Work record

Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous

Also known as: Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous · Hylas and Philonous

1713 · 18th Century · Philosophy · English

Read this when matter is taken for granted, and a careful conversation tests what we actually perceive.

Abstract

Written
Published 1713
Setting
Early eighteenth-century British philosophy, three years after the Principles; A conversational setting over three days, in England
Country
Ireland / Great Britain
Language
English
Genre
Philosophical dialogue
Form
Three-day dialogue in English prose
Recommended
Grades 11–12 (A clear philosophical dialogue; pair it with the Principles and with Locke.)

Occasion. Berkeley published the Dialogues in 1713 as a more accessible companion to the Principles of 1710. Hylas defends material substance; Philonous speaks for Berkeley's immaterialism. The argument is a conversation over three days, not a treatise in numbered sections.

The claim. Sensible things, Philonous says, are those immediately perceived by sense. For such things, to exist is to be perceived. He does not turn the world into a private dream: other created minds may perceive, and God perceives always. He would rather take immediate objects of perception as the real things than dissolve things into mere appearances.

Against sceptics and atheists. The subtitle names the official opponents. Berkeley's unexpected move is to say that rejecting material substance, in the philosophers' sense, protects ordinary belief and piety rather than undermining them. The last movement of the book turns the charge of scepticism back toward common sense.

How to read it here. The hosted text is the public-domain English of Gutenberg #4724, the companion volume to this library's Principles (#4723). The two should be read together. The Dialogues are the clearer starting point for many students in grades 11–12, especially after some acquaintance with Locke. A first reading can follow the three days in order and keep a short list of what Hylas surrenders at each stage, before turning back to the treatise of 1710.

Key figures

  • George Berkeley: Author, and the mind behind Philonous
  • Philonous: The 'lover of mind,' who defends immaterialism
  • Hylas: The defender of material substance, gradually argued out of his first position

Summary

George Berkeley published Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous in 1713, three years after A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge. The later book is not a new doctrine so much as a clearer, more conversational statement of the same immaterialism. Two speakers carry the argument. Hylas, whose name recalls matter, begins as a defender of material substance. Philonous, 'lover of mind,' speaks for Berkeley. In three successive days of talk, Philonous drives Hylas from the claim that sensible things exist outside the mind, first by examining the secondary qualities, then the primary, then the very idea of an unthinking material support. The official subtitle says the dialogues are written in opposition to sceptics and atheists. Berkeley's surprising claim is that denying matter, as philosophers use that word, is the way to restore common sense and to honor God. Sensible things, Philonous argues, are those only which are immediately perceived by sense. To exist, for such things, is to be perceived. That does not leave the world a private dream. Created things may exist in other created minds, and they have a steady existence in the mind of God, who perceives always. Philonous refuses, as he says, to change things into ideas; he would rather change ideas into things, taking the immediate objects of perception to be the real things themselves. The hosted text is Project Gutenberg #4724, the same public-domain English series as the library's Principles (#4723). The two works should be read together and linked both ways. The Principles state the case in treatise form; the Dialogues test it in conversation, answer the charge of scepticism, and end by turning the reader back, as the last page says, to common sense. Students in grades 11–12 can follow the talk with guidance, especially if they have already met Locke's essay on human understanding, which is the book Berkeley is most steadily answering.

Virtues in this work

  • Prudence: Philonous proceeds by agreed distinctions and will not let the argument run beyond sensible things without a further case.
  • Humility: The close of the book presents a return to common sense as the fruit of following the argument, not as a refusal to think.
  • Faith: Berkeley offers immaterialism as a way of honoring God's continual perception of the world, and of answering atheism rather than aiding it.

Plot or Argument

  • A morning meeting

    Philonous finds Hylas abroad early, and they agree to examine the question of material substance in conversation.

  • Sensible things

    They agree that sensible things are those immediately perceived by sense, and the argument then tests whether such things can exist unperceived.

  • The attack on matter

    Philonous presses Hylas through secondary and primary qualities, and then through the idea of an unthinking material support.

  • God and other minds

    The world is not left a private dream: other created minds may perceive, and God perceives always.

  • Back to common sense

    The last movement claims that the same principles which seemed to lead to scepticism restore ordinary belief.

    Lessons

    • Two books, one argument

      The Dialogues recast the Principles in conversation. Students should ask what the dialogue form makes easier, and what a treatise still does better.

      • What does the dialogue form allow Berkeley to do that the Principles, written as a treatise, does not?
      • Where, if at all, does the later book add a new claim, rather than a new way of putting an old one?
    • Esse and perception

      The distinction Hylas draws between existing and being perceived is the nerve of the book. Philonous answers it only for sensible things, and then rebuilds a public world in God and in other minds.

      • Why does Philonous refuse to apply the argument to everything, and limit it to sensible things?
      • Does the appeal to God's perpetual perception solve the problem of unperceived objects, or only move it?
    • Scepticism and piety

      Berkeley presents immaterialism as a defense of common sense and of religion. A class should test that presentation, not merely repeat it.

      • How, in the Dialogues, is the denial of material substance supposed to serve piety rather than harm it?
      • Is the last turn back to common sense earned by the argument, or is it a rhetorical close?

    Context

    Berkeley, a fellow of Trinity College Dublin, had already published the New Theory of Vision (1709) and the Principles (1710). The Dialogues appeared in 1713, while he was in London, and were meant to meet the bewilderment and mockery that had greeted the earlier treatise. The main philosophical opponent in view is the Lockean account of material substance and abstract ideas.

    Composition

    The work was written in English and published in 1713. The hosted text is Project Gutenberg #4724, from the same public-domain series as this library's text of the Principles (#4723).

    Reception

    Readers have long used the Dialogues as the more teachable statement of Berkeley's immaterialism. Admirers praise the dramatic patience of the argument; critics have asked whether the God who perceives always is a solution or a new mystery. The Johnson anecdote of kicking a stone belongs to the later reception, not to this text.

    Comparisons

    • A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge

      The Principles of 1710 state the same immaterialism as a treatise; the Dialogues of 1713 recast it as a conversation and spend more time answering the charge of scepticism. The two should be read together.

    • An Essay Concerning Human Understanding

      Locke's essay is the book Berkeley is most steadily answering: the critique of abstract ideas and of material substance begins from Lockean terms and turns them against the idea of matter.

    • A Treatise of Human Nature

      Hume later takes up Berkeley's account of general ideas and his critique of material substance, and presses them in a direction Berkeley would not have called a defense of common sense or of piety.

    Quotes

    “Good morrow, Hylas: I did not expect to find you abroad so early. HYLAS. It is indeed something unusual; but my thoughts were so taken up with a subject I was discoursing of last night, that finding I could not sleep, I resolved to rise and take a turn in the garden.”
    — George Berkeley, Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, The First Dialogue, opening (Project Gutenberg #4724).Quote card
    “To EXIST is one thing, and to be PERCEIVED is another. PHIL. I speak with regard to sensible things only.”
    — George Berkeley, Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, The First Dialogue (Project Gutenberg #4724).Quote card
    “That there is no such thing as what PHILOSOPHERS CALL MATERIAL SUBSTANCE, I am seriously persuaded: but, if I were made to see anything absurd or sceptical in this, I should then have the same reason to renounce this that I imagine I have now to reject the contrary opinion.”
    — George Berkeley, Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, The First Dialogue (Project Gutenberg #4724).Quote card
    “This point then is agreed between us--That SENSIBLE THINGS ARE THOSE ONLY WHICH ARE IMMEDIATELY PERCEIVED BY SENSE. You will farther inform me, whether we immediately perceive by sight anything beside light, and colours, and figures; or by hearing, anything but sounds; by the palate, anything beside tastes; by the smell, beside odours; or by the touch, more than tangible qualities.”
    — George Berkeley, Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, The First Dialogue (Project Gutenberg #4724).Quote card
    “I am not for changing things into ideas, but rather ideas into things; since those immediate objects of perception, which, according to you, are only appearances of things, I take to be the real things themselves.”
    — George Berkeley, Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, The Third Dialogue (Project Gutenberg #4724).Quote card
    “In answer to that, I say, first, created beings might begin to exist in the mind of other created intelligences, beside men. You will not therefore be able to prove any contradiction between Moses and my notions, unless you first shew there was no other order of finite created spirits in being, before man.”
    — George Berkeley, Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, The Third Dialogue (Project Gutenberg #4724).Quote card
    “just so, the same Principles which, at first view, lead to Scepticism, pursued to a certain point, bring men back to Common Sense.”
    — George Berkeley, Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, Close of the Third Dialogue (Project Gutenberg #4724).Quote card
    “And I give it you on my word; since this revolt from metaphysical notions to the plain dictates of nature and common sense, I find my understanding strangely enlightened, so that I can now easily comprehend a great many things which before were all mystery and riddle.”
    — George Berkeley, Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, The Third Dialogue (Project Gutenberg #4724).Quote card

    For Students

    A reading companion for classical Christian high school students. See the student guide.

    Reading Guide

    Watch for

    • The roles of Hylas and Philonous, and how Hylas's position changes over three days.
    • The agreement that sensible things are immediately perceived by sense.
    • The claim that to exist, for such things, is to be perceived.
    • The appeal to other minds and to God's perception.
    • The last turn back toward common sense.

    Key terms and names

    Hylas
    The speaker whose name recalls matter, and who begins as a defender of material substance.
    Philonous
    The 'lover of mind,' who speaks for Berkeley's immaterialism.
    Material substance
    An unthinking support, supposed to exist outside all perception, which Philonous denies in the sense philosophers give the phrase.
    Sensible things
    Those things only which are immediately perceived by sense, by the agreed definition that drives the argument.
    Immaterialism
    Berkeley's claim that the real things we perceive are ideas in minds, including the mind of God, not qualities of an unthinking matter.

    Seminar Questions

    1. Comprehension What roles do Hylas and Philonous play, and what is the official purpose named in the subtitle?
    2. Comprehension What definition of sensible things do the two speakers agree on in the First Dialogue?
    3. Interpretation How does Philonous answer the fear that, if to exist is to be perceived, the world vanishes when no human being is looking?
    4. Interpretation What does he mean by saying he is not for changing things into ideas, but rather ideas into things?
    5. Big Question Is the denial of material substance a defense of common sense, or a more radical scepticism than it admits?
    6. Big Question How should a class judge Berkeley's claim that this argument serves piety and opposes atheism?

    Faith Connections

    • Acts 17:28 (Scripture)

      In him we live and move and have our being: a standard for Berkeley's appeal to God's continual perception, and a warning against making that appeal a mere device.

    • Psalm 94:9 (Scripture)

      He who planted the ear, does he not hear: a measure for the claim that the world's order is held in a knowing mind, not in unthinking matter.

    • John 1:3 (Scripture)

      All things were made through the Word: a Christian frame for the claim that the world's existence is not independent of mind, without treating Berkeley's system as itself a gospel.

    Logic and Rhetoric

    Central argument: Because sensible things are only what is immediately perceived, they cannot exist as unthinking material substances outside all perception; their steady existence is kept in other minds and in the mind of God, which is the way to restore common sense and to honor piety.

    Rhetorical device: philosophical dialogue. The three days of conversation let Hylas state the ordinary objections in turn, so that Philonous can meet each one without the stiffness of a numbered treatise.

    Debate: Resolved: that Berkeley's denial of material substance in the Three Dialogues is a genuine defense of common sense and of piety, rather than a disguised scepticism.

    Memory Work

    just so, the same Principles which, at first view, lead to Scepticism, pursued to a certain point, bring men back to Common Sense.

    Close of the Third Dialogue. The compact close of the book, in which principles that seemed to lead to scepticism are said to bring men back to common sense.

    Writing Prompts

    Essay: Explain how the Dialogues argue that to exist, for sensible things, is to be perceived, and then judge whether the appeal to God's perception saves a public world.

    Comparison with A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge: What does the dialogue form of 1713 add to, or change in, the treatise form of 1710? Where are the two books saying the same thing, and where does the later book answer a fear the earlier one had left more open?

    Creative Prompts

    • Classroom

      Make a three-column chart of Hylas's positions on days one, two, and three, and note at each stage what he has given up and what he still hopes to save.

    • Dialogue

      Write a fourth short scene in which Hylas, a year later, explains the Dialogues to a friend who has read only Locke.

    • Essay

      Philonous says he is not for changing things into ideas, but rather ideas into things. Explain the claim from the Third Dialogue, then judge it.

    Further Reading

    • A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, George Berkeley

      The 1710 treatise to which these dialogues are the companion; hosted in this library.

    • An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, John Locke

      The Lockean account of ideas and substance that Berkeley is answering.

    • A Treatise of Human Nature, David Hume

      The next major British argument about perception, substance, and scepticism.

    Verification notes

    Quotes were matched as substrings against the Project Gutenberg #4724 text stored with this work.

    No verification flags recorded.