of free architecture.*
This dwelling, (the aspect of the universal element or inorganic nature of spirits), also iacludes within it now a form of individuahty, which brings nearer to actuality the spirit that was formerly separated from existence and external or internal thereto, and thus makes the work to accord more with active seK-consciousness. The worker lays hold, first of aU, on the form of seH-existence in general, on the forms of animal Ufe. That he is no longer directly aware of himself in animal life, he shows by the fact that in reference to this he constitutes himself the productive force, and knows himseK in it as being his own work, whereby the productive force at the same time is one which is superseded and becomes the hieroglyphic symbol of another meaning, the hieroglyph of a thought. Hence also this force is no longer solely and entirely used by the worker, but becomes blended with the shape embody-
* The Egyptian columns and architecture.
710 Phenomenology of Mind
ing thought, with the human form.* Still, the work lacks the form and existence where seK as self appears : it also fails to express in its very nature that it includes within itseH an inner meaning ; it lacks language, the element in which the sense and meaning contained are actually present. The work done, therefore, even when quite purified of the animal aspect, and bearing the form and shape of self-consciousness alone, is stUl the sUent soundless form, which needs the rays of the rising sun in order to have a soimd which, when produced by Hght, is even then merely noise and not speech, shows merely an outer self, not the inner self.f
Contrasted with this outer self of the form and shape, stands the other form, which indicates that it has in it an inner being. Nature, turning back into its essential being, degrades its multiphcity of life, ever individualising itself and confounding itseK in its own process, to the level of an external encasing shell, which is the covering for the inner being. And still this inner being is primarily mere darkness, the unmoved, the black formless stone. J
Both representations contain inwardness and existence— the two moments of spirit : and both kinds of manifestation contain both moments at once in a relation of opposition, the self both as inward and as outward. Both have to be united. The soul of the statue in hmnan form does not yet come out of the inner being, is not yet speech, objective existence of self which is inherently internal, — and the inner being of multiform existence is still without voice or soimd,
♦ The representation of the gods with forms half animal, half human.
t The statues of Menmon.
X The Black Stone of Mecca : a fetish still worshipped by the faithful.
still draws no distinctions within itself, and is still separated from its outer being, to wMcli all distinctions belong. The artificer, therefore, combines both byblending the forms of nature and self-consciousness ; and these ambiguous beings, a riddle to themselves — the conscious struggling with what has no consciousness, the simple inner with the multiform outer, the darkness of thought mated with clearness of expression — these break out into the language of a wisdom that is darkly deep and difficult to imderstand.*
With the production of this work, the instinctive method of working ceases, which, in contrast to selfconsciousness, produced a work devoid of consciousness, For here the activity of the artificer, which constitutes self-consciousness, comes face to face with an inner being equally seK-conscious and giving itself expression. He has therein raised himself by his work up to the point where his conscious Hfe breaks asunder, where spirit greets spirit. In this unity of self-conscious spirit with itself, so far as it is aware of being embodiment and object of its own consciousness, its blending and mingling with the unconscious condition of immediate forms of nature become purified. These monsters in form and shape, word and deed, are resolved and dissolved into a shape which is spiritual — an outer which has entered into itself, an inner which expresses itself out of itself and in itseK, — they pass into thought, which brings forth itself, preserves the shape and form suited to thought, and is transparent existence. Spirit is Artist.
* Sphinxea
B
Religion in the Form oe Art*
Spirit has raised the shape in which it is object for its own consciousness iato the form of consciousness itself ; and spirit sets such a form before itself. The artificer has given up the external synthesising activity, that blending of the heterogeneous forms of thought and nature. When the shape has gained the form of self-conscious activity, the artificer has become a spiritual workman.
If we next ask, what the actual spirit is, which finds in the rehgion of art the consciousness of its Absolute, it turns out that this is the ethical or objective spirit. This spirit is not merely the universal substance of all individuals ; but when this substance is said to have, as an objective fact for actual consciousness, the form of consciousness, this amounts to saying that the substance, which is individualised, is Imown by the individuals within it as their proper essence and their own achievement. It is for them neither the Light of the World, in whose unity the self-existence of self-consciousness is contained only negatively, only transitorily, and beholds the lord and master of its reality ; nor is it the restless waste and destruction of hostile nations ; nor their subjection to " casts," which together constitute the semblance of organisation
* Greek religion.
of a completed whole, where, however, the universal freedom of the individuals concerned is wanting. Rather this spirit is a free nation, in which custom and order constitute the common substance of all, whose reahty and existence each and every one knows to be his own will and his own deed.
The rehgion of the ethical spirit, however, raises it above its actual reahsation, and is the return from its objectivity into pure knowledge of itself. Since an ethically constituted nation hves iu direct unity with its own substance, and does not contain the principle of pure individuahsm of seK-consciousness, the rehgion characteristic of its sphere first appears in complete form in severance from its stable security. For the reahty of the ethical substance rests partly on its quiet unchangeableness as contrasted with the absolute process of self-consciousness ; and consequently on the fact that this self-consciousness has not yet left its serene life of customary convention and its confident security therein, and gone into itself. Partly, again, that reahty rests on its organisation into a plurahty of rights and duties, as also on its organised distribution into groups of stations and classes, each with its particular way of acting which co-operates to form the whole ; and hence rests on the fact that the individual is contented with the hmitation of his existence, and has not yet grasped the unrestricted thought of his free self. But that serene immediate confidence in the substance of this ethical hfe returns to trust in self and to certainty of self ; and the plurahty of rights and duties, as well as the restricted particular action this involves, is the same dialectic process in the sphere of the ethical hfe as the plurahty of " things "
714 Phenomenology of Mind
and their various " qualities " — a process which only comes to rest and stabihty in the simphcity of spirit certain of self.
The complete fulfilment of the ethical life in free self-consciousness, and the destined consummation {SchicksaVj of the ethical world, are therefore found when individuahty has entered into itself ; the condition is one of absolute levity on the part of the ethical spirit ; it has dissipated and resolved into itself all the firmly established distinctions constituting its own stabihty, and the separate components of its own articulated organisation, and, being perfectly sure of itseK, has attained to boundless cheerfuhiess of heart and the freest enjoyment of itself. This simple certainty of spirit within itself has a double meaning ; it is quiet stability and sohd truth, as well as absolute unrest, and the disappearance of the ethical order. It turns round, however, into the latter ; for the truth of the ethical spirit hes primarily just in this substantial objectivity and trust, ia which the self does not think of itself as free individual, and where the self, therefore, in this inner subjectivity, in becoming a free self, falls to the ground. Since then its trust is broken, and the substance of the nation cracked, spirit, which was the connecting medium of the imstable extremes, has now come forward as an^extreme — that of self -consciousness taking itself to be essential and ultimate. This is spirit certain within itseK, which mourns over the loss of its world, and now produces out of the abstraction of self its own essential being, raised far above actual reahty.
At such an epoch art in absolute form* comes on the scene. At the earher stage it is instinctive in its
* The religion of pure beauty.
operation ; being absorbed and steeped in existence, it works out of and works into this element ; it does not find its substance in the free Hfe of an ethical order, and hence, too, the self operating does not consist of free spiritual activity.
Later on, spirit goes beyond art in order to gain its higher manifestation, viz. that of being not merely the substance bom and produced out of the self, but of being in its manifestation object of this self ; it seeks at that higher level not merely to bring forth itself out of its own notion, but to have its very notion as its form, so that the notion and the work of art produced may know each other reciprocally as one and the same,*
Since, then, the ethical substance has withdrawn from its objective existence into its bare self-consciousness, this is the aspect of the notion, or the activity with which spirit brings itself forward as object. It is pure form, because the individual in ethical obedience and service has so worked ofi every unconscious existence and every fixed determination, as the substance has itself become this fluid and undifferentiated entity. This form is the night in which the substance was betrayed, and made itself subject. It is but of this night of pure certainty of seK that the ethical spirit rises again in a shape freed from nature and its own immediate existence.
The existence of the pure notion into which spirit has fled from its bodily shape, is an individual, which spirit selects as the vessel for its sorrow. Spirit acts in this individual as his universal and his power, from which he suffers violence, as his element of " Pathos,"
* This paragraph may be regarded as an interpolated note.
716 Phenomenology of Mind
by having given himself over to which his selfconsciousness loses freedom. But that positive power belonging to the universal is overcome by the pure self of the individual, the negative power. This pure activity, conscious of its inahenable force, wrestles with the unembodied essential being. Becoming its master, this negative activity has turned the element of pathos into its own material, and given itself its content ; and this imity comes out as a work, universal spirit individualised and consciously presented.
a The Abstract Woek of Aut
The first work of art is, because immediate, jabstract and particular. On its own side it has to move away from this immediate and objective phase towards selfconsciousness, while, on the other side, the latter for itself endeavours in the " cult " to do away with the distinction, which it at first gave itself in contrast to its own spirit, and by so doing to produce a work of art inherently endowed with hfe.
The first way ia which the artistic spirit keeps as far as possible removed from each other its form and its active consciousness, is immediate ia character — ^the form assumed is there as a " thing. " in general. It breaks up into the distinction of particularity, which contains the form of the self, and universahty, which represents the inorganic elements in reference to the form adopted, and is its environment and habitation. This shape assumed obtains its pure form, the form belonging to spirit, by the whole being raised into the sphere of the pure notion. It is not the crystal, belonging as we saw to the level of understanding, a form which housed and covered a hf eless element, or is shone upon externally by a soul. Nor, again, is it that commingling of the forms of nature and thought, which first arose in connection with plants, thought's activity here being still an imitation. Kather the notion strips off
718 Phenomenology of Mind
the remnant of root, branches and leaves, still clinging to the forms, purifies the forms and makes them into figures in which the crystal's straight lines and surfaces are raised into incormnensurable relations, so that the animation of the organic is taken up into the abstract form of understanding, and, at the same time, its essential nature — incommensurability— is preserved for imderstanding.
The indwelling god, however, is the black stone extracted from the animal encasement,* and suffused with the light of consciousness. The hmnan form strips off the animal character with which it was mixed up. The animal form is for the god merely an accidental vestment ; the animal appears alongside its true form,t and has no longer a value on its own account, but has sunk into being a significant sign of something else, has become a mere symbol. By that very fact, the form assumed by the god in itself casts off even the need for the natural conditions of animal existence, and hints at the internal arrangements of organic hf e melted down into the surface of the form, and pertaining only to this surface.
The essential being of the god, however, is the unity of the universal existence of nature and of self-conscious spirit which in its actuahty appears confronting the former. At the same time, being in the first instance a particular form, its existence is one of the elements of nature, just as its self-conscious actuahty is a particular national spirit. J But the former is, in this unity, that element reflected back into spirit, nature made transparent by thoughts and united with self-
♦ D. sup., p. 710. t e.g. the eagle as the " bird of Zeus."
I e.g. Athene. ,
conscious life. The form of the gods retains, therefore, within it its nature-element as something transcended, as a shadowy, obscure memory. The utter chaos and confused struggle amongst the elements existing free and detached from each other, the non-ethical disordered reahn of Titans, is vanquished and banished to the outskirts of self-transparent reality, to the cloudy boundaries of the world which finds itself in the sphere of spirit and is at peace. These ancient gods, first-bom children of the union of Light with Darkness, Heaven, Earth, Ocean, Sun, earth's aimless typhonic Fire, and so on, are supplanted by forms and shapes, which do but darkly recall those earher titans, and which are no longer things of nature, but spirits clarified by the ethical life of self-conscious nations.
This simple form has thus destroyed within itself restless endless individuation, the individuation both in the life of nature, which operates with necessity only qua imiversal essence, but is contingent in its actual existence and process ; and also in the life of a nation, which is scattered and broken into particidar spheres of action and into individual centres of self-consciousness, and has an existence manifold in action and meaning. All this individuation the simplicity of this form has abolished, and brought together into an individuahty at peace with itself. Hence the condition of xmrest stands contrasted with this form; confronting quiescent individuahty, the essential reaUty, stands self-consciousness, which, being its source and origin, has nothing left over for itself except to be pure activity. What belongs to the substance,, the artist gave entirely along with his work ; to himself, however, as a specific individuahty there
720 Phenomenology of Mind
belongs in his work no reality. He could only have conferred completeness on it by relinquishing his particular nature, divesting himself of his own being, and rising to the abstraction of pure action.
With the first and immediate act of production, the separation of the work "and his self-conscious activity is not yet healed again. The work is, therefore, not by itself really a spiritual entity ; it is a whole only when its process of coming to be is taken along with it. The obvious and common element in the case of a work of art, that it is produced in consciousness and is made by the hand of man, is the aspect of the notion existing qua notion, and standing in contrast to the work produced. And if this notion, qua the artist or spectator, is unselfish enough to declare the work of art to be per se absolutely spiritual, and to forget himself qua agent or onlooker, then, as against this, "the notion of spirit has to be insisted on ; spirit caimot disp'ense with the moment of being conscious of itself. This moment, however, stands in contrast to the work, because spirit, in this its primary disruption, gives the two sides their abstract and specifically contrasted characteristics of " doing " something and of being a " thing " ; and their return to the imity they started from has not yet come about.
The artist finds out, then, in his work, that he did not produce a reahty like himself. No doubt there comes back to him from his work a consciousness in the sense that a wondering multitude honours it as the spirit, which is their own true nature. But this way of animating or spiritualising Ms work, since it renders him his seK-consciousness merely in the form of admiration, is rather a confession that the work is not
animated in the same manner as the artist. Since the work comes back to him in the form of gladness in general, he does not find in it the paia of his self-discipline and the pain of production, nor the exertion and strain of his own toil. People may, moreover, judge the work, or bring him ofierings and gifts, or endue it with their consciousness ia whatever way they like — if they with their knowledge set themselves over it, he knows how much more his act is than what they understand and say ; if they put themselves beneath it, and recognise in it their own dominating essential reahty, he knows himself as the master of this. The work of art hence requires another element for its existence ; God requires another way of going forth than this, in which, out of the depths of his creative night,, he drops into the opposite, into extemahty, to the character of a " thing " with no selfconsciousness. This higher element is that of Language — a way of existing which is directly self-conscious existence. When individual self-consciousness exists in that way, it is At the same time directly a form of universal contagion ; complete isolation of iudependent self-existent selves is at once fluent continuity and imiversaUy communicated imity of the many' selves ; it is the soul existing as soul. The god, then, which takes language as its mediimi of embodiment, is the work of art inherently spiritualised, endowed with a soul, a work which directly in its existence contains the pure activity which was apart from and in contrast to the god when existing as a " thing." In other words, self-consciousness, when its essential being becomes objective, remains in direct relation with itself. It is, when thus at home with
VOL, II,— X
722 Phenomenology of Mind
itself in its essential natnie, pure thought or devotion, wh-ose inwardness gets at the same time express existence in the Hymn. The hymn keeps within it the individuahty of self-consciousness, and this individual character is at the same time perceived to be there universal. Devotion, kindled in every one, is a spiritual stream which in all the manifold self-conscious units is conscious of itself as one and the same function in all ahke and a simple state of being. Spirit, being this universal self-consciousness of every one, holds in a single unity its pure inwardness as well as its objective existence for others and the independent seH-existence of the individual units.
This kind of language is distinct from another way Grod speaks, which is not that of universal seKconscioTisness. The Oracle, both in the case of the god of the rehgions of art as well as of the preceding rehgions, is the necessary and the first form of diviae utterance. For its very principle impHes that Grod is at once the essence of nature and of spirit, and hence, has not merely natural but spiritual existence as weU. In so far as this monient is impHed primarily in its principle and is not yet realised in religion, the language used is, for the rehgions selfconsciousness, the speech of an alien and extemarl self-consciousness. The self-consciousness which remains ahen and foreign to its rehgious communion, is not yet there in the way its essential principle requires it should be. The self is simple seH-existence, and thereby is altogether imiversal self-existence ; that self, however, which is cut ofi from the self-consciousness of the communion, is primarily a mere particular self.
The content of tliis its own peculiar and individual form of speech, is supplied from the general determinate character which the Absolute Spirit as such adopts in its rehgion. Thus the universal spirit of the East, which has not yet particularised its existence, utters about the Absolute equally simple, abstract, and imiversal statements, whose substantial content is sublime in the simphcity of its truth, but at the same time appears, because of this universahty, trivial to the self-consciousness developing further.
The further developed self, which advances to being distinctively for itself, rises above the pure " pathos " of [unconscious] substance, gets the mastery over the objectivity of the principle of Light in Eastern rehgion, and knows that simphcity of abstract truth to be the inherent reahty {das Ansichseyende) which does not possess the form of contingent existence through an utterance of an ahen self, but is the sure and unwritten law of the gods, a law that " hves for ever, and no man knows what time it came."
As the universal truth, revealed by the " Light " of the world, has here returned into what is within or what is beneath, and has thus got rid of the form of contingent appearance; so too, on the other hand, in the religion of art, because God's form or shape has taken on consciousness and hence particularity in general, the pecuhar utterance of God, who is the spirit of an ethically constituted nation, is the Oracle, which knows its special circumstances and situation, and announces what is serviceable to its interests. Keflective thought, however, satisfies itself as to the universal truths enunciated, because these are known as the essential imphcit reahty of the nation's hfe ;
724 Phenomenology of Mind
and the utterance of them is thus for such reflection no longer a strange and ahen speech, but is its very own. Just as that wise man of old * searched in his own thought for what was worthy and good, but left it to his " Daimon " to find out and decide the petty contiagent content of what he wanted to know — whether it was good for him to keep company with this or that person, or good for one of his friends to go on a journey, and such hke unimportant things ; iu the same way the imiversal consciousness draws the knowledge about the contingent from birds, or trees, or fermenting earth, the steam from which deprives the seK-conscious mind of its powers of discrimination. For what is accidental is something undiscemed, undiscriminated, and extraneous; and hence the ethical consciousness lets itself, as if by a throw of the dice, settle the matter in a manner that is similarly undiscriminating and extraneous. If the individual, by his understanding, determines on a certain course, and selects, after consideration, what is useful for him, it is the specific nature of his particular character which is the ground of this seK-determination. This basis is just what is contingent -, and that knowledge which his understanding supphes as to what is useful for the individual, is hence just such a knowledge as that of " oracles " or of the " lot " ; only that he who questions the oracle or lot, thereby shows the ethical sentiment of indifference to what is accidental, while the former, on the contrary, treats the inherently contingent as an essential concern of his thought and knowledge. Higher than both, however, is to make careful reflection the oracle for contingent action, but yet to recognise that
* Socrates.
tMs very act reflected on is something contiagent, because it refers to what is opportune and has a relation to what is particular.
The true self-conscious existence, which spirit receives in the form of speech, which is not the utterance of extraneous and so accidental, i.e. not universal, selfconsciousness, is the work of art which we met with before. It stands in contrast to the statue, which has the character of a " thing." As the statue is existence in a state of rest,^.the other is existence in a state of transience. In the case of the former, objectivity is set free and dispenses with the immediate presence of the self proper ; in the latter, on the other hand, objectivity is too much bound up with the seK, attains insufficiently to definite embodiment, and is, like time, no longer there just as soon as it is there.
The reUgious Cult constitutes the process of the two sides — a process in which the divine embodiment in motion within the pure feeling-element of self-consciousness and its embodiment at rest in the element of thinghood, reciprocally abandon the different character each possesses, and the imity, which is the underlying principle of their being, becomes an existing fact. Here in the Cult, the seK gives itself a consciousness of the Divine Being descending from its remoteness into it, and this Divine Being, which was formerly the unreal and merely objective, thereby receives the proper actuahty of self-consciousness.
This principle of the Cult is essentially contained and present already in the flow of the melody of the Hymn. These hymns of devotion are the way the self obtains immediate pure satisfaction through and within itself. It is the soul purified, which, in the
7^6 Phenomenology of Mind
purity it thus attains, is immediately and only absolute Being, and is one with absolute Being. The soul, because of its abstract character, is not consciousness distinguishing its object from itseK, and is thus merely the night of its existence and the place prepared for its form. The abstract Oult, therefore, raises the self into being this pure divine element. The soul brings about the attainment of this purity in a conscious way. StiU it is not yet the self, which has descended to the depths of its being, and knows itseK as evil. It is something that -merely is, a soid, which cleanses its exterior with the washing of water, and robes it in white, while its innermost traverses the path set before itself of labour, punishment, and reward, the way of spiritual discipline, of altogether relinquishing its particularity— the road by which it reaches the mansions and the fellowship of the blest.
This ceremonial cxilt is, in its first form, merely in secret, i.e. is merely a performance accomplished subjectively in idea, and unrealised. It has to become a real act, for an imreal act is a contradiction in terms. Consciousness proper, thereby, rises to the level of its pure seK-consciousness. The essential Being has in it the significance of a free object ; through the actual cult this object turns back to the self ; and in so far as, in pure consciousness, it has the significance of absolute Being dweUing in its purity beyond actual reality, this Being descends, through this mediating process of the cult, from its universahty into individual form, and thus combines and unites with actual reahty.
The way the two sides make their appearance in the act is of such a character that the self-conscious aspect, so far as it is actual consciousness, finds the absolute
Being manifesting itself as actual nature. On the one hand, nature belongs to self - consciousness as its possession and property, and stands for what has no existence per se. On the other hand, nature is its proper immediate reaUty and particularity, which is equally regarded as not truly real and essential, and is abrogated. At the same time, that external nature has the opposite significance for its pure consciousness — viz. the significance of being the inherently real, for which the self sacrifices its own [relative] unreahty, just as, conversely, the seK sacrifices the unessential aspect of nature to itself. The act is thereby a spiritual movement, because it is this doublesided process of cancelling the abstraction of absolute Being (in the way devotion determines the object), and making it something concrete and actual, and, on the other hand, of cancelling the actual (in the way the agent determines the object and the self acting), and raising it into universahty.
The practice of the rehgious Otdt begins, therefore, with the pure and simple " ofiering up " or " surrender " of a possession, which the owner apparently considers quite useless for himself and spills on the groimd or lets rise up in smoke. By so doing he renoimces before the ultimate Being of his pure consciousness all possession and right of property and enjoyment thereof ; renounces personahty and the reversion of his action to his self ; and instead, reflects the act into the universal, into the absolute Being rather than into himself. Conversely, however, the objective ultimate Being too is annihilated in that very process. The animal offered up is the symbol of a god ; the fruits consumed are the actual hving Ceres and
728 Phenomenology of Mind
Bacchus. In the former die the powers of the upper law [the Olympians] which has blood and actual life, in the latter the powers of the lower law [the Furies] which possesses in bloodless form secret and craftypower.
The sacrifice of the divine substance, so far as it is active, belongs to the side of self-consciousness. That this concrete act may be possible, the absolute Beiug must have from the start implicitly sacrificed itself. This it has done in the fact that it has given itseK definite existence, and made itself an individual animal and fruit of the earth. The self actively sacrificing demonstrates in actual existence, and sets before its own consciousness,, this already implicitly completed self-renunciation on the part of absolute Being ; and replaces that immediate- reahty, which absolute Being has, by the higher, viz. that of the seK making the sacrifice. For the unity which has arisen, and which is the outcome of transcending the particularity and separation of the two sides, is not merely negative destructive fate, but has a positive significance. It is merely for the abstract Being of the netherworld that the sacrifice offered to it is whoUy surrendered and devoted ; and, in consequence, it is only for that Being that the reflection of personal possession and individual self-existence back into the Universal is marked distinct from the self as such. At the same time, however, this is only a trifling part ; and the other act of sacrifice is merely the destruction of what cannot be used, and is really the preparation of the offered substance for a meal, the feast that cheats the act out of its negative significance. The person making the offering at that first sacrifice reserves the greatest share for his own enjoyment ;
and reserves from the latter sacrifice what is useful for the same purpose. This enjoyment is the negative power which supersedes the absolute Being as well as the unity; and this enjoyment is, at the same time, the positive actual reahty in which the objective existence of absolute Being is transmuted into self-conscious existence, and the self has consciousness of its unity with its Absolute.
This cult, for the rest, is indeed an actual act, although its meaning hes for the most part only in devotion. What pertains to devotion is not objectively produced, just as the result when confined to the feeling of enjoyment* is robbed of its external existence. The Cult, therefore, goes further, and replaces this defect, in the first instance by giving its devotion an objective subsistence, since thB cult is the common task — or the individual task for each and aU to do — ^which produces for the honour and glory of God a House for Him to dwell in and adornment for His presence. By so doing the external objectivity of statuary is partly cancelled ; for by thus dedicating his gifts and his labours the worker makes God well disposed towards him and looks on his self as attached and appertaining to God. Furthermore, this course of action is not the individual labour of the artist ; this particularity is dissolved in universahty. But it is not only the honour of God which is brought about, and the blessing of His countenance and favour is not only shed in idea and imagination on the worker; the work has also a meaning the reverse of the first which was that of self-renunciation and of honour done to what is aUen and external. The Plalls and Dwellings
* i.e. at the feast.
730 Phenomenology of Mind
of God are for the use of man, tlie treasures preserved there are in time of need his own ; the honour which God enjoys ia his decorative adornment, is the honour and glory of a refined artistic and high-spirited nation. At the festival season, the people adorn their own dwellings, their own garments, and their establishments too with the furnishings of elegance and grace. In this manner they receive a return for their gifts from a responsive and grateful God ; and receive the proofs of His favour — ^wherewith the nation became bound to the God because of the work done for Him — not as a hope and a deferred reaUsation, but rather, iu testifying to His honour and in presenting gifts, the nation finds directly and at once the enjoyment of its own wealth and adornment.
The LivrNG Work of Art
That nation wMch approaches its god in the cult of the reHgion of art is an ethically constituted nation, knowing its State and the acts of the State to be the will and the achievement of its own activity. This universal spirit, confronting the self-conscious nation, is consequently not the " Light " of the world, which, being selfless, does not contain the certainty of the individual selves, but is only their universal ultimate Being and the dominating imperious power, wherein they disappear. The rehgious cult of this simple unembodied ultimate Being gives back, therefore, to its votaries in the main merely this : that they are the nation of their god. It secures for them merely their stable subsistence, and their bare substance as a whole ; it does not secure for them their actual self ; this is indeed rejected. For they revere their god as the empty profound, not as spirit. The cult, however, of the religion of art, on the other hand, dispenses with that abstract simpUcity of the absolute Being, and therefore with its " profundity." But that Being, which is directly at one with the self, is inherently spirit and comprehending truth, although not yet Imown expHcitly, in other words it does not know the " depths " of its nature. Because this Absolute, then, implies self, consciousness finds itseK at home with it
732 Phenomenology of Mind
when it appears ; and, in the cult, this consciousness receives not merely the general title to its own subsistence, but also its self-conscious existence within it : just as, conversely, in a despised and outcast nation whose mere substance is acknowledged, the absolute Being has not a selfless reahty, but in the nation whose seK is acknowledged as living in its substance.
From the ceremonial cult, then, self-consciousness that is at peace and satisfied in its ultimate Being turns away, as also does the god that has entered into self-consciousness as into its place of habitation. This place is, by itself, the night of mere " substance," or its pure individuahty ; but no longer the strained and striving individuahty of the artist, which has not yet reconciled itself with its essential Being that gradually becomes objective ; it is substance satisfied, having its *' pathos " within it and in want of nothing, because it comes back from mere intuition, from objectivity which is overcome and superseded.
This " pathos "is, by itself, the Being of the Orient,* a Being, however, which has now " set" and disappeared within itself, and has its own "setting," self-consciousness, within it, and so contains existence and reahty.
It has here traversed the process of its actualisation. Descending from its pure essentiahty and becoming an objective force of nature and the expressions of this force, it is an existence relative to an other, an objective existence for the self by which it is consumed. The sUent inner being of selfless nature attains in its fruits the stage where nature, duly prepared and digested, is offered as material for the hfe which has a self. In
* The "Light" of the world.
its being useful for food and drink it reaches its highest perfection. For therein it is the possibihty of a higher existence, and comes in touch with spiritual existence. In its metamorphosis the spirit of the earth has developed and become partly a silently energising substance, partly spiritual ferment ; in the first case it is the feminine principle, the nursing mother, in the other the masculiae principle, the self-driving force of selfconscious existence.
In this enjoyment, then, that orient " Light " of the world is discovered for what it reaUy is : Enjoyment is the Mystery of its being. For mysticism is not concealment of a secret, or ignorance ; it consists in the self knowing itself to be one with absolute Being, and in this latter, therefore, becoming revealed. Only the self is revealed to itself ; or what is manifest is so merely in the immediate certainty of itself. But it is just in such certainty that simple absolute Being has been placed by the cult. As a thing that can be used, it has not only existence which is seen, felt, smelt, tasted ; it is also object of desire, and, by actually being enjoyed, it becomes one with the seK, and thereby disclosed completely to this self, and made manifest.
When we say of anything, " it is manifest to reason, to the heart," it is in point of fact still secret, for it still lacks the actual certainty of immediate existence, both the certainty regarding what is objective, and the certainty of enjoyment, a certainty which in rehgion, however, is not only inamediate and xmreflecting, but at the same time fuUy cognitive certainty of self.
What has thus been, through the cult, revealed to self-conscious spirit within itself, is simple absolute
734 Phenomenology of Mind
Being ; and this has been revealed partly as the process of passing out of its dark night of concealment up to the level of consciousness, to be there its silently nurturing substance ; partly, however, as the process of losing itself again in nether darkness, in the self, and of waiting above merely with the silent yearning of motherhood. The more conspicuous moving impulse, however, is the variously named " Light " of the East and its tumult of heaving Ufe, which, having likewise desisted from its abstract state of being, has first embodied itself in objective existence in the fruits of the earth,* and then, surrendering itself to self-consciousness,f attained there to its proper realisation ; and now it curvets and careers about in the guise of a crowd of excited, fervid women, the unrestrained revel of nature in self-conscious form.J
StiU, however, it is only Absolute Spirit in the sense of this simple abstract Being, not as spirit per se, that is discovered to consciousness : i.e. it is merely immediate spirit, the spirit of nature. Its self-conscious life is^ therefore merely the mystery of the Bread and the Wine, of Ceres and Bacchus, not of the other, the strictly higher, gods [of Olympus], whose individuality includes, ias an essential moment, self-consciousness as such. Spirit has not yet qua self-conscious spirit offered itself up to it, and the mystery of bread and wine is not yet the mystery of flesh and blood.
This imstable divine revel must come to rest as an object, and the enthusiasm, which did not reach consciousness, must produce a work which confronts
* As fonnd in the mysteries of Demeter.
t As found in the mysteries of Bacchns and Dionysus.
% The Maenads ; cp. Euripides, Bacchae.
it as the statue stands over against the enthusiasm of the artist in the previous case, — a work too that is equally complete and finished, yet not as an inherently lifeless but as a hving self. Such a cult is the Festival which man makes in his own honour, though not imparting to a cult of that kind the significance of the Absolute Being; for it is the ultimate Being that is first revealed to him, not yet Spirit — ^not such a Being as essentially takes on human form. But this cult provides the basis for this revelation, and lays out its moments individually and separately. Thus we here get the abstract moment of the hving embodiment of ultimate Being, just as formerly we had the unity of both in the state of unconstrained emotional fervency. In the place of the statue man thus puts himself as the form elaborated and moulded for perfectly free movement, just as the statue is the perfectly free state of quiescence. If every individual knows how to play the part at least of a torchbearer, one of them comes prominently forward who is the very embodiment of the movement, the smooth elaboration, the fluent energy and force of aU the members. He is a Kvely and hving work of art, which matches strength with its beauty; and to him is given, as a reward for his force and energy, the adornment, with which the statue was decorated [in the former type of rehgion], and the honour of being, amongst his own nation, instead of a god in stone, the highest bodily representation of what the essential Being of the nation is.
In both the representations, which have just come before us, there is present the unity of self-consciousness and spiritual Being ; but they still lack their due balance
736 Phenomenology of Mind
and equilibrium. In the case of the bacchic * reveUing enthusiasm the self is beside itself ; in bodily beauty of form it is spiritual Being that is outside itself. The gloominess of consciousness in the one case and its wild stammering utterance, must be taken up into the transparent existence of the latter ; and the clear but spiritless form of the latter, into the emotional inwardness of the former. The perfect element in which the inwardness is as external as the extemahty is inward, is once again Language. But it is neither the language of the oracle, entirely contingent in its content and altogether individual in character ; nor is it the emotional hymn sung in praise of a merely individual god ; nor is it the meaningless stammer of delirious bacchantic revelry. It has attained to its clear and imiversal content, and meaning. Its content is clear, for' the artificer has passed out of the previous state of entirely insubstantial enthusiasm, and worked himself into a definite shape, which is his own proper existence, permeated through all its movements by self-conscious soul, and is that of his contemporaries. Its content is universal, for in this festival, which is to the honour of man, there vanishes the onesidedness pecuHar to figures represented in statues, which merely contain a national spirit, a determinate character of the godhead. The finely built warrior is indeed the honour and glory of his particular nation; but he is a physical or corporeal individuahty in which are simk out of sight the expanse and depth of meaning, the seriousness of significance, and the inner character of the spirit which underhes the particular mode of Kfe, the cravings, the needs and the customs of his nation. In re-
* As distinct from the worship of Apollo,
linquishing all this for complete corporeal embodiment, spirit has laid aside the particular impressions, the special tones and chords of that natm-e which it, as the actual spirit of the nation, includes. Its nation, therefore, is no longer conscious in this spirit of its special particular character, but rather of haviag laid this aside, and of the universaUty of its human existence.
vol.. II.— V
iThe Spiritual Work op Art
The national spirits, which find their being in the form of some particular animal, coalesce into one single spirit.* Thus it is that the separate artistically beautiful national spirits combine to form a Pantheon, the element and habitation of which is Language. Pure intuition of self in the sense of universal human nature takes, when the national or tribal spirit is actualised, this form : the national spirit combines with the others (which together with it constitute, through nature and natural conditions, one people), in a common undertaking, and for this task builds up a collective nation, and, with that, a collective heaven. This universahty, to which spirit attains in its existence, is, nevertheless, merely this first imiversaUty, which, to begin with, starts from the individuahty of ethical Ufe, has not yet overcome its immediacy, has not yet buUt up a single state out of these separate national elements. The ethical life of an actual national spirit rests partly on the simple confiding trust of individuals in the whole of their nation, partly in the direct share which aU, in spite of differences of position, take in the decisions and acts of its government. In the imion, not in the first instance to secure a permanent order but merely for a common act, that freedom of participation
* V. sup., A., b.
on the part of each and all is for the nonce set aside. This first community of life is, therefore, an assemblage of individualities rather than the dominion and control of abstract thought, which would rob the individuals of their /self-conscious 'jshare in the wiU and act of the whole.
The assembly of national spirits constitutes afcircle^ of ^forms and shapes,^wliich now embraces the whole of nature, as well as the whole ethical world. They are too under the supreme command rather than the supreme dominion of one. (^y themselves, they are the universal substances embodying what the self-conscious essential reahty inherently is and does^ This, however, constitutes the moving force, and, in the first instance, at least the centre, with which those universal entities are concerned,' and which, to begin with, seems to imite in a merely accidental way aU that they variously accomplish, feut it is the return of the divine Being to self-consciousness which already contains the reason that self -consciousness forms the centre for those divine forces, and conceals their essential unity in the first instance under the guise of a friendly external relation between bojh worlds.^
The same universality, which belongs to this content, has necessarily also that Jgrm of consciousness in which the content appears, fit is no longer the concrete acts and deeds of the cult; it is an action whicji is not indeed raised as yet to the level of the notion, but only to that of ideas, the synthetic_connectipn of selfconscious and external eastence?] The (^emenf^in which these presented ideas exist, language, is the earUest language, the Efic as such, which contains the universal content, at any rate universal in the sense
740 Phenomenology of Mind
of completeness of the world presented, though, not in the sense of universahty of thought. The Minstrel is the individual and actual spirit from whom, as a subject of this world, it is produced, and by whom it is borne. His " pathos " is not the deafening powers of nature, but Mnemosyne, Kecollection, a gradually evolved inwardness, the memory of an essential mode of being once directly present. He is the organ and instrument whose content is passing away ; it is not his own self which is of any account, but his muse, his imiversal song, ^/^^at, however, is present in fact, has the form of an inferential process, where the one extreme of imiversahty^ the world of gods, is connected with individuality, the minstrel, through the middle term of particularity. The middle term is the nation in its heroes, who are individual men like the minstrel, but only ideally presented, and
thereby at the same time universal hke the &ee extreme of universahty, the gods.
In this Epic, then, what is inherent^ established in the cult, the relation of the divine to the human, is set forth and displayed as a whole to consciousness. I The content is an ''act"* of the essential Being conIscious of itseH. Acting disturbs the peace of the substance, aiid awakens the essential Being ; and by so doing its simple unity is divided into parts, and opened up into the manifold world of natural powers and ethical forces. The act- is the violation of the peaceful earth ; it is the trench which, vivified by the blood of the living, calls forth the spirits of the ( departed, who are thirsting for Hfe, and who receive it in the action of seK-consciousness.t There are two
* A "drama." t The Epic exorcises the dead past ; v. Odyssey, XI.
sides to the business the universal activity is concerned to accompUsh : the side of the(self)— in virtue of which it is brought about by a collection of actual nations with the prominent individuaUties at the head of them ; and the side of the ^miversal^in virtue of which it is brought about by their substantial forces. The re=| lation of the two, however, took formerly the character of being the synthetic connection of imiversal and individual, i.e. of being the process of ideal presentation.^ On this specific character depends the judgment regarding this world.
The relation of the two is, by this means, a comraingUng of both, which iUogicaUy divides the unity of the action, and in a needless fashion throws the act from one side over to the other. The imiversal powers assume the form of individual beings, and thus have in them the principle from which action comes ; when they effect anything, therefore, this seems to proceed as entirely from them and to be as free as in the case of men. Hence both gods and men have done one and the same thing. The seriousness with which those divine powers go to work is ridiculously unnecessary, since they are in point of fact the moving force of the individuahties eijgaged in the g,cts_; while the strain and toil of the latter again is an equally useless effort, since the former direct and manage everything. Over-zealous mortal creatures, who are as nothing, are at the same time the mighty self that brings iato subjection universal beings, violates the gods, and procures for them actual reahty and an interest in acting. Just as, conversely, these powerless gods, these impotent imiversal beings, which procure their sustenance from the gifts of men and, through
742 Phenomenology of Mind
men, first get something to do, are the natural inner
principle and the substance of all events, as also the
ethical material, and the "pathos " of action. If their
cosmic natures first get reahty and a sphere of effectual
operation through the free self of individuality, it is also
the case that they are the universal, which withdraws
from and avoids this connection, remains unrestricted
and imconstrained in its own character, and, by the
inexhaustible elasticity of its unity, extinguishes the
■^atomic singleness of the individual acting and his
\ various aspects, preserves itseK in its purity, and dis-
I solves all that is individual in the current of its own
( continuity.
Just as the gods fall into this contradictory relation with the antithetic nature having the form of self, in the same way their universality comes into conflict with their own specific character and the relation in which it stands to others. They are the eternal and resplendent individuals, who exist in their own calm, and are removed from the changes of time and the influence of ahen forces. But they are at the same time determinate elements, particular gods, and thus stand in relation to others. But that relation to others, which, in virtue of the opposition it involves, is one of strife, is a comic self-forgetfulness of their eternal nature. The determinateness they possess is rooted in the divine subsistence, and, in its specific limitation, has the independence of the whole individuality ; owing to this, their characters at once lose the sharpness of their distinctive pecuharity, and in their ambiguity blend together. '
One purpose of their activity and their activity itself, being directed against an " other " and so against
The Sfiritual Work of Art '74^
an invincible divine force, /^e/' a contingent and futile piece of bravado, which passes away at once, and transforms the pretence of seriousness in the act into a harmless, self-confident piece of sport with no result and no issue. If, however, in the nature of their divinity, the negative element, the specific determinateness of that nature, appears merely as the arbitrariness of their activity, and as the contradiction between the purpose and residt, and if that independent_sel|:;Confi4ence outweighs and overbalances the element of determinateness, then, by that very fact, the pure force of negativity confronts and opposes their nature, and moreover with a power to which it must fiuaUy submit, and over which it can in no way prevail. They are the uni^ versal, and the positive, as against the individual self of mortals, which cannot hold out against their power and might. But the universal seH, for that reason, hovers over these^ortal selves) and over this whole world of ideal presentation to wmch the entire content belongs ; and is for them the empty form of bare Necessity, not determined conceptually — a mere event to which they stand related selfless and sorrowing, for these determinate natures do not find themselves in this purely formal necessity.
This necessity, however, is the unity of the notion, a unity dominating and controlling the contradictory independent subsistence of the individual moments, a unity in which the inconsistency and fortuitousness of their action is coherently regulated, and the spor-j tive character of their acts receives its serious value! in those moments themselves. The content of the world of ideal presentation carries on its process in the midst unrestrained and detached by itseM, gathering
744 Phenomenology of Minct
round the individuality of some hero, who, howevel, feels the strength and splendour of his life broken, and mourns the early death he sees ahead of him. For the actual individuahty, firmly fixed in itself, is isolated and excluded to the utmost point, and severed into its elements, which have not yet found each other and united. The one individual element, the abstract unreal moment, is necessity which takes no share in the life of the mediating term just as Httle as does the other, the concrete real individual element, the minstrel, who keeps himself outside it, and disappears in what he ideally presents. Both extremes must get nearer the content ; the one, necessity, has to get filled with it, the other, the language of the minstrel, must have a share in it. And the content formerly left to itself must preserve in it the certainty and the fixed character of the negative.
This higher language, that of Tragedy, gathers and keeps more closely together the dispersed and disintegrated moments of the inner essential world and the world of action. The substance of the divine falls apart, in accordance with the nature of the notion, into its shapes and forms, and their movement is likewise in conformity with that notion. In regard to form, the language here ceases to be narrative, in virtue of the fact that it enters into the content, just as the content ceases to be merely one that is ideally presented. The hero is himself the spokesman, and the representation given brings before the audience — who are also spectators— self-conscious human beings, who know their own rights and purposes, the power and the will belonging to their specific nature, and who know how to state them. They are artists who do not express with
unconscious naivete and naturalness tlie merely external aspect of what they begin and what they decide upon, as is the case in the language accompanying ordiaary action in actual Kfe ; they make the very inner being external, they prove the righteousness of their action, and the "pathos" controlling them is soberly asserted and definitely expressed in its universal individuahty, free from all accident of circumstance and the particidar pecuharities of personahties. Lastly, it is in actual human beings that these characters get existence, human beings who impersonate heroes, and represent them in actual speech, not in the form of a narrative, but speaking in their own person. Just as it is essential for a statue to be made by human hands, so is the actor essential to his mask — not as an external condition, from which, artistically considered, we have to abstract ; or so far as abstraction must certainly be made, we thereby state just that art does not yet contain in it the true and proper self.
The general ground, on which the movement of these shapes produced from the notion takes place, is the consciousness of the first form of language, where the content is ideally presented, and its detail spread out without reference to self. It is the commonalty in general, whose wisdom finds utterance in the Chorus of the Elders ; in the powerlessness of this chorus the generaKty finds its representative, because the common people itself compose merely the positive and passive material for the individuahty of the government confronting it. Lacking the power to negate and oppose, it is unable to hold together and keep within bounds the riches and varied fullness of divine life; it allows each individual moment to go off its own way,
746 Phenomenology of Mind
and in its hymns of honour and reverence praises each individual moment as an independent god, now this god and now again another. Where, however, it detects the seriousness of the notion, and perceives how the notion proceeds to deal with these forms, shattering them as it goes along; and where it comes to see how badly its praised and honoured gods come ofE when they venture on the ground where the notion holds sway; — ^there it is not itself the negative power actively setting to work, but keeps itself within the abstract selfless thought of such power, confines itseK to the consciousness of ahen and extCTnaJjiesiinyj^ and produces the empty wish to tranquillize, and feeble iQefEective talk intended to appease. In its terror before the higher powers, which are the immediate arms of. the substance ; in its terror before their struggle with one another, and before the simple and uniform action of that necessity, which crushes them as well -as the Uving beings' boimd up with them; in its compassion for these Hving beings, whom it knows at once to be the same with itself — ^it is conscious of nothing but ineffective horror of this whole process, conscious of equally helpless pity, and, in fine, the mere empty peace of surrender to necessity, whose work is apprehended neither as the necessary act of character, nor as the action of the absolute Being tvithin itself.
Volume II. (BE). SPIRIT . 429-682 (part 15)
Spirit does not appear in its dissociated miJtipUcity on the plane of this spectacular consciousness, the indifierent ground, as it were, of presentation; it comes on the scene m the simple diremption of the notion. Its substance manifests itself, therefore, merely torn asunder into its two extreme powers. These elementary imiversal beings are, at the same time, self-conscious individu-
aKties — heroes who put their conscious life into one of these powers, find therein determinateness of character, and procure their effective activity and reahty. This universal individualisation descends again, as wiU be remembered, to the iromediate reahty of existence proper, and is presented before a crowd of spectators, who find in the chorus their image and counterpart, or rather their own thought giving itseK expression.
The content and movement of spirit, which is object to itself here, have been already considered as the nature and realisation of the substance of ethical hfe. In its form of rehgion spirit attains to consciousness about itself, or reveals itself to its consciousness in its purer form and its simpler mode of embodiment. If, then, the ethical substance by its very principle broke up, as regards its content, into two powers — which were defined as divine and human law, law of the nether world and law of the upper world, the one the family, the other state sovereignty, the first bearing the impress and character of woman, the other that of man — ^in the same way, the previously multiform circle of gods, with its wavering and unsteady characteristics, confines itself to these powers, which owing to this feature are brought closer to individuahty proper. For the" previous dispersion of the whole into manifold abstract forces, which appear hypostatised, is the dissolution of the subject which comprehends them merely as moments in its self ; and individuahty is therefore only the superficial form of those entities. Conversely, a further distinction of characters than that just named is to be imputed to contingent and inherently external personaUty. "^
At the same time, the essential nature [in the case of
748 Phenomenology of Mind
ethical substance] gets divided in its form, i.e. with respect to knowledge. Spirit when acting, appears, qua consciousness, over against the object on which its
' activity is directed, and which, in consequence, is determined as the negative of the knowing agent. The agent finds himself thereby in the opposition of knowing and not knowing. He takes his purpose from his own character, and knows it to be essential ethical fact; but owing to the determinateness of his character, he knows merely the one power of substance ; the other remains for him concealed and out of sight. The objectively present reahty, therefore, is one thing (m itself, Sand another
(jforVonsciousness. The higher and lower right come to signify in this connection the power that knows and reveals itself to consciousness, and the power concealing itself ajud lurking in the background. The one is the aspect of hght, the god of the Oracle, who as regards its natural aspect [Light] has sprung from the aUiHuminating Sun, knows aU and reveals all, Phoebus and Zeus, who is his Father. But the commands of this truth-speaking god, and his proclamations of what is, are reaUy deceptive and fallacious. For this knowledge is, in its very principle, directly not knowledge, because consciousness in acting is inherently this opposition. He,* who had the power to unlock the riddle of the sphinx, and he too who trusted with childlike confidence,! are, therefore, both sent to destruction through what the god reveals to them. The priestess,' through whose mouth the gracious god speaks,} is in nothing different from the equivocal sisters of fate,§ who drive their victim to crime by
* Oedipus. t Orestes.
t In tlie Delphic Oracle. § The witches in "Macbeth."
their promises, and who, by the double-tongued, equivocal character of what they give out as a certaiaty, deceive the King when he reHes upon the manifest and obvious meaning of what they say. There is a type of consciousness that is purer than the latter* which beheves in witches, and more discriminating, more thorough and more soHd than the former which puts its trust in the priestess and the gracious god. This type of consciousness,! therefore, lets his revenge tarry for the revelation which the spirit of his father makes regarding the crime that did him to death, and institutes other proofs in addition — for the reason that the spirit giving the revelation might possibly be the devil.
This mistrust has good grounds, because the knowing consciousness takes its stand on the opposition between certainty of itself on the one hand, and the objective essential reahty on the other. Ethical rightness, which insists that actuahty is nothing per se in opposition to absolute law, finds out that its knowledge is onesided, its law merely a law of its own character, and that it has laid hold of merely one of the powers of the substance. The act itself is this iaversion of what is subjectively known into its opposite, into objective existence, turns roimd what is right from the point of view of character and knowledge into the right of the verg^opposite with which the former is boimd up in the essential nature of the substance — turns it into the " Furies " who embody the right of the other power and character awakened into hostihty. The lower right sits mth Zeus enthroned, and enjoys equal respect and homage with the god revealed and known.
To these three supernatural Beings the world of the
* Macbeth. t Hamlet.
750 Phenomenology of Mind
gods of the chorus is limited and restricted by the acting individuaUty. The one is the substance, the power presiding over the hearth and home and the spirit worshipped by the family, as weU as the universal power dominating state and government. Since this distinction belongs to the substance as such, it is, when ^ ideally presented, not individuaHsed as two distinct forms [of the substance], but has in actual reality the two persons of its characters. On the other hand, the distinction between knowing and not knowing falls within each of the actual self-consciousnesses ; and only in abstraction, in the element of imiversaKty, does it get divided into two individual shapes. For the self of the hero only exists as a whole consciousness, and hence includes essentially the whole of the distinction belonging to the form; but its substance is determinate, I and only one side of the content distinguished belongs t to him. Hence both sides of consciousness, which have in concrete reahty no separate individuaUty pecuharly their own, receive, when ideally represented, each its own particular form : the one that of the god revealed, the other that of the Furies keeping themselves concealed. In part both enjoy equal honour, while again j the form assmned by the substance, Zeus, is the necessity of the relation of the two to one another. The substance is the relation [1] that knowledge is for itself, but finds its truth in what is simple; [2] that the distinction, through and in which actual consciousness exists, has its basis in that inner being which destroys it; [3] that the clear conscious assurance of certainty has its confirmation in forgetfulness.
Consciousness disclosed this opposition by action, through doing something. Acting in accordance with
the knowledge revealed, it finds out the deceptiveness of that knowledge, and being committed, in view of the mner meaning, to one of the attributes of substance, it did violence to the other and thereby gave the latter right(^as'iagainst itself. When following that god who knows and reveals himself, it reaUy seized hold of what is not revealed, and repents of having trusted the knowledge, whose equivocal character (since this is its very nature) had to come also before it, and admonition thereanent to be found. The frenzy of the priestess, the inhuman shape of the witches, the voices of trees and birds, dreams, and so on, are not ways in which truth appears; they are admonitory signs of deception, of want of discernment, of the individual and accidental character of knowledge. Or, what comes to the same thing, the opposite power, which consciousness has violated, is present as express law and authentic right, whether law of the family or law of the state ; while consciousness, on the other hand, pursued its own proper knowledge, and hid from itself what was revealed. The truth, however, of the opposing powers of content and consciousness is the final result, that both are equally right, and, hence, in their opposition (which comes about through action) are equally wrong. The process of action proves their imity in the mutual overthrow of both powers and the self-conscious characters. The reconcihation of the opposition with itself is thei Lethe of the netherworld in the form of Death — or the Lethe of the upper world m. the form of absolution, not from guilt (for consciousness cannot deny its guilt, because the act was done), but from the crime, and of the atoning consolation and peace of soul which absolution ] gives. Both are forgetfulness, the disappearance of the
752 Phenomenology of Mind
reality and action of the powers of the substance, its component individuaUties, and of the powers of the abstract thought of good and evil. For none of them by itseK is the real essence ; this consists in the undisturbed cahn of the whole within itself, the immovable unity of Fate, the qxiiescent existence and hence want of activity and vitahty in the family and government, and the equal honour and consequent indifferent imreaUty of Apollo and the Furies, and the return of their spiritual life and activity into Zeiis solely and simply.
This destiny completes the depopulation of Heaven — of that unthinldng mixture of individuaHty and ultimate Beiug — a blending whereby the action of this absolute Being appears as something incoherent, inconsistent, contingent, unworthy of itself ; for individua;lity, when attaching in a merely superficial way to absolute Being, is unessential. The expulsion of such unreal insubstantial ideas, which was demanded by the philosophers of antiquity, thus already has its beginning in tragedy in general, through the fact that the division of the substance is controlled by the BQtJQji, and hence individuaHty is the essential individuality, and the specific determinations are absolute characters. The self-consciousness represented in tragedy knows and acknowledges on that account only one highest power, Zeus. This Zeus is known and acknowledged only as the power of the state or of the hearth and home, and, in the opposition falling inside knowledge, merely as the Father of the particular knowledge assuming a definite shape ; he is the Zeus acknowledged in the taking of oaths, the Zeus of the Furies, the Zeus of what is universal, of the inner being dwelling in concealment. The further moments taken from the
The Sfiritual Work of AH 75S
notion (Begriff) and dispersed in the form of ideal presentation (Vorstelking), moments wMch the chorus permits to hold good one after the other, are, on the ' other hand, not the " pathos " of the hero ; they sink to the level of passions in the hero — to the level of accidental, insubstantial moments, which the impersonal chorus no doubt praises, but which are not capable of constituting the character of heroes, nor of being expressed and regarded by them as their real nature.
But, further, the persons of the divine Being itself, as well as the characters of its substance, coalesce into the simplicity of what is devoid of consciousness. This necessity has, in contrast to self-consciousness, the characteristic of being the negative power of all the forms that appear, a power in which they do not recognise themselves, but perish therein. The self appears as merely allotted amongst the different characters, and not as the mediating factor of the process. But seH-consciousness, the simple certainty of self, is in poiut of fact the negative power, the unity of Zeus, the unity of the substantial essence and abstract necessity ; it is the spiritual xmity iato which everything returns. Because actual seK-consciousness is stiU distinguished from the substance and Fate, it is partly the chorus, or rather the crowd looking on, whom this movement of the divine Mfe fiUs with fear as being something ahen and strange, or in whom this movement, as something closely touching themselves, produces merely the emotion of passive pity. Partly again, so far as consciousness co-operates and belongs to the various characters, this alliance is of an external kind, is a hypocrisy — because the true union, that of self, fate, and substance^ is not yet present. The hero, who appears before the
VOL, II.— z
754 Phenomenology of Mind
onlookers, breaks up into his mask and the actor, into the person of the play and the actual seH.
The self-consciousness of the heroes must step forth
from its mask and be represented as knowing itself to
be the fate both of the gods of the chorus and of the
absolute powers themselves, and as being no longer
ti separated from the chorus, the imiversal consciousness.
Comedy has, then, first of aU, the aspect that actual self-consciousness represents itself as the Fate of the gods. These elemental Beings are, qua universal moments, no definite self, and are not actual. They are, indeed, endowed with the form of individuahty, but this is in their case merely put on, and does not reaUy and truly suit them. The actual seH has no such abstract moment as its substance and content. The subject, therefore, is raised above such a moment, as it would be above a particular property, and when clothed with this mask gives utterance to the irony of such a property trying to be something on its own account. The pretentious claims of the universal abstract nature are shown up and discovered in the actual self ; it is seen to be caught and held in a concrete reahty, and lets the mask drop, just when it wants to be something right. The self, appearing here in its significance as something actual, plays with the mask which it once puts on, in order to be its own person ; but it breaks away from this seeming and pretence just as quickly again, and comes out in its own naked- . ness and usual character, which it shows not to be distinct from the proper self, the actor, nor again from the onlooker.
This general dissolution, which the formally embodied essential nature as a whole undergoes when it
assumes individuaUty, becomes in its content more serious, and hence more petulant and bitter, in so far as the content possesses its more serious and necessary meaning. The divine substance combines the meaning of natural and ethical essentiality.
As regards the natural element, actual self-consciousness shows, in the very fact of applying elements of nature for its adornment, for its abode and so on, and again in feasting on its own offering, that itself is the 5|ate to which the secret is disclosed, no mat^r what" its position with regard to the independent substantiaUty of nature. In the mystery of the bread and wine it makes its very own this self-subsistence of nature together with the significance of inner reahty ; and in Comedy it is conscious of the irony lurking in this meaning.
So far, again, as this meaning contains the essence of ethical reahty, it is partly the nation in its two aspects of the state, or Demos proper, and individual family life ; partly, however, it is self-conscious pure knowledge, or rational thought of the universal. Demos, the general mass, which knows itself as master and governor, and is also aware of being the insight and intelligence which demand respect, exerts compulsion and is befooled through the particularity of its actual Ufe, and exhibits the ludicrous contrast between its own opinion of itself and its immediate existence, between its necessity and contingency, its universality and its vulgarity. If the principle of its individual existence, cut off from the imiversal, breaks out in the proper form of actual reahty and openly usurps and administers the commonwealth, to which it is a secret harm and detriment, then immediately there
1^756 Phenomenology of Mind
is disclosed the contrast between the universal in the sense of an abstract theory, and that with which practice is concerned ; there stands exposed the entire emancipation of the ends and aims of the mere individual from all universal order, and the scorn the mere individual shows for such order.*
Rational thinking removes contingency of form and shape from the divine Being ; and, in opposition to the uncritical wisdom of the chorus — a wisdom, giving utterance to all sorts of ethical maxims and stamping with vaUdity and authority a multitude of laws and specific conceptions of duty and of right — rational thought Ufts these into the simple Ideas of the Beautiful and the Good. The process of this abstraction is the consciousness of the dialectic involved in these maxims and laws themselves, and hence the consciousness of the disappearance of that absolute vahdity with which they previously appeared. Since the contingent character and superficial individuahty which mere presentation lent to the divine Beings, vanish, they are left, as regards their natural aspect, with merely the nakedness of their immediate existence ; they are Clouds, f a passing vapour, like those presentations. Having passed in accordance with their essential character, as determined by thought, into the simple thoughts of the Beautiful and the Good, these latter submit to being filled with every kind of content. The force of dialectic knowledge X puts determinate laws and maxims of action at the mercy of the pleasure and levity of youth, led astray therewith, and gives weapons
* cp. Cleon in Aristophanes, Knights. t cp. Aristophanes, Olovds. X The age of the Sophists.
The Sfiritual Worlt of Art VS?
of deception into the hands of solicitous and apprehensive old age, restricted in its interests to the individual details of hfe. The pure thoughts of the Beautiful and the Good thus display a comic spectacle : — through their being set free from opinion, which contains both their determinateness in the sense of content and also their absolute determinateness, the firm hold of consciousness upon them, they become empty, and, on that very accoimt, the sport of the private opinion and caprice of any chance individuahty.
Here, then, the Fate, formerly without consciousness, consisting in mere rest and forgetfulness, and separated from self-consciousness, is united with selfconsciousness. The individual * self is the negative force through which and in which the gods, as also their moments, (nature as existent fact and the thoughts of their determinate characters), pass away and disappear. At the same time, the individual self •• is not the mere vacuity of disappearance, but preserves itself in this very nothingness, holds to itself and is the sole and only reaUty. The rehgion of art is fulfilled and consummated in it, and is come full circle. Through the fact that it is the individual conscious^ ness in its certainty of self which is . shown to be this absolute power, this latter has lost the form of something ideally presented (vorgestellt), separated from and ahen to consciousness in general — as were the statue and also the Hving embodiment of beauty or the content of the Epic and the powers and persons of Tragedy. Nor again is the unity the uncon-^ scious unity of the cult and the mysteries; rather the self proper of the actor coincides with the part
* In comedy.
758 Phenomenology of Mind
he impersonates, just as the onlooker is perfectly at home in what is represented before him, "and sees himself playing in the drama before him. What this seH-conscioiisness beholds is that that, which assimies the form of essentiality as against self-consciousness, is resolved and dissolved within its thought, its existence and action, and is quite at its mercy. It is the return of everything imiversal into certainty of self, a certainty which, in consequence, is this complete loss of fear of everything strange and ahen, and complete loss of substantial reahty on the part of what is ahen and external. Such certainty is a state of spiritual good health and of self-abandonment thereto, on the part of consciousness, in a way that, outside this kind of comedy, is not to be found anywhere.*
* Cp. Hegel's Aesthetik, W U''., X., 3, 660.
c
Eevealed Eeligion*
Through the Religion of Art spirit has passed from the form of Substance into that of Subject ; for art brings out its shape and form, and imbues it with the nature of action or estabhshes in it the selfconsciousness which merely disappears in the awesome substance and in the attitude of simple trust does not itself comprehend itself. This incarnation in human form" of the Divine Beiug begins with the statue, which has in it only the outward shape of the self, while the inner Ufe thereof, its activity, falls outside it. In the case of the cult, however, both aspects have become one ; in the outcome of the religion of art this unity in being completely attained has at the same time also passed over to the extreme of self ; in the type of spirit, which becomes perfectly certain of itseK in the individual existence of consciousness, all essential content is swallowed up and submerged. The proposition, which gives this hghthearted action expression, runs thus : " The Seli is Absolute Being." The Being which was substance, and in which the self was the accidental element, has dropped to the level of a predicate ; and in this self-consciousness, over against which nothing appears in the form of objective Being, spirit has lost its aspect of consciousness.f
* Christianity. t Which implies such opposition.
760 Phenomenology of Mind
This statement, " The Self is Absolute Beiag," belongs, as is evident on the face of it, to the nonrehgious, the concrete actual spirit ; and we have to recall what the form thereof is which gives expression to it. This form wiU contaia at once the movement of that spirit and its conversion, which lowers the self to the note of a predicate and raises suljstance into subject. This we must understand to take place in such a way that the converse statement does not fer se, or for us, make substance iato subject, or, what is the same thing, does not reinstate substance again so that the consciousness of spirit is carried back to its commencement in natural rehgion ; but rather in such a way that this conversion is brought about for and through seK-consciousness itself. Since this latter consciously gives itself up, it is preserved and maintained in thus relinquishing itself, and remains the subject of the substance; but as being likewise seZ/-relinquished, it has at the same time the consciousness of this substance. In other words, since I by thus offering itself up, it produces substance as j subject, this subject remains its own very self. If, ' then, taking the two propositions, in the first the subject merely disappears in substantiaHty, and in the second the substance is merely a predicate, and both sides are thus present in each with contrary inequality of value — the result hereby effected is that the union and transfusion of both natures [subject and substance] become apparent. In this union both, with equal value and worth, are at once essential and also merely moments. Hence it is that spirit is equally consciousness of itself as its objective substance, as well as simple self-contained seK-consciousness.
The religion of art belongs to the spirit animating the ethical sphere,* the spirit which we formerly saw sink and disappear in the condition of right, i.e. in the proposition : " The self as such, the abstract person, is absolute Being." In ethical life the self is absorbed in the spirit of its nation, it is universahty filled to the fuE. Simple abstract individuahty, however, rises out of this content, and its hghtheartedness clarifies and rarifies it till it becomes a " person " and attains the abstract universahty of right. Here the substantial reaUty of the ethical spirit is lost, the abstract insubstantial spirits of national individuals are gathered together into a pantheon; not into a pantheon represented in idea (Vorstellung), whose impotent form lets each alone to do as it likes, but into the pantheon of abstract universahty, of pure thought, which disembodies them, and bestows on the spiritless self, on the individual person, complete existence on its own account.
But this seK, through its being empty, has let the content go; this consciousness is Being merely within itself. Its own very existence, the legal recognition of the person, is an unfulfilled empty abstraction. It thus really possesses merely the thought of itself; in other words, as it there exists and knows itseK as object, it is something unreal. Consequently, it is merely stoic independence, the independence of thought; and this finds, by passing through the process of scepticism, its ultimate truth in that form we called the " unhappy self-consciousness " — the soul of despair. This knows how the case stands with the actual claims to vahdity which the abstract [legal] person puts
* The Roman State.
762 Phenomenology of Mind
forward, as also with the vahdity of these claims in pure thought [ia Stoicism]. It knows that a vindication of such claims means really being altogether lost ; it is just this loss become conscious of itself, and is the surrender and relinquishment of its knowledge about itself. We see that this " unhappy consciousness " constitutes the counterpart and the complement of the perfectly happy consciousness, that of comedy. All divine reahty goes back into this latter type of consciousness ; it means, in other words, the complete relinquishment and emptying of substance. The former, on the contrary, is conversely the tragic fate that befalls certainty of self which aims at being absolute, at beiag selfsufi&cient. It is consciousness of the loss of everything of significance in this certainty of itself, and of the loss even of this knowledge or certainty of self — the loss of its substance as well as of self ; it is the bitter pain which finds expression in the cruel words, " God is dead."*
In the condition of right or law, then, the ethical world has vanished, and its type of rehgion has passed away in the mood of Comedy. The " unhappy consciousness " the soul of despair, is just the knowledge of aUithis loss. It has lost both the worth and digmty it attached to its immediate personality [as a legal person] as well as that attaching to its personality when reflected iu the medium of thought [in the case of Stoicism]. Trust iu the eternal laws of the Gods is silenced, just as the oracles are dumb, whose work it was to know what was right in particular cases. The statues set up are now corpses ia stone whence the animating soul has flown, while the hymns
* From a hymn of Luther.
of praise are words from which all beUef has gone. The tables of the gods are bereft of spiritual food and drink, and from his games and festivals man no more receives the joyful sense of his unity with the divine Being. The works of the muse lack the force and energy of the spirit which derived the certainty and assurance of itself just from the crushing ruin of gods and men. They are themselves now just what they are for us — beautiful fruit broken off the tree ; a kindly fate has passed on those works to us, as a maiden might offer such fruit off a tree. It is not their actual hfe aS they exist, that is given us, not the tree that bore them, not the earth, and the elements, which constituted their substance, nor the climate that determined their constitutive character, nor the change of seasons which controlled the- process of their growth. So too it is not their hving world that Fate preserves and gives us with those works of ancient art, not the spring and svimmer of that ethical Kfe in which they bloomed and ripened, but the veiled remembrance alone of all this reahty. Our action, therefore, when we enjoy them is not that of worship, through which our conscious life might attaia its complete truth and be satisfied to the full : our action is external ; it consists in wiping off some drop of rain or speck of dust from these fruits, and in place of the inner elements composing the reality of the ethical life, a reahty that environed, created and inspired these works, we erect in prohx detail the scaffolding of the dead elements of their outward existence, — language, historical circumstances, etc. All this we do, not in order to enter into their very hfe, but only to represent them ideally or pictorially {vorstdlen) within ourselves. But just as the
764 Phenomenology of Mind
maiden who hands us the plucked fruits is more than the nature which presented them in the first instance — the nature which provided all their detailed conditions and elements, tree, air, hght and so on — since in a higher way she gathers aU this together into the light of her self-conscious eye, and her gesture in offering the gifts ; so too the spirit of the fate, which presents us with those works of art, is more than the ethical Ufe realised in that nation. For it is the inwardising in us, in the form of conscious memory {Er-innerung), of the spirit which in them was manifested in an outward external way ; — it is the spirit of the tragic fate which collects all those individual gods and attributes of the substance into the one Pantheon, into the spirit which is itself conscious of itself as spirit.
All the conditions for its production are present, and this totahty of its conditions constitutes the development of it, its notion, or the inherent production of it. The cycle of the creations of art embraces in its scope all forms in which the absolute substance rehnqmshes itself. The absolute substance is in the form of individuahty as a thing ; as an object existing for sense experience ; as mere language, or the process of that form whose existence does not get away from the self, and is a purely evanescent object ; as immediate unity with universal self -consciousness when inspired with enthusiasm ; as mediated unity when performing the acts of the cult ; as corporeal embodiment of the self in a form of beauty ; and finally as existence Hfted into ideal representation {VorsteUung) and the expansion of this existence into a world which at length gathers its content together into imiversaUty, a universal which
is at the same time pure certainty and assurance of itself. These forms, and, on the other side, the world of personahty and legal right, the wild and desert waste of content with its constituent elements set free and detached, as also the thought-constituted personahty of Stoicism, and the unresting disquiet of Scepticism — these compose the periphery of the circle of shapes and forms, which attend, an expectant and eager throng, round the birthplace of spirit as it becomes self-consciousness. Their centre is the yearning agony of the unhappy despairing self-consciousness, a pain which permeates aU of them, and is the common birthpang at its production, — the simphcity of the pTire notion, which contains those forms as its moments.
Spirit, here, has in it two sides, which are above represented as the two converse statements : one is this, that substance empties itself of itself, and becomes seKconsciousness ; the other is the converse, that selfconsciousness empties itself of itself and makes itself into the form of " thing," or makes itseK universal self. Both sides have in this way met each other, and, ia consequence, their true union has arisen. The relinquishment or "kenosis" on the part of the substance, its becoming self-consciousness, expresses the transition into the opposite, the unconscious transition of necessity, in other words, that it is imflicitly self-consciousness. Conversely, the emptying of self-consciousness expresses this,, that imphcitly it is Universal Being, or — because the self is pure selfexistence, which is at home with itself in its opposite — that the substance is seK-conscibusness expUcitly for the self, and, just on that account, is spirit. Of this spirit,
766 Phenomenology of Mind
wldch. has left the form of substance behind, and enters existence in the shape of self-consciousness, we may say, therefore — if we wish to use terms drawn from the process of natural generation— that it has a real mother but a potential or an implicit father. For actual reaHty, or self-consciousness, and impHcit being in the sense of substance, are its two moments ; and by the reciprocity of their kenosis, each relinquishing or " emptying " itself of itself and becoming the other, spirit thus comes into existence as their unity.
In so far as self-consciousness in a one-sided way grasps only its own relinquishment, although its object is thus for it at once both existence and self and it knows all existence to be spiritual in nature, yet true spirit has(^not become thereby objective for it.^ For, so far, being in general or substance, would not necessarily from its side be also emptied of itseK, and become seK-consciousness. In that case, then, aU existence is spiritual reality merely from the standpoint of fconsciousness, not inherently in itself. Spirit in this [way has merely a fictitious or imaginary existence.* This fanciful imagination is fantastic extravagance of mind, which introduces into nature as well as history, the world and the mythical ideas of early rehgions, another inner esoteric meaning different from what they, on the face of them, bear directly to consciousness, and, in particular, ia the case of rehgions, another meaning than the seK-consciousness, whose rehgions they were, could find and admit to be there. But this meaning is one that is borrowed, a garment, which does not cover the nakedness of the outer appearance, and secures no behef and respect ;
* As in neo-Platonism.
it is no more than murky darkness and a pecidiar crazy twist of consciousness.
If then this meaning of the objective is not to be bare fancy and imagination, it must be ioherent and essential {an sich), i.e. must at once arise in consciousness as springing from the very notion, and must come forward in its necessity. It is thus that self -knowing spirit has arisen ; it has arisen by means of its necessary process through the knowledge of immediate consciousness, i.e. of consciovisness of the immediately existing object. This notion, which, being immediate, had also, for consciousness, the form of immediacy, has, in the second place, taken on the form of self-consciousness essentially and inherently, i.e. by just the same necessity of the notion by which being or immediacy, the abstract object of sense-consciousness, renounces itself and becomes, for consciousness. Ego. The immediate entity (Ansich), or objectively existent necessity, is, however, different from the subjective thinking entity, or the knowledge of necessity — a distinction which, at the same time, does not he outside the notion, for the simple tmity of the notion is itself immediate being. The notion is at once what empties or relinquishes itself, or the exphcit unfolding of directly apprehended {angeschaiit) necessity, and is also at home with itself in that necessity, knows it and comprehends it. The immediate inherent nature of spirit, which takes on the form of self-consciousness, 'means nothing else than that the concrete actual world-sfirit has reached this hnowledge of itseK. It is then too ^at this knowledge first enters its consciousness, and enters it as truth. How that came about has already been explained.
That Absolute Spirit has taken on the form of self-
768 Phenomenology of Mind
consciousness inherently and necessarily, and has done so too as a conscious fact — this position appears now as the behef of the world, the behef that spirit exists in fact as a definite seK-consciousness, i.e. as an actual human being, that spirit is an object for immediate experience, that the believing mind sees, feels, and hears this divinity.* Taken thus it is not an imagination, not a fancy ; it is actual in the behever. Consciousness in that case does not set out from its own inner life, does not start from thought, and enclose the thought of God along with existence; rather it sets out from immediate present existence, and finds God there.
The moment of immediate existence is present as an element in the notion, and present in such a way that the rehgious spirit, on the return of all ultimate reality into consciousness, has become simple positive self, just as the actual spirit as such, in the case of the " unhappy consciousness," was just this simple self-conscious negativity. The seH of the definitely existent spirit has in that way the form of complete immediacy. It is neither set up as something thought, or imaginatively represented, nor as something produced, as is the case with the immediate self both in natural rehgion, and in ireUgion as art. Rather, this concrete God is beheld (sensuously and immediately as a self, as a real indiI vidual himian being ; only so is it a seK-consciousness.
This incarnation, of the Divine Being, its having essentially and directly the form of 'self-consciousness, is the simple content of Absolute Rehgion. Here the Divine Being is known as spicit ; this rehgion is the Divine Being's consciousness concerning itself that it is Spirit. For spirit is knowledge 61 itself in
* e.g. in Christianity.
its state of self-relinquishment, the absolute Reality, which is the process of retaining its harmony and identity with itself ia its otherness. This, however, is Substance, so far as in its accidents substance at the same time turns back into itself ; and does so, not as beiag indifferent towards something unessential and, consequently, finding itself in some ahen element, but as being there within itself, i.e. so far as it is subject or self.
In this form of religion the Divine Being is, on that account, revealed. Its being revealed obviously consists in this, that what it is, is consciously known. It is, however, known just in its being known as spirit, as a Being which is essentially self-consciousness.
There is something in the object always concealed^ from consciousness when the object is for consciousness an " other," something ahen and extraneous, and when consciousness does not know the object as its self. This concealment, this secrecy, ceases when the Absolute Being qita spirit is object of consciousness. For here ia / its relation to consciousness the object is in the form of self ; i.e. consciousness at once and immediately knows itseK there, or is manifest, revealed, to itself ia the object. Itself is manifest to itself merely in its own certainty of seH; the object it has is the self; self, however, is nothing ahen and extraneous, but inseparable unity with itself, the immediate universal. It is the pure notion, pure thought, or self-existence, beiag-for-seK, which is immediately being, and, therewith, beiag-foranother, and, qtia this being-for-another, is immediately turned back into itself and is at home with itself (bei sich).' It is thus the truly and solely revealed. The Good, the Righteous, the Holy, Creator of Heaven
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and Earth, etc. — all these are predicates of a subject, universal moments, which have their hold on this central point, and only are when consciousness goes back into thought.
As long as it is they that are known, their ground and essential being, the Subject itself is not yet revealed ; and in the same way the specific determinations of the universal are not this universal itself . The Subject itself, and consequently this pure universal too, is, however, revealed as self ; for this self is just this inner being reflected into itself, the inner being which is immediately given and is the proper certainty of that [other] self, for r which it is object. To be in its notion that which reveals I and is revealed — ^this is, then, the true form of spirit ; and •moreover, this form, its notion, is alone its very essence and its substance. Spirit is known as self-consciousness, and to this self-consciousness it is directly revealed, for it is this self-consciousness itself. The divine nature is the same as the human, and it is this unity which is I intuitively apprehended {angeschavt).
Here, then, we find as a fact consciousness, or the general form in which Being is aware of Being — ^the shape which Being adopts — to be identical with its selfconsciousness. This shape is itself a self-consciousness ; it is thus at the same time an existent object ; and this existence possesses equally directly the significance of pure thought, of Absolute Being.
The absolute Being existing as a concrete actual selfconsciousness, seems to have descended from its eternal pure simplicity ; but in fact it has, in so doiag, attained for the first time its highest nature, its supreme reach of being. For when the notion of Being has reached its simple purity of nature, it is then hoih the absolute
abstraction, which is pure thought and hence the pure singleness of self, and immediacy or objective being, on account of its pure simplicity.
What is called sense-consciousness is also just this pure abstraction ; it is this kind of thought for which being is the immediate. The lowest is thus at the same time the highest ; the revelation which has appeared entirely on the surface is just therein the deepest that can be made. That the Supreme Being is seen, heard, etc., as an existent self-consciousness, — this is, in very truth, the culmination and consummation of its notion. And through this consummation, the Diviae Being is given to sense, exists immediately, in its character as Divine Being. -'
This immediate existence is at the same time not solely and simply immediate consciousness ; it is religious consciousness. This immediacy means"not only an existent seK-consciousness, but also the purely thought-constituted or Absolute Being; and these meanings are inseparable. What we [the philosophers] are conscious of in our conception, — that objective being is ultimate essence, — ^is the same as what the rehgious consciousness is aware of. This unity of being and essence, of thought which is immediately existence, is immediate knowledge on the part of this religious consciousness just as it is the inner thought or the mediated reflective knowledge of this consciousness. For this unity of being and thought is self-consciousness and actually exists; in other words, the thought-constituted imity has at the same time this concrete shape and form of what it is. God, then, is here revealed, as ■• He is ; He actually exists as He is in Himself ; He is real as Spirit. God is attainable in pure speculative know-
772 Phenomenology of Mind
ledge alone, and only is in that knowledge, and is merely that knowledge itseK, for He is spirit ; and this speculative knowledge is the knowledge furnished by revealed rehgion. That knowledge knows God to be thought, or pure Essence ; and knows this thought as actual being and as real existence, and existence as the negativity, the reflexion, of itself, hence as Self, a particular " this," and a universal self. It is justthis that revealed rehgion knows.
The hopes and expectations of preceding ages pressed forward to, and were solely directed towards this revelation, the vision of what Absolute Being is, and the discovery of themselves therein. This joy, the joy of seeing itself in Absolute Be^^, becomes realised in self-consciousness, and seizes the whole world. For the Absolute is Spirit, it is the simple tniovement)of those pure abstract moments, which expresses just this — that Ultimate Reahty is then eo if so known as Spirit when it is seen and beheld as immediate self-consciousness.
This conception of spirit knowing itseK to be spirit, is still the immediate notion ; it is not yet developed. The ultioaate Being is spirit ; in other words, it has appeared, it is revealed. This first revelation is itself immediate ; but the immediacy is Hkewise thought, or pure mediation, and must therefore exhibit and set forth this moment in the sphere of immediacy as such.
Looking at this more precisely, spirit, when selfconsciousness is immediate, is a particular " this " ; it is an individual self-consciousness set up in contrast to the universal self-consciousness. It is a one, a repelling and excluding imit, which appears to that consciousness, for which it exists, in the impervious form of a sensuous other, an unreduced opposite in the sphere of sense.
This other does not yet know spirit to be its own; in other words, spirit, in its form as an individual self, does not yet exist as equally universal self, as all self. Or again, the shape it assxunes has not as yet the form of the notion, i.e. of the universal self, of the self which ia its immediate actual reaility is at once transcended, is thought, universahty, without losing its reahty ia this universahty.
The prehminary and similarly immediate form of this universahty is, however, not at once the form of thought itself, of the notion as notion ; it is the imiversahty of actual reahty, it is the " alhiess," the collective totaUty, of the selves, and is the elevation of existence into the sphere of presentative or figurative thought (Vorstdlung) ; just as iu general, to take a concrete example, the "this" of sense, when transcended, is first of aU the " thing " of " perception," and is not yet the "imiversal" of "understanding."
This individual human being, then, which Absolute Being is revealed to be, goes through iu its own case as an individual the process foimd in sense existence. He is the immediately present God; in consequence His being passes over into His having been. Consciousness, for wldch God is thus sensuously present, ceases to see Him, to hear Fim : it has seen Him, it has heard Him. And it is by the mere fact that it has seen and heard Him, that it first becomes itself spiritual consciousness* ; or, in other words. He has now arisen in the life of Spirit, as He formerly rose before consciousness as an object existing in the sphere of sense. For, a consciousness which sees and hears Him by sense, is one which is
♦ cp. " He that has seen me has seen the Father " (John xiv.)- " ^f I go not away the Comforter will not come nnto you " (ibid. xvi.).
774 Phenomenology of Mind
itself merely an iminediate consciousness, which has not cancelled and transcended the disparateness, of objectivity, has not withdrawn it into pure thought, but accepts this objectively presented individual, and not itself, as spirit. In the disappearance of the immediate existence of what is knoAvn to be Absolute Being, immediacy preserves its negative moment. Spirit remains the immediate seK of actual reahty, but in the form of the universal self-consciousness of a rehgious communion,* a self-consciousness which rests in its own proper substance, just as in it this substance is imiversal subject : it is not the individual subject by himself, but the individual along with the consciousness of the communion, and what he is for this communion is the complete whole of the individual spirit.
The- terms " past " and " distance " are, however, merely the imperfect form in which the immediateness gets mediated or made universal ; this is merely dipped superficially in the element of thought, is kept there as a sensuous mode of immediacy, and not made one with the nature of thought itseK. It is lifted out of sense merely into the region of ideation, of pictorial presentation ; for this is the synthetic [external] connexion of sensuous immediacy and its universahty or thought.
Imaginative presentation constitutes the characteristic form in which spirit is conscious of itself in this rehgious communion. This form is not yet the self-consciousness of spirit which has reached its notion as notion ; the mediating process is still incomplete. In this connexion of being and thought, then,, there is a defect ; spiritual
* " Lo, I am with you alway even to the end of the world " (Matt, xxviii. ; also xviii. 20).
life is still cumbered with an unreconciled diremption into a " hither " and a " yonder," a " here " and a " beyond." The content is the true content ; but all its moments, when placed in the element of mere presentation, have the character, not of being conceptually comprehended, but of appearing as completely independent aspects, externally related to one another.
*In order that the true content may also preserve its true form when before consciousness, the latter must necessarily pass to a higher plane of mental development, where the Absolute Substance is not intuitively apprehended but conceptually comprehended and where consciousness is for itself brought to the level of its self-consciousness ; — ^in the way this has already taken place objectively or for us [who have analysed the process of experience].
We have to consider this content as it exists in its consciousness. Absolute Spirit is content ; that is how it exists in the form of its truth. But its truth consists not merely in being the substance or the inherent reahty of the reHgious communion; nor again in coming out of this inwardness iato the objectivity of perceptual and presentational thought; but va. becoming concrete actual self, reflecting itself into self, and being Subject. This, then, is the process which Spirit realises in its communion ; this is its life. What this self-revealing spirit is in and by itself, is therefore not brought out by the rich and full content of its life being, so to say, untwined and reduced to its original and primitive strands, to the ideas, for instance, presented before the minds of the first imperfect rehgious communion, or even to what the actual human being
* This paragraph is explanatory.
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[incarnating the Divine Spirit] * tas spoken. This reversion to the primitive and elementary is based on the instinct to get at the notion and ultimate principle ; but it confuses the origin, in the sense of the immediate existence of the first historical appearance, with the pure simpUcity of the notion. By thus impoverishing the life of spirit, by clearing away the idea of the communion and its action with regard to its idea, there arises, therefore, not the notion, but bare externahty and particularity, merely the historical manner in which spirit once upon a time appeared, the soulless recollection of an ideally presented historical figure and its past.f
•^ Spirit is content of its consciousness to begin with in the form of pure substance ; in other words, it is content of its pure consciousness. This element of thought is the process of descending into existence, the sphere of particularity. The middle term between these two is theic synthetic connexion, the consciousness of passing into otherness, the process of ideal presentation as such. The third stage is the return from representation in idea and from that otherness ; in other words, it is the element of self-consciousness itself.
These three movements constitute the hf e of spirit. Its resolution into separate parts, when it enters the form of presentation, consists in its taking on a determinate mode of being ; this detemdnateness, however, is nothing but one of its moments. Its detailed process thus consists in spreading its nature over its various moments, entering every one, each being an element in its composition : and since each of these spheres is
* e.g. Christ
t The life and work of the historical Jesns.
self-complete, this reflexion into itself is at the same time the transition into another sphere of its being. Ideal presentation constitutes the middle term between pure thought and self-consciousness as such, and is merely one of the determinate forms. At the same time however, as has been shown, the character belonging to such presentation — that of being " synthetic connexion " — is spread over aU these elements and is their common characteristic.
The content itself, which we have to consider, has partly been met with already, as the idea or presentation of the " unhappy " and the " beheving " types of consciousness. In the case of the " unhappy " despairing consciousness, however, the peculiarity Ues in the content being produced from consciousness and longingly desired, wherein the spirit can never be satiated nor find rest because the content is not yet its own content inherently and essentially, or in the sense of being its substance. In the case of the "beheving" consciousness, again, this content has been regarded as the impersonal Being of the World, as the essentially objective content of presentative thought — ^a pictorial thinking that seeks to escape the actual world altogether, and consequently has not the certainty of self-consciousness, a certainty which is cut ofi from it, partly as being conceit of knowledge, partly as being pure insight. The consciousness of the re%ious communion, on the other hand, possesses the content as its substance, just as the content is the certainty the communion has of its own spiritual life.
Spirit, represented at first as substance in the element of pure thought, is, thus, primarily the eternal Being, simple, self-identical, which does not, however.
778 Phenomenology of Mind
have this abstract meaning of Being, but the meaning of Absolute Spirit. Yet spirit consists, not in being a meaning, not in being the inner, but in being the actual, the real. " Simple eternal Being " would, therefore, be spirit merely in empty phrase, if it stopped at ideational pictorial thought, and went no further than the expression of " simple eternal Being." " Simple Being," however, because it is abstraction, is in point of fact the inherently negative, is indeed the negativity of reflective thought, or negativity as found in Being per se ; i.e. it is absolute distinction from itself, its pure process of becoming its other. Qua essential Being, it is merely in itself, purely imphcit, or for us : but since this purity of form is just abstraction or negativity, it is for itsdf, it is the self, the notion. It is thus objective; and since presentational thinking apprehends and expresses as an event what has just been expressed as the necessity of the notion, it will be said that the eternal Being produces for itseK an other. But in this otherness it has likewise, ipso facto, returned into itself again; for the distinction is distinction in itself, i.e. the distinction is directly distinguished merely from itself, and is thus the unity returned into itself.
There are thus three moments to be distinguished : immanent absolute Being ; exphcit Self-existence, which is the antithesis, the express otherness, of Being, and for which that Being is object ; and Self-existence or Self-knowledge in that other, in that antithetic expression. The absolute Being beholds only itself in its Self -existence, in its objective otherness. In thus emptying itself, in this kenosis, it is merely within itseK: the independent Self -existence which excludes itself from absolute Being is the knowledge of
itself on the part of absolute Being. It is the " Word," the Logos, which when spoken empties the speaker of himself, outwardises him, and leaves him behind emptied, but is at the same time immediately heard and understood, and only this act of hearing or perceiving himseK is the actual existence of the " Word." Hence, then, the distinctions which are set up are immediately resolved just as they are made, and are directly made just as they are resolved, and the truth and the - reality consist precisely in this self-closed circular process.
This movement within itself is what the absolute Being qua Spirit expresses. Absolute Being, when not grasped as Spirit, is merely an empty abstraction, just as spirit which is not grasped as a process in this way is merely an empty word. Since its moments are taken 'purely as moments, they are notions in restless activity, which are merely in being inherently their own opposite, and in finding their rest in the whole. But the presentative pictorial thought of the religious communion is not this conceptual thinking ; it has the content without its necessity ; and instead of the form of the notion it brings into the reahn of pure consciousness the natural relations of Father and Son. Since it thus, even when thinking, proceeds by way of figurative ideas, absolute Being is indeed revealed to it, but the moments of this Being, owing to this [externally] synthetic presentational thinking, fall of themselves apart from one another, so that they are not related to each other through their own very notion, while, again, this figurative thinking retreats from the pure object it deals with, and takes up a merely external relation towards it. The object is externally revealed to it from an ahen source, and in this thought of Spirit it does not find its own self, does
780 Phenomenology of Mind
not recognise the nature of pure self-consciousness. In so far as the form of presentative thinking and that way of thinking by means of relationships derived from nature have to be transcended, and especially the method of taking the moments of the process, m which the life of Spirit consists, as isolated fixed immovable substances or subjects, instead of transient moments — this transcendence is to be looked at as a compulsion on the part of the notion, in the way we formerly pointed out when dealing with another aspect.* But since it is only an instinct, it mistakes its own real character, rejects the content along with the form, and, what comes to the same thing, degrades the content into a historical imaginative idea and an heirloom handed down by tradition. In this way there is retained and preserved only what is purely external to the sphere of behef, and hence a lifeless entity devoid of knowledge ; while the inner element in behef has passed away, because this would be the notion knowing itseH as notion.
The Absolute Spirit, ideally presented in pure ultimate Being, is indeed not the abstract pure Being ; rather, just by the fact that this is merely a moment in the life of Spirit, it is lowered to the level of constituent element. The representation of Spirit in this element, however, has inherently the same defect, as regards form, which ultimate Being as such has. Ultimate Being is abstraction, and, therefore, the negative of its simphcity, is an other : in the same way, Spirit in the element of ultimate Being is the form of simple unity, which, on that account, is essentially and at the same time a process of turning to otherness. Or, what is the same thing, the relation of the eternal
♦ V. p. 776. •
Being to its self-existence, its objective existence for Itself, is that of pure thought, a directly simple relation. In this simple beholding of itself in the Other, otherness is not as such set up independently ; it is distinction in the way distinction, in pure thought, is immediately no distinction — a recognition of Love, where lover and beloved are not in their very being opposed to each other at aU. Spirit, which is expressed in the element of pure thought, is essentially just this : not to be merely in that element, but to be concrete, actual ; for otherness, i.e. cancelling and superseding pure conception, thoughtconstituted conception, lies in the very notion of Spirit.
The element of pure thought, because it is an abstract element, is itself rather the other of its own simplicity, and hence passes over into ideal presentation proper — the element -where the moments of the pure notion at once preserve a substantial existence in opposition to each other and are subjects as well, which do not exist for a third thing in indifference towards each other, but being reflected into themselves, break away from one another, and stand confronting each other.
Merely eternal, or abstract Spirit, then, becomes an other to itself : it enters existence, and, in the first instance, enters immediate existence. It creates a World. This "Creation" is the word which pictorial presentative thought uses to convey the absolute movement which the notion itself goes through ; or to express the fact that the absolutely simple or pure thought, because it. is abstract thought, is really the negative, and hence opposed to itself, the other of itself ; or because, to state the same in another way, what is put forward as ultimate Being is simple immediacy, bare objective existence, but qua immediacy or existence, is without
782 Phenomenology of Mind
Self, and, lacking thus inwardness, is passive, or has a relative existence, exists for another. This relative existence is at the same time a world. Spirit, in the character of existing for another, is the undisturbed separate subsistence of those moments formerly enclosed within pure thought, is, therefore, the dissolution of their simple universahty, and their dispersion into their own particularity.
The world, however, is not merely Spirit thus thrown out and scattered in all its plenitude with an external order imposed on it ; for since Spirit is essentially simple Self, this self is likewise present therein. It is objectively existent spirit which is individual self, that has consciousness and distinguishes itseK as other, as world, from itself. In the way this individual self is thus immediately established at first, it is not yet conscious of being Spirit ; it thus does not exist as Spirit ; it may be called " innocent," but not strictly " good." In order that in fact it may be self and Spirit, it has first to become objectively an other to itself, in the same way that the Eternal being manifests itself as the process of being self-identical in its otherness. Since i this spirit is determined as only immediately existing, ! or dispersed in the diverse multiphcity of its conscious ; fife, its becoming " other " means that knowledge is centred on itself, concentrates itself upon its subjective content. Immediate existence turns into thought, or merely sense-consciousness turns roimd into consciousness of thought; and, moreover, because that thought has come from immediacy or is conditioned thought, it is not pure knowledge, but thought which contains otherness, and is, thus, the self-opposed thought of good and evil. Man is pictoriaUy represented by the rehgious
mind in this way : it happened once as an event, with no necessity about it, that he lost the form of harmonious unity with himself by plucking the fruits of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, and was driven from the state of conscious innocence, from Paradise, from the garden with aU its creatures, and from nature ofieriug its bounties without man's toil.
Siace this self-centredness on the part of the existent consciousness directly gives rise to disharmony with itself. Evil appears as the first actual expression of the self-centred consciousness. And because the thoughts of good and evU are utterly opposed, and this opposition is not yet broken down, this consciousness is essentially and merely evil. At the same time, however, owiag to just this very opposition, there is present also the good consciousness opposing the one that is evil, and again their relation to each other. In so far as immediate existence turns round into thought, and seK-absorption, seHcentredness, is just thought, whQe again the transition to otherness on the part of Being is thereby more precisely determined, — ^the fact of becoming evil can be removed further backwards away out of the actually existing world and transferred to the veryearliest reahn of thought. It may thus be said that it was the very first-bom Son of Light [Lucifer] who, by becoming self-centred, fell, but that in his place another was at once created. Such a form of expression as " fallen," belonging merely to figurative thought, and not to the notion, just like the term " Son," once more transmutes and lowers the moments of the notion to the level of imaginative thought, or, in other words, drags pictures and presentations into the realm of thought.
784 Phenomenology of Mind
In the same way, it is matter of iodifference to coordinate a multiplicity of other angelic shapes and forms with the simple thought of otherness in the Being of the Eternal, and transfer to them that condition of seKcentredness. This co-ordination must, aU the same, win approval, for the reason that, through it, this moment of otherness does express diversity, as it shoidd do : not indeed as plurahty in general, but as determinate diversity, so that one part is the Son, that which is simple and knows itself to be ultimate Being, while the other part involves the abandonment, the emptying, of self-existence, and merely Uves to praise that Being. To this part may then also be assigned the resimaption once again of the seK-existence relinquished, and that " self-centredness " characteristic of evil. In so far as this condition of otherness falls into two parts, Spirit might, as regards its moments, be more exactly expressed numerically as a Quatemity, a four in one, or (because the multiplicity breaks up itself again into two parts, viz. one part which has remained good, the other which has become evil), might be expressed as a Quinity.
Counting the moments, however, can be regarded as altogether useless, since, for one thing, what is distinguished is itself just as truly one and single — viz. the thought of distinction which is only one thought — as the thought is this element distinguished, the second over against the first. For another thing it is useless to count, because the thought which grasps the many in one has to be dissolved out of its imiversahty and must be distinguished into more than three or four distinct components. This universahty appears, in contrast to the absolute determinateness of the abstract
unit — ^the principle of number — as radeterminateness in relation to number as such ; so that we can only speak in this connexion of numbers in. general, i.e. not of a specific number of distinctions. Hence, in general, it is here quite superfluous to think of number and coimting, just as, in other connexions, the bare difference of magnitude and multitude says nothing at all and falls outside conceptual thought.
Good and Evil were the specific distinctions of thought which we found. Since their opposition is not yet broken down, and they are represented as essential reahties of thought, each of them independent by itself, man is the self with no essential reahty of his own and the mere ground which keeps them together, and on which they exist and war with one another. But these universal powers of good and evil belong aU the same to the self, or the self is their actuahsing principle. From this point of view it thus comes about that, as evil is nothing else than the natiiral existence of spirit becoming self-absorbed and self-centred, conversely, good enters into actual reaUty and appears as an objectively existing self-consciousness. The idea of the transition of the Divine Being into otherness is in general merely indicated and hinted at when Spirit is interpreted in terms of pure thought ; for figurative thinking this idea here comes nearer its realisation : the realisation is taken to consist in the Divine Being " humbling " Itself, and renouncing its abstract nature and unreaHty. The other aspect, that of evil, is taken by imagination as an event extraneous and ahen to the Divine Being : to grasp evil in the Divine Being as the wrath of God — that is the supreme efiort, the severest strain, of which figurative thought, wrestling with its own limita-
786 Phenomenology of Mind
tions, is capable, an efiort whicli, since it dispenses with the notion, remains a fruitless struggle.
The ahenation of the Divine Nature is thus set up in its double-sided form : the self of Spirit, and its simple thought, are the two moments whose absolute unity is Spirit itself. Its ahenation with itself consists in the two faUing apart from each other, and in the one having an unequal value as against the other. This disparateness is, therefore, twofold in character, and two connections arise, which have in common the moments just given. In the one, the Divine Beiag stands for what is essential, while natm-al existence and the seK are unessential and are to be cancelled. In the other, on the contrary, it is seH-existence which passes for what is essential and the Divine pure and simple for imessential. Their mediating, though empty ground is existence in general, the bare community of their two moments.
The dissolution of this opposition does not take efiect through the struggle between the two elements, which are represented as separate and independent Beings. Just in virtue of their independence each must inherently, through its own notion, dissolve itself in itseH. The struggle takes place first ia that quarter where both cease to be this mixture of thought and independent existence, and confront each other merely as thoughts. For ia that case, being determinate notions, they essentially exist merely in the relation of opposition; qvxi independent, on the other hand, they have their essential natmre outside opposition; their movement is thus free, self-determined, and pecuhar to themselves. Just as the movement, then, of both is inherently movement because it has to be regarded in themselves, it is set going only by that element 6t
the two which has the character of being inherently essential as contrasted with the other. This is represented as a spontaneous action ; but the necessity for its seK-abandontnent hes ia the notion that what is inherently essential, and gets this specific character merely through opposition, has just on that account no real independent subsistence. Therefore that element which has for its essence, not independent selfexistence, but simple being, is what empties and abandons itself, gives itself unto death, and so reconciles Absolute Being with its own self. For in this process it manifests itself as spirit: the abstract Being is estranged from itself, it has natural existence and actual individual reahty. This its otherness, or its being sensuously present, is taken back again by the second process of seK-abandonment, of becoming " other," and is aflfirmed as superseded, as universal. Thereby the Divine Being has come to itself in the sphere of the sensuous present ; the immediate existence of actual reahty has ceased to be something ahen or external to the Divine, by being sublated, by its becoming universal : this death of immediacy is therefore its rising anew as Spirit. When the seH-conscious Being cancels and transcends its immediate present, it is universal selfconsciousness. This notion of the transcended individual seK which is Absolute Being, immediately expresses therefore the establishment of a communion which, while hitherto having its abode in the sphere of pictorial presentation, now returns into itseH as the Self : and Spirit thus passes from the second element constituting it, — figurative presentation — and goes over to the third — self-consciousness as such. If we further consider the kind of procedure that pre-
788 Phenomenology of Mind
sentative thinkiiig adopts as it goes along, we find in the fiist place the expression that the Divine Being " puts on " human nature. Here it is eo if so asserted that impKcitly and inherently the two are not separate : just as in the statement, that the Divine Being from the beginning empties Itself of Itself, that its objective existence is self-absorbed, centres ia ItseK and becomes evil, it is not asserted but impUed that fer se this evil existence is not something ahen to the Divine nature. Absolute Being would be merely an empty name if in very truth there were any other being external to it, if there were an absolute " faU " from it. The aspect of seU-centredness, self-absorption, reaUy constitutes the essential moment of the self of Spirit.
That this self-centredness, whence primarily comes its reahty, belongs to the Divine Being — ^while this is for ics a notion, and so as far as it is a notion, — appears to presentative thinking as an inconceivable historical fact. The inherent and essential nature assumes for figurative thought the form of a bare objective fact external and indifferent to God. The thought, however, that those apparently mutually repugnant moments, absolute Being and self-existent Self, are not inseparable, comes also before this figurative way of thinking (since it does possess the real content), but that thought appears afterwards, in the form that the Divine Being empties Itself of Itself and is made flesh. This figmrative idea, which in this way is stUl immediate and hence not spiritual, i.e. it takes the human form assimied by the Divine to be merely in the first instance a particular form, not yet a universal form — ^becomes spiritual for this consciousness in the process whereby Grod, who has assumed shape and form, surrenders again His external, His immediate
itevealeA Religion 'j^^
existence, and returns to His inner Being. The Divine Being is then Spirit when it is reflected into itself.
The reconcihation of the Divine Being with its antithesis as a whole, and, specifically, with the thought of this other — evil — is thus presented here in a figurative way. When this reconcihation is expressed conceptually, by saying it consists tti the fact that evil is inherently the same as what goodness is, or again that the Divine Being is the same as nature in its entire extent, just as nature separated from God is simply nothingness, — then this must be looked at as an unspiritual mode of expression which is bound to give rise to misunderstandings. When evil is the same as goodness, then evil is just not evil nor goodness good ; on the contrary, both are really done away with — evil in general, self-centred self-existence, and goodness^ selfless simple abstraction. Since in this way they are both expressed in terms of their notion, the unity of the two is at once apparent ; for self-centred self-existence is simple knowledge ; and what is self-less simple abstraction is as much -pxae self-existence centred within itself. Hence, if it must be said that good and evil in theix conception, i.e., so far as they are not good and evH, are the same, just as certainly it must be said that they are not the same, but absolutely different ; for simple seKexistence, or again pure knowledge, is equally pure negativity or per se absolute distinction. It is only these two propositions that make the whole complete; and when the first is asserted and asseverated, it must be met and opposed by insisting on the other with immovable obstinacy. Since both are equally right, they are both equally wrong, and theic wrong consists in taking such abstract forms as " the same "
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and "not the same," " identity " and " non-identity," to be spmething true, fixed, real, and in resting on them. Neither the one nor the other has truth ; their truth is just their movement, the process iu which simple sameness is abstraction and thus absolute distinction, while this agaiu, being distinction fer se, is distinguished from itself and so is self-identity. Precisely this is what we have in the case of the sameness of the Divine Being and Nature in general and hmnan nature in particular : the former is Nature so far as it is not essentially Being; Nature is divine in its essential Being. But it is in Spirit that we find both abstract aspects afl&mied as they truly are, viz. as cancelled and preserved at once : and this way of affirming them cannot be expressed by the judgment, by the soulless word " is," the copula of the judgment. In the same way Nature is nothing outside its essential Being [God] ; but this nothing itself is all the same ; it is absolute abstraction, pure thought or self-centredness, and with its moment of opposition to spiritual unity it is the principle of Evil. The difficulty people find in these conceptions is due solely to sticking to the term "is," and forgetting the character of thought, where the moments as much are as they are not, — are the process which is Spirit. It is this spiritual unity, — unity where the distinctions are merely in the form of moments, or are transcended and maintained — which became known to presentative thinking in that atoning reconcihation spoken of above. And since this unity is the universahty of seK-consciousness, self-consciousness has ceased to be figurative or pictorial in its thinking ; the process has turned back into it. Spirit thus takes up its position in the third element,
in universal self-consciousness : Spirit is its own community. Tlie movement of this community beiug that of self-consciousness, which distinguishes itself from its figurative idea, consists ia expUcitly bringirig out what has implicitly become established. The dead Divine Man, or Human Gtod, is imphcitly universal selfconsciousness ; he has to become expHcitly so for this self - consciousness. Or, since this seK - consciousness constitutes one side of the opposition involved in ideal presentation, viz. the side of evil, which takes natural existence and individual seK-existence to be the essential reaKty — this aspect, which is presented as independent, and not yet as a moment, has, on account of its independence, to raise itself in and for itself, to the level of Spirit ; it has to reveal the process of Spirit in this aspect.
This particular seH-consciousness is Spirit in natural form, natural spirit : self has to withdraw from this natural existence and enter into itself, become selfcentred ; that means, it has to become evil. But this aspect is already per se evil : entering into itself consists, therefore, in persuading itself that natural existence is what is evil. By presentational picturethinking the world is supposed actually to become evil and be evil as an actual fact, and the atoning reconcilement of the Absolute Being is viewed as an actual existent phenomenon. By seK-consciousness as such, however, this figiu-ative presentation of the truth, as regards its form, is considered to be merely a moment that is already superseded and transcended ; for the self is the principle of negation, and hence knowledge — a knowledge which is a pure act of consciousness within itself. This moment of the nega-
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tive must in like manner find expression as regards the content. Since, that is to say, the Absolute Beiag is inherently and from the start reconciled with itself and is a spiritual imity, ia which the parts constitutiag the presentation are sublated, are moments, what we find is that each element of the presentation receives here the opposite significance to that which it had before. By this means each meaning finds its completion in the other, and the content is then and thereby a spiritual content. Since the specific determinateness of each is just as much its opposite, unity in otherness — spiritual reahty — is achieved and completed : just as formerly we saw opposite meanings combined and united objectively, or in themselves, and even the abstract forms of " the same " and " not-the-same," " identity " and " nonidentity " cancelled one another and were transcended. If, then, from the point of view of figurative thought, the natural self-consciousness rooted and fixed in itself was the real evU, that process of becoming fixed in itself is in the sphere of self-consciousness, the knowledge of evil as something that fer se belongs to existence. This knowledge is certainly a process of becoming evil, but merely of the thought of evil, and is therefore recognised as the first moment of reconciKation. For, being a return into self out of the inamediacy of nature which is specifically the principle of evil, it is a forsaking of that immediacy, and a dyiag to sin. It is not natural existence as such that consciousness forsakes, but natural existence that is at the same time known to be evil. The immediate process of fixing itself within itself, of becoming self-centred, is just as much a mediate process : it presupposes itself, i.e. is its own ground and principle : the reason for fixing itself in self is
because nature has per se already done so. On account of evil man must be tuyned back into himself, but evil is itself the process of doing so, of "fixing himself in self." This first movement is just on that account itself merely immediate, is its bare and simple notion, because it is the same as what its ground or reason is. The movement, or the process of passing into otherness, must therefore come out afterwards in its own more peculiar form.
Beside this immediacy, then, the mediation of ideal presentation is necessary. Imphcitly and essentially, the knowledge of nature as the untrue inadequate expression of spirit's existence, and this universality of self which has thereby arisen within the Hfe of the self — these constitute the reconcihation of spirit with itself. This imphcit state is apprehended by the self-consciousness that does not think conceptually, in the form of an objective existence, and as something presented to it figuratively. Conceptual comprehension {Begreifen), therefore, does not mean for it a grasping {Ergreifen) of this conception (Begriff) which knows natural existence when cancelled and transcended to be universal and thus reconciled with itseK ; but rather a laying hold of that ideal presentation, the imaginative idea ( Vorstellung) that the Divine Being is reconciled with its existence through an event, — the event of God's emptying Himself of Himself, relinquishing His Divine Being, through H!is factual Incarnation and His Death. The laying hold of this idea now expresses more specifically what was formerly called in figurative thinking spiritual resurrection, or the process by which God's individual seK- consciousness * becomes the universal, becomes the rehgious communion.
* The Christ.
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The death of the Divine Man, qiia death, is abstract negativity, the immediate result of the process which terminates only in the miiversahty belonging to nature. In spiritual seK-consciousness death loses its natural significance ; it passes into its true priQciple or conception, the conception just mentioned. Death then ceases to signify what it means directly — the nonexistence of this particular individual — and becomes transformed and transfigured into the imiversality of spirit, which fives in its own communion, dies there daily, and daily rises again.
That which belongs to the sphere of pictorial thought — viz., that Absolute Spirit, qua individual or rather qua particular, embodies and presents in its objective existence the nature of spirit — is thus here transferred to seHconsciousness itself, to the sphere where knowledge maintains itself in its otherness, in its opposite. This self-consciousness does not therefore really die, as the particular person * is represented to have really died ; its particularity succumbs and expires in its universafity, i.e. in its knowledge, which is true Being reconciling itself with itself. That primary and prior element of presentative thinking is thus here set forth as transcended, has, in other words, returned into the self, into its notion. What was in the former merely an existent entity has come to assume the form of Subject. By that very fact the first .element too, pure thought and the spirit eternal therein, are no longer away beyond and outside the mind thinking pictoriaUy nor beyond the self ; rather the return of the whole into itself consists just in containing all moments within itself. When the death of the mediator is laid hold of by the self, brought
* Christ.
within its grasp, this means the sublation and transcendence of his factuality, of his particular independent existence : this particular self-existence has become universal self-consciousness.
On the other side, the universal, just because of this, is self-consciousness, and the pure or abstract unreal Spirit of bare thought has become concrete and actual. The death of the mediator is death not merely of his natural aspect, of his particular self-existence : what dies is not merely the outer encasement, which, beiug stripped of true Being, is eo ipso dead, but also the abstraction of the Divine Being. For the mediator, as long as his death has not yet accomphshed the reconcihation, is something one-sided, which takes as true Being the simple abstract element of thought, not concrete reality. This one-sided extreme of self has not yet equal worth and value with ultimate Being ; the self first gets this as Spirit. When the mediator as imaginatively presented dies, his death impHes at the same time the death of the mere abstraction of Divine Being, which is not yet affirmed as a self. That death is the bitterness and pain of the " unhappy consciousness," when it feels that Grod himself is dead. This harsh utterance is the expression of inmost self-knowledge which has seK bare and simple for its content ; it is the return of consciousness into the depth of darkness where Ego is nothing but bare identity of Ego, a darkness distinguishing and knowing nothing more outside it. This feeling thus means, in point of fact, the loss of the Substance and of its objective existence over against consciousness. But at the same time it is the pure subjectivity of Substance, the pure certainty and inner assurance of itself, which it lacked when it was object or immediacy, pure ultimate
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Being. This knowledge is th.us the process of spiritualisation, whereby Substance becomes Subject, by which its abstraction and Ufelessness have expired, and Substance therefore has become concrete and real, simple umversal self-consciousness.
In this way, then. Spirit is Spirit knowing its own self. It knows itself ; that, which is for it object, exists, or, in other words, its objectively presented idea is the true absolute content. As we saw, the content expresses just Spirit itself. It is at the same time not merely content of self-consciousness, and not merely object for self-consciousness ; it is also concrete actual Spirit. It is this by the fact of its passing through and realising the three elements of its nature : this movement through the content of its whole self in this way constitutes its actual reahty. What moves itself, that is Spirit; it is the subject of the movement, and it is likewise the moving process itself, or the substance through which the subject makes its way. We saw how the notion of spirit arose when we entered the sphere of religion : it was the process of self-assured spirit, which forgives and pardons evil, and in so doing puts aside its own simplicity of nature and rigid unchangeableness : it was, to state it otherwise, the process, in which what is absolutely in opposition recognises itself as the same as its opposite, and this knowledge breaks out into the " yea, yea " with which one extreme meets the other. The religious consciousness, to which the Absolute Being is revealed, sees this notion, and does away with the distinction of its self from what it beholds ; and as it is Subject, so it is also Substance ; and is thus itself Spirit just because and in so far as it is this process.
This religious communion, however, has not yet achieved its complete self-consciousness. Its content, in general, is put before it iu the form of an objective pictorial idea; so that this disruption or opposition* still attaches even to the actual spiritual character of the communion — to its return out of its presentative way of thinking ; just as the element of pure thought itseK was also hampered with that opposition. This spiritual communion, too, is not aware what it is ; it is spicitual self-conscioiisness, which is not object to itself in this form, or does not develop iato clear consciousness of itself. Kather, so far as it is consciousness, it has before it ideal presentations, those picture-thoughts which were considered.
We see seK-consciousness at its last turning-point become inward to itself and attain to knowledge of its inner being, of its self-centredness. We see it relinquish and empty itself of its natural existence, and reach pure negativity. But the positive significance — ^viz. that this negativity, or pure inwardness of knowledge is just as much the self -identical Absolute Being : put otherwise, that Substance has here attained to being absolute self-consciousness — this is, for the devotional consciousness, an objective other, something external. It grasps this aspect — that the knowledge which becomes purely inward is inherently absolute simphcity, or Substance — as the idea of something which is not thus by its very conception, but as the act of satisfaction obtained from an other. In other words, it is not really aware as a fact that this depth of pure self is the power by which the abstract Ultimate Being is drawn down from its abstractness and
* i.e. between spiritual consciousness and objective idea.
798 Phenomenology of Mind,
raised to the level of self by the strength and force of this pure devotion. The action of the self hence retains towards it this negative significance, because the relinquishment of itself on the part of substance is for the self an ultimate reahty, something f&r se ; the self does not at once grasp and comprehend it, or does not find it in its own action as such.
Volume II. (BE). SPIRIT . 429-682 (part 16)
Since this unity of Ultimate Being and Self has been essentially and inherently brought about, consciousness, too, has this idea of its reconciliation, but in the form of an imaginative idea. It obtains satisfaction by attaching, in an external way, to its pure negativity the positive significance of the tmity of itself with absolute Being. Its satisfaction thus itself remains hampered with the opposition of an external beyond. Its own peculiar reconciliation therefore enters its consciousness as something remote, something far away in the future, just as the reconciliation, which the other self achieved, appears as away in the distance of the past. Just as the individual god-man * has an imphcit, a potential father and only an actual mother, in like manner we may say the universal god-man, the spiritual communion, has as its father its own proper action and knowledge, while its mother is eternal Love, which it merely feds, but does not behold as an actual immediate object present in its consciousness. Its reconciliation, therefore, is in its heart, but stiQ with its conscious Ufe sundered in twain and its actual reahty shattered. What falls within its consciousness as the inherent and essential element, the aspect of pure mediation, is the reconcihation that lies beyond : while what appears as actuaUy'Jpresent 'm. its consciousness, as the
* The historical Christ.
aspect of immediacy and of existence, is the world which, -has yet to await transfiguration. The world is no doubt imphcitly reconciled with the Divine Being ; and that Being no doubt knows that it no longer regards the object as aUenated from itself, but as one with itself in its Love. But for self-consciousness this immediate presence has not yet the form and shape of spiritual reahty. Thus the spirit of the communion is, in its immediate consciousness, separated from its reUgious consciousness, which declares indeed that these two modes of consciousness imphcitly and inherently are not separated, but this is an impUcitness which is not realised, or has not yet become an absolute exphcit self-existence as well.
(DD)
VIII
ABSOLUTE KNOWLEDGE*
THHi Spirit manifested in revealed reKgion has not as yet surmounted its attitude of consciousness as such; or, what is the same thing, its concrete self-consciousness is not at this stage the object it is aware of. Spirit as a whole and the moments distinguished in it fall within the sphere of presentative thinking, are presentations with the form of objectivity. The content of this presentational thought is Absolute Spirit. All that remains to be done now is to cancel and transcend this bare form ; or better, because the form appertains to consciousness as such its true meaning must have come out in the shapes and modes consciousness has already assumed.
The surmoimting of the object of consciousness in this way is not to be taken one-sidedly as meaning that the object shows itself returning into the self. It has a more definite and specific meaning: it means that the object as such presents itself to the seH as a vanishing factor ; and, furthermore, that the emptying, the relinquishment, of self-consciousness itseli establishes thinghood, and that this laying aside of seK-consciousness
* V. sup. p. 684. " Absolute Knowledge " is at once the consummation of experience and, on the historical side, constructive philosophy: V. infra, p. 815 fF.
has not merely negative, but positive significance, a significance not merely for us or per se, but for seHconsciousness itself. The negative of the object, its canceUing its own existence, gets, for self-consciousness, a positive significance ; or, self-consciousness knows this nothingness of the object because on the one hand self-consciousness itself relinquishes itself ; for ia doing so it establishes itself as object, or, by reason of the iudivisible unity characterising its seH-existence, sets up the object as its self. On the other hand, there is also this other moment in the process, that self-consciousness has just as really cancelled and done away with this self -relinquishment and objectification, and has resumed them into itself, and is thus at home with itself in its otherness. This is the movement of consciousness, and in this process consciousness is the totahty of its moments.
Consciousness, at the same time, had to take up a relation to the object in aU its aspects and phases, and grasp its meaning from the point of view of each of them. This totahty of its determinate characteristics makes the object fer se and inherently a spiritual reahty; and it becomes so in truth for consciousness, when the latter apprehends every individual one of them as self, i.e. when it takes up towards them the spiritual relationship just spoken of.
The object is, then, partly immediate existence, a thing in general — corresponding to immediate consciousness ; partly an alteration of itself, its relatedness, ,(or existence-for-anotherand existence-for-self ),(Zefermwateness — corresponding to perception ; partly essential being or in the form of a universal — corresponding to intelJigence or understanding. The object as a whole is
VOL. U.—2 C
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the mediated result [the conclusion] or the passing of universaKty into individuality through specification, as also the reverse process from individual to universal through cancelled individuahty or specific determination. These three specific aspects, then, determine the ways in which consciousness must get to know the object in the form of self. This knowledge of which we are speaking is, however, not knowledge in the sense of pure conceptual comprehension of the object; here this knowledge is to be taken as a developing process, has to be taken in its various moments and set forth ia the manner appropriate to consciousness as such ; and the moments of the notion proper, of pure and absolute knowledge, are to assimie the form of modes or attitudes of consciousness. For that reason the object does not yet, when present in consciousness as such, appear as the inner essence of Spirit in the way this has just been expressed. The procedure consciousness adopts in regard to the object is not that of considering it either in this totahty as such or in the pure conceptual form; it is partly. that of a mode or attitude of consciousness in general, partly a multitude of such modes which we [who analyse the process] gather together, and in which the totaUty of the moments of the object and of the procedure of consciousness can be shown merely resolved into their separate elements. To understa(,nd this method of grasping the object, where apprehension is a form or mode of consciousness, we have here only to recall the previous forms of consciousness which came before us earUer in the argument. As regards the object, then, so far as it is inmaediate, an indifferent objective entity, we saw Reason, at the stage of "Observation," seeking and fijiding itself in
this indifferent thing — ^i.e. we saw it conscious that its activity is there of an external sort, and at the same time conscious of the object merely as an immediate obj ect. We saw, too, its specific character take expression at its highest stage in the infinite judgment : " the being of the ego is a thing." And, further, the ego is an immediate thing of sense. When ego is called a soul, it is indeed represented also as a thing, but a thing in the sense of something invisible, impalpable, etc., i.e. in fact not as an immediate entity, and not as that which is generally understood by a thing. That judgment, then, " ego is a thing " taken at first glance, has no spiritual content, or rather, is just the absence of spirituahty. In its conception, however, it is in fact the most luminous and illuminating judgment ; and this, its inner significance, which is not yet made evident, is what the two other moments to be considered express.
The thing is ego. In point of fact, thing is transcended in this infinite judgment. The thing is nothing in itself ; it only has si^iificance in a relation, only through the ego and its reference to the ego. This moment came before consciousness in pure insight and enhghtenment. Things are simply and solely useful, profitable, and only to be considered from the point of view of their utility. The trained and cidtivated self-consciousness, which has traversed the region of spirit in self-alienation, has, by giving up itself, produced the thing as its self ; it retains itself, therefore, stiU in the thing, and knows the thing to have no independence, in other words knows that the thing has essentially and solely a relative existence. Or again — to give complete expression to the relationship, i.e. to what here alone constitutes the nature of the object — the thing stands for something that
804 Phenomenology of Mind
is self-existent ; sense-certainty, sense-experience, is announced as absolute truth; but this self-existence is itself declared to be a moment which merely disappears, and passes into its opposite, into a being at the mercy of an " other/'
But knowledge of the thing is not yet finished at this point. The thing must become known as self not merely in regard to the immediateness of its being and as regards specific detbrminateness, but also in the sense of essence or inner reahty. This is found in the case of Moral Self-consciousness. This mode of experience thinks of its knowledge as the absolute essential element, knows no other objective being than pure will or pure knowledge. It is nothing but merely this will and this knowledge. Any other possesses merely non-essential being, i.e. being that has no inherent nature fer se, but only its empty husk. In so far as the moral consciousness, in its view of the world, lets existence drop out of the self, it just as truly reclaims and takes this existence back again into the self. In the form of conscience, finally, it is no longer this incessant alternation between the " placing " and the " displacing " [dissembling] of existence and self ; it knows that its existence as such is this pure certainty of its own self ; the objective element, into which qiia acting it puts forth itseK, is nothing else than pure knowledge of itself by itseK.
These are the moments which compose the reconcihation of spirit with its own consciousness proper. By themselves they are particular and separate ; and it is their spiritual imity alone which furnishes the power for this reconciUation. The last of these moments is, however, necessarily this unity itseK, and, as we see,
binds them all in fact into itself. Spirit certain of itself in its objective existence takes as the element of its existence nothing else than this knowledge of self. The declaration that what it does it does in accordance with the convictions of duty — this statement is the warrant for its own action, and makes good its conduct.
Action is the first inherent division of the simple unity of the notion, and the return out of this division. This first movement turns round into the second, siace the element of recognition is put forward as simple knowledge of duty in contrast to the distinction and diremption that lie in action as such and, in this way, form a rigid reahty confronting action. In pardon, however, we saw how this rigid fixity gave way and renounced its claims. Reahty has here, qua immediate existence, no other significance for self-consciousness than that of being pure knowledge ; similarly, qua determinate existence, or qua relation, what is self-opposed is a knowledge partly of this purely individual self, partly of knowledge qua universal. Herein it is estabhshed, at the same time, that the third moment, universaUty, or the essence, means for each of the two opposite factors merely knowledge. Finally they also cancel the empty opposition that still remains, and are the knowledge of ego as identical with ego : — this individual seK which is immediately pure knowledge or imiversal.
This reconciliation of consciousness with, self-consciousness thus proves to be brought about in a doublesided way ; in the one case, in the rehgious mind, in the other case, in consciousness itself as such. They are distinguished inter se by the fact that the one is this reconciliation in the form of impKcit immanence, the other in the form of explicit self-existence. As
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we have considered them, they at the beginning fall apart. In the order in which the modes or types of consciousness came before us, consciousness has reached the individual moments of that order, and also their imification, long before ever rehgion gave its object the sh^pe and mould of actual self -consciousness. The unification of both' aspects is not yet brought to light; it is this that winds up this series of embodiments of spiritual hfe, for in it spirit gets to the point where it knows itself not only as it is inherently in itself, or in terms of its absolute content, nor only as it is objectively for itself in terms of its bare form devoid of content, or in terms of seK-consciousness, but as it is in its self-completeness, as it is inherently and explicitly, in itself and for itself.
This unification has, however, already taken place by imphcation, and has done so in rehgion, in the return of the objective presentation (Vorstdlung) into self-consciousness, but not according to the proper form, for the rehgious aspect is the aspect of the essentially independent {Ansich) and stands in contrast to the process of self-consciousness. The imification therefore belongs to this other aspect, which by contrast is the aspect of reflection into self, is that side which contains its self and its opposite, and contains | them not only imphcitly {an sich) or in a general way, but exphcitly {fiir sich) or expressly developed and distinguished. The content, as well as the other aspect of self-conscious spirit, so far as it is the other aspect, have been brought to hght and are here in their completeness : the unification stiU a-wanting is the simple unity of the notion. This notion is also already given with the aspect of selfconsciousness ; but as it previously came before us
above, it, like all the other moments, has the form of being a particular mode or type of consciousness. It is that part of the embodiment of self-assured spirit which keeps within its essential principle and was called the " beautiful soul." That is to say, the " beautiful soul " is its own knowledge of itself in its pure transparent unity — self-consciousness, which knows this pure knowledge of pure iawardness to be spirit, is not merely intuition of the divine, but the self-intuition of God Himself.
Since this notion keeps itself fixedly opposed to its realisation, it is the one-sided form which we saw before disappear into thin air, but also take a positive external embodiment and advance further. Through the process of reahsation, this self-consciousness bereft of objective content ceases to hold fast by itself, the abstract determinateness of the notion over against its fulfilment is cancelled and done away with. Its selfconsciousness attains the form of universaHty ; and what remains is its true notion, the notion that has attained its realisation — ^the notion in its truth, i.e. in imity with its extemalisation. It is knowledge of pure knowledge, not in the sense of an abstract essence such as duty is, but in the sense of an essential being which is this particular knowledge, this individual pure self-consciousness which is at the same time an object; for the object is the self -existing self.
This notion obtained its fulfilment partly from the acts performed by the spirit that is sure of itself, partly from rehgion. In the latter it obtained the absolute content qtia content, or in the form of an ideal presentation or of otherness for consciousness. On the other hand, in the first the form is just the self, for that mode contains the active practical spirit sure of
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itself ; the self accomplishes the Kfe of Absolute Spirit. This mode, as we see, is that simple notion, which however gives up its eternal inner Being, takes upon itself objective existence, or acts. The power of diremption or of coming forth out of its inwardness hes in the purity of the notion, for this purity is absolute abstraction or negativity. In the same way the notion finds its element of reality, or the objective being it contains, in pure knowledge itself ; for this knowledge is simple immediacy, which is being and existence as well as essence, the former negative thought, the latter positive thought. This existence, finally, is just as much that state of reflection into self which comes out of pure existence — both qua existence and qua duty — and this is the state of evil. This process of " going into self " constitutes the opposition lying in the notion, and is thus the appearance on the scene of pure knowledge of the essence, a knowledge giving rise to no action and no reaKty. But to make its appearance in this opposition is to participate in it ; pure knowledge of essence has inherently reUnquished its simplicity, for it is the diremption or negativity which constitutes the notion. So far as this process of diremption is the process of becoming self-centred, it is the principle of evil : so far as it is the inherently essential, it is the principle of constant goodness.
Now what in the first instance takes place implicitly and inherently is at once objectively for consciousness, and is duphcated as well — ^is both for consciousness and is its seK-existence or its own proper action. The same thing that is already inherently estabhshed, thus repeats itself now as knowledge thereof on the part of consciousness and as conscious action. Each finds
the other lay aside the independence of character with which each appears confronting the other. This waiving of independence is the same renunciation of the one-sidedness of the notion as constituted implicitly the beginning ; but it is now its own act of renunciation, just as the notion renounced is its own notion. That impHcit nature of the beginning is in truth as much mediated, because it is negativity; it now establishes itself as it is ia its truth ; and the negative element exists as a determinate quality which each has for the other, and is inherently and essentially seKcancelling, self-transcending. The one of the two parts of the opposition is the disparity between existence within itself in its individuahty and universality ; the other, disparity between its abstract imiversality and the self. The former lets its self-existence perish, and relinquishes itself, makes confession ; the latter renoimces the rigidity of its abstract universality, and thereby puts away its hfeless self and its inert imiversahty; so that the former is completed through the moment of universaUty, which is the essence, and the latter through universaUty, which is self. By this process of action spirit has come to light in the form of pure universality of knowledge, which is self-consciousness as seK-consciousness, which is simple unity of knowledge. It is through action that spirit is spirit so as de&iitely to exist ; it raises its existence into the sphere of thought and hence into absolute opposition, and returns out of it through and within this very opposition.
Thus, then, what was in the case of religion objective content, or a way of ideally presenting an other, is here the action proper of the self. The notion is the connecting principle securing that the content is the action
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proper of the self. For this notion is, as we see, the knowledge that the action of the self within itseU is all that is essential and all existence, the knowledge of this Subject as Substance and of the Substance as this knowledge of its action. What we have done here, in addition, is simply to gather together the particular moments, each of which iu principle exhibits the life of spirit in its entirety, and agaia to fix and secure the notion iu the form of the notion, whose content was disclosed in those moments and had already presented itseK in the form of a mode or type of consciousness.
This last embodiment of spirit — spirit which at once gives its complete and true content the form of self, and thereby reahses its notion, and in doing so remains within its own notion — ^this is Ahsolute Knowledge. It is spirit knowing itself in the form of spirit, it is conceptual comprehensive knowledge through notions. Truth is here not merely in itself absolutely identical with certainty ; it has also the typical form of certainty of self, or in its existence — ^i.e. for spirit knowing it — it is in the form of knowledge of itself. Truth is the content, which in the case of rehgion is not as yet at one with its certainty. This identification, however, is secured when the content has received the form and character of self. By this means, what constitutes the very essence, viz. the notion, comes to have the nature of existence, i.e. assumes the form of what is objective to consciousness. Spirit, appearing before consciousness in this element of existence, or, what is here the same thing, produced by it in this element, is systematic Science.
The nature, moments, and process of this type of
knowledge have then come about in such a way that this knowledge is pure self-existence of self-consciousness.
It is ego, which is this concrete ego and no other, and at the same time, from its very nature, is mediated, or sublated universal ego. It has a content, which it distinguishes from itself ; for it is pure negativity, or seK-diremption ; it is consciousness. This content in its distinction is itself the ego, for it is the process of superseding itself, or the same pure negativity which constitutes ego. Ego is in it, qiut distinguished, reflected into itseK; only then is the content conceptualy comprehended (begriffen) when ego in its otherness is stiU at home with itself. More precisely stated, this content is nothing else than the very process just spoken of ; for the content is the spirit which traverses the whole range of its own being, and does this for itself qiia spirit, by the fact that it possesses the form of the notion in its objectivity.
As to the actual existence of this notion, science does not appear in time and in reahty till spirit has arrived at this stage of being conscious regarding itself. Qtm spirit which knows what it is, it did not exist before, and is not to be found at aU till after the completion of the task of mastering and overcoming the imperfection of its form — the task of procuring for its consciousness and making itself aware of the shape of its inmost essence, and in this manner squaring its self-consciousness with its consciousness. Spirit in and for itself, spirit in its self-contained reahty, is, when distinguished into its separate moments, self-existent knowledge, conceptual comprehension in general, which as such has not yet reached the substance, or is not in itself absolute knowledge.
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Now in actual reality the knowing substance is arrived at earlier than its form, earlier than the form of the notion. For the substance is the undeveloped inherent nature, the fundamental notion in its inert simpHcity, the state of inwardness or the seK of spirit not yet objectivified. What is there, what does exist, is in the shape of unexpressed simpUcity, the undeveloped immediate, or the object of presentative consciousness in general. Because knowledge (Erkennen) is a spiritual state of consciousness, which is only aware of what implicitly and inherently is so far as this is a being for the self and a being of the self or a notion — knowledge has on this accoimt merely a barren object to begin with, in contrast to which the substance and the consciousness of this substance are richer in content. Revelation in such a case is, in fact, concealment ; for the substance is here still self -less existence and nothing but certainty of self is manifest or revea,led to it. To begin with, therefore, it is only the abstract moments that fall to seK-consciousness when dealing with the substance. But since these moments are pure activities and must move forward by their very nature, seKconsciousness enriches itself till it has torn from consciousness the entire substance, and absorbed into itself the entire structure of the substance with aU its constituent elements. Since this negative attitude towards objectivity is positive as well, establishes and fixes the content, it goes on till it has produced these elements out of itself and thereby reinstated them once more as objects of consciousness. In the notion, knowing itself as notion, the moments thus make their appearance prior to the whole in its complete fulfilment ; the movement of these moments is the process by which
the whole comes into being. In consciousness, on the other hand, the whole — but not as comprehended conceptually— ^is prior to the moments.
Time is just the notion definitely existent, and presented to consciousness iu the form of empty pure intuition. Hence spirit necessarily appears iu time, and it appears in time so long as it does not grasp its pure notion, i.e. so long as it does not annul time. Time is the pure self ia external form, apprehended in iatuition, and not grasped and understood by the self, it is the notion directly apprehended through intuition. When this notion ^asps itself, it supersedes the time character, conceptually comprehends intuition, and is iatuition comprehended and comprehending through conceptions. Time therefore appears as spirit's destiny and necessity, where spirit is not yet complete within itself ; it is the necessity compelling spirit to increase and enrich the share seK-consciousness has in consciousness, to put into motion the immediacy of the inherent nature (which is the form in which the substance is present in consciousness) ; or, conversely, to realise and make manifest what is inherent, regarded as inward and immanent, to make manifest that which is at first within — ^i.e. to vindicate and secure for it the certiainty of self.
Eor this reason it must be said that nothing is consciously known which does not fall within experience, or (as it is also expressed) which is not fdt to be true, which is not given as an inwardly revealed eternal verity, as a sacred object of behef, or whatever other expressions we care to employ. For experience just consists in this, "that the content — and the content is spirit — ^in its inherent nature is substance and so object
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of consciousness. But this substance in which spirit consists, is the development of itself exphcitly to what it is inherently and impHcitly ; and only by this process of reflecting itself into itself is it then essentially and in truth spirit. It is inherently the movement which constitutes the process of knowledge — the transforming of that imphcit inherent nature into exphcitness and objectivity, of Substance into Subject, of the object of consciousness into the object of self-consciousness, i.e. into an object that is at the same time superseded and transcended — in other words, into the notion. This transforming process is a cycle that returns into itself, a cycle that presupposes its beginning, and reaches its beginning only at the end. So far as spirit, then, is of necessity this process of seH-distiuction, it appears as a single whole, intuitively apprehended, over against its simple seK-consciousness. And since that whole is the aspect distinguished, it is distinguished into the intuitively apprehended pure notion, Time, and the content, the inherent impHcit nature. Substance, qua subject, involves the necessity, at first an inner necessity, to set forth in itself what it inherently is, to show itself to be spirit. The completed systematic expression in objective form becomes, then, at the same time the reflection of substance, the development of it into a seK or subject. Consequently, imtil and unless spirit is inherently completed, completed as a world-spirit, it cannot reach its completion as self-conscious spirit. The content of rehgion therefore expresses earher in time than speculative science what spirit is ; but science alone is the perfect form in which spirit truly knows itself. iThe process of carrying forward this form of know-
ledge of itself constitutes the task which spirit accomplishes in the concrete actual shape of History. The reUgious communion, in so far as it is at the outset the substance of Absolute Spirit, is the crude form of consciousness, which has an existence all the harsher and more barbaric the deeper is its inner spirit ; and its inarticulate stohd self has all the harder task in dealing with its essence, the unconceived content alien to its consciousness. Not tiU it has surrendered the hope of cancelhng that foreignness by an external, i.e. ahen method, does it turn to itself, to its own pecuhar world in the actual present. It turns thither because to supersede that ahen method means returning iato self-consciousness. It thus discovers this world in the Kving present to be its own property ; and so has taken the first step to descend from the ideal inteUigible world, the world of the intellect, or rather to endue the abstract elemeht of the intellect with concrete self-hood. Through " observation," on the one hand, it finds existence in the shape of thought, and comprehends existence ; and, conversely, it finds in its thought existence.* When, in the first instance, it has thus itself expressed in an abstract way the immediate unity of thought and existence, of abstract Being and Self ; and when it has expressed the primal principle of "Light" in a purer form, viz. as unity of extension and existence — for " existence " is an ultimate simple term more akin to thought than "Light" — and in this way has revived again in thought the Substance of the Orient,! the Absolute Substance of Eastern Kehgions ; thereupon spirit at once recoils in horror from this abstract imity, from this
* Descartes. t Spinoza.
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self-less substance, and maintains as against it the principle of subjective Individuality.* But after spirit has relinquished this principle and brought it under the ordeal of culture, has thereby made it an objective existence and established it throughout the whole of existence, has arrived at the idea of " Utihty " f and in the sphere of absolute freedom has foimd the key to existence to be Individual Will, J — after these stages spirit then brings to Hght the thought that hes in its inmost depths, and expresses ultimate Reahty in the form Ego=Ego.§
This "Ego identical with Ego" is, however, an inward, self-reflecting process ; for since this identity qua absolute negativity is absolute distinction, the selfidentity of the Ego stands in contrast to this absolute distinction, which — being pure distinction and at the same time objective to the seK that knows itself — has to be expressed as Time. In this way, just as formerly ultimate Reahty was expressed as unity of thought and extension, it would here be interpreted as imity of thought and time. But distinction left to itself, unresting, unhalting time, really collapses upon itself ; it is the objective quiescence, the stable continuity of extension ; while this latter is pure identity with self — is Ego.
Again, Ego is not merely self, it is identity of seK with itself. This identity, however, is complete and immediate unity with seK ; in other words this Subject is just as much Substance. Substance by itself alone would be void and empty Intuition {Anschauen), or the intuition of a content which qua specific would
* Leibnitz. f The principle of the " Aufkldrung."
X Kant. § Fichte.
have merely a contingent character and would be devoid of necessity. Substance would only stand for the Absolute in so far as Substance was thought of or intuited " as absolute unity ; and all content would, as regards its diversity, have to fall outside the Substance and be due to reflection, a process which does not belong to Substance, because Substance would not be Subject, would jiot be conceived as Spirit, as reflecting about self and reflecting itself iato self. If, nevertheless, a content were to be spoken of, then on the one hand, it would only exist in order to be thrown into the empty abysm of the Absolute, while on the other it would be picked up in external fashion from sense perception. Knowledge would appear to have come by things, by what is distinct from knowledge itself, and to have got at the distinctions between the endless variety of things, without any one understanding how or where all this came from.*
Spirit, however, has shown itself to be neither the mere withdrawal of self-consciousness into its pure inwardness, nor the mere absorption of self-consciousness into blank Substance devoid of aU distiuctions. Spirit is the movement of the self which enipties itself of self and sinks itself within its own substance, and qita subject, both goes out of that substance into itself, making its substance an object and a content, and also supersedes this distinction of objectivity and content. That first reflection out of immediacy is the subject's distinction of self from its substance, the notion in -a state of seK-diremption, the subjectification of the self, and the coming of the pure ego into being. Since this distinction is the action pure and simple of Ego = Ego,
* Schelling. VOL. U.— 2 n
818 Phenomenology of Mind
the notion is the necessity for and the uprising of existence, which has the substance for its essential nature and subsists on its own account. But this subsistiag of existence for itself is the notion established and realised in determinate form, and is thereby the notion's own inherent movement — that of descending into the bare and simple substance, which is only subject by being this negativity and going through this process.
Ego has not to take its stand on the form of selfconsciousness m opposition to the form of substantiahty and objectivity, as if it were afraid of emptying itself and becoming objective. The power of spirit lies rather in remaining one with itself when giving up itself, and, because it is seK-contained and sel£-subsistent, in estabhshing as mere moments its explicit self-existence as well as its implicit inherent nature. Nor again is Ego a tertium quid which casts distinctions back into the abysm of the Absolute, and declares them all to mean the same there. On the contrary, true knowledge hes rather in the seeming inactivity which merely watches and considers how the element distinguished proceeds, how it is self-moved by its very nature and returns again iato its own unity.
With absolute knowledge, then. Spirit has wound up the process of its various forms and modes, so far as in assuming these various shapes and forms it is affected with the insurmountable distinction which consciousness imphes [i.e. the distinction of consciousness from its object or content]. Spirit has attained the pure element of its existence, the notion. The content is, in view of the freedom of its own existence, the self that empties and gives up itseK to objectivity; in other words, that
content is the immediate unity of self-knowledge. The pure process of thus relinquishing itself to extemaUty constitutes — when we consider this process in its bearing on the content — the necessity of this content. The diversity of content is, qua determinate and specific, due to relation, and is not inherent ; it is its restless activity of cancelling and superseding itself, or its negativity. Thus the necessity or diversity, like its free existence, is the self too ; and in this self-form, in which existence is immediately thought, the content is a notion. Seeing, then, that Spirit has attained the notion, it unfolds its existence and develops its processes in this ether of its fife and is Systematic Science. The moments of its process are set forth in Science no longer as determinate modes or forms of consciousness, but — since the distinction, which consciousness imphes, has reverted to and has become a distinction within the seK — as determinate notions, and as the organic self-explaining and self-constituted process of these conceptions. While in the Phenomenology of Mind each moment is the distinction of knowledge and truth, and the process in which that distinction is cancelled and transcended, on the other hand Systematic Science does not contain this distinction and supersession of distinction. Kather, since each moment has the form of the notion, it unites the objective form of truth and the knowing seK in an immediate unity. In Science the individual moment does not appear as the process of passing back and forward from consciousness or presentation to self -consciousness and conversely : there the pure form, liberated from the condition of being an appearance in mere consciousness, — the pure notion with its further development, depends solely and purely
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on its characteristic and specific nature. Conversely, again, there corresponds to every abstract moment of absolute Science a form or mode in which mind as a whole makes it appearance. As the mind that actually exists and historically appears is not richer than Science, so, too, mind in its actual content is not poorer. To know the pure notions of Science ia the form in which they are modes or types of consciousness — this constitutes the aspect of their reahty, in which its essential element, the notion, appearing there in its simple mediating activity as thinking, breaks up and separates the moments of this mediation, and exhibits its content by reference to the internal and immanent opposition of its elements.
Science contains within itself this necessity of relinquishing and divesting itself of the form of the pure notion, and necessarily involves the transition of the notion into consciousness. For Spirit that knows itself is, just for the reason that it grasps its own notion, immediate identity with itself ; and this, in the distinction it imphes, is the certainty of what is immediate or is sense-consciousness — the beginning from which we started. This process of releasing itself from the form of its self is the highest freedom and security of its knowledge of itself.
AU the same, this relinquishment of self and abandonment to externality are stiU incomplete. This process expresses the relation of the certainty of its self to the object, an object which, just by being in relation, has not yet attained its full freedom. Systematic knowledge is aware not only of itself, but also of the negative of itself, or its limit. Knowing its limit means knowiag how
to sacrifice itself. This sacrifice is the emptying of self, the self-abandonment, in which Spirit sets forth, in the form of free and unconstrained fortuitous contingency, its process of becoming Spirit, intuitively apprehending outside it its pure self as Time, and likewise its existence as Space.* This last form into which Spirit passes. Nature, is its living inamediate process of development. Nature — Spirit divested of self and given over to externality — is, in its actual existence, nothing but this eternal process of abandoning its own independent subsistence, and the movement which reinstates Subject.
The other aspect, however, in which Spirit comes into being, History, is process in terms of knowledge, a conscious self-mediating process — Spirit given over to and emptied into Time. But this form of abandonment is, similarly, an emptying of itself by itself.; the negative is negative of itself. This way of becoming presents a tardy procession and succession of spiritual shapes and forms, a gallery of pictures, each of which is endowed with the entire wealth of Spirit, and moves so tardily just for the reason that the self has to permeate and assimilate all this wealth of its substance. Since its accomphshment consists in Spirit knowing what it is, in fully comprehending its substance, this knowledge means its subjectification, a state in which Spirit leaves its external existence behind and gives itself over to the attitude of Recollection {Erinnerung). In this subjectification. Spirit is engulfed in the darkness and night of its own self -consciousness ; its vanished existence is, however, conserved therein; and this superseded existence— the previous state, but bom anew from the
* Cp. Ency. §244 ; also Naturphilos., Introd.
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womb of knowledge — \b the new stage of existence, a new world, and a new type and mode of Spirit. Here it has to begiQ aU over again at its immediacy,* as freshly as before, and thence rise once more to the measure of its stature, as if, for it, aU that preceded were lost, and as if it had learned nothing from the experience of the spirits that preceded. But re-collection {Erinnerung) has conserved that experience, and is the inner being, and, in fact, the higher form of the substance. While, then, this phase of Spirit begins all over again its formative development, apparently starting solely from itseK, yet at the same time it commences at a higher level. The realm of spirits developed in this way, and assimiing definite shape in existence, constitutes a succession, where one detaches and sets loose the other, and each takes over from its predecessor the empire of the spiritual world. The goal of the process is the revelation of the depth of spiritual Kfe, and this is the Absolute Notion. This revelation consequently means superseding its " depth," is its " extension " or spatial embodiment, the negation of this subjectivity of the ego — a negativity which is its seK-reUnquishment, its extemalisation, or its substance : and this revelation is also its temporal embodiment, in that this extemalisation in its very nature relinquishes, externahses itself, and so exists at once in its spatial " extension " as well as in its " depth " or the self. The goal, which is Absolute Knowledge or Spirit knowing itself as Spirit, finds its pathway in the recollection of spiritual forms as they are in themselves and as they accomplish the organisation of their spiritual kingdom. Their conservation, looked
* Cp. Aristotle, Metap., 10716, "Movement can neither come into being, nor cease to be ; nor can time come into being or cease to be."
at from the side of their free phenomenal existence in the sphere of contingency, is History ; looked at from the side of their conceptually comprehended organisation, it is the Science of phenomenal knowledge, of the ways in which knowledge appears.* Both together, or History comprehended conceptually, form at once the recollection and the golgotha of Absolute Spirit, the reahty, the truth, the certainty of its throne, without which it were lifeless, sohtary, and alone. Only
This chalice of God's plenitude Yields foaming His Infinitude, f
* "Phenomenology."
t Adaptation of Schiller's Die Freundschaft ad fin. ; cp. also Schiller's Philos. Brief e, " Gott."